# U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

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ADVISORY BOARD ON RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH

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WORK GROUP ON TBD-6000

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WEDNESDAY NOVEMBER 2, 2011

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The Work Group convened in the Zurich Room of the Cincinnati Airport Marriott, 2395 Progress Drive, Hebron, Kentucky, at 9:00 a.m., Paul L. Ziemer, Chairman, presiding.

### PRESENT:

PAUL L. ZIEMER, Chairman JOSIE BEACH, Member WANDA I. MUNN, Member

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# ALSO PRESENT:

DAVE ALLEN, DCAS

JOHN RAMSPOTT\*

TED KATZ, Designated Federal Official ROBERT ANIGSTEIN, SC&A

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LEROY DELL\* JOHN DUTKO\* JENNY LIN, HHS\* GEORGE LUBER\* GREG MACIEVIC, DCAS\* JOHN MAURO, SC&A\* DAN McKEEL\* JAMES NETON, DCAS

\*Participating via telephone

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### C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S

Report by Dr. Anigstein8
Discussion of film badge data110
Topic: NIOSH will bound doses154 with sufficient accuracy in the early years

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

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(9:00 a.m.)

MR. KATZ: Good morning, everyone in the room, and on the line. This is the Advisory Board on Worker Health TBD-6000 Work Group. We're going to be discussing GSI today. Welcome everyone. Let me begin with roll call with Board Members. And since we're speaking about a specific site, please speak the conflict of interest too for all the agency related personnel.

(Roll call.)

All right, we have an agenda for the meeting. is posted Ιt on the NIOSH website. I would just ask everyone on the line, except when you're addressing the group, please mute your phone. If you don't have a mute button, if you press and that'll mute your phone then for this Then to come off of mute, conference line. you just press \*, and then 6 again. Please,

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do not put the call on hold at any point. If you need to leave for a bit, hang up and dial back in. Thank you, and Dr. Ziemer it is your agenda?

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Thank you, Ted.

I'll officially call the meeting to order. All

of you here in the room have copies of the

agenda. It has been posted on the website. I

believe it has been distributed also.

If you're on the phone and didn't get the agenda, you can pull it up on the NIOSH OCAS website. The -- I'll just take a minute and review our agenda and schedule for today. We're focusing primarily on, but not exclusively on the early time period at GSI, relative really to the petition itself, the SEC petition. And by early, we're talking about 1953 to perhaps '62 or '63.

Right now, I'm not making a sharp division, although at some point, we would need to. Then -- and that delineation relates

mainly to the period prior to the AEC license activity. So, that was part of our focus to get a better feel for the radiation protection program in the early years, but there are some related issues that carry over into the AEC period as well.

So, on the agenda, we're -- the first issue that we're considering are those questions that relate to the radiation safety practices in the early years.

Then we'll be looking at some specific things relating to film badges, and the film badge data that we have really is related at the moment to the AEC period, although there may be some issues that we can discuss about the presence of film badges prior to the AEC licensing period.

Then we want to also consider the overall question, if we're at that point today, as to whether or not we believe the NIOSH model can bound dose with sufficient

accuracy for the early years.

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We have a break scheduled at noon for lunch, a one-hour break. We'll probably take a brief comfort break mid-morning. We are committed to adjourning no later than 3:00, and I will adjourn us at 3:00, whether or not we finish this agenda because of other commitments not only of the chair, but of others in this room.

So, we will -- and actually originally we didn't believe it would take that long for this agenda in any event, but I just wanted to let everyone know that we must conclude by 3:00.

So, that's the agenda. We're going to begin with the issue of questions regarding what sources were used and what radiation safety practices were used in the early years, and we'll kick that off with a summary of the SC&A interviews that were done recently.

Bob did those and prepared a

report. I believe the Work Group Members have the full report. There's a redacted version that's available to the -- to the petitioner and others, and I believe although it is redacted, I suspect that most of the names of the folks who worked at GSI probably know who they are, but we cannot specifically name them here ourselves today in this group.

So, I'm going to ask Bob to go ahead and give his report, and then we'll have a chance to ask questions and discuss that, and then Board Members and petitioners as well. Now, Bob?

DR. ANIGSTEIN: Thank you, Paul. Okay, the first interview that we had recently, and we had many before, was a former radiographer, who was actually suggested by the co-petitioner on the phone or the other -- can I name names, Ted?

MR. KATZ: What?

DR. ANIGSTEIN: Can I name people

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MR. KATZ: I mean people can name themselves, but --

DR. ANIGSTEIN: No, I mean can I name names --

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: No. Just suggested by one of the --

Right. DR. ANIGSTEIN: So, we -interviewed, and to summarize interview, he had a weekday job that did not involve radiation exposure. This is any somebody going back into the '50s, and he worked as a radiographer on weekends.

First he worked -- on and off, he worked somewhere in 1953. He apparently did the work. He worked for a while. He was laid off. Не back. Then he came came continuously employed starting some time in '56 or after '56. So, '56 or '57 he started employment, and he performed permanent radiography only on weekends.

So, his radiation exposures: during the week, he did not wear a film badge, and his radiation exposures were just from the weekend work. He said he worked whenever it was available, anxious to get the overtime.

He estimated that it was 80 to 90 percent of the weekends that he worked, and he worked one or two days per weekend.

Just parenthetically, I did some research and I found that Illinois actually has a law that requires one day off in seven.

Now, we could not find out when that law was passed. The last I -- with revision of the general statutes I think in the -- somewhere in the 1970's, but that doesn't mean there wasn't an earlier law. This is when they revised their whole code.

So, whether that law was in effect in the '50's, we don't know. And even if it were in effect, with the current law, if the worker volunteers to work, he can be exempted

from it. But just as a point that seven days a week seems a little much, but I could be wrong.

At any rate, he -- and according to his testimony, he always wore a film badge during this radiography work. According to gentleman who Ι interviewed times, and he seemed to give very consistent, clear account of his work seemed to have a clear memory - he said the radium radiography -- we're talking about the radium now, because this is the major issue, was performed in this radiographic facility in the number 6 building.

Initially, I for one was not aware.

I thought that this facility was built only when they got the cobalt sources and applied for the AEC license. But apparently, it had been there all along.

At least according to this radiographer, it was definitely there when he

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came back to work around '56. It may have been there earlier. He wasn't -- he wasn't certain because he didn't work in that area.

He said the radium sources were kept in a lead shielded cabinet in the middle of the radiography room, and he did hear the story. Now, this is a second hand account that while he was away in the '54 to '56 period, he heard that someone had gotten into the room and taken the radium source home.

But when he came back in 1956, the door was locked and kept locked. So, he said whenever -- whenever anyone had to leave, and this is а sketch from the AEC licensing document of the radiography room. There were several drawings like this one, because it had right dimensions. There were other drawings that had just distortion. The room was 22 -- in the licensing text, it would be corresponding. It was 22 by 60 feet, not quite to scale.

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This was used later with the cobalt sources. So, when they applied for the cobalt license or started using the cobalt source, they put it in steel plates. That was an addition. These weren't there when they were doing the radium radiography.

The rest of the structure was there. There was the operations room, which also was an office, and it provided some shielding, and the radium sources were kept in the middle.

Talking to this gentleman called the -- I needed a follow up when I call. Didn't through the routine go bringing in Dave Allen and the co-petitioner, who was included in the first call. And he -and I asked him about specifically was there radiography done, radium radiography outside this room. And he said very little.

He said he remembered once there was railroad undercarriage. Backtrack said

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the way they would -- this room had no  $\operatorname{roof}_4$  So, they way they would get a casting into the room, there was overhead cranes that traversed the whole complex of buildings. Several buildings. They're called separate buildings, but they're really just columns separating them.

They're separate roofs, but there are really no walls between them. And so, the cranes traverse from one end of the plant to the other. At least a good portion of the plant. And so, they would bring in a casting, and they would simply deposit it wherever the radiographer wanted it, as well as he could communicate with the crane operator.

I'm just filling in my own understanding of it -- some were in the middle of the room. Now, the railroad undercarriage may very well have been longer than this room, or at least the available space in it.

So, in this instance, he said the

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source was taken by either wheelbarrow or - he 1 2 wasn't sure - to either the number 9 building or the number 10 building. Number 10 building 3 is the last building before you get to new 4 5 betatron building. So, they go in order: 6, 7, 8, 9, 6 7 And he said that it was -- his phrase 10. was, "This is something that happened once in 8 9 a blue moon, meaning the source taken out of 10 the radiography room. CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Bob, what was his 11 12 -- how long did he work there? What was his -13 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Well, as I said, he 14 15 16 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: He worked into 17 the cobalt era? 18 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yes. Не according to the film badge data, he worked 19 20 there. according the film And to

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covered period.	16

1 2 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right. I just 3 wanted to clarify that. DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yes. 4 5 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Because you're talking initially about the radium, but --6 7 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Right. CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: But the 8 on 9 presentation that you're showing us, 10 indicate that the cobalt sources were removed for this. Was that also true of the radium? 11 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yes. He said he --12 13 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Your slide says it was the cobalt sources removed, but what 14 about the radium? 15 16 DR. ANIGSTEIN: No, no. 17 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: See your 18 bullet, "Cobalt sources were either" --

DR. ANIGSTEIN: No, that was a second -- that was an additional comment. First, I specifically -- the main reason we

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1	talked to him was because he was the only one
2	at that time that I knew that had first-hand
3	experience with the radium.
4	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right.
5	DR. ANIGSTEIN: So, he said the
6	radium his comment covered both.
7	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. Just
8	wanted to clarify this includes the radium.
9	DR. ANIGSTEIN: Right.
10	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Thank you.
11	DR. ANIGSTEIN: No, this should've
12	been a separate bullet. The cobalt source,
13	that's a little confusing the way I wrote it.
14	Everything up here is about the radium. Then
15	just by the way, cobalt also.
16	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Got it.
17	DR. ANIGSTEIN: Okay?
18	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes.
19	DR. ANIGSTEIN: All right. So,
20	then we talked again. We had talked to both

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these gentlemen about

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year

included their initial interviews in my reports at the time. So, this time -- at that time, I spoke to them alone. This time we had Dave Allen and the petitioner on the line.

And the second one was the -- he describes -- for some reason, he describes himself as an administrator. I think at one point, he was at Saint Louis Testing Laboratories. It's a family business. His son is now the president.

They did the radiography. The -they -primarily -- they use a -- they had a 10
curie cobalt source, which they used on a rail
spur on the GSI site. It was off to the -- I
don't have the plan with me. I have it at
home. It's a big area, and there are rail
tracks. I guess there's a spur on the side
for whatever purpose.

So, it's well away from the buildings, and this is the area they chose, understandably so as to not disrupt the

operations and the normal traffic on the site And they also had a 50-curie iridium source, which they used inside the plant.

difference was cobalt The the source was used apparently for the radiography, and then when they started repairing the castings, they kept taking more "Well, let's see; did we get all the defects?" They would grind out -- from my understanding of this, it's as if they did a lot of dental work. It's very much like filling a cavity. They drill out the bad part, and they fill it in with new material, and that's exactly how they did the steel. And there's X-rays just like a dentist uses.

So, then -- except they did it more than once, and then they would use the -- they'd bring in the 50-curie iridium source. Where they didn't want to bother taking the casting out of the plants that were being worked on, so wherever it was being worked on,

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they would put in that source and take the radiograph.

They eventually stopped using it because it was too good. It showed more defects than they wanted to see. So, they went to using the betatron, which was not quite as fussy, and they -- they had to produce -- but they chipped off the casting. They had to produce the film, saying, "Here, we radiographed it, and it's good."

So, this cobalt radiation source was used for a while. And then when they did do that, it was very good practice. The same practice you would use today. Went around with a survey meter, and marked off the 2 mR per hour boundary.

Now, most of these castings were hollow shapes. Not always, but many of them. And so, you didn't have to get that far away to get down to the 2 mR per hour because the steel itself would absorb the radiation,

acting as a shield.

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Nevertheless, they would do the survey, mark it off as these yellow/magenta rope things they use today, radiation warning signs, and they kept it under constant surveillance. I mean before I was skeptical of it. I said, "Well, you guys got to take a break."

The SLTL guy said, "No. If he had to take a break, he basically turned off the machine." Meaning in this case, he retracted the source back into its shield, locked it so it couldn't be removed and went and did his business and came back.

And they -- he couldn't remember exactly. He came in in late '64, and I used that by the names he -- he wasn't quite sure. By the names he mentioned and the fact that they had just been working at the Saint Louis Arch at the same time -- I looked up when that was built. So, this seemed to be the best

estimate.

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He also performed -- because they were required by the AEC license to have periodic calibration of their survey meters. So, before there was the Nuclear Consultants Corporation that did that for them, and at this point, Saint Louis Testing took over.

So, apparently, they took over all Well, not all the functions, the functions. but these functions. They didn't take over safety functions. radiation They didn't supply film badges, and they didn't -- they weren't really -- they didn't perform any radiation surveys, except of course when they were on site themselves for their own purposes.

When I asked him about was there 80-curie source, he said, "Well, no." He knew of no large source for the whole time he was there. He said there was a small source, what he called a millicurie source, because he was

once called in -- actually, they called him in and said, "Something is wrong with this meter."

It's not showing any reading."

The reason it wasn't showing any reading is that it was saturated because they had an exposed source that had come out. He said it was one of the, what he called, millicurie sources. Initially 260-280 millicurie sources. That was the only thing he knew about.

Finally, we were talking to his former GSI supervisor. We talked to -- the third call, a former GSI supervisor, who also confirmed that the radiographic facility in number 6 building was there when he started work.

Αt the time if his initial interview, he could not tell me what year that was. He did say that during radium radiography, the area was roped off or taped off, and posted with radiation danger signs.

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However, he was critical of the management of the -- because he said unlike the practice at St. Louis Testing, if the radiographer -- according to this gentleman, if the radiographer had to leave to get film for the next exposure, the area was left unmonitored.

He said that when necessary, the cobalt-60 cameras were transported by overhead crane to another location. And this is not completely in conflict. The only difference between this and the first radiographer that we interviewed was how often this happened.

Neither of them -- he did not deny that it happened. He just said it was not a common practice. I was talking about the first radiographer.

Asking and -- he also said, when I asked him about other sources, then the small cobalt -- then the radium initially, then the

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small cobalt sources, he said the iridium source was used only by St. Louis Testing; that they didn't have one.

he heard Не said he something about an 80-curie source, does not remember it, and he heard it presumably in recent years.

When I called him a second time, he said he got his -- he said he started thinking about when he started when other people were there, and he says he thinks it was most likely around 1955 that he started. So, he was there just before the other gentleman had returned to work and started doing radiography.

He said he did not actually do radium radiography, but he -- he helped. He helped out. He did perform cobalt-60 radiography later.

Then finally, we did get a hold of the former official of Nuclear Consultants

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Corporation, and we said that the radiation safety was really a sideline. Their main business was supplying radio isotopes for medicine.

said he did supply the badges because we have one report. called -- it was called AEC Form 4, which was discussed before here, which is a summary of radiation exposure, which happened to be the first radiographer Ι the that same as interviewed in this current round. And it said -- at the bottom of it, it said, "NCC."

So, it was prepared by the Nuclear Consulting Corporation in -- in -- somewhere around the spring of 1962. April, I think. March-April. So, at the time, they were apparently getting their act together while they -- when they applied for the first AEC license. And part of that was giving this -- what they should've been doing is giving this man his radiation exposure record, going way

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back to the beginning of his employment. 27

This becomes important. So, it said, "NCC," on it. So, that doesn't mean they were supplying film badges all along. It just means they went over the records, and prepared a summary of his exposures. And then they did later supply the film badges, and we -- he said -- I said, "Where did you get your" -- he said he got his film badges from Landauer. He didn't say he made them himself. He didn't have any dosimetry record, which didn't surprise me.

When he -- I said said, "Were there any other sources besides radium?" So, he said, "There was no radium." By the time he came, they discontinued using radium. He didn't -- no mention of any other sources.

Frankly, it was very hard for me to hear him. Voice was very, very faint. Even though I had an amplifier on my telephone, I couldn't keep telling him. And so -- but he

did say something about they seemed to know what they were doing. They seemed to have their act together.

He said there were no incidents leading to overdose that he can recall that he would've seen the -- you know, he handled the film badge directly. So, this is some of the interviews.

So, issues as how affects the current picture. So, what learned was about film badge dosimetry use of radium sources and then the possible unlicensed sources, meaning that's a question mark.

So, here is a photograph from the magazine that was published by -- I think it was a monthly magazine covered by GSI, supplied to its workers. It was used for public relations, which I'm sure was sent to local officials -- and one of the gentlemen on the phone now very kindly supplied me a copy

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He saw a picture earlier, but I wanted to -- I wanted to try to get the best possible reproduction of it. The purpose of this was the man was wearing a film badge, or what appears to be a film badge.

First, I saw a picture of it but it wasn't that clear, so I asked for the original and it's pretty -- you can make a good argument that that's a film badge. And if you notice, it has the white open window. The frame is wider on top than on the bottom, unlike some of the badges where the window is near the top.

And going on the ORAU website, they have this museum maintained by somebody at ORAU, and I just looked at everything, and it looked very much like this one. Same shape. Doesn't mean it was the same one, but it was corresponding to the same time period.

So, then since the man who started

doing radiography in '56 or '57 said he wore a film badge, and here's a '53 picture, I think we can pretty much say they had film badges. They had film badges all along, which is new information.

Because before that, I was skeptical that they had film badges. I thought maybe they only got film badges when they got the AEC license, and it would be one of the license requirements.

So now, then we did look. We tried to find the Nuclear Consultants, and the -- actually, Jim first looked for it. Then he -- I asked him just if I could get this Landauer -- NIOSH had paid Landauer to create an index, and what they did was they started -- the index only started in '61, and we found out why.

We used to work Landauer -- associate talked to one of his colleagues, a senior official at Landauer, and was told that

before '61, they did not keep totals and they did not really identify the clients or their records would not have been very useful for -- for future use, but it was starting in '61.

I mean they didn't identify names. They didn't identify names and they didn't accumulate totals. He didn't think there was any point in indexing those years. It started -- the company started in business in the mid-'50s.

But starting with '61, and going through '64, they did index them. I forget how many thousand there were. There were several thousand. I know because I actually read them line by line just to be on the safe side to see if there's anything that this search -- the text search might not show up, and even though in alphabetical order -- it was in Excel files, we can sort it any way we want.

Jim and I both agreed there's

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nothing. Nuclear Consultants isn't therea Konnecker was the head of Nuclear Consultants. His name doesn't show up. And we even said, we speculated -- maybe there was another middle man that he bought -- had an account with Landauer, and he got his film badges through still another party. And we couldn't find any Landauer customer in the St. Louis area, other than big corporations, government agencies. Obviously would not have been a supplier.

So, he must've just been mistaken.

I'm just thinking that. I also asked him, "Do you have any idea who they got their film badges from before you came on board in '62?"

And he said he assumed Landauer because Landauer was the biggest supplier.

So, I think it's sort of like a little word association game. I say, "film badge." You say, "Landauer."

So, okay, knowing something now

about the radiography practices: that they were mostly done inside that room, the radiography room with a radium source, we just ran an MCNP analysis, simple geometry, in two locations.

One was in the middle of the office because that's where the radiographer would They would put the source -- the set up. source was kept in the middle of the room in a they would have the casting cabinet. So, brought in, as he said, in the middle of the far the office room, as away from practical. Didn't want to have it right next to them.

They would drop position the radium source, and scurry back to the office, and wait there until the exposure was over. Most of the shots were short.

So, here -- so, I asked -- so, we did an analysis of this exposure position.

Then he said there was a door that was kept

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locked. No one was allowed in other than the radiographers. If they had to take a break, or if they had to go and get more film, they would simply leave and lock the door behind them.

So, I did an exposure position here. Some worker happened to be idly hanging around, smoking a cigarette there, and what his rate would be. And NCC, Konneker, who is in the records, who had done the radiation survey, he said of the -- not necessarily at this point, but he actually went around with the cobalt sources exposed; went around and did a survey in the office and outside.

