# U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

ADVISORY BOARD ON RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH

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WORK GROUP ON IDAHO NATIONAL LABORATORY

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TUESDAY
JUNE 21, 2011

The Work Group convened in the Frankfurt Room of the Cincinnati Airport Marriott, 2395 Progress Drive, Hebron, Kentucky, at 9:00 a.m., Phillip Schofield, Chairman, presiding.

### PRESENT:

PHILLIP SCHOFIELD, Chairman JOSIE BEACH, Member JAMES M. MELIUS, Member GENEVIEVE S. ROESSLER, Member

ALSO PRESENT:

**NEAL R. GROSS** 

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TED KATZ, Designated Federal Official PETE DARNELL, DCAS
BRIAN GLECKLER, ORAU Team
STU HINNEFELD, DCAS
JODI JENKINS, ORAU Team
JENNY LIN, HHS\*
JOHN MAURO, SC&A
STEVE OSTROW, SC&A\*
MATTHEW SMITH, ORAU Team\*
JOHN STIVER, SC&A\*
TIM TAULBEE, DCAS

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<sup>\*</sup>Participating via telephone

3 C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S Roll Call Airborne Releases Comment Numbers 1 and 2 (Reactor Discharges, Chem Plant, Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion 8 Program) Internal Dosimetry, Comments 4 through 10 64 External Dosimetry 190 Deliverables and Meeting Plans 322

## P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

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CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: This is Phil Schofield. This site covers approximately 190 square miles. It was started in 1949, it's had 52 working reactors. They have covered everything from fuel handling, reprocessing to complete meltdown testing.

There's been 99 documented episodic releases. There's been a number of incidents of releases that actually were measured at the perimeter. So it's a very large, complex site with a lot of potential for internal exposures as well as high levels of external exposures.

I guess we're ready to start on the matrix, unless anybody else has any comments?

Okay, on the matrix, the first issue is talking about the routine airborne releases.

And the finding "Routine was, airborne releases: source terms provided require improvement for use in determining the worker intake from airborne releases at

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different INL facilities.

The data NIOSH uses do not take into account the deficiencies in the environmental monitoring equipment and their locations. And in addition, NIOSH does not assess the uncertainties associated with mineralogical -- meteorological, excuse me, dispersion model used for the INL site.

Most importantly the source terms do not account for worker inhalation of resuspended contaminated soils or materials around the INL facilities." So now it's your game, NIOSH.

DR. MAURO: Excuse me, this is John Mauro. Just to set the stage a little bit might be helpful. It's my understanding that since we originally reviewed the INL Site Profile, which I don't recall, it must have been four years ago, perhaps --

DR. OSTROW: This is Steve, it was 1996.

DR. MAURO: '96, okay. Five years ago. And, Steve, you probably know a little bit more about it than I do. There has been, subsequently, revisions.

MR. KATZ: 2006.

DR. MAURO: 2006, I lose decades all the time.

(Laughter.)

DR. MAURO: And in light of that, I guess it would be helpful to me and I'm sure then everyone else, a little bit of what has transpired since our original review.

There clearly were a number of revisions to the Site Profile, dome of which may have responded to many of our concerns, some may have not. We, SC&A, are aware that, now, Steve, you could help me out a bit. In the matrix there is a column to the right of the comments that has been filled out by NIOSH.

And when I reviewed it over the

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weekend, I said to myself, well, it appears 1 2 these are comments that weren't there 3 before, but they're there now and they reflect the latest information that NIOSH has 4 5 result of the revisions to the Site Profile. Would that be a correct characterization of 6 7 the matrix? Some of the answers 8 MR. DARNELL: 9 were in this matrix in 2006 when it started, 10 they've been updated and completed over the time period. 11 12 DR. MAURO: That helps, yes. 13 MR. DARNELL: Yes, it is mostly new information for the Work Group. 14 15 DR. MAURO: And when was the last Site Profile revised? 16 17 MR. KATZ: April of 2011. 18 DR. MAURO: Okay, it's so relatively recent. major 19 And was that revision, several of the chapters or just the 20

one, you know?

1 DARNELL: Yes, these are all MR. 2 major revisions. We actually combined the two sites into one Technical Basis Document. 3 For the purpose of the 4 DR. MAURO: 5 Working Group, SC&A did not do a formal review 6 of that. So really we're right now on the 7 recipient end to discuss, I quess, these developments, in 8 important light our 9 original comments, it sounds like that is a 10 lot. Now, Steve, I don't recall us going 11 12 through a review cycle where we did a formal 13 review of these revisions. No, what happened is 14 DR. OSTROW: 15 that our original Site Profile Review which 16 was did in 2006, then in December of 2008, we 17 took a look at the -- NIOSH had revised the 18 Site Profile, or the TBDs, we had issued a supplementary report. 19 And we updated a few of the issues, 20

number 25, 26, 29 and 35 and we added three

new ones, 36, 37 and 38. And that was December of 2008.

And everything's sort of lain dormant since then. NIOSH subsequently updated all their TBDs. The most recent was the external, which was April of 2011, which we didn't review any of these.

As was just mentioned, NIOSH combined the INL and ANL web together with all the TBSs, changed their methodologies in a couple of places, updated a lot of things. And you'll see, a few days ago, in that matrix, the column with the NIOSH response, this is updated.

And, as we're discussing today, the last column might be a little bit confusing with the Board Action. This, I think, NIOSH, Pete Darnell, added this as sort of comment. This is whether we, SC&A, had changed the issue from the original matrix.

The first comments, under 1, it

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says under Board Actions, SC&A comments on							
matrix and we didn't change anything when we							
did our review in 2008.							
A few of them later on, we had							
changed the 2008 revisions. That's sort of							
where we stand right now.							
MR. KATZ: Thank you, Steve. Pete,							
do you want to walk us through?							
MR. DARNELL: Well, actually we had							
planned for Brian to be the main lead with the							
responses, is that							
MR. KATZ: Oh, sure.							
MR. DARNELL: he explained that							
what we wanted to go through the responses or							
<del></del>							
MR. KATZ: Sure.							
DR. MAURO: If I can help, you							
know, for my benefit and everyone. Because							

it's been some time and because we haven't

haven't read -- a bit of a story about each

I haven't read,

and I think others

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1 one.

In other words, obviously, in the first item we're concerned about atmospheric dispersion modeling and the resuspension factors and how it was done originally.

And maybe the way in which the story could unfold is to explain the degree to which you have developed perhaps a revised approach to dealing with atmospheric -- Because if I recall, on the first one, it was a matter of the way in which the modeling was done, the kind of data that was used, whether or not resuspension factor was taken into consideration.

For workers that were actually on the different areas on the site and if, in fact, you have come up with a new strategy maybe conceptually explain that strategy, the data upon which it was based.

More of a story than it is getting into the nuts and bolts. I suspect what will

happen, not to overstep my bounds, but,  $_{12}$  guess, once we understand conceptually how the changes were, then the Work Group could decide whether or not they'd like SC&A to take a closer look to see how it was done, check some numbers, that sort of thing. Or perhaps judge, you know, that looks like it answers the question.

MEMBER BEACH: Well, it sounds like, it looks like to me too there's also some action item imbedded in this for SC&A already.

DR. MAURO: Okay. Yes.

MR. DARNELL: Just one thing. To answer your question before we got started, there are 1,422 claims for INL.

MEMBER BEACH: Okay.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: This area, the site is on the Snake River Plains there in Southeast Idaho. It's considered a high desert, about 5,000 foot elevation across most

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And one thing this area of Idaho is known for is a lot of wind. So the modeling is very crucial for those people who were not monitored, or maybe they were only monitored for certain things because of the fact that this area does have a lot of high level winds, you might say. I mean, it's very well known.

It's referred to, I think, by a lot of people in that area as the Rexburg wind, which encompasses the site. So the modeling unit, I don't know exactly how you can do that kind of modeling over such a large area with a great deal of accuracy.

I mean, that's just my opinion, you know, and I would like to hear NIOSH's explanation how they feel they can do this.

MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I can say, in a general sense, atmospheric dispersion models work best at great distances in large areas.

It's when you approach the source term, which

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is probably the source of the comment, that you have difficulty with the interpretation of the atmospheric model.

And a high wind actually disperses the radioactive effluent more and makes exposure potential less from a particular release. A high wind in a dispersion -- if you're worried about the dispersion, exposure from dispersion, a windy situation is better than a calm situation.

But the fact remains that the use of that atmospheric model to predict close-in concentrations is problematic. So that, I think, is the point. I'm not so sure we've gone very far on that particular part of the finding.

The finding has two actual sort of pieces. One has to do with deficiencies in the monitoring approach, in addition to, what about uncertainties in the model?

The deficiencies in the monitoring

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approach --I'm paraphrasing here, I planned talk very much today. I'm to paraphrasing here, but the deficiencies in the findings modeling approach relate to some related non-compliance with to **NESHAPs** requirements, EPA/NESHAPs requirements, lot of our data was collected for other purposes than what we're using it for now.

it provides level of stringency that probably of the much EPA was very specific monitoring does not. about where we should comply with NESHAPs, we these things shall do things, have compliant. And whether or not the fact that they not completely compliant were NESHAPs obviates their utility for this is not clear to me.

It seems to me that despite those findings about those sampling locations, that data is probably still good for the purposes we're using. We're talking about the

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environmental release pathway which, you know, said, Phil, there's potential for certainly high external exposures and fields containment at these places, would be some internal exposure potentials as well.

you're talking And about SO environmental pathway which is, you know, kind of at the vanishing end where people are going So I just wanted to throw that to be exposed. in as some context here for this particular finding. And I don't really know what, if address this anything, has been done to particular question.

MR. GLECKLER: As far as when the revision of the environmental TBD took place, we didn't change any of the values in the assessment other than we, Jodi added iodine-129 intakes because, as time goes on, the iodine-131 was decaying off for the later years after the reactors were shutting down

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and we didn't have any iodine, so we're concerned that thyroid cancer claims might be underestimating internal doses.

So we added iodine-129 into that because that does become a significant isotope as the iodine-131 disappears. But outside of that and extending the year, some of the intakes for the subsequent years, it's like those values haven't been changed.

And I guess part of the question we originally had and I think to their responses of what tells us, you know, it's like what's wrong, basically what's wrong with the model that was used and why isn't it applicable?

DR. OSTROW: This is Steve. I looked into a little bit. First time I think we discussed the responses last week, I didn't get a chance to look at the new responses but I reread older ones.

I think our basic problem is I think NIOSH is using the INL historical Dose

Evaluation Report as a basis. And they're using the mesoscale model that is in that.

And I looked into it a little bit.

As you mentioned before, it's probably fine at long distances like off-site type dispersions but it's not really accurate for close in. It's not really accurate, even less than about 20 kilometers it loses a lot of accuracy, because it can't really model the local topography too well.

Yes, I'd like to add a DR. MAURO: little, it's coming back to me now from the last meeting. I'm familiar with a lot of the off-site dose reconstruction work done as part of this program. The dose reconstruction work t.hat. CDC Radiation Studies Branch has supported, in fact, I was involved in a lot of that work.

And the modeling that was used which was mainly devoted to people that did not live onsite. And as you can imagine we're

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talking fairly large distances.

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Now I remember the last time we were here and you start to look at each of the work areas and you'll have a facility that might be, let's say, the Chem Plant or TAN or these various locations.

They might have emissions, both chronic, which they had. And also, more importantly, these episodic emissions. And it was more of a conceptual problem.

And then you had people working in the immediate vicinity of these sites. Let's say within a few hundred yards of where the release point was.

And I remember my concern was that when you're up close to a source, certainly within a few hundred yards, what happens is the Gaussian dispersion model, which you take the average annual releases, you multiply by average annual chi over q and that works great if you're a kilometer, two kilometers, three

kilometers away.

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But when you're in the near field, my concern was that building turbulence, episodic nature of the releases, all of a sudden the type of work that was done for, I guess, the off-site dose calculation that was originally done is, I believe, RAC did it, Risk Assessment Group did the original work.

And it seems to me that that extrapolation has some flaws to it. And to make sure that you don't underestimate -- because when you're in the near field, those models just break down. Especially if you're close to a building wake effect, the whole thing doesn't really work anymore.

Now the degree to which a case could be made that you use certain assumptions in the near field that would tend to bound it, that there are ways of tricking these things to try to get to it.

But I guess all I can say is right

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now I can't say whether or not that's what you folks did.

MR. GLECKLER: In all honesty, we're not aware of what was done because we're not the original authors on the TBD on that. And some of them just aren't on the project at this time.

And so it's tracking down some of that information could be tricky to find out those details.

DR. MAURO: Yes, as it turns out, just coincidentally, I spent several years looking at the off-site doses from this facility and the models. And, in fact, we ran different models to see how wrong the Gaussian model might be.

We ran three-dimensional puff advection models and stuff like that. So what I'm getting at is that this happens to be a subject that I happen to know a lot about.

And, you know, people run into this

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problem all the time. You've got lots and lots of met towers collecting wind speed, direction, stability class. And that's your raw data and there were dozens of these. In the early years, there was just three, later years, you had a lot more.

But a lot could be done with that data in order to do far field and near field modeling. And I guess we were hoping to hear a little bit more about that story. Acknowledging that that situation exists and how you come to grips with that situation when you're trying to reconstruct doses to people who are close to the source.