And he said, well, he would assume a 25 percent occupancy; that nobody is going to be there all the time, but that's likely it would be 25 percent of the time as an upper bound for the outside the room, the radiographer.

So, we came up with three ways of

assessing radiation exposures to radium. First was the -- based on the MCNP analysis, the radiation exposure in the office, assuming 30 percent because it was in the AEC licensing applications as well, we do radiography at 30 percent of each shift, isotope radiography.

So, we said, "Okay." So, the radiation exposure is 30 percent. The occupancy was 100 percent during that time, and here we have an exposure of -- assuming this large number, 406, 30 to 50 work hours, we get an exposure of 296 millirem for a year. That was in the office.

Then, what would be his exposure, the real exposure, would be while he was handling the sources. He was carrying them, dangling them at the end of the spring on a fish pole, and I took the most conservative, which is a distance of four feet. And we just used the -- we didn't do the MCNP for this one.

just used this We translate well for this one. This should be a capital gamma, but this particular Acrobat Reader doesn't produce it. It did on my home This is -- the factor for radium is computer. 8.25 R square centimeter per hour millicurie. So, we take 500 millicuries at a distance of this many centimeters -- 406.25, and you will shift 30 seconds per exposure, 15 seconds to place the source, 15 seconds to remove it and put it back in the shield.

Ten exposures per shift, and you get 9.69 R per year. So, that would be added to this relatively small 269 millirem. Again, I apologize for this. It didn't -- the trouble when you change computers. It looked good on my own computer.

Then the final thing is for the same gentleman, as I said, we have his exposure records. So, we know he got about -- over a period of four-and-a-half years, so

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that's spread out and you get a good average.

The more years you have, the more meaningful it is. So, you had a good average.

So, he got 2 rem a year. However, he only worked weekends, and he got the 2 rem a year during those weekends. So, we could make two assumptions, two extreme assumptions.

One is he worked the minimum amount of time. He worked only one shift, and he worked, and it was 80 percent of the time. So, that's the lowest that that's consistent with his account. That translates, if you pro-rate this then to a full-time radiographer working 406 shifts, that prorates to 20.5 rem per year. That's the high end.

Then you take the low end. He worked every Saturday and Sunday, 90 percent of the time, except for two weeks off for vacation. And that would translate to 9 rem a year, which is remarkably close to this amount, this model amount, when this -- yes,

this 9.69. I'm sorry; I misstated. That includes this already.

So, it's remarkably close to this number. I surprise myself when you get real life data that confirms your model. My guess is that -- well, I'm not going to say what my guess is. If -- I think the numbers speak for themselves.

Then finally we have the statement on the AEC application on how good the Radiation Safety Program was before. They didn't even talk about the program. They talked about the training.

formal training have а Now we program. We used to have a more informal training program, but it was very successful and we know that because nobody ever exceeded the then applicable AEC limits. It was aware that they changed, and most people only got 25 25, but percent. The average was exceeded it.

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So, if nobody exceeded it, the limits were -- they changed some time in 1954. So, let's say for the covered year, from '53 to '54, it would be 15 rem a year. Now, starting in -- I'm sorry, there's an error on my part. Not sure how I got this. It should've been 12 and not 12.5.

Because starting with '55, they were allowed to get 3 rem quarter, and then 18 -- no, n - 18 rule. Now you get somebody who is, let's say, 30 years -- 40 years old and not done previous radiography and radiation exposure. So, he's got a credit -- let's say he's 38 years old and make it real simple.

So, he's already got 100 rem in the bank that he can draw on. So, he could continue getting 12 rem a year, and then you subtract -- then for every year, you subtract 5 or 7 from that 100.

So, you could continue getting 12 rem a year for quite a while before he exceeds

the lifetime limit.

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CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: That's correct.

DR. ANIGSTEIN: So, therefore, as a practical limit, you could -- people could be getting 12 rem a year after '55. And that falls very neatly into this range of 9 to 20, and falls very close to the modeled exposure of about 9.69.

So, I would say if we needed to have a plausible upper bound, and initially, I was -- when we saw those -- you know we had those FOIA records, AEC records, back in 2000.

We started looking at them over a year ago.

I was skeptical. I was saying, "Well, that's an easy thing to say, 'we never exceeded the AEC record.' But where's the proof?" Apparently, they had these records, and the AEC are not going to make a false statement. But the AEC can say, "Well, let me inspect your film badge records."

So, it seems like this would be a

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truthful -- they didn't make an extravagant claim where nobody got more than 10 millirem a week, or some nonsense like that. But this seems believable, and this seems to be a plausible upper bound for those years.

Now, we'll get -- I think the question will be answered a little later. Finally -- by the other sealed sources. So, the iridium-192 is not listed by AEC.

Now, we just saw this License Amendment number 8, and we saw a little part of it that was forwarded by the petitioner. And that is well after the covered period. I haven't been able to find number 8, but I found number 7. I remember seeing number 7, and number 7 was already well into the late '60s and the early '70s.

So, this one -- I think this one was 1972. So, they may have had license to use iridium later, but that has nothing to do with the activities during the covered period.

So, during the early years, it was not listed on the AEC license. The GSI supervisor, whom I specifically called back and asked, and he said no. He said St. Louis testing had the iridium source. GSI did not have one.

Another I looked up later because of still another supervisor who now deceased, recently deceased. I specifically asked him during this meeting I had with the in Collinsville in 2007 about workers the iridium source, and he said the same thing. He said iridium was owned by St. Louis Testing, and GSI never had an iridium source.

So, it would be unlikely they would have an unlicensed source because this is '74.

They have -- every few months has to be sent back, and re-irradiated at the reactor. And again, it' implausible to have had one.

So, then finally the question of the large -- was there a large cobalt-60

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source? Now, number one, it's not listed on the AEC license until 1968. Again, the supervisor said he had no recollection of this source. The other -- now I -- the other supervisor, the betatron supervisor, passed away about a year ago. He said he does not believe they ever had such a source.

However, he left the company in 1966. So, he said he was definitely involved in the non-destructive testing department until late '64, but later on he was in the department that would've handled the -- he would've regularly met with the people in the testing department, and he said they would have known about it. And also, the official from St. Louis Testing said he knew of no large such source.

Now, the final thing he tracked down, and I'm just reiterating this as before, was we went back to the NRC and said, "What about Pennsylvania?" The General Steel, it

was then called General Steel Castings, have any records from the Eddystone facility, which is the only other big casting -- it's like the sister plant to the Granite City plant.

And finally, what came out was while there was nothing -- there was nothing at Eddystone, but there was in Avonmore which is a former National Roll and Foundry company, which was acquired by General Steel Castings. They had a 10 curie source, but they got rid of it in 1959. In addition 10 curies assayed in something in '57.

They did say at one point, and it was a little suspicious, because at one point they say, "Well, we're not going to use it."
But they had all kinds of deficiencies. "You didn't do this right. You didn't do that to earn the license." And their response was, "We're not going to bother responding because we're -- we've mothballed the source, we're going to be discontinuing the use of it, and

we're going to perhaps sell it to another GSI facility," or General Steel Castings facility.

So, they said, "Oh, maybe they sold this through Granite City?" But it doesn't make But then the sense. any disposition was assigned, saying it was disposed of according to 10 CFR details of how it -- of -- no other detail, but it was a signed statement.

So, this obviously would not have been in accordance with 10 CFR 20 if it passed it onto a facility with no license for it. But even if saying, "Okay, so, maybe they were a little sloppy and careless, or naive." And that would have -- then you would've said, "They would've gotten this source in 1959. Why would they suddenly go, in 1962, and say, 'We urgently need a license for 300 millicurie source because Illinois won't allow us to use radium,' if they already had a much bigger source all along?

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So, that's implausible. And how would -- and the State of Illinois, which knew about the radium sources and disapproved of their use, they would've had to pull the wool over their eyes. There's just too many implausibilities there.

So, finally, the explanation is why would some worker have thought that they had a large source? And I was surprised to find, looking over close to a thousand pages of literature, many of them are redundant. But anyway, repeat copies of the same thing. Even though they ordered 300 millicurie sources, and getting a 260 and a 280, the camera was good for a 10 curie source.

Why? Maybe that's what they happened to have available, or maybe they thought in the future they might want to use more powerful sources. So, this is a very hefty unit. It would weigh anything between 400 and 750 pounds.

It was also the -- the -- let me just go back very quickly to this sketch. Okay, this sketch shows the sources. So, clearly, these look like two wheels. If you don't know what they are, maybe you don't know. But now we know they're on wheels, they clearly look like two big shields between two wheels.

In fact, here is the Radionics source. This is the one that was licensed in 1968, and this is the only one we've been able to get a photograph of. And here it is, sitting on two wheels, very much like that little crude sketch of something sitting on two wheels.

And here, they have different -so, you can have a -- if you can read that. Is
that big enough to read?

MEMBER BEACH: It's in the report.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: We have a copy of

## **NEAL R. GROSS**

it.

I can make DR. ANIGSTEIN: Okay. I'm just using -- so, here we go. it bigger. like it full screen. Okay, should be better. 10 curie source, I mean a So, a shield for a 10 curie source, already weighs 750 pounds. They called it shipping weight, really includes that the wheel, assembly. Basically, the shipping weight is the weight because it includes the wheels and the assembly.

The shield itself is 600 pounds, whereas the 100 curie, and that's the one they got. Even though they got 80 curies, the model number is -- they go by is a 60-100. So, its capacity is 100.

And so, that one weighs 1,300 pounds. Okay, it is obviously bigger than 750 pounds. But both of them are pretty damn big. So, it could easily be that someone who is not actually doing the radiography and therefore doesn't have to sit down and calculate, "Okay,

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I've got so many curies, and this is so much thickness of steel. So, I need so many minutes or hours to do the exposure."

But someone who is helping with the radiography doesn't have to know that. He is helping setting up the shots, and it looks like a pretty big source, even though it's a small, little, puny source inside. So, that's basically -- and then now I'm going onto the next topic. So, I'll go back to that later.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay, thank you, Bob. Let me ask the Work Group Members if you have any questions on this issue. Well, on any of the worker interviews or on the information Bob has provided here.

MR. DELL: I have a statement.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Hang on. We're asking the Board Members here first. Okay, Wanda, did you have a question on that?

MEMBER MUNN: No, but I did want to thank Bob for the illustrative material that

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he provided. It was very helpful for me $\frac{t}{50}$
get a better idea of the overall concept of
where these problems originally may have
where the questions may have come from.
CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: So, Bob, SC&A now
is of the position that there was a film badge
program.
DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yes.
CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Although we don't
have the records, that there apparently was a
film badge program?
DR. ANIGSTEIN: Right. We have
record of one worker.
CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right.
DR. ANIGSTEIN: And we have the
statement about not exceeding the limits.

DR. ANIGSTEIN: Right.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: And also the general usage in that room, but occasional usage outside. What about the issue we talked about before of the possibility of people

cautioned that this transcript is for information only and is subject to change. traversing the area where radium а might've been roped off? DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yes. CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: I didn't really address that but is that still here, possibility? DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yes, but analysis that I showed at that last meeting is for each such intrusion, you get on the order of a millirem.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, it's fairly low, number one. And number two --

ANIGSTEIN: did a DR. I mean I detailed calculation for the 10 curie source before we realized that it really was enforced, and there if you assume that somebody didn't necessarily walk straight past the room, they decided, "Here's a short cut. I'm going to take a short cut in some random direction."

On average, per intrusion, you got

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on the order of a millirem. 1 52 2 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right. But the 3 other thing was I think in the previous scenario, we assume that every shot had that 4 5 possibility --6 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yes. 7 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: -- whereas, if like 90 percent or more were in the enclosed 8 9 room, then that changes that scenario a great 10 deal. 11 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Ιt does, but I 12 think that it's a non-issue. 13 It's still a CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: trivial amount. 14 15 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yes, right. 16 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: But in terms of 17 conceptually --18 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Right. Particularly 2 rem 19 if assign a dose of just 20 standing outside that door on а 25 percent 21 basis, this other scenario is not going to

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change. Because obviously, you can't do $\overline{53}$
you can't have simultaneously exposures inside
the room, and outside the room.
CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right.
DR. ANIGSTEIN: So, well, I guess
you could if you and that was assuming, by
the way, the analysis of the radiography room
assumed that both radium sources were exposed.
So, we had a total of 1 curie.
CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right, okay. I
wanted to ask Dave or Jim as far as NIOSH is
concerned, do you have any either questions or
issues with the analysis that we've heard from
SC&A on this?
MR. ALLEN: No. Definitely no

MR. ALLEN: No. Definitely no questions. The analysis Bob did in this latest thing had several possibilities in there.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right. The bounding numbers could be a little different depending on the four foot versus six foot.

But in terms of sort of -- okay, I want to ask the petitioner now if there are questions or comments that he or his colleagues wish to make.

DR. MCKEEL: Dr. Ziemer, this is Dan McKeel. Can you hear me?

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: I can, Dan.

DR. MCKEEL: Okay, good. Yes, I have actually a number of comments. I guess I sort of have to start and go through them.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Sure.

DR. MCKEEL: The first thing that I'd like to say is there was information presented this morning by SC&A, Dr. Anigstein, that I don't believe is in the report that we are -- at least I received on October the 31<sup>st</sup>. And particularly, the information about the interview with Dr. Wilfred Konneker.

Our agreement last meeting was that I would be allowed to be a silent observer to those interviews, and I have written to you,

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Dr. Ziemer, several times, asking what is the status with that interview.

Ted Katz has written back and said that he thought Dr. Anigstein had made contact with Dr. Konneker, and that Dr. Anigstein had decided not to conduct a group interview because Dr. Konneker was not well.

Interestingly, that wasn't mentioned this morning. What was mentioned was that Dr. Konneker was sort of quiet on the Well, know, he's elderly phone. you an gentleman, and so he may be quiet. There are other people who are in this Work Group who are hard to hear from time to time. So, I understand that.

But the point I am distressed about, to say the very least, is we had a bargain. Dr. Anigstein relayed a lot of information that he attributes to Dr. Konneker by way of his own personal interview, to which Dave Allen and myself were not privy.

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And I simply need to say that our bargain in that situation, as far as I'm concerned, was broken.

The other comment I have, or that I did listen to three of the first interviews, the ones described as 1, 2 and 3, and all I can say is that there are discrepancies between what I heard during the interview and what was said this morning and reported, and what's written in the review paper received October 31st.

Now, one other gentleman that was interviewed is on the phone, and wants to make a statement, and I hope he will do that after I finish. But I want to skip over to him, and say the following.

During that interview, and in interviews that we've had with the same gentleman, and by we I mean John Ramspott had had, and relayed to me, it was very clear that this gentleman's main concern was with safety

issues at GSI.

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And his testimony to us was that the small source, cobalt-60, was used extensively outside of the small radiography building in Building 6, and that his main concern was that many of those sessions, not once in a blue moon or things like that, were And that in fact he relays the unattended. story when he first came there in the first shot, that they set it up and both the primary radiographer and himself left the scene and went back to do their jobs.

So, that's a very substantial thing. Then I want to -- then I want to go back to what I feel is -- I don't know of a polite word to say this, but there's a lot of indication that GSI had owned and used an iridium-192 source that was different from the one by St. Louis Testing.

And in this recitation that we just heard from Dr. Anigstein, during which I made

notes, I note that he carefully left out the testimony, which I had sent to you all to the Work Group, and to SC&A and to NIOSH, from at least three former workers, including people that had been mentioned this morning.

interview that One was an conducted with Ziemer а former radiation safety officer at GSI back in November, and there more correspondence was November and December, reinterview in another in February of these report interviews.

The final report was in a report that SC&A prepared, and in the December 10<sup>th</sup> interview, which this gentleman was nice enough to share directly with us, and so we didn't need to depend on just what's written down, I have it in front of me.

It's titled, "Draft Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health. Summary of a former General Steel Industries Worker

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Conducted by Paul L. Ziemer." Report Date is December 10<sup>th</sup>, 2009. On page 2 -- on page 1, there's a section called, "Information provided by 'identifying information redacted'." And there's a section in there that cobalt-60 sources, and Mr. Wheeler there says it's hollow.

The source was always referred to as an 80 curie source. He was unsure of any independent documentation or certification of that amount, but stated that it was always identified and referred to by that nomenclature.

also Then 2 on page so, carefully left out this morning, and I thought not explained, that the cobalt -- the large source of cobalt-60, the 80 curie source, was that at least five workers had given affidavits that they used that source during 1963, 4 and 5.

One of those workers that signed

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that 2008 affidavit, and I'm going to mention his name because all of these men have given me permission to do so, and I'm going to put it on the record, even though it'll be redacted, his name is George Luber, L-U-B-E-R.

He's -- George has spoken directly to the Advisory Board several times. George was one of the people who signed that 2008 affidavit, and Mr. Dutko reinterviewed George recently, and George reconfirmed what he had said before: that the large cobalt source he was talking about was easily distinguished from the small cobalt-60 sources by its size and weight.

Now, it is true, as Dr. Anigstein pointed out, that even the quote small source, that is small in curies compared to the large source, was contained in a heavy housing, a Unitron model 110A, or model 110B, depending on the period of the time that is reported in the AEC license material.

George Luber said that it was quite easy to distinguish the two types of cobalt sources based on their size and their weight. So, the big source had larger wheels, and it weighed a lot more. It was harder to push around.

And what's most telling about that is the photograph that Dr. Anigstein reports and shows of the radionic model that was -- housed the large source is exactly what the men described as being the large source. That is a spherical container.

Now, on the other hand, the small source was described by at least one person as having a funnel shaped container. Now, I heard that; I thought, "Gee, that's an odd shape for a container." But anyway, that's what was on -- put on record. I believe it was either in the October 2010 meeting, or the September 20<sup>th</sup> meeting of this year.

But in any case, at the September

20<sup>th</sup> meeting, a GSI worker was on the phone<sub>2</sub> and he mentioned that he had some material that he wanted to give to John Ramspott, and Dr. Anigstein -- someone had said, "Well, Bob Anigstein, are you going to get a copy of that?" And Bob says, "Oh, I'm sure that John Ramspott will send me those like he always does."

that was on the record that there was a material that was important that should Anigstein's have wound in Dr. up And anyway, what that material possession. was was a brochure about the Unitron Model 110AB, and it showed a very nice picture of a Unitron Model 110AB.

Now, this was a brochure from 1972, and what it showed was an all stainless steel cart and container. It was quite striking. And my comment, when I first saw it was, "Well, gee whiz. Let's show that to the men because if you were wheeling around a

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beautiful bright, shiny cart like that anybody, particularly a steel worker, would remember that particular fact about the machine."

It is interesting to note that in the earlier license applications from GSI to the AEC, where Nuclear Consulting Corporation is referred to as the manufacturer actually of the small source, what's mentioned there is a Unitron model 110A -- no, B, which might be, I would think, an earlier model.

So, it is certainly possible that earlier in the course, Unitron offered a non-stainless steel model, and that's what the men might've seen. But what was striking about the picture of the Model 110AB was the funnel-shaped container for the source.

To me, it looked like a funnel turned on its side. That's the way I -- because if you just laid it on its side on the ground so the small end was pointing to the

left, as I remember, and the -- as you looked at it from the front, and the large end was pointing to the right if you looked at it from the front.

So, anyway, it was my understanding that that was the whole point of what we were getting at at the September 20<sup>th</sup> meeting that we were going to assemble pictures of both units, the small and the large cobalt-60 sources, and then they were going to be shown to the workers, and let the workers say, "Oh, yes. This is the one I saw the large source," and so forth.

So, that hadn't been done. And in fact Dr. Anigstein reports that he doesn't have a picture of the Unitron Model 110AB. Well, I would say that all he had to do was to call either the person that spoke up on the phone, or call Mr. Ramspott, whom he knows very well, to get that picture.