MR. GLECKLER: I'm not aware of any near field monitoring models out there for this type of radioactivity.

DR. MAURO: When I was working at -I did a lot of work at commercial nuclear
power plants just for this reason. And we
used to have to calculate the doses to workers

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who were working on Unit 2 while Unit 1 was being built within, you know, a few hundred yards.

And that was a requirement and there are ways of dealing with that. And there are Reg Guides out there, there are strategies. So there are, people have had to deal with this kind of class of problem before.

And I guess when we originally reviewed this we were hoping to see a little bit more attention to, okay, how do we come to grips with this dilemma?

It sounds like that dilemma still might exist. And we'd be glad to look at it, I guess, if so desired by the Board, and identify why these are weaknesses.

And if so desired by the Board, we could also identify possible strategies for coming to grips with those. Because those strategies exist.

MEMBER ROESSLER: John, would you explain more about the RAC measurements? Was that independent?

DR. MAURO: I believe all this work was done based on the -- RAC took, what they did is they collected all of the effluent data that they could from every facility in the entire plant. And then they went through a classic atmospheric far field mesoscale dispersion modeling.

Because they were concerned with off-site doses. So what happens is, so now you're ten miles away. Now the question is --

MEMBER ROESSLER: No close-in?

DR. MAURO: No, all of a sudden you -- and everything sort of averages out. You know, the winds are blowing, but when you bring it in it's almost like, you know, you have a release from here and you're interested in the doses over here, to people living over here. But you've got people living over here.

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What happens is you get building							
wake effects that affect what's actually here.							
Eventually those building wakes effects are							
all schmeared out and things sort of tend to							
average out at far distances. Especially if							
you're doing it over the course of a year,							
let's say.							
But let's say you have an episodic							
release. And in theory the episodic release							
will come out of here on this day and the wind							
could be blowing it that way. And there would							
be no impact for people here.							
So, I mean, it becomes a completely							
different kind of problem.							
MEMBER ROESSLER: So RAC's method -							
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DR. MAURO: RAC did that.							
MEMBER ROESSLER: was off-site?							
DR. MAURO: RAC was off-site,							
absolutely.							
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MEMBER ROESSLER: That's what I

wanted to know.

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RAC was entirely off-DR. MAURO: site. And it was, you know, in those days Radiation they concerned about, the were Studies Branch was researching whether they needed to do any epi work off-site. And they used the RAC as a way to, first, let's take a look collective at the burden on the population groups that live in the area, what kind of dose they may have gotten and if it was high enough, they would have triggered an And that was the whole mission epi study. behind RAC.

MEMBER ROESSLER: Okay. Good, thanks.

DR. TAULBEE: So if I understand what it is that the Board or SC&A is concerned here with these particular releases are the routine releases coming form the sites and we use the RAC data in order to estimate those doses and you feel that we should be looking

at a more detailed analysis. Taking into

DR. MAURO: Yes, what adjustments might be needed. Yes. As far as the, I agree with you by the way, Stu, regarding the Clean Air Act and the isokinetic sampling issues. They were operating at a level of resolution that had to do with compliance with the radionuclide NESHAPs.

Which, I think, probably came much would later. And it certainly be inappropriate to hold it, there's some very fine-structure issues there. So the degree to which we may referenced that, have in mу opinion, is the bigger problem. The fundamental problem of how atmospheric an dispersion model is doing, than, let's say, some fine-structure NESHAP requirement.

MR. HINNEFELD: Okay.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: The resuspension issue, particularly, what was

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brought up by some people who have they had these evaporation ponds is held where they might have three million gallons or something to this effect of waste material was pumped into these ponds and then it was allowed to evaporate, they brought in loaders and they would scoop this up and they would bury it. And the big question is a lot of those people had, is they said, we weren't wearing face masks, you know, once we start doing this it gets very dusty, then for some time after this work is finished they said you can be going past there and you'll actually have the dust being kicked up from these evaporation ponds, you know, and you're driving right through this cloud of dust from them.

And this is an area of concern that some people have expressed. And I could not find anything, so far, in the database that gives me any real confidence about how these

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were monitored, these evaporation ponds. 29						
MR. HINNEFELD: Don't we know the						
location of the evaporation ponds?						
CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: I don't						
remember off the top of my head.						
DR. TAULBEE: There's multiple						
ones.						
MR. HINNEFELD: Yes, there are						
several.						
CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: And how these						
are going to be addressed.						
DR. MAURO: If it helps any, we've						
learned a lesson, I guess, on Nevada Test						
Site, which is an interesting challenge. We						
encountered a lot of problems but in the end a						
gourds of atratogica wars identified which						

couple of strategies were identified which seemed reasonable that, in theory, could apply here.

If you know that over many, many years you've releasing airborne been radioactivity, that a certain amount of that

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material may have deposited on surfaces. And very often at a site like this, I can't say to the degree to which it was done.

We have a pretty good idea of the number of becquerels per meter squared, or picocuries, becquerels per gram, in the surface soil.

And if you're concerned about resuspension factor to me the simplest if approach is well Ι have say, some information on the dust loadings, milligrams per cubic meter in the air, and in and around where people might be working.

And very often, those kinds of data are collected. And you know the picocuries per gram in the soil, well, you know, you don't need meteorology anymore. You just simply say, well, listen, if I know I've got typically one milligram per cubic meter of airborne dust.

And I know typically the soil

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contains one picocurie per gram of whatever?
You could just assume that that would be the dust load, that would be what would be available in the dust that a person might be inhaling.

This is a way to come to grips with problems. these kinds of It's really straightforward. And some could argue that under some circumstances that could overestimate because -- or underestimate. I'm just a subject that sorry, this is familiar with because I've done it so many times.

The particle size distribution that's in the soil is different than the particle size distribution that's in the air.

What happens is what's in the air is usually finer particles, things that are larger than 50 microns stay down.

So what happens is you actually get an enhancement. So what's in the air, if you

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get a certain amount of picocuries in the topsoil and you get a certain number of the picocuries, you're going to assume that whatever the picocuries per gram is in the topsoil that's the picocuries per gram that's in the soot in the air.

Well, it turns out there often is an enhancement because the particles in the air are finer particles, they're the ones that are more likely to be resuspended. And as finer particles, we know that they carry more activity per unit mass.

So there may be enrichment. But there's literature on that, in fact I wrote a report on that. The enhancement factor from that process. All of which is trackable.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Now to go back to your other problem you brought up, and this is another point that has been brought up by some of the people who've worked up there, is that, particularly in the earlier days, the

exhaust ventilation systems for a lot of these reactors wasn't as effective as it is nowadays.

They don't have high quality HEPA filters in a lot of these facilities stuff, so the materials that was escaping or off-gassing, a lot of these people said, well, you know, we were only 200 yards from the reactor and that's where we, you know, our change room was, our lunch room was.

We had the metal shop over here and, you know, in summer we had the doors open, in the winter we took our air, the air that was brought in was not filtered that was being brought into the buildings. And that's a big area of concern about what some of these people are getting in there.

Particularly these people who were not on a bioassay program, what potential levels they were getting.

MR. GLECKLER: Yes, one thing to

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note is the ones that were on a bioassay program would have had the same exposures as some of the ones that weren't.

You know, is that the vast majority of the bioassay results of the INL facility, or the INL site were negative, something around the 90 percent of the results were negative, below the detection limits.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: So you could actually use that as a bounding number?

MR. DARNELL: The current TBD for environmental doses uses those stacks to calculate the doses. That's what the majority of the environmental dosing is based on is stack release data.

MR. GLECKLER: I guess the issue is whether the model that was used is appropriate or not for near field in estimates. And it seems like I remember, did we touch on the issue of looking at the onsite ambient monitoring data on that?

DR. MAURO: I recall during 35 Steve, please jump in, you know me, I start talking I can't stop. So jump in, correct me. I recall that there was some measurements made along the fence line of some of these areas, which is certainly useful data.

If I recall, there was DR. OSTROW: environmental monitoring two types of programs. They had lots and lots of TLDs, film badges, around the site perimeter, but they also had a lot of monitoring around the fence perimeters of the different facilities.

Because INL spread out the facilities over a larger area of land and each facility was a little bit like an island and they had a boundary fence.

So they did airborne monitoring at the boundary fences of each of these different facilities, a lot of the different facilities with that data too. Not just site boundary

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data	but	also	fence	data	from	the	different
facilities.							

DR. MAURO: So you got this, you know, big, gigantic site. And inside the site is broken up into very large areas.

MR. GLECKLER: Major operating areas.

DR. MAURO: Major operating areas which are very, very big also, where you probably have some good data on the internal fences around each of the area, which are helpful in knowing really how much left this area and is on its way over to another area.

But it doesn't help too much on the people that might be inside the area. Because I think the spacing is pretty big. So in other words, you could have an area the size of this table, let's say this is the TAN area or the CPT, okay, this is the area.

And there could be a building over here having its releases and people working

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over here. And in my mind, the data you collect, you know, where Josie is, is not going to be too helpful to you, if people were here.

It would be if the area was so small that yes, your site boundary data -- or not site, but your area boundary data was in close proximity to where people were, so that might work. But I think at this site the spacing, the distribution, if you would --

MR. GLECKLER: So even like the onsite monitoring data might be too far out.

DR. MAURO: If it's at the fence line, it might be. And there's a case to be made. I mean, it really is a matter of looking at the layout, lay of the land, where the people are, where the monitoring is.

And it's almost a judgment it's, just, you know, just too far away where you really have to question whether you could use that data for these people.

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DR. OSTROW: But, you know, Steys again, I think one of the arguments that NIOSH has mentioned, I think it was Stu just said it a few minutes ago, that over 90 percent of the bioassays were negative. So they're using that as an indication that the people who were monitored didn't pick up any particularly high airborne from anywhere.

So the idea that people weren't monitored probably didn't get exposure, I think that was part of NIOSH's claims in the, when you wrote this.

DR. MAURO: Could I add one more thing? This is one of the times when we started at the place where usually this is not the big source of exposure.

Usually at any site, there's environmental issues, I mean, Nevada Test Site that was a big deal, of course, because of the nature of the operation.

But most operating facilities, you

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worry about the guys inside the buildings that are doing the work. And we're sort of starting this at place where, in all а likelihood the exposures were certainly there. it that's not where the big guess exposures were.

The big exposures was the people handing the material, doing whatever they do inside the buildings. But we happened to start here.

So to keep perspective, these are issues that are certainly on the table but it may turn out there are more important issues of where people could have gotten substantially higher exposures that are of concern inside the buildings.

MEMBER MELIUS: Just to follow up on that, then to me I'm not sure it makes a lot of sense for NIOSH to do a very elaborate, you know, labor-intensive modeling of these exposures.

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It seems to me that, you  $kno_{\slash\hspace{-0.4em}Q0}$  maybe you need to do more and maybe you need some sort of a factor to take into account for the near-term near-source exposures.

And that's going to be a safety factor or something. I mean, I get your point looking at that. But I'm not sure you'd want to do a very elaborate model.

DR. MAURO: I agree. I agree. Yes, we may have actually, I think the way it was -

MEMBER MELIUS: Let's clear the whole table, it can get filled up with sources and monitors.

(Laughter.)

DR. MAURO: It turns out and it's SC&A's ball, when we wrote this proposal I think did lot of intention to pay а environmental issues. Because we knew a lot about environmental issues. the But reality is the action is inside the buildings.

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CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: So is there
any real purpose in you guys going back to
look at the modeling that they did on this?
MR. HINNEFELD: I think the first
action is probably ours. To look at the
model, you know, and get a picture and we
understand the model and look for a fairly
simple near field adjustment that maybe should
be made to the models that we're using.
Or whatever, or to provide a
thorough argument. If we believe we're fine
where we are, provide a thorough argument as
to why that's the case. So I think the action
on this is ours at this point.
MEMBER BEACH: So NIOSH did ask for
reference that SC&A used to determine
uncertainties not accounted for in the
DR. OSTROW: We did but
MEMBER BEACH: meteorological
dimension, is that necessary still?
MR. HINNEFELD: Well to my way of

thinking that was just the general near field 1 2 issue with expert --3 DR. OSTROW: Yes, we didn't have anything specific in mind, just the near-field 4 5 issue --6 MR. HINNEFELD: Yes, so I don't 7 know --8 MEMBER BEACH: That was an SC&A 9 request. I mean that was a NIOSH request --10 Yes, and what I'm MR. HINNEFELD: saying is, having heard the discussion today, 11 12 you don't need find know, to go 13 reference for that, you know, they just do that in --14 15 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: I think that kind of closes out the first comment and it 16 17 definitely goes into Comment Number 2 --18 DR. OSTROW: Well, I'll comment on This is Steve. We had made the 19 this perhaps. comment about episodic airborne releases and 20 21 particularly at the initial engine tests at

the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion program where they blew radioactivity out all over the place into the air and we said that some of it might have been underestimated.

The release is by a factor of two to 16 and NIOSH asked then in this comment where'd we get the number of two to 16 from? Well, we had referenced that in our original Site Profile Review Report from 2006. Actually, if one wants to look it up it's on page 56 of our Site Profile.