Now I want to come back to the

iridium-192, and I digress because in the same interview that Ziemer, Dr. Ι just was describing what was on page 1. But on page 2, another paragraph called, "Iridium 192." And the iridium is spelled I-R-R-I-D-I-U-M 192. And it says -- there are two points. "Mr. Wheeler stated that the Point 1 says, iridium-192 source was nominally identified as initially being a 0.25 curie, in parenthesis, 250 millicurie, end parenthesis, source."

He further identified it as an old source that had gone through a large number of half lives, so that he believed the activity could be much lower than 0.25 curies when he was using it. And then point two says the iridium source was only used to radiograph items small building, in а separate number he could not recall. He indicated that the area was not roped off for these exposures.

Then on the copy I have of the

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draft, which was sent to me by Mr. Dutko, who obtained it directly from this gentleman, the part of 1.1, which says, "Mr. Wheeler stated that the iridium-192 source," the iridium-192 is crossed out, and there is 0.25, and there are five letters that look to me like they are C-U-B-U-L, but they could be C-O-B-O-L, Cobol 60. And that zero is also a U. So, maybe some have that deleted.

So, when I saw that, I said, "Well, this was an early draft, and the point is that in the final versions that emerged of this interview, that iridium-192 paragraph was completely gone, eliminated. It disappeared.

So, my thought was, "Well, maybe" - which I don't have the response that Mr. -why don't we call him Mr. W? So, Terry Dutko
called Mr. W back, and said, "Do you remember
if you crossed off the iridium-192? Did you
mean to do that and to substitute 0.25 cobalt60?"

And Mr. Wheeler said no. He didn't do that, and he didn't intend to do that. So, I don't know what to say about -- further about Mr. W, except that Dr. Ziemer talked to him, and I assume that Paul must've heard iridium-192, and must've written it down in his draft report. I don't believe that can be a typo of cobalt-60.

The second thing is about one of the supervisors who is deceased. And since deceased people are not covered by the Privacy Act of 1974, I'm talking about 'identifying information redacted', 'identifying information redacted'.

I sent you all an email that Mr. Burgess sent to John Ramspott in 2006, and in that email, Mr. Burgess -- this was before all this controversy about whether there was an iridium-192 source or not. But Jim confirmed that there was in fact a GSI 192 iridium source, and you all have that material.

Now, I don't know why that wasn's brought up by Dr. Anigstein. I don't know whether, to be honest with you, the Work Group shares things with SC&A, but obviously they should be doing that all along. They should be doing that all along.

The third thing is there is another is alive, gentleman who and has been interviewed, and Dr. Anigstein -- I'll call him Mr. P. Mr. P was the radiographer who was in 1956, confirmed that GSI the small building used for radiography in Building 6 was there when he came.

That gentleman confirmed that there GSI iridium-192 source several was on So, not only is there the 2008 occasions. affidavit signed by five radiographers, some of those same gentlemen had before and after affidavit indicated that 2008 had independently that there was an iridium-192 source.

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So, I want to say this morning that I do not believe that it -- the iridium-192 source should've been written off. I don't believe the evidence against it being there is persuasive. I think that NIOSH should have calculated a bounding dose for it, and they've not done so.

So, that brings me to the final point that I want to make. And to me, this is huge and overriding. We've brought it up before. We've talked about it, and I just heard another great example of it this morning.

Dr. Ziemer has said over and over that SC&A is not supposed to be doing NIOSH's And we're going to hear two examples work. today of places where, far I'm as as concerned, SC&A clearly was doing NIOSH's work.

It is NIOSH's job, NIOSH's job, to investigate the portable sources at GSI. It

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is NIOSH's job to calculate a bounding dose<sub>0</sub>
And here, what we have heard, in my opinion,
it is also NIOSH's job to interview people.

I can attest to you that during these interviews, the three that I heard, Mr. Allen asked one question that I'm aware of. Just one, and the rest of the interview was conducted by Dr. Anigstein.

But in what you heard this morning about the modeling for the radium sources, you didn't hear anything from NIOSH. And when NIOSH was given a chance to respond or make comments, there weren't any. But what you did SC&A, hear that -that on its own, was undertook an independent study to create a bounding dose for radium-226 at GSI.

I don't even think -- I hope we don't take up their valuable time even trying to address this today. I just think it's an egregious error. If this were trial, I'd make a motion to strike that entire testimony from

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the record. And I don't think it is valid. $_{71}^{\text{T}}$  think that we need a model or a bounding dose calculated by NIOSH using NIOSH methods, and done by NIOSH personnel.

So, I guess that's the way I feel about it. And I'm going to end it at that point. But just to say that I think again there are so many distortions, omissions, and well, I would say analyses in the SC&A review that I strongly disagree with, and I've registered my disagreement.

I got it on October the 31<sup>st</sup>. I couldn't possibly respond to that fully in one day. And so, I'm not even going to -- that's the extent that I'm going to even try.

So, I do hope you'll listen to the gentleman on the phone. He can say what he wants to say, but I just think this is a serious misrepresentation of all the facts that we have given about the portable radiography sources at GSI not mentioned today

of the 250 kVp machines, for which a dose was not calculated.

That is inexcusable in my opinion. OCAS IG-003 mandates that all sources must be considered, and that dose be а has to calculated. And then after you calculated the can talk about other doses dose, then you being bounding. But you have to do that work first, and it hasn't been done for the kVp for it hasn't been done the and iridium-192 source, and it hasn't been done for the cobalt-60 source.

So, I consider this is all unfinished NIOSH business, and I just hope and feel strongly that this should be considered by the Work Group. With that I'll end. I do have a couple of comments to make about the report by Greg Macievic, but I'll save that for that time.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Thanks, Dan. I do want to respond to the interview with Mr.

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W, and clarify some issues there that you raised. In fact, the initial interview on my part was based on an assumption that there was a cobalt and iridium source.

In December of 2009, we weren't actually trying to determine that issue, and I called Mr. W, based on my assumption that there were both sources present. What we were trying to determine was the practice of roping off areas at 1.5 times the limit distance, and whether he could confirm that practice.

And so, there were two sections to the report, which I established with him, based on my assumption that they were both a cobalt and an iridium source. And we talked about the cobalt, and you saw those. And then we talked about iridium at my suggestion, and got his information.

Then I sent him a form, with that report, which you obviously saw the original draft, and asked him to agree that that report

was correct. That included the iridium. 1 74 2 Shortly after that, I got an urgent email from -- I'm looking at the email here. 3 I can -- I think I can say it because -- hang 4 5 Well, it's a person that's on the phone on. 6 right now. But anyway, the email said -- and 7 this was shortly after the draft was issued. identifying information 8 9 redacted' called me and asked that you call 10

him on the phone. He has computer problems. So, he would like to talk to you on the phone." And he gave me the first -- Mr. W's phone number again, and I called him, and he said to me on the phone that I was incorrect; that what you said was an iridium source was

What I, Ziemer, had said was an iridium source. He said it was not. It was a small cobalt source, and that I would have to change the report before he would agree that it was correct.

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not.

I changed the report, and if you compare the new one with the old one, you'll see that they are exactly the same, except that the word cobalt-60 replaces the word iridium. And then I -- and I have before me, and I sent him the revised copy, and I have it before me and am looking at it, the signed copy by Mr. W, dated February 24<sup>th</sup>. It says that the second revised report summarizes the information that he provided.

So, all I can tell you -- and I did not -- I did not initiate that change. It was initiated by Mr. W at his request, and then I sent him the revised report, and he agreed that that was the correct one.

I know that he had interactions with people there in between, and I said, "Well, they must've told him" -- I assume that someone had said, "You're mistaken." I don't know what occurred at his end. I'm just telling you that I'm reporting exactly what he

was saying.

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is far the big As as source concerned, at that point the issue was when that source was in use. Mr. W's work time, I believe, went on into the '70s, and certainly the big source was there at that We were not trying to establish dates on those sources at that time, but rather practice of roping them off.

So, that's the source. I did not remove iridium at my own volition. It was removed at the request of the individual. So, I just wanted to set the record straight on that, Dan, in case there's some implication that I was somehow trying to remove iridium from the scene. That wasn't even the issue with this at that time.

We weren't -- I think all of us at that time, because we hadn't looked at the licenses or anything at that point, trying to establish radiological practices for the

sources.

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I think Dr. McKeel, you said one of the individuals there also had a statement they wanted to make?

Yes, I did. My name is MR. DELL: Leroy Dell. I was employed with General Steel from 1956 to 1972, or late '71, and I think the said that I did not doctors any radiographer work. Yes, I did. With betatron, Ι did quite а bit. With the radiation, I did a -- I mean a minimum amount, but did help set up a lot of shots.

The first shot I set up, helped set up, was about 40 feet from the main runway of the foundry in the number 6 building, right in the corner. And when we set the shot up, it was with a fishing pole, or we called it the fishing pole. It was a pole about eight feet long, and you reach over. You uncap the radiation, and it was like a plumb-bob. You took a hook on the end of the pole, picked it

up, and set it in what looked like a little shot glass wherever you would -- had positioned it to shoot the casting, to X-ray the casting.

We got it set up, and after we got it set up, we started to leave, and we didn't -- we did rope the area off one-and-a-half times what we were supposed to. But the minute we started off, some guy raised the tape and started walking through.

I went to the laboratory. The regular radiographer went back to the betatron to take some film and get some more film. This was done -- I don't care what anyone says. It was done daily. If the man had a shot set -- now, most shots with the cobalt-60 were short shots.

So, it -- it didn't -- I mean you had time to get to the laboratory and back, and the shot would be ready, or you'd have time to run over and get a sandwich, and come

back. And now that -- that was done very often.

And far as the shiny, pretty as little the cases for cobalt-60, it wasn't there when I was. I didn't see it. What I а big ball of steel between wheels. And they had -- I used two of them. One was with the plumb-bob. The other was you cranked it out.

Now, that was the two sources of cobalt I used, unless the one with the plumb-bob could've been anything. I don't know what it was. And then I did use the betatron quite a bit. I had the betatron turned on when I was inside the betatron, inside the casting, by one of the men.

I got out of the betatron, turned the safety key off, and went around. The man kept trying to turn the machine on, and right in front of him on the -- on the board, the control board, it showed that the key on the

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outside was turned off. So, I say that struck me right then. These guys are very, very, very poorly trained.

And I told John Ramspott. I said,
I don't see anything that General Steel did
wrong until I started thinking. Sure, they
did everything wrong as far as training, and
then when the one -- one man started signing
your name to film and sending them out, and
you were responsible, that's when I decided to
quit.

that radiation, don't let But cobalt used. Wherever anyone was they needed the cobalt, they would move it. If you look at the cameras, you'll get the right, One of them looked a little bit true camera. it, but it would have a hook. Not a hook, a ring, like on top, and all they'd do is take a little chain, and hook there, and it down the foundry or wherever wanted it.

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So, that radiation was used wherever they pleased. My main thing was very, very poor training. And then when they started signing name to film, that's when I decided, hey, I didn't want no part of General Steel.

They'd tell me to sign the film off. It would be bad, and I wouldn't do it, and it would be a high pressure testing, which I would -- no doubt in my mind there's some in the submarines now with flaws in them, and there's some in high pressure generators, and big dams that there's flaws in. Because he would say, "Sign. Oh, that's not that bad."

Well, he didn't have a license. He

didn't know. I have a license. But he'd say, "That's not that bad." He wanted to send it on out, the casting on out, with as little of work on it as possible.

Well, sure. I did too, but I wanted it to be right. And when it went out,

if it had my name on it, I wanted it to be right, or I wouldn't sign it. But he would sign it anyway. He'd sign mine or 'identifying information redacted' name to it.

So, that was the point. And then on top of -- I went up into the top of the betatron one time with the man -- the betatron went down, so the man goes up in the top of the betatron there, and there's all kinds of big, electrical transformers and everything else.

And he takes a chain and a pole with the chain on the end of it, and grounds everything out. But you had to wait about 30 minutes before you went up. But he did that, and there wasn't supposed to be anyone up there in no way form or fashion. But I went up there.

So, they were very, very lack and slack in safety. And if you -- if you'd say anything, you know, you were just a jerk. So,

I did the next best thing. I quit, and went to work somewhere else. And that's about all I have to say unless someone wanted to ask a question.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay, thank you, Mr. Dell. We appreciate that input. We're going to take a 15-minute break at this point, a comfort break.

MR. DUTKO: Dr. Ziemer?

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, who is this?

MR. DUTKO: John Dutko.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: John Dutko. We need that for the court reporter here. Thank you, John.

MR. DUTKO: I don't understand at a complete all why there's utter blatant disregard for our testimony. We have given mounds of testimony. It seemed like our testimony is cherry-picked at best. I don't understand why. It seems like at best you try to circumvent -- and I don't understand.

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1 But I do know this. Ιt is 2 appreciated by the men who have gone out of their way to reconstruct this. 3 Thank you. 4 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay. 5 DELL: MR. One statement, more 6 please. 7 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes. 8 MR. DELL: I'm not asking for 9 anything at all. John Ramspott just happened 10 and said he had heard I work to call me, I don't want anything. I'm not asking 11 there. 12 anything. I don't have any axe to grind. 13 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay, thank you very much. We're going to take our break. 14 15 MR. DELL: All right. 16 KATZ: Wait one moment. MR. Go 17 ahead --18 MR. LUBER: This is George Luber. Can I make a statement? 19 20 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay, George. 21 We're getting ready to take a break, but if

	information has been redacted as necessary. The transcript, however, has not been reviewed and certified by the Chair of the TBD 6000 Work Group for accuracy at this time. The reader should be cautioned that this transcript is for information only and is subject to change.
1	you make it brief, we'll let you do it nows
2	Otherwise, you'll have to come after the
3	break.
4	MR. LUBER: Okay. In my opinion
5	strictly, I think some people are a bunch of
6	'redacted profanity'. End of my statement.
7	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Thank you. Okay,
8	that statement is not very helpful, but it is
9	in the record. We're going to take our break
10	at this point.
11	MR. RAMSPOTT: Dr. Ziemer?
12	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes?
13	MR. RAMSPOTT: John Ramspott. I'd
14	like to speak when you return.
15	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes. Thank you,
16	John.
17	MR. RAMSPOTT: Thank you.
18	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes.
19	DR. ANIGSTEIN: I would just like
20	to
21	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: We got to stop or

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1	it's going to go on. 86
2	(Whereupon, the above-entitled
3	matter went off the record at 10:37 a.m., and
4	resumed at 10:51 a.m.)
5	MR. KATZ: Okay, this is the
6	Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health,
7	TBD-6000 Work Group, we're back online.
8	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay, John
9	Ramspott, are you ready to make a statement?
10	MR. RAMSPOTT: Yes, sir. I am.
11	It's John Ramspott, and I certainly appreciate
12	the opportunity, having listened this morning
13	to Dr. Anigstein's report, and guidelines that
14	it be the early years. I'm going to direct
15	some issues that way.
16	I think we're looking at, maybe,
17	you said '63 and earlier to '53. So, I'd
18	first like to thank Mr. Dell for his time, and
19	I'd like to make sure, so everybody is clear,
20	Mr. Dell was the isotope supervisor at GSI.

Mr. Dell, that's why he did not do

a massive amount of radiography, because be was supervising all the other radiographers.

Mr. E, who was referenced as an employee from '53, and some time off for the military, and then going into '56, actually reported to Mr. Dell.

So, Mr. Dell has, I think, the clearest vision of what went on at GSI. We recently made contact with him. He stated very well. There was no priming, no trying to get him to say it was inaccurate.

He just said it the way it was. There are things that -- I mean it has to be on the record. You heard what he said. The cobalt, radium, that was used in the plant, and his quote, "Daily." People need to understand that. That matches up with what all the other workers said as well.

I want to address Bob's report with that a little bit, because blue moon, once in a blue moon, once in a while, what -- well,

when that's coming from people who are  $part_{8}$  time radiographers, it may seem like once in a while, once in a blue moon. But coming from the supervisor, he knew better. He is the one that actually made it happen.

Now, I want to address your attention. It appears there are a lot of reports being generated by everyone, SC&A. The Board I hope is reviewing the FOIA information to Dr. Dan McKeel. One year ago discovered, with the help of a FOIA individual, and as a result, all these things that we're looking at right now a year ago did not exist.

One individual found that information. One individual was not lazy. One individual did better homework. I'm sorry. That's how it works. Dr. McKeel got the information.

Now, a year ago everybody said, and Appendix BB will prove this, there's no mention of cobalt. There's no mention of

iridium. There's no mention of radium. 89 year ago, none of it existed. So, for anybody to be aloof and say, "Well, an 80 curie source couldn't exist at GSI or iridium couldn't," they have to be blind. Look what we found as a result of someone doing a lot of homework.

Now, there's no nice way of saying it. Someone is calling all these workers liars, or delusional. They sure didn't roll around 750-pound pigs with cobalt sources in it and not know what they were moving.

Now, I'm going to address the FOIA again, because everybody seems to be hanging their hat on that FOIA. That FOIA is an organized -- in my opinion. I'm going to let you -- you have to decide this. That FOIA is a collection of information that GSI wanted the AEC to believe. That FOIA, if you look at it, Section 8, 9, 10, it says, "Those sources will be used exclusively in that small radiation block building." Exclusively.

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Here we got people telling we they're used throughout the plant. This is a collection of lies. You can't just -- you turn that into the AEC. Well, AEC didn't come back for a reinspection apparently. They said, "There was no need for an inspection," I think is what I saw in there.

It's like getting audited by the IRS. Hey, they're going to see -- they're going to want to see your paperwork. They're going to want to see your books. I'm sorry. Someone did a sloppy job.

I'm also kind of concerned Now, with the FOIA -- you mentioned Dr. Konneker. Dr. Konneker is being looked at as the guru, the safety expert. He's a wonderful guy. tracked him and know exactly what he does in St. Louis. He's а benevolent individual. He's probably one of the best physicists around in his time.

But you know what? He never walked

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in GSI's door until December of '62. We'ge talking about all of the time before that, guys. We're talking about the early years. Konneker wasn't there. Any letter or promise of what he's going to do, what's going to happen, that's at the tail end of GSI killing all these guys. That's over with. We're a little late.

We kind of missed the boat. As I mentioned Dr. Konneker, the guy you just heard on the phone, Mr. Leroy Dell, is the only person that took his test and passed. All his management flunked.

He passed the test. Now, that kind of tells you who Mr. Leroy Dell is. He should be your expert. Not some other people who part time. Now, there's a whole there's one big thing in the FOIA that I can't overlooked, even believe was not even mentioned.

Take a look at the section --

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again, I think it is Section 8. Maybe  $g_2$  Nobody mentioned it. It's about GSI's noncompliance. The AEC slapped them on the wrist, scolded them. "Sorry, guys. You are non-compliant." And this was issues like leak testing, which Paul, you raised the question in one of the meetings.

I didn't even know what it was, so I looked it up, and now when it -- it's one of the big problems in GSI. In 1962, they did not do leak tests. You'll see from the report, there's about four items they didn't do.

They didn't do surveys of places they used the sources. I know they didn't because they were using it out in the plant. They did the first survey of that little block building in '62, folks. Not -- you know, not in '53 when all this started over at GSI. But we're a little -- we're a little late.

Now, I hope you -- like Dan McKeel

said, if this were a trial, throw all that FOIA information, that fabrication and safety, safety, safety extensive training. That's not science. That's like science fiction. They wrote a book of what they thought they ought to do, what they wanted to do.

I don't have a radiographer that I know, with the exception of Mr. Dell, that went to a good scheduled training class. None. Feel free to ask him. But those are some thoughts.

You know, the surveys they talked about bring up a little point everybody seems to miss. How do you do an extensive survey on how safe a radiation non-destructive testing area is that's in the middle of a plant?

Well, they did that survey. I don't care if they're three feet, four feet.

No one did a survey. There's no mention in any of that FOIA. They didn't do any radiation survey in the betatrons where they

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said they were eventually going to use the sources occasionally. Occasionally.

Their quote is exclusively. They used those sources everywhere, and their safety was terrible. There's no ifs ands or buts about it. If you can't see that -- you know, everybody brings up, OCAS IG-003.

I'm going to bring it up for the last time in my closing. "All radiation must be used in dose reconstruction." Now, I've used the term, it's a law. Maybe it is not a law technically. I don't know. But if it's a guideline that everybody is supposed to use, and you don't take all this into consideration, then I think you're violating that guideline.

So, hopefully that'll be talked about a little bit more. Thank you, appreciate your time.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay, thank you,

John. Let's move onto -- well, let me see. I

think Bob, you had something you wanted to add.

DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yes.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Bob, regarding the discussion this morning. Just before the break, you wanted to --

DR. ANIGSTEIN: There was just comments that -- I assume Dr. McKeel is on the line.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Go ahead.

DR. ANIGSTEIN: far the As as interview with -- this is quoting Dr. -- NCC, Nuclear Consultant Corporation, the -- by the time we got the information that he might be available, it was extremely difficult to track him down. And with his no answer on telephone, there was one telephone that listed on the internet directory pages, finally ended up sending a letter to him by -actually, I sent a letter to him by good oldfashioned US Mail, because I had an address

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for him, and then I made contact with Sheldon Art Gallery, Sheldon Art Center, because he had endowed one of their galleries.

So, I spoke to the director there, and he offered -- he agreed to -- actually, first I contacted the St. Louis -- was it Washington University in St. Louis, because he was -- again, he had been a former trustee, and asked them if they could convey some information to him. They refused.

The Sheldon Art Gallery did finally
-- or Center did agree to send him
information, and I was able to finally get
through and talk to some young lady that
worked and answered his phone. And she said
she got the email from Sheldon Art Gallery.

She put it in front of him, and suggested -- she gave me the private number, which is actually the similar one that Dr. McKeel furnished from several years earlier, and suggested that I call the next morning.

I was under a deadline to get the report out. The meeting was approaching. It takes a little time for me to edit and formulate and format my reports. So, I can't be putting information in at the last moment. It doesn't make any sense.

So, it was agreed, and I had checked with Dr. Ziemer and Ted Katz, that maybe I should just call him first and find out if he has any information to offer before we go through elaborate scheduling, and Dr. McKeel said he wanted many days notice before a group participates in a phone call.

So, I was going to make an exploratory phone call and if it was anything really valuable, like look if there was really some information there, then we might schedule a conference call.

And as I reported to Dr. Ziemer,
Paul, and Ted Katz, we all agreed there really
was minimal information. I'm not sure that he

had ill health or simply just a very faint voice. And basically, he kept saying, "I'm sorry. I'm sorry I couldn't help you more. I really don't have any information."

And the information that I did get is in the appendix through the report, which everybody saw. The name is -- his name is deleted, but the affiliation is there. So, it's obvious who I spoke with. So, I don't think it was in any way a violation of the agreement.

Then the business about the sources being somewhat different, I'm sure there were different manufacturers. I'm sure that if you looked at both the 80 curie source housing and the -- made by Radionics and the Budd company sources, I'm sure there might've been some difference in design.

However, my point was that someone having seen only one source, and had left the employment of GSI before the other source was

officially procured, may very well have thought it was a large source. But it was a large housing, so why put a small source in a large housing?

Well, for whatever reason, they did. And furthermore, with all due respect to John Ramspott, who was just on the phone, he did not send me or offer to send me -- no one offered to share the picture of the Budd radiography source.

The gentleman I interviewed simply said, "Are you by any chance in contact with John Ramspott?" I said, "Yes, I am." "Well, tell him I have information for him." He didn't say, "I have information for you." If he had wished to send it to me, he did not have a computer or email, but he certainly could have -- I certainly would've made an arrangement with him, as I did with John, to -- he can use our FedEx account, so there's no cost with him, and send me the information. I

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could copy it, and send it back to him. 100

No one ever offered to share that with me. I did not want to aggressively push it at that point. Again, it was getting very late, and I had to finish my report. It was late. It was late as it was.

So, in terms of the comment about the recently deceased radiography supervisor who said -- yes, I saw the email. The email simply said iridium-192 was used for radiography. That is true. It was used by St. Louis Testing.

The same gentleman, a year later, was present at the meeting where -- which John Ramspott arranged, and I specifically asked him, because I looked at the transcript, and the transcript is on the web, even though it's redacted. You sort of have to guess who was speaking.

I specifically said, "Was there an iridium-192 source?" And he said, "GSI did

not own one. It belonged to St. Louis
Testing." So, this is the same one who had
said, and correctly, iridium-192 was used but
not by -- but not by GSI.

then finally, Dr. McKeel And brought up the -- why today we did not mention the 250 kVp X-ray source. The purpose of my new information or report was to say interpretation of information that had previously been talked about.

The X-ray machine was discussed at the last meeting. There was no need, and we - NIOSH discussed it. SC&A responded to some of their discussions. We basically agreed with their assessment. We had some technical comments about it, but basically agreed with their assessment, and didn't need to bring it up again.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, the X-ray sources were used in the later period anyway. So, '64 on is when we had --

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1	DR. ANIGSTEIN: I think so, yes. 102
2	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: That was actually
3	during the AEC era.
4	DR. ANIGSTEIN: I think you're
5	right.
6	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: It was. Okay,
7	thank you.
8	DR. MAURO: This is John Mauro.
9	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: John Mauro?
10	DR. MAURO: Before you move on, can
11	I just make a couple of observations?
12	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: You certainly
13	can.
14	DR. MAURO: Paul?
15	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, go ahead,
16	John.
17	DR. MAURO: Thank you. In
18	listening to everything here, I'd like to just
19	make an observation I think is important in
20	keeping with the idea that we're trying to
21	zero on what are the important SEC issues.

And I think a lot of factual information that we discussed might be in some degree dispute, and some of that factual information is critical to the SEC, and some of it is marginal.

I'd like to point out that whether the cobalt-60 source was there in '64 or is marginal. The real issue was there beginning in '62 or '63, when there was clearly some degree of control, and there was health physics program, and there was badging.

So, that date, that dispute, seems to be a marginal issue. Iridium-192, whether it was owned by the St. Louis Testing or perhaps by GSI, again in the earlier years, it becomes a marginal issue.

The issue that is central has to do with the degree to which there was access controls, and movement of material to other locations, where there may have been a

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breakdown in access controls during the use of these smaller sources.

What I heard, what I heard, is that during one interview, there was a considerable amount of control in the early years, through 1962, as indicated by Bob's report. But I also heard Mr. Dell on the line, indicating that there -- I did not hear him say that the sources were used all over the plant. hear him say they were used in building 6, and quite frankly, I'd like to hear him whether he felt these sources were in fact moved all over the plant.

MR. DELL: I can tell you.

DR. MAURO: Please.

MR. DELL: It was moved all over the plant from the betatron to 6 building. Any building they wanted to use it in, if they had a casting and didn't want to move the casting or -- we would take the camera, hook it on the crane, move it down to wherever, down to the

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foundry or wherever it was -- building it was in and set it down. That crane would pick it up and take it in all over the plant.

DR. MAURO: And I have one more brief question. When they did move it at these locations, I wasn't quite clear as to these are generally relatively short shots. Did you observe -- I guess starting in 1955, I believe that's when you said you had -- or '57. I'm not sure of the date.

MR. DELL: I started in the last of '55 and stayed until the first of '72.

DR. MAURO: Okay. During that time period, when they were moved or when they were in building 6, either way, did I hear you say that there were barriers put up, but -- and that -- but there was not a degree of control over those barriers? That you expected -- in other words, I'd like to hear a little more. Your sense was that -- that they were -- there was not people patrolling those barriers

during the time when the shots were being taken? Or was it generally that the shots were short, and that the barriers were in fact in place and controlled?

MR. DELL: The barriers were supposed to be, and every time I've seen it, the barriers were put up. If men wanted to walk through there, I'd say barriers. All it was was a tape, like the police tape, around, that said, "Radiation area." They were put up, and they were put up 50 percent further than they had to be put up.

If anyone wanted to walk through, and walk within two inches of the casting, they would just lift the tape, walk through and walk right on, rather than to walk around it. And -- and they wouldn't do it if the operator was there, but like I said, the operator may be in the little brick building. After he set the shop up, he may go sit in the little concrete block building, or he may go

to the betatron, or he may go get a sandwich at the lunchroom or something.

It was not -- I tell you, they were very lack in safety. Very, very lax in safety.

DR. MAURO: Thank you, Mr. Dell. I appreciate your helping me out with this.

MR. NETON: Mr. Dell, this is Jim Neton. I have one other question. You say that these shots were done all over the plant, but could you estimate what percentage were done in the room, exposure room, versus about the plant?

MR. DELL: No, I cannot because I was not in the plant that much. I was more in the laboratory in the earlier years.

MR. NETON: So, you don't know whether an occasional shot could've happened? I think I hear you say very strongly that they could've occurred anywhere, and we've heard that. But I guess the question in my mind is

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what frequency were they done anywhere? 1 108 2 MR. DELL: Well, you know, every time I went in the plant -- I'll put it this 3 I don't know what frequency it was, but 4 5 every time I walked down to give the men a 6 shot to shoot or anything, I'd not seen one 7 that would be in that of ten building. They would be on the outside of the 8 9 block building. 10 Okay, thank you. MR. NETON: Was this true of CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: 11 12 the radium sources, as well as the cobalt? 13 MR. DELL: know what? Now, you Everyone says radium. I don't know which was 14 15 radium and which was cobalt. I know that we 16 had a plumb-bob. I even remember when it got 17 stolen. Ιf it would've been policed, it 18 wouldn't have got stolen, but it got stolen. And we had the cameras. 19 20 don't know what -- I Ι 21 that it said -- we called them. They said,

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"Well, cobalt 60." But the plumb-bob, I $don_{10}$
know what it was. It could've been radium. It
could've been cobalt. But I know we did use a
plumb-bob, and we did use the camera.
CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, I think it
is pretty well established that the cobalt
source replaced the radium sources in 1962.
MR. DELL: Well, radium could've
been the one that we used with a fishing pole
then.
CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: I think the
testimony of the other workers indicates that
that was the case.

MR. DELL: Well, if it was, yes, it was used wherever they wanted to use it.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay, thank you.

MR. RAMSPOTT: Dr. Ziemer?

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes?

MR. RAMSPOTT: John Ramspott, if I may ask -- just clarify a point. I thought if I heard Leroy Dell correctly, he said one out

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of ten seemed to be in the block building.  $\mathfrak{Sp}_0$  that means 90 percent were done out in the plant. Is that correct?

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, we heard two things. One was that he -- he wasn't there very much to see, but the ones that we saw were. So, he apparently saw a small fraction of the total, but that fraction was mainly around the plant is what I understood.

MR. DELL: And you're both right.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, okay. And - and on this, someone asked earlier if we're
disregarding worker testimony. The fact is we
have conflicting testimony on many of these
issues depending on who has brought it up. But
okay, Bob, you have a comment?

DR. ANIGSTEIN: Well, just to Mr. Dell, we may be -- let's see. If you saw -- if you witnessed radiography going on in the plant, they'd be rather conspicuous because there were signs around the ropes or tapes

1 around, but it would not if but <del>the</del> 2 radiography was going in the radiography room, there would be no way of knowing about that 3 unless you actually walked into that room to 4 5 observe it. 6 So, would you always know that 7 there was radiography going on in that room if 8 you were --9 MR. DELL: If I went down, I would If I went down to talk to a 10 walk in the room. man that was supposed to be doing this, of 11 12 course I would walk in the room. 13 DR. ANIGSTEIN: I see. And the the locked 14 room wasn't kept room so 15 outsiders couldn't walk in? DELL: It would not be locked 16 17 if the man was there. 18 DR. ANIGSTEIN: I see. Okay. And if it was locked, 19 DELL: 20 knew he with the betatron Ι was

somewhere else.

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	DR.	ANIGSTEIN:	I	understand,	уęs <sub>2</sub>
That makes	sens	se.			

MR. RAMSPOTT: Dr. Ziemer, John Ramspott.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, John?

MR. RAMSPOTT: Just like to remind everybody they had two cobalt sources, and they had two radium sources. So, something could be going on in the block building, and in the plant simultaneously.

MR. DELL: Yes, and it was at times.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, good point.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$  RAMSPOTT: We never discussed this, but I assumed that.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, I think that certainly makes sense.

MR. RAMSPOTT: I wouldn't think somebody would want to be in with both cobalt cooking at the same time.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right.

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Actually, according DR. ANIGSTEIN: to the first radiographer I interviewed this past month, I asked if it was possible, just for my own bounding analysis, to use the two radium simultaneously inside sources radiography room, and he said, "Sure. You just put some blocks of shielding in between, and you could have two castings. You could be two castings simultaneously near each other, just as long as there was shielding so you wouldn't be exposing the film from one casting, from the source that was being used by the other one." MR. DELL: But that was not a

MR. DELL: But that was not a practice.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: But it could be done.

MR. DELL: It was possible to do it, but it was against the rules, and it was not a practice because scatter radiation would come back in on the other one.

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1 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Sure. 114 2 MR. DELL: You'd have to set it up 3 exactly right. I mean it would have to be perfect. 4 5 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: I think that's a 6 good point. 7 Radiation interfering MR. DELL: with the other film. So, it was a no-no. 8 9 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, Ι 10 that's a good point because it would mess up -- they'd mess each other up with scatter. 11 12 DR. MCKEEL: I will back up that 13 statement. Okay, 14 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes. 15 further comments on these issues right now? We 16 want to also cover the film badge issue here 17 before lunch. Okay, we have the NIOSH White 18 Paper on Film Badge Response, and I think the author of that paper is also on the phone with 19 20 us today so that he can answer questions on

that if necessary, and we have that -- well,

let me ask if there's any other -- Greg, do you want to make any statements on your paper to start with, then we'll have SC&A give their critique on it.

DR. MACIEVIC: Sure, yes. Let me give a basic idea of what I was trying to do with the paper because there seems to be discussion about all the energy ranges, the filters, the graphs and all that.

The whole point of what I was trying to show, the question was what happens to a dosimeter that is exposed to high energy photons? I want to preface by saying I worked at Landauer 1979 through 1984, involved with research and quality control on film. TLDs and track etch type dosimetries.

So, I am familiar with Landauer and the types of film. What I was trying to show, and it is basically simple, is this: one, that as the photon energy goes up, film of any type and metal filters of any type, the metal

filters will cause an over-response of the film to high energy photons.

And the example, and through my experience, one of the things that was commented on was the Landauer having a plus or minus 20 percent accuracy all the way up to 6 MeV. And that is true, but the one thing that has to be mentioned: at Landauer that 6 MeV was nitrogen-16, which produces under a lead filter an over-response of the film.

If you didn't tell Landauer that was being exposed to nitrogen-16 or a high energy photon, they would not make correction, and you would get a higher dose on that dosimeter than you would if it was it's full response with respect to cesium cobalt. In that 0.5 to 1 MeV range, response is essentially flat. It starts to tail up at about 4 to 5 MeV, and you start to go up.

That was the purpose of the two

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graphs, and I chose those two graphs to show that for tungsten, for lead, and the point being any high-z material; if you've got high-z, you've got high energy photons. You're going to get an over-response of the film. It's not going to not respond. It's going to over-respond.

And now, you can get into things about, "Well, orientation of the film, the type of dosimetry," which is totally irrelevant to this, if a DuPont dosimeter had metal filters, which they did, it's going to have an over-response.

Now, the question you want to go and say, "Well, how much do you make the correction to that, and all that? But it is not an SEC type issue. It's more of a correctional factor for the dosimetry issue because the dosimeter does work.

I think even Bob Anigstein shows that in doing his Monte Carlo simulation that

he uses, as a justification, the dosimetry 118 say, "See my experiment work." Now, if the dosimeter didn't work, then you wouldn't use that as a justification.

The dosimetry does go there. not a question of that you don't know the dose. It's that the dose isn't responding. And that was basically what I was trying to show. Also, the graphs are from the 1960s, and I've tried to get from the books and things that I had in papers that refer back to things that were done in the '60s to film that was used in the '60s, and show that there is an over-response as you get past that 1.022 MeV; you will start to see a rise in the curves.

And it is there for the lead filters, with Kodak film; it's there with the tungsten. I'm sorry, tantalum filter in that one batch that's there, and that really the point of it. They didn't try to go beyond

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that, but that -- the question was does this dosimeter respond?

Well, it does respond, and it overresponds. Ιt is to dose up now reconstructor's discussion as to how you address that over-response, but you distinctly have over-response of the film.

Let's see. I had one other -- oh,
I recently, as of yesterday, so I'm using -when I talked about dose over-response, and
the question brought up, "Well, are you
talking dose or intensity?"

Well, the relative response to the film does increase when you compare it to cesium calibration, or a cobalt calibration doesn't matter. That film rises when you compare high energies to those energies.

I came upon an abstract for a paper, which I think I'll get -- have put out on the internet, the web for you guys to take a look at. But so far, I only have the

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abstract. And here is the abstract, and this is from D.M. Quinn, radiological engineer, Power Authority State of New York, Indian Point Number 3 Nuclear Power Plant, Buchanan, New York.

It's а paper from 1980 under discrepancies from film and thermoluminescent readings dosimetry at an operating power reactor, and the abstract says, "The results of exposure measurements using film badges and thermoluminescent dosimetry were compared in operating nuclear power plants."

The film badge over-responded to the high energy nitrogen-16 gamma rays produced under power. All the TLD did not, because TLD is lower-z material. So, it is not over-responding like the film.

And it says, "Discussions of charged particle equilibrium and energy dependence are included. The cause of the over-response was determined to be the excess

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pair-production electrons created because 12f the high atomic number and the lead energy compensating shields surrounding the film and the film itself. Because film has silver, it also over-responds."

So, my point was not to say, "I'm talking about just Kodak film, or DuPont film or any of these others." I'm saying if you got a film, you've got high energy photons, and you've got metal filters. You're going to get an over-response. That's basically my summary.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay, thanks, Greg. And I just want to actually confirm one piece of information for everyone on those Landauer badges, they actually have early three filters, and I confirmed this with the individual who is your -- on your reference, it third author. You'll Greq, is the recognize that as your old boss -- Landauer.

The three filters in all the

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Landauer films in those days -- or badges rather, were lead, aluminum and plastic. And then there was an open window for the betas. But so, the lead high-z would actually overrespond I think more than your curve would show, which is for -- was it titanium or?

DR. MACIEVIC: Right.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: So, there was some question, I think, raised as to what the filters were in those Landauer badges. I did ask whether they ever changed it for different users, and the answer was no. It's the same regardless of the user.

And as I said -- as he said, if you -- if it had -- if they didn't tell him they were using high-energy stuff, then they would end up giving them the high reading. Okay, Bob, you have a comment.

DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yes, that makes very good sense because, on the Landauer film badge reports at the time, the separate

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columns for low, medium and high energy gammas, and that would correspond to using the plastic, the aluminum and the lead filters.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right, because they had different densities under each of those, and actually identify and compare those. Now, Bob, do you want to go through your analysis here?

DR. ANIGSTEIN: Okay. Well, first of all, our report was based on a critique of Dr. Macievic's report such the as discussion we just heard on the phone actually was very clear. I would say it was more -somehow I got more out of it than I did out of reading the original paper, the original report.

But I'll go through -- since obviously I prepared this earlier, I'll just go through my quick -- quickly my independent -- it's more of an independent analysis to -- which ended up confirming the conclusions.

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And what we did was we said the first reaction was -- before we can talk about the film badge response to different energies, the question is what energy were the workers exposed to. They obviously did not stand in front of the betatron beam or they wouldn't -- they wouldn't be around very much longer.

So, we went back to the original MCNP analysis that we did back in -- for the report that was first issued in March 2008, and it was a very easy job in terms of labor because everything was set up; the only thing we hadn't done at the time because we saw it was -- didn't think there was any need for it was do an energy spectrum. We just did the -- you know, what is the dose, and what is the exposure rate, and certain revisions.