We had referenced them, I think John alluded to this earlier perhaps. And we had done a report in 2003: A Critical Review of Source Term for Select Initial Engine Tests Associated With the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion program in INL. So we had done that report in 2003.

And in that, we had concluded that for some of the initial engine tests that the quoted releases were underestimated by a

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factor of up to 16.

In particular, the initial engine test number four underestimated noble gases by up to a factor of 16, halogen by up to a factor of seven and solids by a factor of up to two.

And our original report in 2003 elaborates what our basis was for that. John, are you familiar with this report?

DR. MAURO: Yes, I was in it up to my eyeballs when we did that work. It was quite controversial because at the time we were, in effect, reviewing work done by RAC as part of the off-site dose calculation.

And we were asked by Radiation Studies Branch to independently review the source terms that were used by the Risk Assessment Corporation on behalf of the Radiation Studies Branch.

And we found some very significant underestimates and we go into it in agonizing

detail. And to this day we feel very strongly that they significantly underestimated those source terms for the reasons given.

And anyone reading the report can make the judgment themselves whether or not our position was well-founded or not.

It's been published by the Radiation Studies Branch of CDC and I don't know if any action has been taken on it. But SC&A has looked very carefully at this question on behalf of CDC now, and has on the record published why we believe those source terms are low.

DR. OSTROW: That's the basic point, I guess perhaps the action here would be, would NIOSH just take a look at that 2003 report and see, you know, either agree with or if you don't agree with it why you think your current model is better.

MR. HINNEFELD: Yes, I agree that it's a NIOSH action, yes. It's just first you

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start with reading that report and I think
it's relatively straightforward to find in our
files, they're on our website.
DR. OSTROW: Well, if you can't
find it
MR. HINNEFELD: We got it. I think
I looked it up a couple weeks ago.
DR. OSTROW: Okay.
MR. DARNELL: One of the things
that we were wondering though, these are not
listed in the TBD as being significant
releases.
MR. GLECKLER: And you identified
several of the initial engine test releases as
being significant but these specific ones that
you guys evaluated aren't listed in there as
being significant.

And the other thing I wanted to point out is, noble gases don't contribute any significant internal dose so it doesn't really matter if we underestimate those.

DR. MAURO: I can help you 47 little, and I'm not disagreeing with you. When we remember what the purpose of these analyses were by the Radiation Studies Branch is mainly whether or not there could have been — did RAC come up with a reasonable estimate of the sources?

There were many, many, many sources that came out of Idaho National Lab. The two of them were identified as the big bankers, these are the ones that anything is going to have a significant off-site impact it's going to be the Chem Plant and the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion program.

And they went through the SO may have been there screening process, And because of the importance of those more. source terms and in order to achieve closure, whether or not they've adequately looked at were asked important ones, we independently and look at all of this.

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And we agreed that they picked the right ones as being the problem ones. And so we looked very carefully at the way in which RAC modeled the effluents, routine and episodic from the Chem Plant and routine -- well, it really isn't routine -- episodic from the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion program.

We found that the Chem Plant, they did a nice job. The source, the curies per year and even the emphasis on the episodic releases were well done, well within a factor of two.

found that, the However, we and evidence that we've laid out is very comprehensive, that when you're running one of these aircraft nuclear propulsion, you actually allow it to run until the fuel melts. So that melted fuel is being vented directly to the atmosphere, which included everything.

Everything went up. And it was a lot. And we believe that not only the noble

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gases but iodine's and other radionuclides were released. And it would be more of a local phenomenon because some of them would come down pretty quickly.

But it was still, you know, our position is that this is a pretty nasty, dirty operation. The degree to which, and it was a major source term at the site, when that operation was going on.

And to use the source terms that RAC used for the purposes of reconstructing near field doses to workers that might have been in the vicinity, we feel would have underestimated by about those factors, which are not small, factor of 16, factor of two or three, depending on the isotope.

So in our mind taking a look at that, say okay, obviously there's another opinion out there, here's the work that was done, would it change things very much if we were to use those instead of the RAC values?

1 in other words, all And, 2 sudden, do the doses involved in the Aircraft 3 Nuclear Propulsion Program change 4 substantially in light of the fact that 5 there's new source terms, whether it's noble 6 gases or otherwise? 7 MR. HINNEFELD: So an outcome here, I mean, I think we're obliged to look at this 8 9 and the fact that the Site Profile says such 10 and such is not a major release does not --DR. MAURO: 11 Because --12 (Simultaneous speakers.) 13 MR. HINNEFELD: necessity to evaluate the finds. 14 15 DR. MAURO: It was a major release, and that's why they were looked at twice, once 16 17 by RAC, once by us. 18 MR. HINNEFELD: It may resolve in 19 almost no change to anybody's dose. Especially in this noble gas issue. 20 21 DR. MAURO: That's true.

1 So it may not MR. HINNEFELD: 2 but we're obliged to investigate, can't just say that without investigating. 3 4 DR. MAURO: Yes, sir. 5 MEMBER ROESSLER: So that already is an action item for NIOSH. 6 7 Well, it is now. MR. HINNEFELD: One other thing on 8 MR. GLECKLER: 9 that. It's like one of the documents I do 10 remember reading those tests for the initial It's like they only took place 11 engine tests. 12 under certain meteorologic, they're 13 specific in those documents on that. Yes, but remember that 14 DR. MAURO: 15 was primarily to protect the public. You 16 know, I mean, we don't want the wind blowing 17 in the direction that there's populated areas. 18 Now there may be more to the story than that but you're right, they did take the times --19 think 20 MR. GLECKLER: Ι the 21 documents talked about the workers too.

It may have been the 1 DR. MAURO: 2 workers too, at the time. 3 DR. OSTROW: Well, I read about bit. 4 that yesterday а little Apparently 5 happened with the engine that's true, what 6 tests with actually running them was that they 7 couldn't run them a lot of the time because 8 they were waiting for the perfect 9 meteorological conditions both for and for on-site. 10 They didn't want the releases to 11 12 out over one of the other test 13 So there were a lot of days when they either. couldn't operate at all which really hampered 14 15 them. 16 So you're right. DR. MAURO: 17 the point is that certainly mean may 18 ameliorate the potential. Even though these emissions may have been higher it may not be 19 20 of any significance. 21 MR. GLECKLER: Yes, the and

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1	evaluation that was done for this, were those
2	meteorological conditions factored into that,
3	do you know?
4	DR. MAURO: When we ran it?
5	MR. GLECKLER: Yes.
6	DR. MAURO: Yes, we actually ran a
7	much more sophisticated, a puff trajectory
8	model, you know, as opposed to
9	MR. GLECKLER: Using either the
10	actual augmented conditions or what
11	DR. MAURO: No, we modeled
12	MR. GLECKLER: the best
13	condition specification was?
14	DR. MAURO: We modeled the
15	emissions based on a lot of indirect data on
16	the failure of the fuel. In other words we
17	knew how much fuels they started out with.
18	And we knew after it was over what was left,
19	and it wasn't there.
20	MR. GLECKLER: Yes, but what was
21	the meteorological data set that you used?

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DR. Oh, MAURO: we had great meteorological data. In fact this may be the lead federal facility in the world of They have more met towers there meteorology. than you can shake a stick at. MR. GLECKLER: But was it specific to the testing time frame or?

DR. MAURO: No, what happened is, nice work, they only had three towers at the time. But then later they had 20 something towers. Then they calibrated the met data and wind fields that you would calculate using only the three field wind data, because you have the joint ones, frequency data. You've got three towers, right.

And you could theoretically create a wind field, they use wind field as opposed to standard Gaussian, this is a nice technology which you're probably familiar with.

So you almost could picture using

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the data, which comes in every 15 minutes Wind speed, direction, stability class, they make little arrows in three dimensional space.

This is the wind field at 2 o'clock in the afternoon on July 5th. And this is the wind field at 2:15, you know, and this goes on, so you have this wind field.

You puff something into it, okay, a puff comes up and it enters the wind field and the puff sort of dances along inside the wind field, spreading, according to the way the wind field is. I mean it's a great model. It's called the puff advection model.

Now, later, 20 years later, they don't have just three towers, they've got 20 something towers. Okay, they say let's reconstruct the wind field using, as best we can, to see how much added value do the extra towers provide you.

Does our understanding of the wind field change, for example now is now, if we

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were to construct the wind field now just using three towers as opposed to constructing the wind field using all 27, do we really vastly change the picture of these arrows?

And the answer is no. The answer is those extra towers are nice. They maybe expand the distance over which you could start to get good wind field.

Take into consideration maybe far away there is a mountain and a valley and you want to be able to see where the wind is blowing out there.

But in the near field it really didn't change things too much. So what we get is the data was out there, they did a great job, the met data was there.

The models were there and we benefitted from the fact that we had access to that data and we could run those models.

MR. GLECKLER: Correct me if I'm wrong but what it sounds like is you're using

long-term meteorological data set 1 2 short-term episodic release models. All the towers 3 DR. MAURO: No. give you is wind direction and stability class 4 5 at the location of the tower. MR. GLECKLER: What about the time 6 7 frame of the data? We'll show 8 DR. MAURO: you 9 They give it like this, the tower 10 is sitting there and it's -- every 15 minutes is putting out the wind speed over that 15 11 12 minutes. 13 stability class, The that's the delta T. The temperature difference between 14 15 the higher sensor and the lower sensor, wind 16 speed and direction. 17 it in this 15 minute says 18 period, and it's a real 15 minute time period, so date, the time, that at that time the wind 19 was blowing in this direction. 20 The Delta T, 21 the difference in the above tower sensor and

the low was this, which gives you stability class and direction.

And that's changing every 15 minutes, every 15 minutes. And it's almost like a living, and you got all this data.

So you can construct, you could ask yourself the question, if I ran an initial engine test on this particular date and it lasted this long and this is what was puffed out during that time period, that one hour test let's say.

You place that, and you know that this is the amount of radioactivity that came out, or you could estimate as best you can.

Let's say it's a noble gas or an iodine, whatever, came up and was put into that wind field, you could do a great job in tracking now where did that puff go over the next 10 hours.

MR. GLECKLER: Is that what was done for this though?

1	DR. MAURO: That's what 59
2	MR. HINNEFELD: That was done for
3	the earlier work.
4	DR. MAURO: No, the earlier work
5	did not use puff advection, we did.
6	MR. HINNEFELD: You did that before
7	you did this work for EEIOCPA?
8	DR. MAURO: We didn't do that work,
9	we just cited it. In other words all that
10	work was
11	MR. HINNEFELD: Okay, so you cited
12	that work that was done earlier
13	DR. MAURO: We cited that work that
14	was done.
15	MR. HINNEFELD: in what you did?
16	DR. MAURO: In what we did, you've
17	got it.
18	MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. Great.
19	DR. MAURO: Does that help?
20	MR. HINNEFELD: Yes, I couldn't
21	understand exactly what you were saying.

I wasn't making myselfo 1 DR. MAURO: 2 this was all done years ago. 3 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. And the model is sort of a simulation, it sort of --4 5 it does this 15 minutes and it does this 15 6 minutes? 7 DR. MAURO: Right. 8 MEMBER MELIUS: Can I suggest for 9 our next meeting we have a scale model of the whole site? 10 DR. MAURO: In 3-D, like a movie. 11 12 We can make a movie, Avatar. MR. HINNEFELD: We'll call Pixar. 13 (Simultaneous speakers.) 14 15 MEMBER MELIUS: That way John won't 16 have to move glasses around and wave the wind. 17 MR. GLECKLER: Ι know the 18 meteorological specifications for performing those tests were such that, you know, the wind 19 20 blowing, the wind would not blow 21 radioactivity towards any occupied areas

1	site. 61
2	Unless there was an unplanned
3	change of direction and meteorological
4	conditions. So the effect of those tests
5	should be minimal on
6	DR. MAURO: You know what? I'd be
7	the first to admit that, in all likelihood the
8	action, again, is inside the buildings. And
9	maybe we're over here gilding the lily. You
10	know you could really do a great job on
11	something that's not important.
12	But quite frankly we haven't
13	demonstrated that it's not important. I can't
14	really because let me tell you they put a
15	lot of radioactivity out during those initial
16	engine tests. A lot.
17	MR. GLECKLER: Short-lived
18	radioactivity though.
19	DR. MAURO: Yes, short-lived but,
20	yes. You know, it was there.
21	MR. GLECKLER: Because the big

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thing is it would be a notable incident in the INL records if the radioactivity got blown back into an occupied area and contaminated that area with any significant level of contamination.

DR. MAURO: Again I'll be the first to admit that. But it was picked, in other words this is important. The Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion program and the Chem Plant were picked out of all of the different sources.

They must have had 50 different sources and episodic events, as these are where the action is. If there's going to be a problem with off-site impact that might require epidemiological follow-up it's going to be these.

And that's the only reason we were brought in, to look at that. So it's not that these happen to be the insignificant ones, no these were the big ones.

And if any place there's going to

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be a local outdoor insult, it's going to be
these.
MR. GLECKLER: When you say these
are the big ones are you specifically talking
about the ones listed here in the 2006 report
or the initial engine tests?
DR. MAURO: Amongst, no, no.
Amongst the initial engine tests there were so
many tests. They were three, four and ten.
It's coming back to me, three, they had
MR. GLECKLER: It went higher than
that.
DR. MAURO: They went way above
that. But these are the ones where the most
severe meltdowns occurred. And these are the

ones where if there's -- where the biggest releases occurred.

The others we didn't even look at because on the scale they were like another order of magnitude lower in potential having airborne remissions.

1	MR. GLECKLER: Okay, so you'g
2	saying the ones listed in the 2006 review on
3	that are the probably the most significant
4	ones?
5	DR. MAURO: Yes. And
6	MR. GLECKLER: Or some of the most
7	significant ones.
8	DR. MAURO: Quite frankly what I
9	would do is say let's go take a look at that
10	work and see if in fact it adds, you know, use
11	some modelings, looks at the source terms.
12	We'd be the first to say well if RAC was here,
13	I forget the president of RAC, he's very
14	famous.
15	MR. GLECKLER: John Till.
16	DR. MAURO: John Till. If John
17	Till was there he'd probably say, no your work
18	is junk. You know, he won't, he would be
19	wrong.
20	He wouldn't, he's a nice man. He
21	wouldn't, but he may not agree. But we'd

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1	strongly disagree with him, we think that they
2	missed it.
3	But nevertheless it's on the
4	record. NIOSH, CDC has accepted our work, has
5	published our work, it's out there for the
6	public to see.
7	And I guess the question is if it
8	turns out, in fact, our assessment is
9	legitimate, probably have an obligation to put
10	it to bed or to say the degree to which it has
11	relevance here.
12	MR. KATZ: I think that's our
13	action item
14	MR. HINNEFELD: Yes.
15	MR. KATZ: Great.
16	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Here's the
17	date of the study.
18	DR. MAURO: That was the work we
19	came off of, so sometime after that date that

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CHAIRMAN

SCHOFIELD:

we looked at it.

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All

right.

Looks like 1 Any more discussion on Item 2? 2 NIOSH has to work. Then I guess we'll go on to Item Number 3 here. 3 These are the fence line measurements, boundary measurements. 4 5 sounds like you may have got a lot of this 6 already addressed. 7 MR. GLECKLER: I thought we had this addressed, on that at the last meeting to 8 9 where we had some concurrence out of it? 10 Yes, this is Steve, DR. OSTROW: unless John has any more opinion on this I 11 12 think SC&A considered it satisfied and 13 withdraws this issue. Or whatever, we're satisfied with NIOSH's response here. 14 15 And this is sort of subsumed in the 16 general environmental issues that we have. 17 don't think we need to carry this as an issue. 18 DR. TAULBEE: So we can consider this one closed? 19 20 DR. MAURO: Let me just understand.

So I remember the original concern is that

1 really can't TLD sitting you use on 67 2 fencepost to represent real people who 3 working inside. But you're saying that no, these real people were wearing TLDs, so what's 4 5 the problem? 6 MR. GLECKLER: -- get inside that 7 fence line is --Can't argue with that. 8 DR. MAURO: 9 Okay. 10 Yes, I think we can DR. OSTROW: consider this issue closed. 11 12 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay. 13 DR. OSTROW: We're making progress. That's a good one. 14 MR. KATZ: 15 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay. We're 16 going on to Issue Number 4. It's the quality 17 and completeness of the internal dosimetry 18 program. And I know there's been some issues 19

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facility about missed data, the absence of

some of

raised by

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the personnel work

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data in some cases. Would you like to address that?

MR. GLECKLER: As far as the completeness of that data, or the quality, it's like I am usually, I guess our generic response to the Tiger Team stuff is it wasn't, you know, the Tiger Team, say that, like their focus was different than what our focus was on that.

And their intent was different than what our intent for using the information was.

But the one key thing that we have done is completely revised the internal TBD on that.

And now for the activation fission product on that we're now using the OTIB-54 approach on that. And for the actinides I put together a similar approach that OTIB-54 uses, we still use ratios, but it's based on site specific data on that.

And it's a boiled down list to where so we've got a much broader list of

nuclides that are now being accounted for and I believe that was the biggest concern in the last meeting, that was expressed in the last meeting, was the list of nuclides that we were factoring in was too limiting on that and some organs might miss out on dose because of key nuclides not being factored into that.

So hopefully what we have in there now is sufficiently broad.

DR. MAURO: OTIB-54 is a very good OTIB. What it basically does, and I'm trying to draw a bridge between what you just said and OTIB-54.

MR. GLECKLER: Okay.

DR. MAURO: OTIB-54 says listen, if I happen to have urine samples from workers, let's say a comprehensive set of urine samples, where I did gross beta-gamma analysis on it. I've got a pretty good idea of the gross beta-gamma that was in that urine.

The problem I don't have is what

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the mix of radio nuclides are. It -- what  $\frac{1}{10}$  it, the strontium-90, cesium-137, is -- whatever it is. So it sounds like I'm not quite sure what was done originally, you know, the approach taken originally.

But ultimately if you're saying your starting point was gross beta-gamma measurements and originally you went about calculating the dose from that data. But now you say no, we're going to do it a better way. We're going to use the OTIB-54.

Now embedded in the OTIB-54 is a mix, there's mixes, and you could pick and choose which mix of radionuclides. In other words you could be at this reactor, or could you could be at that reactor.

And the reactors could be different enough so that the kinds of beta-gamma emitters that might become airborne from that reactor could be substantially different than the beta-gamma emitters from this reactor.

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Now, and what OTIB-54 says if you know which kind of reactor you're working with, more or less, you probably could work with this mix. Saying that this is the way in which the beta-gammas would be mixed as opposed to this reactor.

And all of that was fine in OTIB-54. We reviewed it, Joyce Lipsztein reviewed, and others reviewed it and said, no, that looks like a really good way to come at this problem.

So you basically are saying you basically have gotten to a place where for workers at this site you know that we have bioassay data

You assigned that worker to a particular type of reactor, one of the 52 reactors that are at the site, or class of reactors.

MR. GLECKLER: No, OTIB-54 takes those individual reactors and comes up with

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basically a homogenized or collective set $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}$
ratios that are representative of all the
reactor types.
DR. MAURO: That's the one place we
had a problem with OTIB-54.
MR. GLECKLER: Yes there's some
changes that are being looked into for OTIB-
54.
DR. TAULBEE: That's correct.
OTIB-54 is under revision right now.
DR. MAURO: Okay.
DR. TAULBEE: But in general the
description from reactor to reactor, it's my
understanding that the mixed fission product,
the mixture, doesn't change significantly from
reactor to reactor as much as it does from
reactor to separations area?

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reactors are actually more time dependent than

That

DR. MAURO: Yes.

DR. TAULBEE:

huge delta is.

And so that's where

the ones within

anything else. 1 73 2 DR. MAURO: Yes. 3 DR. TAULBEE: With the ten day, 60 day, 180 day, right? 4 5 DR. MAURO: Mixing -- Yes. 6 DR. TAULBEE: Right. And so it's 7 really not so much different type of reactor 8 it's the time sequence associated with 9 and then the difference 10 separations area. So by incorporating OTIB-54 that's 11 12 where they're taking into account those 13 radionuclides that highest take the dose 14 associated with whichever time period, 15 long they kept the fuel there, how often they 16 changed it, et cetera, that that's where that 17 mixture is going to be changing. And that's 18 what I believe you've incorporated into the revised TBD, correct? 19

part when it comes to the OTIB-54, and that

GLECKLER:

MR.

20

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Yes, for the most

revised TBD says basically just use OTIB-54, gives specific guidance the on periods for specific facilities and that are applicable and the reasons why those decay periods are applicable to those facilities. like In the instance the ICPP multiple periods there's decay the instructions are to basically evaluate all the potential decay periods and use the one that results in the highest dose. DR. MAURO: Well see ICPP was not, see I think, OTIB-54 was really written for reactors.

MR. GLECKLER: It covers both.

DR. MAURO: No, it does both?

MR. GLECKLER: Ιt covers waste sites and reprocessing type facilities well.

> DR. MAURO: Okay.

MR. GLECKLER: It's a pretty broad scope document.

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1	DR. TAULBEE: Well it seems to me
2	that since this revision was really
3	significant that maybe SC&A might want to take
4	a look at the new revision?
5	MEMBER BEACH: That's for 0-54?
6	DR. MAURO: See to me
7	MR. HINNEFELD: No, for Finding
8	Number 4.
9	MEMBER BEACH: Four, right.
10	DR. TAULBEE: Right.
11	MEMBER BEACH: But OTIB-54 is under
12	review right now also, correct?
13	DR. MAURO: One area is, that one
14	aspect. This homogenized issue. Where if you
15	don't know what reactor and you're going to
16	work with a generic reactor, maybe we had a
17	problem with that.
18	MR. HINNEFELD: If you give me a
19	little bit I can probably find out.
20	DR. TAULBEE: I know we are
21	revising it right now, internally, with a

slightly modified mix due to some better data that we've got. But I don't know that that's hit for you all to look at yet.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: So how would this be applied say for those people working up at TAN, in that area, versus those people at the Chem Plant who have a number of different reactors.

I shouldn't say in that -- in that particular area. So now you have these two areas and you have, maybe you have personnel, which I assume there were many personnel that went back and forth between the two. How are you going to apply that to that particular person?

MR. GLECKLER: Okay. This would typically be applied to individuals with bioassay data, so let's say the person worked there prior to 1960, they would typically have a gross beta and urine sample results, or multiple sample results going on.

We would take that gross uring sample result, and Table 7-1 of OTIB-54 has some ratios. Test Area North, it's an area with operating reactors -- reactors were still operational back in that time frame we'd use the ten day TBD. The INL TBD says to use a ten day decay period for that time frame.

And that which yields the highest rations from Table 7-3. Now table 7-1 of OTIB-54 accounts for the fraction of the urine that's attributable to strontium and cesium.

And for the gross-beta we would use the amount that's attributable to strontium. And then we take the intake that we calculate using that ratio and that information and apply the ratios in Table 7-3, I believe. I'm pretty sure I got these table numbers right, but I'm not positive.

But for all the other activation fission products in OTIB-54 there's a list of ratios for each decay period. There's a ten

day, a 40 day decay period, 180 day decay period and a one year decay period.

And the highest ratios for the activation fusion products come out of the ten day decay period. So that would yield pretty much the highest doses and intakes possible using the OTIB-54 approach.

DR. MAURO: You got me on that one.

I would have thought that as the core ages,
in other words the reactor is operating for a
long time period.

And what happens is as time goes on the importance of cesium-137 and strontium-90 is starting to become more and more greater inventory of the total curies inside the reactor.

And therefore, those are the ones that, if you are going to inhale some airborne articulates, they're the ones that are going to give you the greatest dose per becquerel inhaled, as opposed to the shorter lived,

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which are not going to really, see the shorter liveds are going to go out and then stop.

Even if you've operated for long periods of time the inventory's going to stop here. On the longer lived they're just going to keep climbing.

MR. GLECKLER: Yes but cesium and strontium are pretty much accounted for by the bioassay measurement to where the, in the Table 7-1 values, are not as time, as the decay period goes up, yes, the ratios get a little higher.

Let me see, I've got it here -- forget which way they go.

DR. MAURO: See to me a ten day mix is not going to be as damaging as a one year mix. In terms of the airborne gross betagamma.

What the mix of radionuclides is going to be you're going to have your dose per unit intake is going to be much higher for a

one year mix.

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Let's say you have a becquerel per cubic meter. The one year mix of becquerel per cubic meter is going to be a lot more harmful, theoretically, than a ten day mix, unless I'm thinking about it wrong.

On a per becquerel per cubic meter or becquerel per liter, in urine, is the older, is the age material that's going to, on a per unit activity, is going to give you the higher dose. Because you have longer lived radionuclides that are making up that mix.

And by longer lived ones, of course, are going to deliver a greater dose commitment.

DR. TAULBEE: What OTIB-54 looking at is ratios. So I think it's just giving the ratio on the different you radionuclides. They are not doses, which is what you're talking of it being longer. think we're actually talking two different things here.

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DR. MAURO: Okay.

MR. GLECKLER: Yes, because specifically this will have to do with intakes. But typically the doses will still yield higher because cesium and strontium are, you know, basically around the same sort of life. And so they're going to be out and like the Table 7-1 values are urine activity fractions.

And it's like 7-3 where they use that indicator nuclide, which is cesium or strontium. Now if you calculate the others, and like for the cesium, if you're strontium the cesium ratios do not change from ten days to one year.

And so it's the same throughout but you get a much larger mix of other short-lived nuclides at the ten day mark with much higher ratios. But part of what you said is true but not for that reason that you're indicating.

It's because of the actinides<sub>2</sub> because the actinides tend to go yield a higher result with the longer decay periods the way that they're dealt with in this TBD revision.

DR. MAURO: For the purpose of the in the place I think work we're what What I'm getting at is this is the important. internal dose to workers inside the building radioactivity exposed to airborne from whatever the facility is.

And this, in my mind, this is where the action is for internal events.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: John, can I ask you a question on that? What about say personnel who worked in the reprocessing of some of these fuel pins and stuff, like CTP, was that 602 I think it is, where they redid these. So they would have been exposed to a lot of the -- particularly the actinides.