So, now, we just went back and dug up the same pile, and we went and basically changed one line. We changed a few lines in the input file. I think literally one line to

produce by energy bin, the exposure rate. 125

photon Not the flux we're interested in the photon flux; we're interested in how much of the exposure is due to 10 to 15 keV photons. How much of it is 10 to 10.1 keV photons, and so forth. It would take us too long. There were a number of locations in the first one. We would just two important ones. Some locations that we originally did were fenced off. would likely have ever No one there.

One was in the control room, where the operators would stay during the shot, and another one was this restroom, which was -- here it is shown practically line of sight to the betatron in this particular position. This is, by the way, not the customary position for the betatron, but it was one that was used -- the casting is on the railroad track, and some fraction of the shots were done that way, and

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there was a greater degree of scattered radiation both toward the control room, and towards the outside areas.

This is shown empty now as an Only recently, looking at the FOIA space. information, it turns out there was a two-foot However, based on the original wall here. FUSRAP reports, where they went in to clean up back in the -- what was it? In the '80s. They showed an open door here.

So, I don't know, I -- I go by the prior report because that was done by the person doing the radiation survey, very carefully drawn.

Anyway, but we -- but I kept this because this is the extreme. There's no shielding. Here is the number 1. Here is the number 6. And here is the exposure rate in the number 1, the red dots, inside the control room as a function of energy. And see, the energy peaks at about 105-110 keV. Then it

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goes down past 1 MeV.

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It goes down very low, and here 10 MeV and the curve actually goes up to 25, but it's just flat. So, no point taking up space with it.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: That's because there are virtually no photons of that energy that actually show up in the control room. Is that --

DR. ANIGSTEIN: Right, right.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes.

DR. ANIGSTEIN: And this I superimposed on the drawing that was -- well, I went back to the original source because I was able to get a better copy, make a better copy of the drawing. But it appears in Dr. Macievic's report also.

Here is a response with the 0.02 inch, or the half a millimeter, tantalum filter. And it is right in the sweet zone. It's right in the nice, flat region of that

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film response. It doesn't under-respond. 178 doesn't over-respond.

That seems to have been calibrated in cesium. This is the point -- this would be the cesium energy, and it seems to be pretty close to the 1.0 line. So, by the way, the graph did not show those lines. I superimposed them to make them easier to read.

So, apparently it was calibrated against cesium, and it gives a nice response, a slightly lower response here, but not by much. Maybe five percent. So, it looks like the film badge is pretty good for that, for that spectrum.

Now, here's the spectrum within a different form, a cumulative exposure rate in the restroom, the unshielded restroom, which in reality was a little more shielding than we had. And even here is a harder spectrum, but even here, if you look at the 2 MeV, the cumulative is 0.5, meaning 50 percent of the

exposure is due to photons below 2 MeV, and the other 50 percent is due to exposures above 2 MeV.

You want to get up to slightly over 9 MeV, and that encompasses 90 percent. So, then it just trails off. You don't -- what happens is a 25 MeV electron gives almost -- rarely gives off a 25 MeV photon. All the photons are less than 25 MeV.

Then finally, I just reproduced the other drawing from Dr. Macievic's paper, which he copied. I don't have the original source from it. And here, it shows this is -- this is one using a filter. It's a combination filter, a total of 1 millimeter, combining tin and lead, and again show a comparable curve just looking at the -- the 90 degree -- the normal incidence.

A zero degree is going to be straight at the film. And they keep doing that. The highest point here is about 2.2

MeV. It keeps going up, which confirms what Dr. Macievic said.

Then finally, as a quotation, and this was a study done at Los Alamos by the author, Ellery Storm, a very prolific writer. So he and a man named Israel put out the definitive -- it's still used -- calculations of attenuation coefficients for all from z equals 1, z equals 100, as an aside. this is the direct quote from his abstract. Response of Eastman type K and DuPont 552 film on high energy were investigated. Both types of film are found to be energy-independent from 0.4 to 2 MeV. For a given roentgen value, a given response in terms of density is obtained and the effective energy increases beyond 2 MeV.

The motivation for doing this study was they had a 22 MeV betatron made by Allis-Chalmers, and the -- there were -- they had the same concern: is the film badge still good

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at those high energies. Because previous \( \frac{1}{3} \) they had been used primarily for medical X-ray work, lower energies, and the answer was yes, it is. And they did use the 22 MeV betatron to create exposures of that same film, and the fact was it was good.

information Then the that obtained, which is comparable to -- Dr. Ziemer talked to him, and Greg Macievic information official from the senior official Landauer made the following at He said they had large statements. didn't anything say to my contact aluminum.

He had large filters, including a lead one, and he said he had good response to high-energy air production in the lead, and good angular response with very large angles.

For people that may not be quite familiar, what happens is the reason film by itself would not be good, like a bare film at

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high energies, is the interaction rate 132 these high-energy photons per millimeter is actually greater than in the body because of the response in the film.

It is silver with a Z of 47, bromine Z equals 35. However, the energy that's liberated by the energy interaction does not stay in the film because it's so thin. So, the actual energy deposited would be smaller.

However, with the lead behind it, you get both the high interaction, even higher interaction, Z 82, and the energy does stay in. The electrons do get captured, and they in turn give off secondary electrons and low energy photons to expose the film.

So, the lead, on the one hand, we think of as a shield. But actually, it is an intensifier. It is used in other X-ray work, medical X-ray work to make the film more sensitive. You put in the thin lead screen

behind it.

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in his opinion, this had -there that time, there were at were calibrated with cobalt 60, which has which is by the way the same -- my impression is that this is -- this -- here you have calibration of cobalt 60. It doesn't say so, but this X right on the 1, 1.0, is equal to approximately 1.2 MeV, and cobalt 60 has average energy of 1.25. So, this is clearly what was used for calibration.

And they were calibrated from 60, and this official said he would not expect deviation by more than 10 to 15 percent. They used DuPont film, and it was calibrated in So, I think that we can put this issue air. to rest probably more conclusively than almost any other issue that we've encountered. The film badges were, with the array of filters, and with Landauer's knowledge and exposure of processing them where took all the they

exposure fields under consideration, and end up with a dose based on calculation, utilizing the exposures under the no filter, plastic filter, aluminum filter that was the case lead filter. It's a pretty good one.

And with all the modern techniques according colleague now, to our Joseph Zlotnicki, who is the former vice president of Landauer, he said he would use -- even despite everything, he would use film today. The only limitation would be that for very high doses, and we're talking about around 100 rem, the film response is non-linear, meaning if you go into the very high dose region, you double the You don't double the density. sort of tapers off, and you don't get -- but for the medium or low -- but medium doses, he said it's perfectly good, even though it's been replaced by TLDs.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, and by high here, I think you're talking about almost

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lethal doses, where they have accident --1 135 2 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yes, I think so. CHAIRMAN 3 ZIEMER: Yes, such as criticality accidents where the film badges 4 5 are not useful any longer. 6 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yes. 7 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Thank you. Okay, I think we want to give the petitioner an 8 9 opportunity to ask questions also on the film 10 badges. MR. DUTKO: Dr. Ziemer? 11 12 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes. 13 John Dutko, sir. MR. DUTKO: CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: 14 Yes, sir. 15 MR. DUTKO: How do you calibrate a 16 film badge you don't have on a good portion of I said before, and it seems like 17 the time? nobody cares to listen, when we were working 18 19 magnaflux, magnaflux operators were never 20 issued film badges. They weren't worn outside

of the betatrons, period.

I don't know what about that is not understood right now but thank you, sir.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes. Well, NIOSH actually in the proposal for reconstructing doses, they have other methods for handling those individuals who are not wearing film badges. Right now, we're we're simply addressing the reliability of the film badge data itself that we do have. have this at all sites. It is the -- are the film badges reliable for what they're trying to measure? And that was --

MR. DELL: Can I make a statement?

I think I can clear that up.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes.

MR. DELL: When he left and worked in magnaflux, he would not be in that block building. And the block building is the only place that they were supposed or -- you know, when they set it up to do the X-raying. But he may be working within 15 feet of a casting

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setting out in the building that was being $_{137}^{\rm X}$
rayed.
Like I said, they did it daily, but
that's the reason he wouldn't wear a film
badge down there because it wasn't supposed to
be anything outside that block building. So,
that's the way it was set up, and he's right
when he left and he was going to magnaflux, he
didn't wear a film badge.
CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, we
understand that, and and actually NIOSH has
proposed a way to compensate for that with
additional assignment of additional exposure
beyond what a film badge would have recorded.
MR. DELL: I hope that's cleared

up. I'm sorry if --

CHAIRMAN Yes, that's ZIEMER: helpful. Thank you. Any other comments from the petitioner?

Ziemer, it's MR. RAMSPOTT: Dr. John Ramspott.

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1	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Go ahead. 138
2	DR. MCKEEL: Wait a minute.
3	MR. RAMSPOTT: Did somebody else
4	have a comment? Are you ready for me, Dr.
5	Ziemer?
6	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, go ahead.
7	DR. MCKEEL: Can you all hear me?
8	This is Dan McKeel.
9	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Oh, I can hear
10	you now.
11	DR. MCKEEL: Actually, the
12	petitioner, the co-petitioner, hadn't had a
13	chance to comment.
14	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, I asked if
15	the petitioner had comments, and I guess we
16	weren't hearing you at first, Dan. Go ahead.
17	DR. MCKEEL: Can I go on and make
18	my comment?
19	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Oh, sure. Sure.
20	DR. MCKEEL: Good. Well, I have a
21	couple of comments. Number one, when I read

the SC&A review of Greg Macievic's paper 1 Qp film sensitivity, what I was impressed by was that Dr. Anigstein actually had numerous criticisms of the methods within this paper, including the validity of many of the references that were given, and used terms like irrelevant and so forth.

Then, Dr. Anigstein went on, as he do an independent analysis, again, far Ι am concerned is as NIOSH's work. he But anyway, came to basically the same conclusion: that this film was sensitive -- overly sensitive and hyperresponded to high-energy photons.

So, that is the NIOSH paper, and the SC&A response. What is amazing to me that's left out of this story is that at the September the 20<sup>th</sup> meeting, John Ramspott mentioned that he was going to acquire through the generosity of Leroy Dell, who is on the phone, Mr. Dell's actual GSI film badge and

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his pocket dosimeter. And John put that into the record.

Well, actually that meeting happened and occurred, and John did get the badge, and on October the 6<sup>th</sup>, I believe, I sent the Work Group a picture of Mr. Dell's badge, and lots of information about it.

One thing that was clear from examining the film packet, which had Leroy Dell, badge number 30, and 2084, which is the program -- film badge program that Landauer conducted for General Steel Industries. It had the type film clearly written on there, which was DuPont Type 544.

Now, left out of Dr. Anigstein's analysis, and left out of Greg Macievic's original paper, is the fact that we know what at least one badge that actually was used at the time at GSI, what the film badge type was: DuPont type 544.

So, I started doing a little bit of

independent analysis in reading about just that specific -- I thought specific, unique type of film. And what I found out is DuPont makes a large number of different kinds of films, and they do change their characteristics, and emulsino characteristics, over time.

But anyway, here's one description of DuPont type 544 film that I found in a Los document, which the title Alamos has P9/00420212, and there is a section in there on film badges, and it said, and I quote, 544 film packets were DuPont type used to the integral gamma all measure dose at stations. They were measuring atomic bomb blasts.

This packet contains a sensitive film, type 555, which indicates doses from 0.01 to 6R, and an insensitive film, type 834, which measures doses from 2 to 10 to the third R. A 40 mil lead strip surrounded the film so

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that gamma exposures could be distinguished  $_{1}\frac{1}{42}$  the presence of beta radiation.

Then it just notes, the film packet was contained in a protective plastic wrapper for placement in the field.

So, my comment is that although Dr.

Macievic had well outlined that, based on his

exposure working at Landauer, that his

comments are applied to a wide range of films

that are used in film badges.

But my issue is, if you know the type of film used at GSI, that's the point. That's what we're talking about here. We're talking about General Steel Industries. We're not talking about all the other sites. You know, we're not talking about generic issues.

We're talking about a specific issue: what did the GSI film badges register with respect to high-energy photons? And so, both of those analyses should have used DuPont type 544 film, and as a matter of fact, it

would be interesting to know what was the response characteristics just as a scientist.

It would be interesting to know what were the response characteristics of the two types of film emulsion that were in film 544, that is, sensitive film 555, insensitive film 834.

And I would just comment that if Macievic worked at Landauer, and if Dr. Ziemer had a private conversation with a Landauer employee, and Dr. Anigstein mentions in his that he had report private communication with a senior Landauer person through his colleague, Joe Zlotnicki, then why is it that, among all those three interviews with high-level former and present Landauer employees, could you not -- and we know the film badge program. That's not an issue, 2084 -- why could you not know from their extensive records what type of film was used in their film packet, and what type of filters were

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used in their film badges, and then key the analyses by both NIOSH and SC&A to those specifics?

I'll out And so, just put that I don't necessarily mean there. that analyses are invalid. I do think that, again, SC&A was duplicating work that NIOSH had done. They already criticized NIOSH's methodology, which was severe, and then went performed their own analysis.

would But Ι say to you, scientist, there is a principle that, know, you come -- if you have to use surrogate data or you have to use co-worker data, well, then that under certain you can use circumstances. But on the other hand, if you have -- if you know the type of film, and you know the type of filters, base your analysis on those actual facts, and that wasn't done in this case.

Frankly, when everybody claims

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they're using the best science available, 149 me that's simply not true. It doesn't square with the facts. All they had to do, all that NIOSH, all that SC&A had to do -- after all, they both interviewed Mr. Dell -- was to find out about the film badge.

I can promise you from being a silent observer of the last interview that that topic didn't even come up.

So, I would still think that to put this issue to rest, which I don't consider has been done, then both NIOSH and SC&A should weigh in with specific, short reports on whether, knowing that DuPont type 544 film was used, and finding out exactly what filters were used in the Landauer badges at GSI. Not just in general, but at GSI, then to update their analyses. If the conclusion is the same, well, then that's fine with me. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Dan, I want to

make a partial response to that. The issue here of course was -- in the beginning was a general question: do film badges -- can film badges correctly read the high energy photons.

Now, that was sort of what Greg was looking at in a generic sense. The fact that Landauer has a specific film and specific filters, we don't have -- in my opinion, we don't have to reanalyze that. Landauer has already done that. They know what the response is.

They actually know what the filters are. We don't have to reproduce what Landauer already has done and has been doing for years. The question was, could we rely on their results. Are they in fact correcting for the fact that there's high-energy photons involved? Can they see that?

The answer from Landauer is yes, and generically, what we learn is that all films of this type behave in general that way,

and that all high-Z filters in general behave that way. The specific ones: that analysis has been done by Landauer, and we have been -- it was sort of the question, are we accepting their analysis.

I don't know what we would gain by going back and running -- basically, we're talking about exposing film of that type with known filters, and sort of confirming what Landauer has done.

certified Well, they have а dosimetry program. It has been certified for independently national dosimetry years by certification bodies, and I think we're simply saying that we are accepting those values, that they have the ability to make distinction.

Ι would also add that my confirmation of the -- of the filters this weekend for occurred over own satisfaction. So, it's not like I

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report in advance to issue. I simply wanted to confirm that Landauer did not use different types of badges for different -- for different customers.

They all had -- every customer had these same filters and these same film packets. So, that's the only comment I would make on that.

DR. MCKEEL: Well, I would like to make this comment in response. This is Dan McKeel again.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Sure.

DR. MCKEEL: I believe that actually, just for the record, everybody needs to understand that, before I contacted Landauer on my own and found out that they had film badges, some film badges for some people at GSI, nobody on the Board, SC&A or NIOSH had any inkling that this was true.

I have letters dating back to 2005 from then-OCAS director Larry Elliott, who

said, no, there was no film badge data at ald for General Steel Industries. And I'd also like to put on the record that it was I, not anybody else, that brought up the issue of film badge sensitivity because it hadn't been discussed before. It hadn't been analyzed before.

And so, you know I brought it up. I brought it up at the September 20<sup>th</sup> meeting, and Dr. Neton said, well, we've already analyzed that. And so, we will bring forth that report.

So, in a fairly short while, I did get a report on -- from Dr. Macievic's paper, and it was dated August 2010. So, I thought, gee, that's kind of strange. So, it was done in August of 2010, and it's just being circulated in November of 2011.

So, the next day, I have an email from Josh Kinman, I believe, that says, oh, that report I sent you yesterday was -- the

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date was in error. And so, there's a new report attached, a date-corrected report, that says October of 2011.

So, anyway -- I mean August of 2011. Excuse me. So, I just don't know. My own opinion is, despite what Paul just said, it's that if Landauer is supposed to have total credibility, then they should know, they should have in their records exactly what kind of film badges they supplied to General Steel Industries, including the types of film.

And I too have been to the ORAU museum website, and seen the fact that Landauer has at least, at least three different kinds of film badges shown on those pages. So, to say that they -- you know, they didn't just issue one kind of film badge and one kind of film, that's not true.

MR. DELL: Comment please.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Are you done, Dr.

McKeel?

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

1	DR. MCKEEL: Yes. 151
2	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay, who else
3	was commenting?
4	MR. DELL: I have a comment. When
5	I first started at General Steel in '56, I
6	don't know what was in the film badge, but it
7	was a different shape, a larger film badge,
8	than what I had in '68 and '70. There was a
9	difference there.
10	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, I think
11	we're aware of that. In fact
12	MR. DELL: And then there was one
13	other thing. The dosimeters, you guys get
14	real technical. I'll tell you how technical
15	General Steel was. Every day, we calibrated
16	the dosimeter and took the reading on it at
17	the end of the day and wrote it down. The
18	next day, we recalibrated.
19	We didn't send it in and out. That
20	was the use of the dosimeter.
21	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Those are the

1	those are the pocket dosimeters, I believe. 152
2	MR. DELL: Yes.
3	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right. Yes,
4	actually we agree that, prior to Landauer,
5	there probably was a different supplier. Dr.
6	Anigstein suggested it might've been a
7	Tracerlab badge. I think there was a picture.
8	I don't know if it's available to you. It's
9	in the report. Maybe Dr. McKeel
10	MR. DELL: I saw it, and it's a
11	larger badge than what we had in the later
12	years.
13	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right. It's
14	larger than the Landauer badge.
15	MR. DELL: Yes.
16	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right. It had a
17	larger opening. That's the one that I was
18	referring to. It might've been a Tracerlab.
19	We're not sure on that. Thank you for that
20	input. That's also helpful.
21	MR. RAMSPOTT: Dr. Ziemer, this is

1 John Ramspott. 153 2 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, John. 3 MR. RAMSPOTT: Can Т make а 4 comment? 5 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: You sure can. 6 MR. RAMSPOTT: I'm going to refer 7 back to Dr. Mauro and his statement earlier. We're hearing a lot about film, 8 and we're 9 hearing a lot about filters, and we're hearing 10 a lot of data. Your meeting did say it was going to be kind of the early years. 11 12 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right. 13 MR. RAMSPOTT: To go on the record, you have no film. You have no filter, and you 14 15 have no data. You have no badges prior to, I 16 believe, '64 or late '63. 17 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: I think that is 18 correct. MR. RAMSPOTT: Now, everything else 19 is hypothetical, would be, maybe. 20 And then I 21 back to the ORAU website, and it's easy

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1	Google search, ORAU radiation badges. And when
2	that website comes up, there's a button I
3	didn't hit until about two weeks ago.
4	It's called the info button. It's
5	right on the front page. When you click on
6	that, there's a chart on there that shows
7	everybody's badges, and what they're good for,
8	and what they can do. And Landauer gives
9	their accuracy rating on there.
LO	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right.
11	MR. RAMSPOTT: Anybody looked at
L2	it? Do they know what the rating is? I'll
L3	share it with you. Gamma 20 percent.
L4	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Twenty percent,
L5	yes.
L6	MR. RAMSPOTT: Beta 20 percent.
L7	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right.
L8	MR. RAMSPOTT: That means the badge
L9	misses 80 percent, doesn't it?
20	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: No, no.