DR. MAURO: I have to say I always

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thought of 54 as more of a reactor thing than a reprocessing tool, but I may be wrong.

MR. GLECKLER: As far as what, I'm not familiar offhand with what that area did, could you elaborate on what that specific area was involved with?

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Well the development of the fuel pins, say extracting the uranium back out to have it recycled through the system. Or like the RaLa program that went on up there for --

MR. GLECKLER: Because well you've got RaLa, that's separate from the first thing that you mentioned. Because the first thing you mentioned deals with more the routine operations that took place at the facility.

Then we're only talking about uranium as the actinide predominately other than it's recycled uranium. And there are things that were added to the TBD that account for the recycled component, you know, the

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And that's based on Y-12 information and material that they actually got from the ICPP. Then for the most part the other actinides stayed with the fission

We don't have any indication that they've ever separated plutonium out, that's been something you see quoted a lot in a lot of the INL documents and I haven't come across anything to show that there's ever plutonium separated.

So they all stayed with the fission products on that. So that actinide scenario that you're talking about is pretty much recycled uranium. High enriched recycled uranium on that.

And then for the RaLa there is some specific guidance that I put in there because the ICCP, the decay periods that are recommended for that facility are the 40 day,

products.

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the 180 day and the one year that we have to evaluate except for the RaLa runs where then we do the ten day as well, I believe.

There is specific guidance in the revised TBD for individuals involved with that work.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: How are you going to apply that to, say personnel who may have been exposed to both. Maybe they were there in the Chem Plant processing this stuff.

MR. GLECKLER: Let me look real quick.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Then maybe they were filling in at one of the reactors.

MR. GLECKLER: I believe the way that I've got it written in there, because I don't look at the RaLa stuff much because we don't encounter it too much. But I think the way I wrote it in there was that you just add the ten day in the list of scenarios that you have to assess.

It's like then I believe you have to assess all four of them at that point and pick the one that's highest. I know that's the case for normal ICPT exposure is you've got the 40 day, 180 day and one year decay periods that are applicable to that facility. You have to assess all three and pick the one that yields the highest dose on that.

And I believe I've got it written to where we just add the ten day into that mix for the RaLa workers, or workers that were there when they were doing --

DR. TAULBEE: So I think to answer your question, Phil, basically when somebody's split between the two we assume them to be in one or the other, and which ever one gives the highest dose.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay. What about time frames? Say maybe they're only on an annual urinalysis versus a person's on semi-annual, quarterly or even monthly.

MR. GLECKLER: Because virtually, you know, the vast majority of the bioassay results are negative and that we're typically just doing a missed dose calculation anyhow.

So we're only using the very last bioassay result for a given monitoring period — and to deal with unmonitored periods and unmonitored workers, out at INL we're still doing the default dose approach that was initially described in the original TBD.

And that's where we'll use hypothetical bioassay result on that and missed assign them dose. And that's а typically, if they're unmonitored in order to get that for like а best estimate compensable claim they have to have at least a positive external dose. Otherwise they'll just get the environmental for a comp or best estimate claim on that.

But the basis for only giving them a missed dose for those unmonitored periods is

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the fact that we've got the bioassay datag over 90 percent of it was, you know, less than detect.

DR. MAURO: I'm constructing in my mind the logic sequence of how to get through this situation where you have, you're saying the rock you're really standing on is that you've got urine samples for a lot of workers and you've measured gross beta gap. That's really to make a generalization. And it applies — no matter where they worked.

And at the same time you run into a situation where those very people that were monitored, the vast majority don't have positive hit. They're less than the lower limits of protection, but a few are above it.

So you're confronted with a circumstance that says okay, for those that we do have fairly good data, let's say quarterly urine sample collection, gross beta-gamma, you go back into maybe his work history. And if

he doesn't have a good idea of what his work history was you go back and make the worst plausible assumption.

Well if he happened to have been working over here the worst thing that you could assume was that he's working over here and this was his mix, and we're going to assign that to him. I mean that would seem to be a reasonable way to go. And you've done the right thing by that person.

But now you have a person, let's say, that he has all his results come back lower than limits of detection. All right, so you say, and let's say he was only monitored once a year. Okay, you got a guy, what do we do with this guy. And I guess I'm not sure.

See to me it's always just a simple story. All right, what are we going to do about the guy that worked there for many years. We took annual urine sample. We know he could have worked in areas where he could

have been exposed to some airborne.

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What am I going to do with him? Ι don't have gross beta-gamma data on him, and everything is less than the limits of detection. How do I deal with him? I have to build a coworker model to somehow deal with him and assign him something. We can't just say he wasn't exposed, especially if there's evidence that he did work in areas where he could have been exposed. See I like to hear the story that way.

MR. GLECKLER: With INL it's like they didn't conduct as much routine monitoring as other facilities. Typically a lot of their monitoring was based on workplace indicators, air monitoring results, you know, something occurring within the facility. It's like they typically would, you know, you see this in the exposure results and the bioassay data for the workers.

They'll monitor a whole group of

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workers that were in the vicinity of where there was a release event. And that and it's like judge by what those bioassay results yield.

So if they're all negative it's like they're not, you know, not going to monitor anyone else or do much follow up, if any, at that point.

But if there's significant intake and that sometimes they expand that out and monitor some other workers, but they'll typically have a whole series of monitoring results for those workers that were involved and had positive bioassays.

DR. MAURO: So they weren't, so all workers weren't, it was just because they happened to work in this area where routine bioassay, on some kind of bioassay schedule, it was sort of like episodic.

That is when we felt it was necessary, it was done. When it wasn't, it

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wasn't done. And the presumption being when
it wasn't done there was no need to do it.
MR. GLECKLER: From the most part
it looks like they relied heavily on workplace
indicators on that. It's like because there's
a handful of them that you do see to where
they do get annual bioassays.
But typically that's about the most
frequent of the routine monitoring that you'll
see is annual.
DR. MAURO: Annual. Now let's
MR. GLECKLER: Or eventually annual
whole body counts.
DR. MAURO: But they all did have
film badge, were they all badged?
MR. GLECKLER: Yes.

DR. MAURO: So what we have is, is there any argument that could be made that there was a relationship between the film badge reading and the bioassay?

That is if you're consistently

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seeing a relatively low film badge reading, is there any -- I'm trying to find, I'm putting myself in your shoes and to try to convince myself.

You see, it sounds like you're in a tough spot. You've got a place where there was airborne radioactivity. The reactors, the Chem Plant, the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program.

But you have relatively limited amount of positive readings, or a limited amount of bioassay, annual bioassays and only for select people.

So somehow you've got to have a hook that says why is that we believe that we could bound the doses to all workers, internal doses.

Because we have this indirect evidence, whether it's air sampling data, film badge data, operational data. In other words you've got to have a hook to allow yourself to

walk away.

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And say, well for these particular people here's the reason why it's okay we're not assigning you any internal does. Or we're assigning this internal dose.

And I'll be the first to say, you know, I didn't read all this material. But I'm trying to give you an idea of how I think about these things and how SC&A thinks about these things.

So you've just got to make like a common sense argument why in the end what you're recommending rings true. And unfortunately these matrices don't really help us understand that kind of story.

MR. GLECKLER: But if you're saying that the workers that were monitored their exposures aren't indicative of the, you know, the workers that were unmonitored might have had equal or higher exposure, or more importantly, higher exposures than effectively

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a coworker, you know, you're saying that you wouldn't deem a coworker study valid for that site.

MR. HINNEFELD: Well I think the conclusion though is for a coworker study to be valid that you have to have some confidence that there wasn't a systematic exclusion of most highly exposed people.

DR. TAULBEE: Let me, Page 5 of this, this actually comes under another issue a little bit later when we talk about gross beta-gamma. You know we've got 90,000 urine samples here at the site, and 98 percent of them were below detection limit.

So that's what effectively, I believe, Brian correct me if I'm wrong here, that's why we're banking on the MDA assignment as being reasonable for somebody not being monitored.

You know they've taken almost 100,000 urine samples, and only two percent

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are showing positive. Therefore, for somebody who's not monitored, or we only have one urine sample, you know, for a year, and we assign a missed dose for that entire year based upon that, that's where we feel confident here.

Ιf sampling was based upon the workplace indicators, and have we results and that's the only sampling that was done, and only two percent are positive, the workplace indicators seem to be significant as far detecting pretty as something.

DR. MAURO: And that story is all laid out in your Site Profile?

DR. TAULBEE: That's what I'm --

MR. GLECKLER: It goes into now the number of bioassay samples that, the different types of bioassay samples. Like the gross beta in urine, gross gamma in urine, how many of them were, you know, negative and stuff. It goes into some of those statistics now that

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would chart in the matrix.

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And that's a lot of that got in, I wrote the stuff for the matrix first, I believe, and incorporated it into the TBD, so the statistics are now in the TBD. But the big thing is, yes, it's not like they weren't monitoring people.

And it's not the scenario where they were only monitoring people sparingly and yes, like 98 percent of them or whatever, it's like were negative and well that's not representative.

You know they took a large amount of samples. Almost, just short of 100,000 bioassay samples, and they were negative.

DR. MAURO: To speak, I mean, what you just said is the story I like to hear. You have got 90,000 urine samples and it cuts across just about every activity you could possibly imagine, over all the years.

And we're getting this non-detects.

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That's a pretty strong statement. It's also
common sense that I'm not looking for heavy
statistical analysis
DR. TAULBEE: Right.
DR. MAURO: Okay. And here's why
you believe. And this almost becomes self
evident. If you have 90,000 measurements
representing, I don't know, how many. How
many people over what time period in every
facility.
MEMBER ROESSLER: Well there's two
questions. How many people and over what time
period.
DR. MAURO: Yes, right.

MEMBER ROESSLER: That helps us better evaluate the significance of it.

DR. MAURO: Yes.

DR. TAULBEE: Well I guess back to my, you know, we opened this particular one. The internal TBD has been revised significantly since the last time this Work

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Group met.

So it seems to me it would be important for SC&A to look at that again and make those types of comments. These 90,000 followed at this time period, workers on the TBD, make that comment and we can follow up on that. But that seems like -- that seems to me where -- the step we're at.

DR. MAURO: Anyplace where you could be fooled by the gross beta-gamma. That would be another dimension of the problem is that if you're working in a place where you're dealing with transuranics, you're taking gross beta-gamma.

MR. GLECKLER: Right. That's why I think perhaps SC&A should look at this new revised internal TBD using OTIB-54 and the methods that Brian's talking about here.

MEMBER ROESSLER: Just for my information while we're on it, over what time period were those urine samples taken?

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MR. GLECKLER: Typically the gross beta-gamma urine samples stopped somewhere in the mid `60s. And like the gross beta stopped around 1960, and the gross gamma stopped, you don't see hardly any of those after like the mid 1960s where once they got a lot more confidence in the whole body counting which started around 1960 and later.

On that they pretty much went to whole body counting for the bulk of the workforce and in later years you start to see some Pu bioassays.

MEMBER ROESSLER: So the urine samples started back in '49?

MR. GLECKLER: I forget what the start year is. The initial year that they started operations at the site there weren't any bioassay results that we could find. But I believe it's the following years when they started up, like `53 --

MEMBER ROESSLER: So we're looking

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1 a period of maybe 12 12 to 2 something like that and how many people? 3 MR. GLECKLER: That we could probably -- I didn't do that sort on the data 4 5 to figure out how many different 6 individuals were there, but I think 7 information in the database would allow us to sort that if you really want that information. 8 9 MEMBER ROESSLER: That would give us a idea of how representative these urine 10 samples were for the group we're interested 11 12 That's close enough. 13 DR. MAURO: No, and I agree, and we all the operations at these different 14 know 15 areas was just completely different, time and 16 space and I know a lot of attention was placed 17 on the reactors. But there were some very 18 exotic activities going on like the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program. 19 20 sweeping statement regarding

the early years they were taking

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beta-gamma analysis is sort of like the  $r_{102}^{\rm ck}$  you're standing on, at least for the early years.

Then later you're saying chest count data became the currency for making sure that they understood what the internal doses were, and that would apply, again, universally to the diverse activities that took place.

And why that would work and why it wouldn't necessarily be important. I mean in the end when I'm reviewing these things I just look for these simple things. You know, and start again.

A funny way what I do is I say what could have tricked me into thinking I know what I'm doing when I don't?

I almost look the other way around, not looking for reasons why I think everything's okay. No, looking for reasons why things might not be okay. It's sort of like flipping it. I like that way of looking

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at almost testing yourself, where in here
could I have been fooled. And anyway.
MEMBER ROESSLER: So later on it
would be the chest count in addition to whole
body counts so they got most of the stuff plus
the plutonium.
MR. GLECKLER: Yes in the later
eras they start doing some PU bioassay and I
don't know really why
MEMBER ROESSLER: He said chest
counts, I don't think you did. But
DR. MAURO: I thought you said
chest count, it wasn't chest count?
MR. GLECKLER: I meant it in vivo
Yes, they're whole body counts.
DR. MAURO: Whole body counts.
MR. GLECKLER: Yes, whole body
counts. They do lung counts too for some
workers at the

badged on a yearly, did they have a whole body

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD:

Was everybody

scan done?

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MR. GLECKLER: What's that?

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Were there personnel who were badged who didn't get these whole body counts done on a yearly basis or these quarterly, semi-annual?

MR. GLECKLER: Yes, there's number of personnel that don't have any bioassay results on that to where ones that were monitored at all typically if they're in the whole body like count era it's they typically have annual whole body counts that.

Unless there's a one check to special, that usually means that there's a workplace indicator then that triggered that one to be taken.

And they also did a lot of termination whole body counts for workers.

Even sometimes that's the only bioassay result for individuals is their termination whole

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body count. And that's, so they might not have been monitored during any of their employment but they could receive their termination whole body count.

MEMBER MELIUS: So, John, when you look at this, like one of the other issues I thinking that so needed to be in the Site Profile itself is look at were there groups of workers that were missed?

DR. MAURO: Yes, that's a --

MR. GLECKLER: Yes and I don't see that data in here, I would expect to see it but if that's something you could look at.

DR. MAURO: And also exposure scenarios that could have been missed by a gross beta-gamma when a person is exposed to transuranics, whether it's urinalysis or chest count or a chest count or a whole body count.

MEMBER BEACH: And also the lab workers it sounds like had a possibly higher exposure potential. And I'm curious of what

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labs that they were looked at because it's not listed in here also.

DR. MAURO: Yes, you know the reality is it's been six years since we looked at this. It sounds like an awful lot of work was done, a lot of NUREGS came out -- OTIBS. I think we have to look at this again.

MR. GLECKLER: The approach now is very different from the previous approach and in defense of the old approach it's like from what I've been seeing is, you know, the old approach is still claimant favorable in most situations.

It's like it might be, you know, the argument that SC&A originally had is that for certain organs not having a certain nuclide in the list is like might result in an underestimate of dose.

But from what we've been seeing with some claims that come back for rework for added cancers and that we haven't put them

through the PDR process yet. But some of them have come back for rework and their doses typically go down.

the problem with old But the that put that approach is no one approach together was still on the project and we didn't defend have the data to it, unfortunately, other than we hear that there's a lot of effort put into coming up with that approach, and it seemed fairly good.

But right now after comparing it to the new, the comparisons that we've done with the old approach and the new approach it seems like it was claimant favorable.

DR. MAURO: Well I could imagine if you defaulted to strontium-90 on your gross beta analysis and did -- assumed it was all strontium-90 and the guy was doing his own dose, I mean you're going to come off the charts.

And then later on you back off and

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say well we're going to do a realistic  $m_{108}$  But I can see that are those just dropping like a rock.

MR. GLECKLER: Yes.

MR. KATZ: Yes. No, I had the same question, I don't understand, but --

MEMBER MELIUS: Well was the old metric just not documented? It's making me nervous.

MR. GLECKLER: Yes, it sounded like it was documented but not in a manner that, it was with an individual where the project never recovered those files from them after they created them in the first place, you know, to support was done. And so essentially it would be counted as not documented, but not to, it wasn't completely undocumented.

They did the legwork on it and there's documentation out there to support it, but the individual that would have had those records is retired and after a few years

never, you know, saw fit to retain them. 1 109 2 Ideally would have recovered we 3 those and put them into the SRDB or somewhere where they were retrievable. That's why we 4 5 just, by the time that this become an issue and now it's like OTIB-54 was out there and 6 7 issued. So it's like that was one of the 8 9 reactors from INL was used for the basis for 10 OTIB-54, so it just seemed natural to go with that approach and be done with it. 11 12 MR. KATZ: Water under the bridge 13 at this point I guess. No, I'm just trying to 14 DR. MAURO: 15 16 (Simultaneous speakers.) 17 MR. KATZ: I think I'd just suggest 18 that the Work Group task SC&A with doing this but as you're doing your work reviewing it 19 20 that you raise questions as you go with DCAS 21 about issues that seem to be unaddressed, or what have you, before reporting out.

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That time have next we way that meeting kind of interaction on clarifications and so on, what was done, why and what might be missing. You'll already answers to that at least instead of thrashing them out here and utilizing this --

Yes, I have to say one DR. MAURO: things I'd really like circumstances like this is while we're reading your work products, have a chance to talk to And find, just you. not to get clarification -- and this has been -- now as we have in the past we informed the Work Group that we're about to have a conference call, for clarification.

MR. KATZ: Yes, that's fine. And then Work Group Members can sit in and listen to those calls. I think it'd be a good way to move it forward as opposed to waiting for the next Work Group meeting.

1 DR. MAURO: Absolutely. 111 2 MEMBER BEACH: I have a question. 3 MEMBER MELIUS: And just one sort of procedural, then there'll just be some sort 4 5 of documentation then of what happened at the 6 work --Technical call. 7 MR. KATZ: 8 MEMBER MELIUS: Yes, so that we're 9 just so when we meet again we don't say, 10 well I think we did that. MR. KATZ: Then if one of the other 11 12 Work Group Members want to know what happened 13 they don't have to rely on the one Work Group Member who was there or what have you. 14 15 MEMBER MELIUS: Or if a Work Group 16 Member has a question about a certain --17 DR. MAURO: I have to say I think 18 we've got to do a lot more of that as we're 19 working on problem. We're working on so many 20 Site Profiles and SECs and when we're reading 21 it what is it you really mean here. And

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document it and put it on the record. And there'll be almost a new way, because we don't do enough of that. That's how I feel.

MEMBER MELIUS: Well also I think it facilitates giving the time frames here and what's happened with this particular Site Profile.

MR. GLECKLER: Yes, because just sitting down and going through the TBD and trying to hash it out unfortunately, you know, I tried to write it as clearly as possible.

But, you know, based on questions I get from our dose reconstructors and that and walking them through stuff it's not 100 percent clear. So it's like it's, we'll probably need some help with understanding what was intended there and stuff.

DR. MAURO: Let's say during one of these conference calls we say, it seems like you've got a hole here. Let's say that happens based on blah, blah, blah, blah, looks

like you got a hole here.

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It's almost like a finding, and usually we try to avoid having, it's not a finding, but it's a conversation saying based on what I'm hearing it sounds like that we're still little uncertain about how you deal with this actually will particular isotope under these particular circumstances.

Which, in a way, would be the first step in identifying a possible finding. I for one would like to be able to have that conversation and pass on that concern during such a call.

Document it, make sure that everybody's aware that we raised this concern, it's on the record. And in a way then it's almost moving into the Work Group arena, so I worry that --

MR. KATZ: I don't think we're moving in -- I mean I think it's fine if you come in and you say you don't understand how X

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1	situation is being dealt with here and if they
2	don't have an answer, I mean that ends up
3	being in your final report.
4	And they have a cue that they
5	better be ready at the Work Group meeting to
6	address because they already know you have
7	some concerns about something. I don't see
8	any problem in that.
9	MEMBER MELIUS: Or if NIOSH/ORAU
10	agrees then they can be working to resolve it
11	and
12	MR. KATZ: Absolutely.
13	MR. HINNEFELD: Come to the meeting
14	saying get
15	MR. KATZ: That's right.
16	MEMBER MELIUS: This is what
17	it's not
18	MR. KATZ: You don't have to argue
19	and arm wrestle, it's just
20	(Simultaneous speakers.)
21	MR HINNEFELD: Yes we're pretty

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much leaving those days behind. 1 115 2 DARNELL: MR. In the past there independence 3 were concerns about of this between SC&A and NIOSH. 4 5 MR. HINNEFELD: Yes, that's come up periodically. 6 7 MR. DARNELL: Okay. if 8 MR. HINNEFELD: But these 9 explanatory Ι mean, these technical 10 conversations can be so much more helpful than just showing up down here. 11 12 DARNELL: Ι agree MR. 13 wholeheartedly. I just wanted to make sure we're not crossing that independence thing. 14 15 MEMBER MELIUS: No, as long as the 16 Group knows that it's occurring Work and 17 secondly that there's a record of the call. 18 Dr. MAURO: All right, you got it. (Simultaneous speakers.) 19 20 Dr. MAURO: I mean, Gen, you've been 21 on so many --

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1	MEMBER BEACH: We can listen 1i6
2	moves it along.
3	MR. KATZ: People listening could
4	ask questions, whatever.
5	MEMBER MELIUS: Or if you're not on
6	the line you could get the memo and if there's
7	something outrageous or wrong or whatever
8	then, you know.
9	MR. KATZ: Right.
10	MEMBER BEACH: So, Pete, I have a
11	question. Your responses are all based on the
12	new Site Profile Review that came out in
13	April, is that correct?
14	MR. DARNELL: Yes. It's
15	information.
16	MEMBER BEACH: And the issues were
17	based on the old Site Profile?
18	MR. DARNELL: Correct.
19	MEMBER BEACH: Okay. I just wanted
20	to make sure

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The

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GLECKLER:

MR.

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recent

1	version that was released.
2	MEMBER BEACH: that you actually
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4	MR. GLECKLER: Only the external
5	one came out in April, all the others came out
6	prior to that.
7	MEMBER BEACH: How much prior?
8	They came out since our last meeting?
9	MR. GLECKLER: Yes.
10	MS. JENKINS: The internal came out
11	in March of 2010, roughly.
12	MEMBER BEACH: Right.
13	MR. GLECKLER: Going back there
14	MS. JENKINS: Actually it was
15	January of 2010, external was May of this
16	year. Site description was August of last
17	year.
18	Oh, Environmental was February of
19	last year. Those are the dates that we have
20	on the network as far as when they get there.
21	Because the dates probably on the actual

reports tend to vary a little bit.

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MEMBER BEACH: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Based on what they have in the TBD there looks like the, whether this effect I don't know, has any that's why I'm asking this question. Basically when they're doing these fuel rods, running them back through and reprocessing this stuff.

Ιt they've had three seems campaigns highly enriched of uranium, neptunium and RaLa Programs. Now how that's going to effect these people who had a in vivo done or who maybe were missed, I don't know if, is that going to have any real effect on them?

MR. GLECKLER: From what I've seen the ones during the RaLa release incidents is like they'll send a whole group in for bioassay and then depending on whether they're positive or negative, a lot of them had really

high positives for iodine.

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And most of those intakes for the RaLa work it's like were real high positive iodine, or real high iodine intakes, and they very short lived. And then it shows they'll take a whole series of subsequent bioassays after that in the subsequent days and it drops off really quick.

So there's no indication that there's anything longer lived, like cesium and that present. So for those instances we could actually limit those acute intakes to iodine. Because they've -- the site has in and written most cases in in what gone specific isotopes.

And I think they'll do a gamma spec on the urine sample in most instances when there's, especially when there's a significant bioassay result and that they'll typically go in and do a gamma spec on it and determine which nuclides are the culprits, so to speak

1	and then
2	DR. MAURO: Yes, and you track that
3	and watch the iodine go away and then you can
4	start to see there's a urine sample where
5	you're doing gamma spec and the iodine starts
6	to go away, as expected, and what's left
7	behind would be some of the lesser amounts for
8	possibly important radionuclides, like
9	cesium.
10	So the process, because you could
11	almost see the iodine swapping your count.
12	MR. GLECKLER: And I've only seen
13	one incidence to where the iodine tailed off
14	and then you could definitely tell that there
15	is cesium there.
16	DR. MAURO: There's always cesium
17	when you have iodine.
18	MR. GLECKLER: Well most of these
19	instances it drops below detection
20	DR. MAURO: Right off the radar.
21	MR. GLECKLER: It drops right below

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the detection limit within a couple days. And
if there's any cesium there you should be able
to see it.
DR. MAURO: You should see it.
MR. GLECKLER: Should be able to
see it there for quite a bit longer.
DR. MAURO: Well I was thinking
that maybe the iodine was just like a thyroid
count but it's not.
MR. GLECKLER: No this is
typically, I think that's the gross beta and
gross gamma in here and there, it's one of
those two areas.
But I think it's the end of the
gross beta in urine era and the beginning of
the gross gamma in the urine era is typically
where most of those RaLa runs were done.

And so I think a lot of it's gross gamma now that I think about it. But you see it in the bioassay results tail off within a couple days on that so there's --

1 DR. MAURO: There wasn't a 2 spec on this, this is just a gross? The gross 3 count. MR. GLECKLER: Yes, they'll just do 4 5 a gross count. But in instances they'll do, 6 when they're real high, they'll do a gamma 7 spec and label, they won't give you the gamma spec result. It looks like they're just using 8 9 the gamma spec to identify the nuclide. 10 DR. MAURO: Okay. And they'll have in MR. GLECKLER: 11 12 the record they'll write down what isotope. 13 DR. MAURO: Yes, what peaks they 14 saw. 15 MR. GLECKLER: That they saw, and 16 typically it's one of the iodines. 17 always especially if it's and there's 18 usually an incident report for the RaLa runs or incidents. 19 And for the routine stuff you don't 20 21 see as many incident reports with

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positive bioassays, the real big incidents you do definitely see the incident reports for.

But you'll see whole groups in the, even though they redact out the names of the other individuals, well we've got the unredacted data too, it's like in the database now. It's like in the exposure reports for individuals you'll see that they sent a whole group in.

And the whole group's got a lot of significant positive bioassay results on that. So they're not just sending one worker in because of a workplace indicator, they're sending in groups of people that were in the affected area, and they typically show up on the same bioassay card.

MEMBER MELIUS: Can I ask a different sort of global question just so I understand? This new profile incorporates Argonne West.