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MR. RAMSPOTT:

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What does it mean?

1 CHAIRMAN It's plus 1 Pr ZIEMER: 2 For example, a reading of 10 might've minus. been 8 or 12. 3 MR. RAMSPOTT: Okay, but when you 4 5 add up all those readings at the end of a month, wouldn't you still end up with missing 6 7 80 percent? 8 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: No, no. For 9 example, if you had 10 readings of 10, would be 100. 10 11 MR. RAMSPOTT: Okay. 12 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: The true value 13 might've been 120, or it might've been 80. It might've been 80. In other words, it's a plus 14 15 or minus. It's an error -- it's an error 16 band. 17 It's like when you weigh yourself 18 on the scale, and if you weigh 200 pounds, 19 maybe you really weigh 201 199, 20 something like that. How accurate is it? 21 MR. RAMSPOTT: I just the saw

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1	accuracy 20 percent, and I was trying 156
2	figure that out.
3	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, it's a plus
4	or minus value.
5	MR. RAMSPOTT: Okay, then I'm just
6	going to defer back to my point.
7	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay.
8	MR. RAMSPOTT: No badges
9	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: No, you're right.
10	We're aware. The early period well, I
11	think we're not necessarily saying no badges.
12	We're saying we don't have records.
13	MR. RAMSPOTT: Well, yes.
14	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes.
15	MR. RAMSPOTT: That's a valid
16	point.
17	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: We think there
18	were badges. We have a photograph. We have
19	worker testimony that tells us there were
20	badges.
21	MR. RAMSPOTT: We don't know if

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that guy wearing that badge got toasted, 159
we?
CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: We only know
MR. RAMSPOTT: We don't have any
reports, do we?
CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: We don't. That's
exactly right.
MEMBER BEACH: Paul, I have a
comment. I know it is close to the lunch
hour. Just in keeping with the matrix, we're
talking about issue number 4, and I think I
heard Bob's comment, was that he recommends or
SC&A recommends that we rest this issue, which
would be close that issue. Is that correct?
CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: For film badges?
MEMBER BEACH: Film badges.
DR. ANIGSTEIN: What is Issue 4?
DR. NETON: In response to film

badges at high energy.

DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yes. No -- yes.

No, I think we're completely satisfied. This

is one of the easier easier things 150 resolve, that we're completely satisfied that the film badges are responsive -- if anything, over-responsive to high energies, and just to echo Dr. Ziemer's comment in response to Dr. types McKeel about the different of badges, it would be inappropriate, let's say, calibration of dose do versus film density on one type of film and apply it to another.

the calibration, But long as which is done on every batch of film that is used by Landauer, and for that particular type of film for all the workers, then the calibration is valid. And as far question of, well, we had several types film. There were two types of -- three or four.

We had two types of film in the Los

Alamos report. There were two other types of

film in the two sources cited by Greq

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Macievic, and they all -- the details afe slightly different, but they all have the same over-respond. general shape. They The response going up after 1 MeV, and they overrespond, and this is understandable because film is composed primarily of silver Slightly different mixes bromide. slightly different other chemicals added, but it's the basic film.

The basic thing is if you energy into the film, you're going to get a in terms of -- after the film is response developed in terms of density. So, again, the type of filter, the thickness of the filter, would be would make quantitative fractional difference.

The number would be slightly different. There would be an over-response by a certain percentage, over by a slightly different percentage. But the general physics does not change.

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CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Ι think is on the money, Josie. point That would appear to close that particular issue. We're trying to focus today on the early years, and this is outside the early years, but it came up in part because of the question whether film badges were in use prior to this period And somehow we got into what badges were used and when, but if the -- if the Work Group is agreeable, we would agree to close that issue. Any objection to that?

MEMBER MUNN: Not at all, no.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: But after lunch, we want to come back to the main issue of the SEC itself in the early years, and evaluate where we are. So, we're going to take a one-hour break for lunch, and then we'll return at ten after one.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the record at 12:09 p.m. and resumed at 1:23 p.m.)

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Let me just check before MR. KATZ: get started on the line for Dr. Poston. Are you on the line with us? No, okay. Petitioners still CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: on the line? MR. KATZ: Petitioners on the line? DR. MCKEEL: Yes, this is Dan McKeel. CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, okay. MR. KATZ: Okay.

Okay, we want to CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: focus item 5 on on the agenda consideration of the question of whether or will NIOSH model bound doses not with sufficient accuracy in the early years. focus here is primarily on the -- what we might call the radium period. This is pre cobalt-60, pre-iridium, pretty much pre-film badge records. So, we have some some record that lapses --

DR. ANIGSTEIN: Right, except for -

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- you know two things about the film  $\operatorname{badges}_{162}$  One is one worker's film badge record, and also the statement of the AEC application.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right.

DR. ANIGSTEIN: For all of the years they'd been using radium, you never exceed -- no one exceeded the AEC, the then existing AEC regulations.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right. So, there are those records. But just to focus on this because we talked about before, separating these periods in terms of thinking about the SEC, and we were going to consider the issue of whether there might be an SEC identified for the earlier period.

So, I have indicated here we want to give NIOSH an opportunity to reiterate their position, and make any comments they want on the early period to have SC&A reiterate their position, and any comments on the early period, and we can consider them

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whether or not the Work Group wishes to make  $\frac{3}{16}$  recommendation to the full Board on that early period.

And let me also add that if we don't make a recommendation, that doesn't preclude us doing it at some other point if you may feel like you're not prepared to make a recommendation one way or the other right now. But at least we want to address that question.

Let me ask Dave Allen to start for NIOSH.

MR. ALLEN: Well, the White Paper we sent out last -- I wouldn't even call it a couple months ago. It was last -- we discussed it in the last Work Group meeting. The White Paper included during the radium era an estimated dose radiography items out in the plant, including people breaking the barrier and walking through.

It also included a similar estimate

for the cobalt era for radiography out in the plant, as well as cobalt radiography inside the -- what I call the radiography room in --

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER:

Building 6, yes.

MR. ALLEN: What it did not include is the -- an estimate for the radium radiography inside of the radiography room. We didn't think it exists. We thought they built that for the cobalt era.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: But we have worker testimony now indicating it was there during the radium era as well.

the White MR. ALLEN: Yes. So, Paper version should be revised to include an estimate for radium radiography inside the radiography room, and the intent of the White Paper was to try to estimate all the major essentially sources, and to we were intending to take the highest one for each era to be the bounding case.

So, I think we have to include that

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radiography inside the radiography room if the
radiography out in the plant is higher than
that, we
CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: You have to see
what it is in the radiography or in the
building 6 area as well.
MR. ALLEN: Right.
CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: You would have to
do that yet.
MR. ALLEN: Yes.
CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: But in terms of
doing that, your methodology would be similar
in terms of putting the source in the room,
calculating doses into the into the control
office and at the door and outside the room, I
assume. Right?
MR. ALLEN: Yes, we would probably

MR. ALLEN: Yes, we would probably start with a similar approach that we'd used for the cobalt and then modify it for the different source.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Difference in the

1 gamma.

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MR. ALLEN: And the gamma. They added some shielding when they went to the cobalt.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Which they didn't have during the radium era.

MR. ALLEN: Right.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay.

MR. ALLEN: So, the intent would be to start with the same approach, and modify it for the appropriate conditions. The only other change I can think of on there is that the St. Louis Testing: we did not know the time frame that they were operating. It was not the limiting factor prior to '62, but it was after. Now it's looking more like it was around 1964 when they started working. So, we might have to break it up into three periods.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: You had some St.

Louis Testing dose assigned to the early
period originally. Is that correct?

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1 MR. ALLEN: Ιt was one ŧ₽€ 2 models that we modeled the St. Louis Testing and said it could've been any of the covered 3 It was not limiting -- it was not the 4 period. 5 bounding dose until after '62. 6 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right. So, I think now I would 7 MR. ALLEN: have to say after '64, and have a different 8 9 dose between '62 and '64. 10 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Thank you. DR. ANIGSTEIN: Late '64 apparently 11 judging just because of the 12 in, came 13 names of who he dealt with. 14 MR. ALLEN: Okay. 15 DR. ANIGSTEIN: It sounded like 16 late '64. 17 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay, but NIOSH's 18 position is that they can reconstruct dose in early period, including dose resulting 19 individuals walking through roped-off 20 from

areas?

MR. ALLEN: Yes.

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CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Thank you. Now, Bob, do you want to summarize for SC&A, and what is SC&A's position on that issue and any related comments?

DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yes. I put on the screen the one sort of summary chart on the radium exposure, and I think that this is a --I think this is a call the Board will have to make in terms of we have one report -- I mean a report of one incident, and the remarkable thing is it's about that report attributed to a different else at someone time.

Someone heard it from someone that this radium source was taken, and the circumstances differ from account to account, and they differ as to how it was recovered, and to where it was taken, and where it was found.

So, there is a -- what I would do

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if I was putting another bullet item, I would say incident of stolen or mistakenly taken radium source, with a big question mark after it.

MR. KATZ: I'm sorry, Bob. Can I just interrupt you a second because, although it's not interfering with us, I don't know that it's not interfering with people on the line.

Someone on the phone has a phone open and a number being dialed in. Whoever that is, you need to mute your phone, because I think everyone else on the phone is listening to an incoming phone call. Okay, I don't hear anything now.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay, thanks.

MR. KATZ: Sorry.

DR. ANIGSTEIN: So, there may have been such an incident. We don't really -- the accounts have been different. Two accounts are similar, but again one is from the

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recently deceased supervisor who described his colleague, named on the application, slightly senior person, who actually went up in an airplane with a Geiger counter was described.

The question is, can you really detect the radium. They have -- radium sources with Geiger counter flying in an airplane, which I guess has, well, probably a minimum speed of 100 miles an hour. I don't think --

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: But if someone -let's assume that the event happened. I think
there's reason to think it probably happened,
but if the individual who had that exposure
made a claim, and indicated that they were
involved in that, that would be accounted for
just as the case where the site -- where the
betatron was turned on inappropriately when
someone was in the room.

That person's dose could be taken care of.

1	DR. ANIGSTEIN: And that it's
2	not inappropriate for me to say I checked that
3	person's dose, and there was nothing on his
4	film badge.
5	MR. ALLEN: Which incident are
6	we're talking
7	DR. ANIGSTEIN: The gentleman who
8	was on the phone this morning said that the
9	betatron would turn on when he was in the
10	room. This was during the period
11	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, I don't
12	know whether it's the same person, or
13	DR. ANIGSTEIN: No, it is the same
14	person.
15	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: We don't want to
16	get into that, but in the case of an alleged
17	event, NIOSH does add that into that
18	individual's dose.
19	DR. ANIGSTEIN: Okay.
20	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: If they say they
21	were in if there's pretty good reason to

think that a person took that source home, 1 2 they will reconstruct that dose because --3 DR. ANIGSTEIN: The only other only other 4 thing the thing about the 5 incident, conclusion, is it general lax 6 indicate Ι mean, having been 7 radiation safety officer myself at one time --I wasn't a certified health physicist, the 8 9 first thing you do is maintain security over 10 your sources. mean you don't need very much 11 12 training to know you put things under lock and 13 So, if they didn't do that, that does key. indicate some laxity during the period let's 14 15 say pre '57. 16 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: That's probably 17 when they put locks on the doors apparently. 18 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yes, right, because one radiographer said that when he came back 19 to work in '56 or maybe '57, there was a lock 20 21 on the door, which hadn't been there before.

So, that -- because of that. Someone else said the same thing: they put a lock on the door after the source was taken.

So, there is some question, and I'm not being concise and to the point. So, first, let's say '53, '54, '55, '56, were the controls really adequate? Well, they didn't have a lock on the door. That's the one thing we know. There was at least one incident.

Whether that just they didn't happen to think anyone could walk in and take the source out of the lead shield -they normally -- there were mean two possibilities my mind. Normally, in the source was kept in the lead shield with a string attached to it, so that you can lift it out with a fish pole. That's a little far fetched to say, oh, here is a big lead shield. Here is a string. Let me see what's at the end of that string.

The other possibility is there was

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exposure being made, and it an was unattended, and with no lock on the radiographer goes away to get film or have lunch or whatever, and somebody walks in and sees this shiny little brass plumb-bob sitting the middle of the room, there in doesn't realize that there is a casting there. Doesn't realize that there is film, and just picks it up and walks off with it.

Maybe. Or maybe it was being done elsewhere in the plant where occasionally it got -- and then it would just -- apparently, they put it on something like a golf tee, like a little cup, and it just sits there. You don't leave it on the string then.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right.

DR. ANIGSTEIN: The string is attached to it so that you can retrieve it. And so, it's conceivable that somebody saw it and didn't know what was going on, and took it. You know, it's --

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CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: So, that may 195 may not have been related to locks on the doors because if it was out --

DR. ANIGSTEIN: They wouldn't have done it anyway, but they may have just --

Right.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER:

DR. ANIGSTEIN: So, the answer is, who knows what was going on? From the -- from '57 on, it seems like at least according to the testimony of one worker, that they had some decent controls. And furthermore, regardless of how careful -- you know, whether they controlled everything, the fact that -- oops, got locked out again.

Unless we believe that they -unless we believe -- I'm going to put it in
extreme terms. Unless we believe that GSI was
a criminal enterprise and deliberately
perjured themselves, I think it's a criminal
act to submit an application to a government
agency with material false statements.

And unless they deliberately perjured themselves and directly lied and deliberately falsified records, they did in fact go with -- stick with the AEC limits. They're pretty high. I mean if I was radiation safety officer supervisor, wouldn't brag about the fact that somebody got 15 rem in a year.

MEMBER MUNN: No.

DR. ANIGSTEIN: But nevertheless, they said basically during '54, '53, it would've been under 15, and after '55, under 12. Twelve point five, unless I made an error somehow.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, keep in mind the ALARA concept wasn't really being utilized in the '50s in most places. There was not a lifetime dose limit.

MEMBER MUNN: No.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: It was quarterly and annual limits, and in fact, though it is

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not mentioned here, the quarterly limit at one
time was a sliding limit. It was 3 rems in
any 13 weeks, and it wasn't calendar quarters.
The NRC specifically changed it to
calendar quarters because it was very hard to
administer a sliding calendar quarter.
MEMBER MUNN: As Bob points out,
although it's nothing to be very pleased with,
nevertheless
CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: The goal was to
stay below the limit. Now it is to be as low
as reasonably achievable. But that's a
different mind set.
DR. ANIGSTEIN: And they all but
they implicitly admitted that there were
instances where people reached the limit
because otherwise they said no one exceeded

If no one exceeded half the limit, the limit. they would trumpet that.

> MEMBER MUNN: Of course.

So, they couldn't DR. ANIGSTEIN:

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have had high doses, and again the -- and the second thing, whether you agree -- Dave and I may disagree about how long the fishing pole was, or how long the -- how long they held it, but the fact that this one radiographer gave us his -- gave us his report and it comes out to two rem per year, 2 R per year -- they call it rem I think.

rem per year, and he only worked weekends. falls right That these two numbers, this falls right in middle of this range. So, I would go with this, with these numbers, as being plausible bounds based information, upper on some documented information, certainly claimantfavorable.

And yet, it is a number. It's not like we can't reconstruct the dose. Now, the doses to the non-radiographers I think that's a little -- little hazier because of the mere fact that they weren't badged.

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So, here is just an example scenario that they spent, according to the nuclear consultant survey, this was -- no, I'm sorry. According to our calculation, this is the dose rate with both radium sources in use, and according to the NCC survey, they would give a plausible occupancy of 25 percent, which seems reasonable.

I mean, no worker was stationed out there at a guard duty station outside that door. He gave it for outside the wall, but I put him outside the door because that's the least shielded location.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Now, we've had worker testimony in this last round here that indicates that the one-and-a-half times the limit distance was in fact used. That was the question we had early on.

DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yes, but that wouldn't apply to this building, see.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: But it could

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apply to the radium used out in --1 180 2 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Outside, yes. But that would've given an even lower dose. 3 But that also has 4 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: 5 implications for the non-radiographers terms of where the boundary was. 6 7 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Right. 8 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: And then if you 9 allow for the fact that they may walk across, and I think both of you have constructed how -10 11 12 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right. 13 I don't think we're MR. ALLEN: very far apart there. They're both smaller. 14 15 They're both kind of а small dose 16 remember. 17 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Well, this is a 18 little higher than that boundary dose because the actual -- the actual exposure rate -- see, 19 20 this already takes the 25 percent 21 The actual exposure rate there is

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1	8.6 mR per hour. Then I take the number 18f
2	hours, multiply by 30 percent, and multiply by
3	the 25 percent
4	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: That's separate
5	from this roped-off area.
6	DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yes, but I'm saying
7	this is the limiting
8	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: That's much
9	higher, yes.
10	DR. ANIGSTEIN: So, if the
11	radiographer is done there, you actually get a
12	higher exposure than if you assume that it was
13	done in the plant. Can't be done in both
14	places because I'm assuming again one curie.
15	So, two sources are there.
16	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Which also is
17	probably unlikely.
18	DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yes. Again, it's a
19	limiting case.
20	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right.
21	DR. ANIGSTEIN: But then you can

source 185 1 is say one source here. One 2 outside. It's a simple --3 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: It's an upper bound. 4 5 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Exactly. Exactly, We're not 6 and that's all we're looking for. 7 looking for realistic, exact. if 8 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Let's see 9 Board Members have comments or questions. 10 information other pieces of that gained since our last meeting on this early 11 12 period: the confirmation that one is 13 badges We don't have the were used. badge numbers. Well, 14 we have one set of 15 numbers based on that one individual. 16 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Right. 17 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: But the actual 18 that film badges were used tells 19 something about the fact that there was

that was one of the questions. Loose cannons

radiation protection program

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in use

just doing this without protection any program; obviously there were some concerns that we've heard today about the -sort of safety programs, leaving the adherence to things unattended and so on, but we also know that we can account for doses of people who traversed the boundaries.

So, the film badge program is one issue. The confirmation that there was a practice of roping off the area to the one-and-a-half times the 2 mR distance, 2 mR per hour distance, is another indication of a --of the presence of a somewhat formalized radiation protection program.