Is there any differences in terms

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of operations or worker, you know, types 124
workers that are covered or something like
that? Because I think that makes some
difference in terms of what we would have SC&A
do, that's
MR. GLECKLER: Originally the Site
Profile included ANL West, we just recombined
it.
MEMBER MELIUS: Okay.
MR. GLECKLER: Because they were so
closely related to where they had, you know,
pretty much the same radiological control
organization up until the very later years I
think they were a little more separate.
And then once Argonne West

And then once Argonne West basically has since disappeared and got reincorporated into the site also, it's now all part of the same health physics organization or radiological control, so.

MEMBER MELIUS: And so operationally it's always been --

1	MR. GLECKLER: The same 125
2	MEMBER MELIUS: Okay.
3	MR. HINNEFELD: Argonne West has
4	their own series of reactors, right?
5	MR. GLECKLER: Yes, they had their
6	own facilities.
7	MR. HINNEFELD: Yes, their own
8	facilities, they were reactor things like INL
9	had?
10	MR. GLECKLER: Yes.
11	MR. HINNEFELD: Different design of
12	the reactors but it was reactors but it was
13	reactor technology, basically.
14	MEMBER MELIUS: And the workforces
15	were, sorry, to some extent combined, I mean
16	in the
17	MR. GLECKLER: Yes, you'll see like
18	maintenance workers are probably the best
19	example. Most of the maintenance workers work
20	out of the CFA.
21	They'll send maintenance workers,

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1	and the same maintenance worker will go to the
2	ICPP as they'll send over to the ANL West at
3	times on that. So even other you'll see
4	them going to all the facilities out on the
5	site.
6	MEMBER MELIUS: I didn't think that
7	was our rationale then for combining
8	MR. HINNEFELD: Yes that and
9	combined rate.
10	MEMBER MELIUS: Okay. I'm just
11	trying to remember a few
12	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: It looks like
13	on Number 4 that's SC&A's action items.
14	MR. KATZ: Right.
15	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: We've got
16	OTIB-54 and how it's defined.
17	DR. MAURO: Oh yes. Absolutely.
18	Yes, we'll definitely take that.
19	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: When the
20	internals, new internals come out.
21	MR KATZ: Anybody need a break?

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1 MEMBER BEACH: Sure. 127 2 Sounds like a good MS. JENKINS: 3 place. 4 MR. KATZ: So should we take a 5 break until 11:00? 6 Okay folks on the phone, we'll just 7 break until 11:00, so just put the phone --(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off 8 9 the record at 10:46 a.m. 10 resumed at 11:07 a.m.) This is the INL 11 MR. KATZ: Okay. 12 We're reconvening after a break, Work Group. 13 little bit it's longer than sorry а Phil, where are we? 14 expected. 15 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: One quick 16 issue here. I know that's one concern about 17 the high-risk jobs. I think for the most part 18 we've kind of addressed where SC&A and NIOSH need to look because this, there again, goes 19 20 back to the internal possible missed doses on 21 Comment Number 5. Anybody have any feelings

on that? 1 128 2 GLECKLER: Other than MR. the 3 bioassay data it looks like they routinely 4 sent people in to submit bioassays or 5 whole body counts when there was a workplace that indicated that 6 indicators they had 7 potential exposure and that the vast majority 8 of those bioassay results were below the detection limits. 9 10 We're going to look at DR. MAURO: You miss those you've got a problem. 11 it. Ι 12 mean we're --13 So it's kind DR. TAULBEE: Okay. of covered then under your review of internal? 14 15 MR. KATZ: TBD. DR. TAULBEE: 16 Okay. 17 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay. This is 18 an area where I've got admit I'm a little calibration 19 short on, is the of the 20 instrumentation and stuff, and accuracy 21 calibrations.

How they were done. I mean that was a deficiency in the Tiger Team reports which I think most of us throughout facility got nailed on that, I think, in many ways.

DR. MAURO: Just а real quick question. Pete, your response is that the problems that Tiger Team identified regarding calibration, et cetera, really are independent of the issues that we're dealing with here. just minute or two why guess independence exists. For whoever, you know.

You would normally think that if the Tiger Team challenged the validity of calibration, low limits of detection, whatever techniques it was, that that would have an effect on the reliability of the data.

MR. DARNELL: Well, I'm trying to go off of memory, I don't remember exactly why I wrote this, looking back over the original draft. I believe it had something to do with the CFRs that were cited for that Tiger Team

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This 48, 50, which neither of CFR 48 and 50, neither of which have anything to do with rad protection aspects. It had more to do with generalized, yes, CFR 50 and 48, excuse me, 40 CFR 50 and 58.

These are concerning primary ambient air quality standards. The requirements for those type of equipment to measure air quality standards differ than the --

DR. MAURO: Oh this has nothing with bioassay data then? I mean because really if there's an issue on bioassay and the methodology used, that would fall within the purview of the group.

MR. DARNELL: You're talking about the CAMs right?

DR. MAURO: Okay. So you're inside the plant? And so this is -- okay it has nothing to do with the bioassay data, it has

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everything to do with the continuous air monitors and the validity of those data.

MR. DARNELL: Right.

DR. MAURO: If you're not using continued air monitors but you're using bioassay data we completely agree. Because we would never use CAM data if we have bioassay data.

It wouldn't hurt to look at the CAM data to see if it's compatible with the bioassay data, but I agree that that's not your primary source of doing those calculations.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: And that also addresses the standards of the internal dosimetry analytical equipment, too. It's not just the monitors under Number 6, the CAMs and stuff and the neutron detectors or whatever instrumentation they're using. That almost should be split into two different sections.

MS. JENKINS: I did the review of

the site reports, I went back and looked 132 their dosimetry reports and their annual assessment reports and other audits and looked at the evaluation of the calibration and the internal dosimetry program.

And they were found to be adequate, it was all right. There were no, in other audits, you know, in all the site assessments, the program reviews, all of that over quite a few years the program was deemed adequate as far as calibration. You've got the instrumentation and the implementation and all that.

MR. DARNELL: One thing you have to remember about Tiger Team reports, a lot of the Tiger Teams were very much specifically directed at one thing. Or they were going on a, bad term to use, is witch hunt. But that's really the idea. They were going after a specific program or they were going after a specific idea to go look at sites.

Usually didn't have the generalized Tiger Team looking at everything. It was very specific. And this particular Tiger Team report, and I'm going off of memory now, I apologize for that, was looking at air quality type of stuff.

And even though they may have had comments in this section where we're looking at thyroid counters, whole body counters and stuff it would more lean towards the standard that had nothing to do with what we're using the, putting in that data for. So we tend to discount what that particular Tiger Team's report says regarding these items.

DR. MAURO: We'll look at that. That'll be part and parcel of what we'll look at to put this to bed. If it turns out it's irrelevant, it's irrelevant. That's all part of internal dosimetry and reconstructing internal doses.

MR. KATZ: SC&A will revisit it.

1 DR. Yes, that's part MAURO: 2 parcel with everything else we're doing. Number 7 about 3 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: the changes of internal dose limits. 4 5 kind of have that covered under we bioassay, Number 7 for missed doses? 6 And the 7 MDA levels, what could have been missed. least that's my take on it. 8 9 GLECKLER: Yes, because their 10 that the dose limits have no was 11 impact on the missed doses. 12 I agree. The DR. MAURO: I agree. 13 extent to which there's any relevance here that over time technology 14 is as the 15 changed so that the change in MDL, is there's a change in MDL notwithstanding the limits. 16 17 mean the limits are the limits. 18 They don't bear on whatever you're doing, whether you're pulling a urine sample 19 or you're doing a whole body count, there's an 20

and if you're getting non-detects with

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that technology you deal with that information in a way that is claimant favorable.

So we don't even look at that. That's part and parcel again to all the internal dosimetry questions. The fact that the regs change doesn't really bear on anything.

MR. GLECKLER: Right it might change the monitoring frequency but --

MS. JENKINS: -- the internal TBD has a table that they break down of the applicable MDAs, and they are broken down by time period. You can see how they change.

DR. MAURO: Now they could have changed because of a change in the regulatory structure, or whatever, that's fine. That wouldn't be our driver for why we would do this. We look at it solely from the point of view of the change in the MDA and what effect that might have in your coworker model and your interpretation of the data. So I think

quite frankly we're covered, we're going 136 look at that.

MEMBER BEACH: Well a couple of questions came out earlier about the urine samples, the time period, and how many people were sampled, that 90,000 what it represents, how many people. I think those related back to Gen's questions.

MR. GLECKLER: Dose limits might influence on monitoring frequency have some but like with, probably not as much in the case of the INL site because they tend to put more on, you know, bioassay monitoring appears to be more dependent on workplace indicators and the need for the likelihood individual being exposed for a given period of time outside of if there wasn't workplace indicator that a lot of them were not routinely monitored.

I mean if they were it wasn't any more frequent than annual which is about the

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least frequent for a routine monitoring program, what they call routine monitoring. So it doesn't seem to influence the INL site's monitoring frequency at all.

MR. DARNELL: And one thing, John, that they had, in rereading the comment that you guys made, it doesn't really talk about MDLs, is that something else that the group is going to be looking at? It's really just asking about history.

DR. MAURO: Yes, I agree with you.

I mean that the comment really zeros in on change of dose limits, and I agree that there really is no -- and is the MDL and how it changes over time that affects how you use that information.

So the fact that the regulatory limits change, my reaction is it doesn't really -- I hate to say this, but I don't like our Comment Number 7.

MR. GLECKLER: Do away with it?

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respect 138 1 MR. With HINNEFELD: 2 people Josie's question about number of 3 monitored. Number of people from Gen's Number 4 question, Ι noted that on as 5 something that we would try to answer. 6 And we can tell you the names, how 7 many people were monitored. The hard part might be the denominator, you know, the people 8 9 that, that's not always apparent. MR. GLECKLER: Yes I think that the 10 data we have we sorted that way. 11 12 MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. 13 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Given the number of 14 large contractors who have 15 through the INL is there any indication that 16 you've seen that changed from one contractor 17 to another? 18 MR. HINNEFELD: You the mean providing 19 companies the contractors change 20 from one --21 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Yes, in other

words, did they, how would Ι say. maybe they set it up that so contractor felt this is, you know, people who are likely to get less that 50 millirem per year won't be badged or won't be on an in vivo program. Next contractor may come in and say well anything under 100 millirem.

MR. HINNEFELD: When you're talking about different contractors you're talking about different prime contractors?

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Right, different prime contractors and whether that affected those numbers?

MR. GLECKLER: From what I've seen in that on the data that I've reviewed and all the numerous INL, ANL West claims that I've reviewed and completed it's pretty much seamless.

It's like by looking at the data you can't tell that there's a contractor

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transition other than maybe the format of the records might have changed.

The data for like the external dosimetry, the format of that changes in various eras, but you'll see that at any site with the same contractor too, so it's hard to tell. You know we haven't bothered to look. But that's just a formatting thing, that's the only thing that potentially could be evident.

But other than that the contractor transitions, from our perspective, appear seamless. There's nothing that stands out to say, oh, this occurred starting this date because this contractor took over the site.

MR. HINNEFELD: In other words you didn't see like a 40 percent increase in the number of bioassay samples one year when some company or when a different contractor took over.

MR. GLECKLER: Correct.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Right, that's

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1	what I'm talking about. And as far as the
2	calibration stuff wasn't AEC/ERTA/DOE
3	responsible for the
4	(Simultaneous speakers.)
5	MR. HINNEFELD: It was the Russell
6	Laboratory that I thought had always run
7	radiation. Which is the AEC/DOE Laboratory,
8	I thought they always ran that.
9	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Well that was
10	my impression too, but I just, that's why I'm
11	trying to get a little clarification here.
12	MR. HINNEFELD: Yes, I know.
13	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: That standard
14	was really being set by the Government.
15	MR. HINNEFELD: Yes.
16	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: And basically
17	enforced because they were the ones doing the
18	calibration, the measurements of the film
19	badges and
20	MR. HINNEFELD: Yes, from where I

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sit they had a really good reputation too.

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I'd be interested in reading that Tiger Team report, I mean I'll have to pull that out and look the at it, because that puzzles me a little bit that they would write those findings up against Russell.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: I guess then we'll go and take, hopefully, just a short time for you to look at that. But otherwise I think that's a closed issue.

DR. MAURO: Yes it's, to me, the question that's posed is really off the table.

Yes, I would say that 7 is closed and it's your answer that certainly we can look at when you talk about MDLs. So the question is posed really I don't think should have been raised.

If anything should have been raised is that, you know, how did the changing MDLs affect your approach you're using to reconstruct doses to workers as the MDLs changed. That would be the issue and it

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sounds like you have addressed that issue and we'll look at it.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: No problem.

MEMBER MELIUS: Yes but I think the whole issue of the representativeness of the -

(Simultaneous speakers.)

DR. MAURO: That's the whole ball game. That's the whole ball game, if you've got, I mean, if those 90,000 urine samples cut across every work category, time period, type of operation that took place.

And it all is coming in in terms of gross beta-gamma and then there is a bridge built between, when I have gross beta-gamma in this time period working in this facility how do I use this information to reconstruct the intake for that kind of work or doing that job.