So, we have those additional pieces of information that we didn't really have well established at our last meeting. But so I want us to keep that in mind. So, we have sort of several pieces of information that some -- some better information on practices, and some -- well, I guess it's better information on

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1	the practices.
2	We know we're focusing on the
3	radium sources. We have the additional
4	information of the presence of the use of the
5	sources in building 6, as
6	DR. ANIGSTEIN: And this is what
7	I'm showing on the screen is during what I
8	call the radium era.
9	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Which is?
10	DR. ANIGSTEIN: Which is prior to -
11	- so, here the date on this thing is pre 1962.
12	That's when they filed the application.
13	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right, and is
14	this this is the AEC form that gives the
15	occupational exposure.
16	DR. ANIGSTEIN: Right.
17	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Part of which for
18	this person was at Pittsburgh Testing Company.
19	DR. ANIGSTEIN: That was earlier.
20	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: And then the
21	rest, the 18 quarters that we're referring to,

are General Steel Industries, '53 up to --1 2 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yes, but in reality it wasn't doing radiography. He was employed 3 there in '53, but he was -- the 18 quarters --4 5 you see, the 18 quarters would have been prior to December 31st, 1961. 6 7 Right, CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: understood. 8 9 DR. ANIGSTEIN: So, therefore if you do that, it starts in the middle of '57. 10 Right. 11 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: 12 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Right. Which is 13 consistent with his account. CHAIRMAN 14 ZIEMER: But they 15 accounting for everything from the time he 16 started working, whether he actually worked 17 with radioisotopes or not in '53. 18 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Well, but they say 19 18 quarters. 20 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right. 21 DR. ANIGSTEIN: So, that would only

2	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: It's part of
3	that.
4	DR. ANIGSTEIN: They put is this
5	is when his initial employment but the 18
6	quarters on this you assume they were
7	discontinuous, but I assumed they were
8	continuous. Would've started in the middle of
9	'57.
10	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right.
11	DR. ANIGSTEIN: Which is entirely
12	consistent. He spent two years in the
13	service, so, mid '54 to mid '56. Came out,
14	went back to work, and then started doing
15	radiography in mid '57, if you assume that the
16	18 quarters end prior to '62.
17	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right.
18	DR. ANIGSTEIN: Which is it's
19	not precisely what this individual said, but
20	it's entirely consistent with what he said.
21	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, okay. Okay,

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be --

Wanda, comments or questions? 1 187 2 **MEMBER** MUNN: Yes, quick two When they're talking about things 3 comments. that we did not know before or things that 4 5 have been reassured in the meantime, we do now 6 know -- have been assured by the workers that 7 pencil dosimeters were widely in use. 8 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: As well. 9 MEMBER MUNN: As well, which is always comforting information to have. 10 But we don't have CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: 11 12 the records. 13 without MEMBER MUNN: Even the records, the thought that they would be used 14 15 assures us that there were safety practices in 16 house at the time. 17 other comment is simply 18 reinforce what was said earlier with respect to unusual incidents. Certainly an incident 19 20 of have discussed type that we

relationship to this case would pose enough of

a stir both in the company and certainly 188 the employee's home that even his -- his family certainly wouldn't have been aware that such an occurrence had been factored in his exposure.

So, it does not seem wise to be putting undue amount of emphasis on that incident as having been indicative of anything other than an off-normal incident. It appears to me that we can bound.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Thank you. Josie?

MEMBER BEACH: I guess I'm on the other end of things. I believe that this is still an SEC issue for the early years, '53 through -- what is it, '63. While we have more information, I still don't think we have key things like the documentation, radiation monitoring.

We have varying accounts of what actually happened. We have varying accounts on the men walking through the areas. We have

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two different models right now. While theyire
close, they're still two different models.
So, at this time, I'm still leaning
towards SEC for those earlier years.
CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Actually, the
issue of two different models per se is is
that's more of an issue of what assumptions
I think the modeling is very similar. It's
what assumptions like the length of the pole
and that sort of thing.
MEMBER BEACH: And maybe different
models wasn't correct. Differing concepts
maybe.
CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, but that's a
that's a bounding issue. I think the other
ones that you raise are the type that would
one would consider for an SEC. You're sort of

getting at some levels of uncertainties that you're uncomfortable with.

> MEMBER BEACH: Correct.

My personal CHAIRMAN ZIEMER:

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feeling is -- for the early years is that the bounding models that have been proposed, whether -- aside from the differences in the assumptions on the length of poles and so on, that -- and taking into account in the absence of film badges and those other records, what you won't have on the other employees in any event, that -- the fact that we know the size of those radium sources and -- you know, this is one of those cases where, in my mind, it is much easier to bound because we don't have a complex system like we have in many labs with multiple external, internal, daughter products and all of these things.

We know the outputs of radium sources. We know what doses you can get at various distances. So, even had they had no film badges and no dosimeters, in my mind, we can reconstruct dose.

So, I'm comfortable in doing that in the early years. I don't think that still

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necessarily precludes us from -- because 191 this point, if we don't make a recommendation for an SEC, we're not -- we haven't ruled it out because there's some other issues that still need to be closed.

I will still want to hear about -I think some of us are satisfied with why we - why we are where we are with respect to
iridium, and the -- when did they start having
use the 80-curie sources and so on.

But there's actually conflicting testimony from the workers on this, and it's not like we're rejecting the workers. They're not all agreeing on when these things were there, and when they started.

We have some workers saying that no
-- in fact, one that was indicated to us as
being the person to pay attention to today,
telling us that the iridium was only from St.
Louis Testing. So, we -- there's some
conflicting testimony there.

A lot of that may move us into the post '62 era because that's when the cobalt sources also started to be used. But we have what we have right now. We have the radium part of the radiography.

We have the cobalt and the St. Louis Testing stuff. We have all that. We have yet to get the final modeling from NIOSH for the betatrons, and we have coming to us in December the exposure model for the old and new betatrons, the air activation model, the model for the uranium activities, the steel activation from the betatron, and then reconciling the dose estimates with the dose records.

So, all of that is still coming in December, and some of this could also impact on the decisions here. Another thing, and I haven't asked for a formal motion, but I've heard I think two of us are leaning toward not an SEC, one leaning toward. We haven't heard

1 from Mark, Poston or so they need 2 opportunity to weigh this stuff in as well. 3 My -- I think -- I was very hopeful 4 we would sort of be in a position to put this 5 part to rest now, but we do have two other 6 committee members who haven't weighed in, 7 number one, and again, Ι don't think precludes us, but it appears to me that it'll 8 9 difficult for make us 10 recommendation at the upcoming meeting. The other two Members -- I assume 11 12 Mark and John have gotten all the documents. 13 MR. KATZ: Yes. CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: I don't know if 14 15 John has because he's had some computer 16 problems in the transmittal of these. So, 17 that's also an issue. 18 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Mark, I think, only got the redacted version because he was not --19 Mark didn't -- I've sent 20 MR. KATZ:

Mark the non-redacted version.

1	DR. ANIGSTEIN: You did?
2	MR. KATZ: Yes, but Mark has been
3	sort of I need to speak to Mark because
4	Mark has really not been engaged in this Work
5	Group for quite a long time. Dr. Poston has
6	made some of these meetings or parts of these
7	meetings.
8	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, so we need
9	to find out
10	MR. KATZ: So, I need to speak to
11	Mark.
12	MEMBER MUNN: On where he is with
13	it.
14	MR. KATZ: On where he is with it,
15	I don't he hasn't come to meetings. He
16	hasn't participated by phone, and he hasn't
17	even responded to these materials I've been
18	sending to him in any way.
19	Now, I know he Mark cut back on
20	a number of Work Groups as he transitioned to
21	his new job. I don't know. It's unclear to

me whether in this case of this Work Group whether he intended to step back on this Work Group as he did on some other Work Groups, or just doesn't have the time to attend the meetings.

But I will be speaking with Mark about that. I know John Poston is still an active member. That's clear to me. He hasn't made this meeting, which he intended to make at least intermittently today, but then he's missed all this, and he needs to see not just the materials that we've forwarded but he needs to see the transcript of the discussion today because I think it's an important transcript. I think workers have said a lot today on the record which is helpful, as well as all of your discussions.

DR. ANIGSTEIN: He got the redacted version of this -- of the presentation. I took all the names out. I left other identifying information.

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1	MR. KATZ: Right. Some materials
2	I've been sending him to another government
3	address he has, even though
4	DR. ANIGSTEIN: I'm talking about
5	Poston now.
6	MR. KATZ: Oh, John Poston.
7	DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yes.
8	MR. KATZ: Right, and John Poston
9	has been limited because he hasn't had access
10	to his CDC account recently. So, right, he's
11	getting only material that is PA-cleared.
12	DR. ANIGSTEIN: I wouldn't call it
13	PA-cleared.
14	MR. KATZ: No, no, no. I know what
15	you're talking about. You're just
16	DR. ANIGSTEIN: Presentation.
17	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: All right, but
18	that's just leaving names out. That doesn't
19	per se affect the technical information in
20	there, I don't think.
21	MR. KATZ: Yes.

1 CHAIRMAN So, that 14p ZIEMER: 2 itself shouldn't be a barrier to --3 MR. KATZ: Oh, no. I think John 4 can read the reports and carry on with that. 5 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Can -- the other thing I think could be considered -- some of 6 7 these issues, for example whether or not the 80 curie source was there before '68, 8 9 know, even if it was, does that affect the 10 modeling very much? I think maybe you can look at that 11 12 data, or maybe you have already. You know, we 13 how it models in after '68, and the would be, all right, let's suppose 14 question 15 for some weird reason which we can't figure 16 out -- it doesn't make sense really to me --17 if it were there two years earlier, what does 18 that mean in terms of the model? I think you can still -- you can 19 20 still bound with it. They changed the number 21 little bit. I don't know if you'd say

something similar to that on the --1 198 2 ALLEN: Well, like MR. you mentioned with the conflicting information and 3 all that stuff, the one consistent piece of 4 5 information with the 80-curie source is that it was used in the betatron building. 6 7 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right. 8 MR. ALLEN: So, I could try to include some analysis of that with --9 10 With CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: the betatrons do the of that 11 when you rest 12 analysis. The other thing I would mention is 13 if there were an iridium source, and again, that is one of those conflicting things, but 14 15 it -- and the one license obviously does allow them to use iridium instead of cobalt. 16 17 DR. ANIGSTEIN: That was in '72. 18 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, it's later here, but suppose that were the case, the --19 bounding 20 the value probably changes 21 little whether you use iridium or cobalt.

1 DR. ANIGSTEIN: It's the opposite 2 It's much less. I would think it 3 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: would be less. If you use iridium -- whether 4 5 you use iridium or cobalt as far as the film, 6 you've got to get the same dose to the film to get the image. 7 8 you may have to leave the 9 iridium source out a little longer to do that, so that -- but my intuitive -- but you could 10 verify this readily. 11 12 DR. ANIGSTEIN: But if the -- the 13 scattered radiation, nobody stands there in front of the source. 14 15 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: No. 16 DR. ANIGSTEIN: So, for the 17 scattered radiation or penetrating through the 18 shield, there's going to be much less than with cobalt --19 20 Yes, because the CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: 21 spectrum is So, just lower energy.

cognizant of that. I don't -- I don't think we gain much by having a great deal of argument about exactly when the sources came there. If they were there earlier, what would it look like? And my -- I don't think it's going to change it very much. That's the only point I'm going to make.

DR. ANIGSTEIN: The only exposure scenario --

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Probably would be less if you substituted the iridium for the

DR. ANIGSTEIN: The only exposure you have with scenario that the 80-curie cobalt is if somebody is on the unshielded roof of the betatron building. That's higher dose from the than you even get betatron.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, but they've modeled that already, I think, and

MR. ALLEN: Bob modeled that.

## **NEAL R. GROSS**

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cobalt.

All right, but 201 1 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: 2 DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yes. 3 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: But nonetheless, it can be accounted for, if necessary. 4 5 let me also -- I want to give the petitioner 6 an opportunity to comment as well on all of 7 talked about that we've here. McKeel? 8 9 DR. ANIGSTEIN: And we also -- just 10 an addition here. In the AEC records, they -when they did get the legal 80-curie source, 11 12 they did -- actually did a radiation survey 13 with the source, exposed source, the in betatron. 14 15 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right. 16 DR. ANIGSTEIN: And we have that 17 data. 18 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Ι have that number, right. Okay, Dr. McKeel, are you on 19 20 the line? You had some comments. 21 DR. MCKEEL: Yes, I am on the line.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Do you have comments or questions at this point?

DR. MCKEEL: Just a few comments, please. We have not heard from Dr. Mauro today about his view of where things stand versus the early SEC, and certainly at the last meeting of this Work Group, he has made impassioned arguments for an early-year SEC.

So, I would personally be very interested in what he might have to say at this point. I also would have to say that as far as a vote on an SEC today, as much as I would like to move this along, I do think it is premature with two Board Members absent, as you said, and also because whether you can accurately bound the dose for the early years is dependent on some facts.

I must disagree with you that it's not important whether there was an iridium-192 source there because at least two people have said that he was there during the 1950's. So,

that replaces there in the early period, and in that case, you would have to calculate a dose for it, and consider that along with the radium-226 dose.

And the other thing that I just cannot really understand is, we heard today Mr. Dell, Leroy, say without any equivocation that he would go down to the 6 building area, and from the betatron area, and to do that you would have to pass through Buildings 10, 9, you know, the intervening area into building 6.

And he said he was impressed that, on this daily tour that he made, that you would often find the small source out in the plant being used. And on intense questioning about this, by both the Board and SC&A, he said that, no, that this could be anywhere in the plant.

So -- and he estimated in fact that 90 percent of the time those smaller sources

were used out in the plant. So, if we're talking about an SEC, which as it stands right now is for the whole GSI workforce, then all of the previous comments that Dr. Mauro has made, with which I have strongly agreed, that you don't have any real data.

Yes, you know the strength of the radium source. You do not know the strength of the iridium source from GSI, which I argue is still -- there's quite a bit of evidence that it was there.

You don't know -- you might know the strength of that, but you don't know how long it was used, where it was used, how many times it was used, how many people were exposed to it when it was being used.

But what you do know from Mr. Dell, which I think is powerful new testimony, is that there were frequent violations of the roped-off area, and as he told the story today, you know, yes, he said a tape was

always put up, actually one-and-a-half times the safe distance from the source. But he also said right after that that people would walk under that tape and go next to the -- go next to the -- could walk within a foot of the source and often did.

In other words, he's painting a picture that people did what was convenient. So, I just think the occupancy time of that zone, and so forth, that they're not really based on plausible assumptions.

think that yes, some dose has calculated there, all been in but the assumptions were wrong. The assumptions were that people -- I remember at the last meeting that all during St. Louis Testing, the use of their GSI, somebody was sources at always around watching and surveilling.

Now we hear that when the GSI sources were used out in the plant, frequently nobody was watching them. So -- and when

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people say, oh, and most -- most is one of the words I dislike in scientific quantitative discussions. What does most mean? Does that mean a majority? It really has no exact meaning. That, most of the time the shots were short.

Well, is that 98 percent of the time, or 50 percent of the time? Who knows?

time, or 50 percent of the time? Who knows?

And so, there's a huge amount of uncertainty about all these assumptions.

So, I guess the bottom line is right at this moment I would appreciate hearing Dr. Mauro's opinion. Of course, he doesn't have to say that, but I would love to hear what he has to say about things.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, actually I would too, and I wasn't sure. John, are you on the line?

DR. MAURO: Oh, yes. I've been on the line all along.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: I thought maybe

## **NEAL R. GROSS**

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you would say something during the SC&Z portion but I didn't hear from you.

DR. MAURO: No, I was just listening earlier when Mr. Dell -- I found Mr. Dell's material to be the most pertinent in just about everything that we discussed. Yes, you know, you do come to a perspective, and I do have a perspective.

What it looks like is we have a time period starting in I guess around '53, going up the end of the SEC period, which I believe is '66.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes.

DR. MAURO: The time period. And I'm starting to think in terms of increments of -- I call it elbows in our knowledge, or how our knowledge changes regarding the level of information we have, and how that bears on with sufficient accuracy, reconstructing doses with sufficient accuracy.

It seems to me starting around '62,

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'63 to the end of the SEC period, we have no lot of regulatory controls. We have film badge data. We have programs in place, which argues toward the ability to reconstruct doses fairly well. Then we have an interesting period, which is I would say from '57 or '56, up to '62, where we have information, and the information goes toward the interviews, where have little bit of conflicting information regarding the degree of control that there was over the radium sources, and perhaps other sources.

We hear from Mr. Dell, and we also heard from, I won't mention the name, but the other person that was interviewed, where we get information in one case that there was a considerable amount of control. In another case, there was some marginal or a lesser degree of control.

So, if that -- and we also have information, as Bob has explained, sort of

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like weight of evidence. We have information on at least one person's exposure records. We also have information on the filing for the application for the license, which argues toward what types of exposures or experience. That's where we heard about no one received more than the radiation exposure limits, the 15 and 12 rem.

So, all of a sudden we have this time period which starts to say that, well, we have information for '56, '57. I'm not too sure where the line is, but to '62, where clearly there's a lesser degree of control than we have for '62, but there is some degree of control with some conflicting information.

This is an area that goes toward weight of evidence in my mind, and it's a tough call. Then we have the time period before '56 to earlier. That time period seems that we have very little information. We have less information on the degree of controls

that there might've been in place.

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We have -- I guess from everything I heard, I guess we have -- all we know is that there were film badges. Other than that, we have some information -- in other words, we don't have the benefit of the knowledge that was given to us around the '56 to '62 period example, related to, for the 18-month exposure, that 2 rem per year for that worker testimony that regarding the there control.

I'll call him Mr. P testified that yes, they did have good controls instituted and managed in terms of barriers. But he, that person, joined -- I believe, was active in those types of activities and starting in '56-'57 time period.

So, then I have this last time period, from '52 to '56, which I'm a little bit more troubled by in terms of having adequate information to come to some judgment

here. So, then of course we have this incident that may or may not have taken place, and that was -- that happened also, it sounds like if it did happen, it was in that '52, '53 to '56, '57 time frame.

And so, taking it all together, I break it up into those three time segments, and the one that gives me -- I am most concerned with is the very early time period, '52-'53, whenever the beginning is, '53, up to about, let's say, '56. I'm feeling a little bit better about being able to reconstruct doses, although there's some concerns because of conflicting information from, let's say, '56-'57 up to '62.

Starting in '62, I feel as if things -- you know, you got a good handle on the problem. I guess that's the best I could do. I wish I could have a stronger answer for you, but that's my perspective.

DR. MCKEEL: I appreciate it very

much. 1 212 2 Thank you, John, CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: 3 for those comments. Let's see of there's any further input here in the people around the 4 5 table. 6 MR. RAMSPOTT: Dr. Ziemer, it's 7 John Ramspott. Yes, John. 8 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: 9 MR. RAMSPOTT: Ι just want 10 clarify one -- I think this is an easy point. Mr. Leroy Dell, if he was still on the phone, 11 12 told myself and Terry Dutko without any doubt 13 that that plumb-bob was stolen out of Building, not 6 Building, and that -- that was 14 15 one of those leave it alone, unsupervised 16 tests. 17 And it was a plumb-bob, which my understanding was radium in plumb-bobs. 18 Yes, that makes 19 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: 20 It probably was more sense to me, too, John.

taken when it was out in use, rather than

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somebody going into the room where they stored it and taking it out of its shield.

MR. RAMSPOTT: Mr. Dell knows the individual that was actually the radiographer, and the guy went to lunch. So, I mean if you guys want to reinterview Mr. Dell to confirm that, but Terry Dutko and myself had that story told to us by Mr. Dell when we first met him.

Another point is Mr. P's radiation badge report, I guess I just heard that that went back to '57, if I understand the 18 quarters. So, there's absolutely no badge information prior to '57 for anybody, unless I'm missing something.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: I think that's correct. That's -- that matches what we have.

DR. ANIGSTEIN: That was correct for Mr. P's badge. We back-calculate; we simply count 18 quarters --

MR. RAMSPOTT: We have no reports

## **NEAL R. GROSS**

1	from anybody 214
2	MR. KATZ: Hey, John, hold on one
3	second, please.
4	DR. ANIGSTEIN: John, wait. But
5	the other information is that they used film
6	badges from at least '53 on, because we have
7	the photograph, and the statement the
8	unqualified statement made by GSI on the AEC
9	application during all the time they used
10	radium, no one ever exceeded the AEC limits.
11	So, that was one of my suggested
12	limits was simply assume that the AEC limit is
13	the limiting dose, which is a very high dose,
14	by the way. Twelve rem or even up to 15 rem
15	in the early years is a very high dose.
16	MR. RAMSPOTT: Having the picture
17	and no badge reports is my point.
18	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes.
19	MR. RAMSPOTT: The picture is one
20	thing, but the actual reports: they do not
21	exist. So, essentially, there's no badge

1	information for '57 to '53.
2	DR. ANIGSTEIN: Except the
3	statement based on badge information that
4	existed at the time, saying there was it
5	never exceeded AEC limits.
6	MR. RAMSPOTT: Know what, Bob? You
7	danced around a little bit today, but you were
8	talking about the legalities of a company
9	lying to the AEC. I read all over those
10	reports that there's not going to be any
11	isotopes out in the plant, too. So, I don't
12	know how anybody can believe, and it's in that
13	FOIA. If somebody is blatant, you got people
14	saying those things are out there in the
15	plant.
16	You got on the report it's not
17	going to happen that way, so I don't think I'd
18	believe anything they said.
19	DR. MCKEEL: Dr. Ziemer, this is
20	Dan McKeel. May I amplify that point, please?
21	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Sure, Dan.

MCKEEL: I am also extremely DR. distressed that there's a -- I would call it kind of unquestioning acceptance that whatever is written down in a license application is this includes the 1962 forward true, and safety, which has been referred to as controls.

a lot more from various workers that things that are written down as ironclad procedures in the safety procedures at GSI, drafted by Dr. Konneker, and NCC, that those things simply happened; for never example, that the crane operators in the Building 6 radiography facility had to notify the supervisor at -- before they were going to come over that building.

We have testimony that that actually never happened. And there are a lot more things like that, and I can't go into all of them today. I would be happy to do that.

But as a matter of fact, for

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everybody there, I would make the following blanket There statement. is little very corroboration, by either records or **AEC** reports, anything that compliance or that complete safety program that is outlined in 1962 license application, and repeated and over through into the 1970s, when was а major change in the safety officer.

lots of evidence from There's workers that those things never happened, and there's almost no corroboration that they did The training program -- this is not happen. brought out today by Mr. Dell, but it is important to say it. He said the training at GSI was extremely poor, and I would say from everything that I've learned that that's a true statement.

And just as an example, which was not brought out today, there was supposed to be annual AEC testing of the radiographers at

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GSI, and as far as we know there is some testimony that 'identifying information redacted', who is deceased, gave informal talks about radiation safety before 1962.

We also have direct evidence from Mr. Dell to John Ramspott, who related to me that as a matter of fact, he was one of the four people that he's aware of that ever took a formal AEC radiation safety test, and he took that test at Washington University.

It was given by Dr. Konneker. In fact, he's the only living worker that we are aware of that even acknowledges knowing Dr. Konneker, but apparently, Leroy Dell knew him and about him quite well.

But the salient point about the radiation safety program quality at GSI is that when Mr. Dell took his examination, radiographer's exam, at Washington U under Dr. Konneker, Bill Davis also took it, and two other people took it as well. And all the

other people flunked, including 'identifying information redacted', who was the head safety man in the later years after 1966, for example, and had some part in radiation safety very early on.

So, three of the chief folks who ran the radiation safety flunked the test, did not pass it, and only Mr. Dell passed the test. That's not a good record for an incontrol, very well run radiation safety program.

fact, in most places, what In is should happen those people could continue in their jobs if they didn't pass the qualifying test to be certified radiographer. And Mr. Dell mentioned this morning that he was licensed but some of the other people that did radiography were not licensed.

So, I want to say, just from what I've heard, that I do not believe the vast

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majority of what's written on paper, and you can refer to it by various things, but I would say, having been in the grants business actively for -- including the Army, actually, for 35 years, that people in all fields, many fields, certainly medicine and certainly Army research, put things in grants that may be well intentioned at the time they are written, but they just never get followed through on. And some of the time, for practical reasons, and sometimes because people never intended to follow through on them.

I'm suggesting that the situation largely at GSI, and I could go through this in much larger detail, but I would challenge anyone through to go radiation safety requirements that are written down as formal things that need to be done notifying that about identifying information redacted', for instance, any time there was going to be a shot done

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Building 6 facility.

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That wasn't done. I mean it just wasn't done. And so, I think just a -- sort of a blanket acceptance that the controls were really quite good, as has come out today just does not square with the actual in practice tax at GSI, and I just had to add that as a postscript.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay, thanks for those additional comments, Dan. I do want to make sure we understand that our assessment of the sort of presence of a radiation safety program in the early years is not dependent on these documents per se, but more on the worker testimony that there were film badges in use. There were dosimeters in use, and there was a practice of roping off the areas at one-and-a-half times the 2 mR per hour distance.

So, we were understanding that as there being the presence of a more formalized radiation safety program. Now, whether it was

effective or not I think you're quite right; that is always a separate question. don't think we're basing that on any statements in these documents, but more on testimony that has come out since our last meeting, where we were trying to establish sort of what the level of practice was, if any, in those everyday.

So, I'm -- we know what was being You always have the question of was it effective in controlling the exposures. To some extent, the modeling doesn't depend fully on whether or not the workers were adhering to things because we make certain assumptions. example, you're not supposed to through a roped-off area. We're assuming people did that on a regular basis in the modeling.

So, there is an effort to take into consideration the idea that good practices were not necessarily always followed.

## **NEAL R. GROSS**

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DR. MCKEEL: This is Dan McKeel again. I certainly do understand that.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes.

DR. MCKEEL: And my final comment for the day is I made similar comments about this at -- to the Board, but at Texas City -- but here's an example where there is one report from one worker out of 3,000, Mr. P, who worked at the site, left for the Army, where there is one page that gives information about 18 quarters' worth of radiation data.

There's no other data for that period that everybody now seems to be quite comfortable about, and actually it is basing a lot of quantitative dose determinations as that representing real data.

Well, if data from a man who worked on weekends -- and there's even some dispute of whether the law permitted working two days on a weekend -- but obviously that is very limited, restricted data from one individual

who is not a full-time radiographer.

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That's the only job description that is represented among that data for those film badges. There are 89 film badge -- film-badge workers who have data out of a workforce that range upwards of 3,000 a year, throughout a 13-year period.

And to say that one set of data, again, which we arranged for you all to have, that that's representative of an entire tenyear period is really astounding to me. And I've said it before, but it does not seem to score any points for this group, that, there is no other place that I'm aware of in science where the rule of statistics that data has to be somehow representative of the population could be so widely ignored. And if that's the only degree of confidence you need certainty of bounding, then you know I'm --I'm just up against a hopeless situation that I've а scientific group that never met

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accepted data like that, and I don't think 225 represents good science, and I'm sure you all strongly disagree with me, but that's the way I feel about it, and I would not take any comfort in the small amount of data.

I understand about the gentleman wearing the film badge. Again, John Ramspott sent you that picture. He supplied you with that picture, and you know, yes, it is evidence that some people had a badge, but where's the data? That doesn't seem to bother anybody.

If there was a program that the -the license application in '62 outlines all
sorts of records that were supposed to be
kept, calibration tests and so forth. None of
the -- shot logs, the utilization and
maintenance records, none of that is there.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, Dan, we're all very much aware of that.

DR. MCKEEL: But you don't seem to

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CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, look -look. This is not unlike -- we have the very
same situation with the worker testimony. We
have very, very few workers out of that
workforce, and they're not unlike this one
case you're talking about, and they don't all
agree. And so, we're having to make judgments
based on a sparsity of information. That's
sort of the nature of this.

This is not a science experiment.

This is science and public policy. It is very, very difficult. We know it. You know it. We're doing our best to sift through this. All of these cases are individual.

We don't know how representative they are. We're trying to appreciate every piece of information we get, and see if we can use it, if it makes sense. So, you know, in a certain sense we share your frustration. We're -- but we are trying to do the best we can to

sift the chaff from the grain, and  $\max_{22}$  sensible decision.

I think it's one of those areas where we won't all agree on either the validity, the value or the interpretation of all of these things. And you know that as well as I.

you know, please be assured that we are doing our best to be fair to all of this data that we have. We're not ignoring it. We're trying to judge it, evaluate it, and see where it makes sense. In some cases, reinforce certain things. to seems In it contradict. other cases seems to So, that's part of the dilemma.

If it were much smaller, straightforward, we probably wouldn't be where we are right now, struggling with these kinds of issues. But we will do the best we can going forward to try to sniff these out, and I know you're frustrated.

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1 DR. MCKEEL: No, I --228 2 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: We are too. I'd like to defend 3 DR. MCKEEL: I'm really not frustrated. 4 myself. 5 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, maybe that's not the right word, but --6 7 No, that's not right DR. MCKEEL: What I am is I am upset because what I 8 word. 9 -- I appreciate everything you did. 10 It's a very tough job that you all must do, and you work at it valiantly, and I think 11 12 everybody is -- I give the Board and SC&A and 13 NIOSH great credit for that. I am in that 14 camp. But what I do think is that while 15 16 we're in this period of the ten-year review, that as I look at difference SECs that have 17 18 been awarded quickly within months or weeks, 19 particularly from some of the larger DOE sites, they have copious film badge data. They 20

have copious neutron data. They have copious

bioassay data, none of which we have for  ${\rm GSI}_{229}$ 

And all I'm saying is that those sites, I think, are awarded SECs because the data is too scanty to actually calculate doses. Whereas here, you take a dose from one individual who works part-time, and his badge therefore only part-time, and extrapolate to a whole ten-year period based on that.

So, what I'm upset about is the inconsistent way that criteria are applied for recommending a denial or an approval of an SEC. And those same comments would go for NIOSH and for the -- but particularly for the Board and for NIOSH.

I think they use different criteria for judging different SECs that are just simply not consistent. And I think there comes a point where history is going to look back at this program, and it's going to say that the purpose of an SEC was, when there was not enough real data to calculate a dose and

bound it with sufficient accuracy for all sources that were present at that site, that that's the time right then that there should've been an SEC awarded.

And when it drags on for years after that point, and when SC&A is allowed to do part of the new modeling and to reconstruct new methods that will help NIOSH achieve their goal, that's where I part company as being within the guidelines for how the SEC process should work.

So, no, sir. I'm not frustrated. It's way beyond that. I am upset as a scientist. And I don't think this program is really about public policy. The public policy has already been decided.

Public policy is in the preamble of the Act that the workers were harmed by activities sponsored by the US government, and they are to be compensated. And so, I think the public policy issues are well settled.

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What I think is -- that NIOSH and 1 2 the Board are about are about science, about And the science has got to do 3 the science. with dose reconstruction and SECs applied in a 4 5 strict context and with very 6 quidelines and rules. 7 think Ι don't they being are 8 applied consistently. So, I want that 9 represented as that's the way I feel about it. 10 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay, well, that'll certainly be on the record. 11 12 DR. MCKEEL: Thank you. So, thanks for 13 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: those additional comments. I want us to take 14 15 a look at moving forward and maybe scheduling 16 another meeting. 17 DR. MAURO: This is John Mauro. 18 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes, John? 19 DR. MAURO: I'm sorry to interrupt 20 you, but there's something that is troubling

me, and I'm not sure it's appropriate to bring

it up or not, but it is troubling me and  $\frac{1}{2}$ 'm going to bring it up anyway.

There probably are a substantial number of workers who, maybe the predominant number of workers, who have developed prostate and skin cancer at this site.

If an SEC is assigned to any time period, those workers will not be assigned a dose on the order of anywhere from I guess 2 to 6 to 15 rem per year. They won't be assigned a dose, though they may very well have experienced a dose of that size. We don't know, but they will not be compensated if an SEC is granted.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: That is correct.

And I would suspect, DR. MAURO: knowing the different of stats on types cancers, that prostate and skin cancer probably the most prevalent amongst the worker population. So, we are in a very -- I mean I don't know whether or not that has any play

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here. But I actually feel as if I was 233 worker there, and I developed prostate cancer, and I was a radiographer and I was denied, well, I would've been granted if they would've used any of these models we're talking about, but I'm denied because an SEC was granted, it would trouble me.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, I understand your point, John, but I don't think we're allowed to make a decision based on thinking about whether or not an SEC would pay off certain cancers better than other cancers.

DR. MAURO: And that's why I sort of opened my statement saying, I probably shouldn't say this, but it's troubling me anyway. And I'll leave it at that.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: No, I -- and I think this is true of any SEC: certain cancers get excluded. And if the dose reconstruction method is not accepted, it cannot be used to reconstruct doses for those who get other

1 cancers. 234 2 DR. MAURO: This side is rare and 3 unique. Most of the times SECs are granted because of internal dosimetry issues. 4 5 dominate. This is a site where concerns by 6 far are external, and so you have a unique 7 circumstance where, if there's any place where this strained set of circumstances are real, 8 9 it's here. 10 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: But that's not an issue that we would be allowed to consider. 11 12 DR. MAURO: I understand. 13 I don't think CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: legally we can --14 15 DR. MAURO: I understand. 16 No, I agree. MR. KATZ: Ι mean 17 that's -- I mean I think, John, it is fine you 18 saying it. It's public education, I guess, in But it cannot have a bearing on 19 this case. how the Board makes a decision. 20 21 DR. ANIGSTEIN: I just want

1 respond. 235 2 MCKEEL: Please, this is Dan that, 3 McKeel. Ι must comment and I on understand this is not in the purview of this 4 5 Work Group, but Dr. Mauro did bring it up. May 6 I, please? 7 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Okay, yes. Go ahead. 8 9 DR. MCKEEL: All right. Here's my 10 Number one, prostate cancer rarely statement. Number 2, 94 percent of all gets compensated. 11 12 the dose reconstructions that were submitted 13 to NIOSH at GSI have already been completed. So, those people have either been compensated 14 15 or not compensated. 16 The dose reconstruction is 17 essentially done. So, people who would've 18 been compensated with skin cancer, all but 6 percent of the total, they would've already 19

The other thing is I would try to

been decided on by Department of Labor.

20

mention to you is, among the problems that people have faced including the workers, to even judge the points that John Mauro just brought up, I personally have had a long discussion with the Department of Labor, trying to find out the breakdown of specific cancers at General Steel Industries, and have not been able to get those data.

So, I really think that's a false issue that he brings up. I don't think people with prostate cancer are probably going to get compensated. And I agree it -- what this is is a statement that it would be better for have SEC, people not to and Ι an am particularly interested in this because I'm a counselor also. I mean the co-petitioner at Dow Chemical, as many of you all probably know.

And so, I've been following for the last six years the patterns of payment at GSI and Dow. What it shows is a complete negation

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of that idea that an SEC is bad for you, There are far fewer claims and cases at Dow, and they've been paid overall approximately twice as much as GSI, which has submitted a far larger number of claims and cases and had far more dose reconstructions.

And also, the covered period at GSI is 13 years. At Dow, it is four years. So, having an SEC at Dow is demonstrably a very, very good thing for workers. And anybody that could claim anything to be different would have to do an analysis like I've done.

I'll be happy to send anybody who is interested those figures. But having an SEC for Dow was a very good thing, for just the covered period. So, I had to make that comment. That comment by Dr. Mauro just can't stand. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Dan, I think it is probably true at the other sites too, where there are SECs. The percent of claims paid is

certainly greater than the other, and there specific be that may cancers are not compensated, but -- well, there are. I mean but that were named, Ι think it double at most of the sites. almost looking at Ted to see if he can verify that, But an SEC site has roughly twice as or Jim. many claims as a regular site.

MR. ALLEN: Right. In general, I think it runs about 50 to 60 percent compensation.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Fifty to 60 percent?

John Mauro's point is DR. NETON: well taken that this site is unique in the that there's high sense very external exposures here. Almost all the other sites -think of one that has been because of external. Ιt has been added because of internal exposures, which provide almost zero dose to the prostate gland and the

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1	skin. 239
2	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well,
3	nonetheless, I don't think we can take that
4	into consideration.
5	DR. NETON: No, I understand that,
6	but I think this is John Mauro's point was
7	interesting.
8	DR. ANIGSTEIN: When we're talking
9	about 12 to 15 rem a year, when we're talking
10	about much smaller dose, that's something
11	else.
12	DR. NETON: That's why I'm saying
13	all the cases that have been done at GSI would
14	be reworked
15	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: I don't want us
16	to spend time discussing this since it's
17	nothing
18	DR. NETON: Exactly.
19	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: in our
20	purview. Let's look at our calendars. We
21	have at the end of the year several more

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things coming from NIOSH. We need time for
SC&A to review those.
DR. ANIGSTEIN: Is that still on
track?
MR. ALLEN: It's on track. I can't
guarantee it won't be late, two weeks late.
But right now, it's on track.
CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: All right, the
federal budgets are still sort of up in the
air. So yes, assuming they're still
they're on continuing resolution, and that's
the
DR. ANIGSTEIN: Assuming SC&A still
has a contract next year.
CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: But anyway, we
need to look at probably late January.
DR. ANIGSTEIN: Not again. We're
talking about beginning of March. It comes a

little late, the report comes a little late. I

do have -- it may not seem like it, but I do

have other work.

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CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: It's not like you
guys are only working on this. You've got
multiple sites.
DR. ANIGSTEIN: I would like two
months, frankly.
CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Can we can we
hit early March?
DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yes, with a
baseball bat.
CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, now, which
days are good for Poston? Is it Tuesday and
Thursday? I think it is.
MR. KATZ: I think so, because
that's why he had a problem today. He

could've done it yesterday. So, Tuesday is good for --

How about March CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: I think we need to get a date down.

ANIGSTEIN: What day of the DR. week is that?

MEMBER MUNN: I can't do early

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I can't do early March. 1 March. 242 2 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: How about the following week. 3 Any time after the 4 MEMBER MUNN: 15<sup>th</sup>. 5 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: You know what? We 6 already penciled in the 15<sup>th</sup>. 7 MR. KATZ: Yes, I already have that 8 9 on mine. 10 CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: I just realized I already have it down. 11 12 MEMBER MUNN: I do too. 13 We're going to CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: meet, and then we're going to deal with these 14 15 additional issues. Well, we'll have a lot on 16 our platter, but we'll plow through 17 We're going to have NIOSH stuff. We're going 18 to have SC&A, and as we go, if we can close out issues on the matrix, we'll do --19 20 BEACH: Or update the MEMBER 21 matrix.

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CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Or update the
matrix. Actually, Bob, can you make sure that
we get an updated matrix which will include an
enclosure of that
DR. ANIGSTEIN: Sure.
CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: which is item
MEMBER MUNN: Four.
CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: four.
DR. ANIGSTEIN: Okay. We have two
matrices floating around at the same time. Do
we just do both, or just the SEC matrix?
CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: No, we finished
TBD-6000.
DR. ANIGSTEIN: I don't mean that.
I mean there is an Appendix BB matrix and a
SEC matrix for GSI.

DR. ANIGSTEIN: Do you want both

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Right, those two.

DR. ANIGSTEIN: With some overlap.

Yes.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER:

1	matrices updated?
2	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: It would be good
3	to do both.
4	MR. KATZ: Yes.
5	DR. ANIGSTEIN: Okay. It's going
6	to be a little while though.
7	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Well, there's not
8	a whole lot of change in them.
9	MR. KATZ: Do you want him to
10	update them now, or update them after the
11	papers come in and so on? Before the next
12	meeting for sure, but do you want them updated
13	now or do you want them updated once we have
14	the new material from
15	CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: I don't think the
16	material will update anything per se, will it?
17	MR. KATZ: Well, there will be new
18	responses from NIOSH in effect.
19	MEMBER BEACH: SC&A will review.
20	MR. KATZ: And SC&A will review
21	those.

there's any
MR. KATZ: So, typically before a
meeting, we get a matrix that takes into
account a new response from NIOSH, a response
from SC&A, all of that, all in the matrix, so
it is all covered up and up to date for that
meeting. Because I don't see how the matrix
gets used before then. So, does that make
sense?
MR. ALLEN: It just seems like the
responses and the comments that are going to
get on the matrix are minimal compared to
these White Papers are going to be.
CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Yes.
MR. ALLEN: It's not like you're
going to have pages and put them
MR. KATZ: No, absolutely not. It's
the matrix is just used to keep us on track
for closing issues. Right?
MEMBER BEACH: Bob, can you send me

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your slide presentation? I didn't get it this time around.

DR. ANIGSTEIN: Will do.

MEMBER BEACH: I know I'm not on your list for some things.

CHAIRMAN ZIEMER: Let me thank the petitioner, Dan. Thank you. And all the GSI workers on the line, and others for your participation today. We will meet again on March 15<sup>th</sup>, and we expect that -- well, we'll certainly keep you posted on any documents that we develop in the meantime.

You can certainly feel free to keep us posted on other issues, or comments that you want to put in the record, as well, in the meantime. Thank you very much, and we are adjourned.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the record at 2:50 p.m.)

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