And you've got argument that's bullet proof, it's over. But if it turns out

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that you could have missed something important because of the nature of that work you're not going to see plutonium, or you're not going to see this, well then you've got a problem. It becomes that simple.

MR. GLECKLER: One think you will not be able to get out of that data set is the

not be able to get out of that data set is the work category and what type of worker those individuals were. You can sort them by name but they don't say anything about occupation or job site.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: You're covering that under Number 4 right, Steve?

MR. HINNEFELD: Well we are covering names. What we said we would do is we would come up with how many people does that represent, those 90,000 and change. That's what we said we would do.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay.

MEMBER MELIUS: Does it have work area or something like that?

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1 MR. GLECKLER: Ιt does in 2 instances it does define what major operating 3 area that the worker was working in. So we can sort on that, but then there's a number of 4 5 those that are left blank. 6 So it's like you won't be able to 7 do a complete sort of, but we could also take the number of ones that we don't have the area 8 9 for. 10 MEMBER MELIUS: Yes, let's them take a look at it. 11 12 That's how we always DR. MAURO: 13 start. Yes, just to start 14 MEMBER MELIUS: 15 with and then --16 MR. GLECKLER: those Because 17 particular data are available sets 18 SRDB, they are not only partially sorted data that was done to come up with these statistics 19 20 that are in the TBD and that and are in the 21 SRDB. So if you've got access to those SRDB

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files you can look at those and even do you own.

DR. MAURO: Right, that's what we do on everyone of these.

MR. GLECKLER: Enough to just look at the in the internal TBD where it says that it will give the reference and back in the reference section you give the SRB document number and those are actually spreadsheets now.

DR. MAURO: You know in the end we create this box, I keep referring to it as Rubik's cube thing, but we just try to see if we can fill the boxes up. By time, type, job category and facility. And say, okay, how much data do you have in each one of those boxes.

And there's absolute answer to it, but if it looks like you have enough data there to construct a coworker model where the range of activities that took place. You

know, usually the problem you run into is that you don't know which box a person belongs to and what do you do then.

MR. GLECKLER: Well the bigger question is do we need to construct a coworker model. The original TBD authors averted the need to do that by coming up with what they called the default missed dose approach.

And that's where the unmonitored workers, if they any, positive external they deemed that they likely got more of than the environmental internal exposure so we'll give them a missed down and they become hypothetical bilaterally.

DR. MAURO: Yes you actually have a procedure, I don't remember the number, where you sort on that basis. Either you give them the 95th percentile, you give them the median or you give them the environmental. And this is your fundamental approach to all workers and it's actually a coworker model, in effect.

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And then as applied now the question always becomes is there a degree of confidence that what box you're going to put the worker in. That's always the problem you always run into. It's not always easy to do that.

But we first look at though whether or not your 95th percentile, one of the things that we're always concerned about it, okay, here is the box that we call the up or down guys.

So yes if we're going to put the person into this box so we can try to reconstruct his dose, are we confident that in building that upper end case is it possible you've missed some high-end exposures that aren't captured by that distribution.

If that happens that's where things start to collapse. When you're saying we really don't know what the high ends were.

Because these, in a particular

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category of worker, that was doing certain kinds of activities that might have experienced exposures that are not captured by that distribution. And that's when we start to run into problems.

But that happens more often in older, this may go back in that to the 40s, it may have that circumstance arise in the 40s, I don't know, we'll see.

MR. GLECKLER: They'll specifically still have claims of stuff like that, you know, from the claimants that occurred.

It's like I know for INL there are some claimants that have said that they were involved with this major incident that's well documented and has all these people that were bioassayed but they specifically will state that for some reason they weren't bioassayed on that.

And so they identify that they were identified in that study and it gets real

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touchy of how you deal with that claim because you don't have any real proof that they were actually involved with that. Whereas that was a heavily investigated incident in some instances.

DR. MAURO: And is he part of that group?

MR. GLECKLER: And that but they're not listed in the names of individuals involved in that incident or not bioassayed.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: So then you always run into the problem in a lot of these instances maybe the people are present at the initial incident for bioassay where they were, you know, checked out.

But then a lot of these people who came in after the initial incident to do clean up or to go in there when the levels might still have been outrageously high or whatever, aren't necessarily documented in that initial group even though they were in there working.

MR. GLECKLER: That's a very plausible scenario and from what I can tell typically in instances where that might have occurred they probably didn't bioassay them because they had respiratory protect.

They went in, you know, they were doing an accident response at that point to where they made sure they had the proper protection like respiratory protection and stuff.

Whereas the that ones were initially there when the incident occurred it's like didn't they have the proper protection in place. You know the engineering control failed or they just weren't wearing respirators at the time.

But the ones that responded would have had proper respiratory protection. So that's very likely why they might not have been monitored but we don't have any way to prove that that happened or didn't happen

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actually. 1 152 2 kind of can tell that You that might have happened by what people are seen in 3 their CATIs in the telephone interviews and 4 5 stuff. I think that's a distinct possibility. 6 DR. MAURO: Just as a quick aside 7 and then I'll let you move on. 92,000 urine samples all occurred post 1970 8 9 you realize you got a problem for the 40s, the 50s and the 60s. 10 11 They're all early. DR. TAULBEE: 12 MEMBER ROESSLER: It said 50s and 13 60s. Oh they're all, you got 14 DR. MAURO: 15 a whole body count? 16 MEMBER ROESSLER: Think it's up to 17 '65 which receipts the whole body counts. 18 DR. TAULBEE: I don't see many after 1965, it dwindles off. They dwindle off 19 significantly after 1965. 20 Then they go to 21 whole body counts.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: So even though the people, or workers, on whole body are counts lot of them were also on your These ones on bioassay too? the two-prong approach here. And they give urine samples maybe quarterly or something or --

MR. GLECKLER: Initially a lot of them were doing whole body counts and urine monitoring on the workers, typically in that area it was gross gamma in urine along with whole body counts. And as time goes on it's like the urine sampling dwindles off and it's all whole body counts.

And from what I can tell, and this is just from observing, you know, looking at all the records they're basically just building up their confidence level in a new bioassay technique, which was the whole body counting at the time.

And once they got their confidence built up with that and realized that yes, it

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1	confirmed that it's a much more sensitive
2	bioassay method and that to where they
3	eliminated the urine sampling for the most
4	part.
5	MEMBER ROESSLER: And everybody
6	prefers doing it that way. The worker and the
7	people that monitor.
8	MR. GLECKLER: Yes.
9	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Kind of
10	surprises me.
11	DR. TAULBEE: Well it's mixed
12	fission products. A big difference compared
13	to, you know, if you think of plutonium type
14	of operations you have a high missed dose
15	(Simultaneous speakers.)
16	DR. TAULBEE: Right, exactly.
17	MR. HINNEFELD: You know, uranium -
18	_
19	(Simultaneous speakers.)
20	DR. TAULBEE: But on mixed fission
21	products you can. It's an easier way of

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measuring, and more accurate.

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CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Other kind of problem is a canary in the coal mine that maybe there's something there you need to take a look at.

MR. HINNEFELD: I think what they concluded and I think what I would judge to be the in mixed fission case is product environment can en vivo counter, or the whole body counts, provides the, do the you comparison for awhile and you recognize after a while that that urine data is not telling you anything that the in vivo count isn't.

after reaching And that so conclusion they essentially did away with it. To me an in vivo count in a mixed fission product environment is pretty darn good bioassay and is probably better than gamma anyway.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Was there any indication that it was done more than annually

on, short of a person being involved in --1 2 GLECKLER: Outside of annual MR. 3 typically the only ones you'll see in the 4 records are specials and that which indicate 5 that there's workplace indicator that а triggered it. 6 7 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: So there is a potential missed dose there. 8 9 MR. HINNEFELD: And that would be 10 in the dose reconstruct. MR. GLECKLER: 11 Yes. 12 MR. HINNEFELD: Dose reconstruction 13 would be that missed dose. GLECKLER: Ιf all their 14 MR. 15 bioassays are negative they still get missed dose on that, which is for fission products 16 17 typically much more significant to get 18 that chronic missed dose than the acute intake of a fission product. 19 20 Usually we can, if 21 potentially comp on that we can ignore

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1	acute intakes because they don't amount 159
2	anything on that.
3	A lot of times they're less than
4	one millirem on that for the year, total. Or
5	the accumulative dose for that acute intake
6	totals less than one millirem, it's a fairly
7	insignificant dose in a lot of instances.
8	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: I'd have to
9	agree there.
10	MR. GLECKLER: So it's missed doses
11	that pack a pretty good whollop at INL based
12	on the MDA information.
13	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay. Well
14	that kind of answered my question. Going on
15	to Issue Number 8. The high fired plutonium
16	and uranium intakes. It looks like you've
17	already revised that?
18	MR. GLECKLER: In regards to
19	plutonium, yes.

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CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD:

comments there?

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You got any

1	DR. MAURO: Well yes, the fact that
2	OTIB-49 or 47 covers it and we've reviewed it.
3	So I assume that you've just adopted that
4	protocol.
5	MR. GLECKLER: Exactly. And we
6	just, the TBD just now lists, or identifies
7	that Super S plutonium was a potential form of
8	plutonium at INL and needs to be evaluated in
9	terms with OTIB-49.
LO	DR. MAURO: 49, and of course, as
11	always, the problem is who're you going to put
L2	in that box and how do you determine who
L3	you're going to assign that too. But that's
L4	not a, you'll deal with that I guess.
L5	You know, if you have any criteria
L6	for circumstances under which, because usually
L7	the high-fired occurs either because of this,
L8	kind of, accident or fire
L9	MR. GLECKLER: It get's, that's
20	with everyone.
21	DR. MAURO: or the nature. Oh,

1	everyone? 159
2	MR. GLECKLER: Yes.
3	DR. MAURO: Across the board?
4	(Simultaneous speakers.)
5	DR. MAURO: Yes, it's high-fired.
6	MR. GLECKLER: It's type M, type S
7	and Super S. We have to evaluate and use
8	whatever yields the highest for that
9	particular
10	DR. MAURO: So you're doing this
11	the way you do the uranium, with the S or M or
12	
13	MR. GLECKLER: Well for the uranium
14	I'm not really sure.
15	DR. MAURO: No, I just, let's go on
16	to uranium now.
17	MR. GLECKLER: Okay.
18	DR. MAURO: I have to say I seem to
19	recall that there are circumstances where you
20	get a high-fired uranium.
21	DR. OSTROW: This is Steve, I think

it was yesterday --

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DR. MAURO: Steve, yes. Please.

DR. OSTROW: I think it was a NIOSH comment, what do you mean by high-fired uranium, and apparently the Rover facilities at the state's, where the state's programs reprocessed graphite state reactor fuel and in the process it resulted in the formation of high-fired uranium oxide.

So that there was high-fired uranium oxide at the site.

DR. TAULBEE: I talked with Dave Allen yesterday about this particular issue and he'd indicated that in other Work Groups this is something that has been addressed and so we can combine those former responses and get back to you on this particular issue.

Dave indicated to me that really ICRP 66 incorporates this, that it's the high-fired uranium is effectively just type S it's not a Super S scenario. But again we'll get

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not bee	n reviewe		the INL	. Work Group	for accur	acy at this tim	ne. The
you	the	documentation	on	that.	So	we'll	take

DR. OSTROW: Okay.

DR. MAURO: And I presume when that comes in we have the green light to go ahead and look at that because that's a little bit separate from reviewing your -- because that's currently in your TBD?

DR. TAULBEE: Correct.

MR. GLECKLER: Correct, it's not a direct, yes we don't address anything other than regular type S uranium.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: When they were reprocessing this graphite, wasn't that with 238? Wouldn't that have been combined with PU 238, of the space program fuel? That's --

DR. TAULBEE: Which it was, 238 would be for RTGs but if this graphite uranium was for some of the SNAP reactors those wouldn't be RTGs, and so they could very well be graphite uranium. I'm not that familiar

that action.

1	with this.
2	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: So we don't
3	know which one of these are RTGs being brought
4	in to be reprocessed?
5	DR. OSTROW: No these are part of
6	the Rover which was actually a space reactor.
7	DR. TAULBEE: Yes, this would be a
8	space reactor, not an RTG.
9	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Oh, this is
10	not an RTG? Okay, none of the RTGs were also
11	being recycled too?
12	DR. TAULBEE: No.
13	DR. OSTROW: No.
14	DR. TAULBEE: You said that was
15	part of the Rover program?
16	DR. OSTROW: Yes.
17	DR. TAULBEE: Okay.
18	MR. GLECKLER: That's something
19	that was tested out at NTS I believe?
20	DR. TAULBEE: Most likely, yes.
21	I'm not sure where the Rover ones were tested

1	at. 163
2	MR. GLECKLER: Yes, I'm pretty sure
3	
4	DR. TAULBEE: So if the fuel came
5	back at ICPP then
6	MR. DARNELL: So on Comment 8,
7	plutonium's closed
8	MR. HINNEFELD: Well I think we're
9	going to look at
LO	(Simultaneous speakers.)
L1	MEMBER BEACH: So there's three
L2	actions items out of there, SC&A has two and
L3	NIOSH has one it looks like.
L4	MR. HINNEFELD: What are the two
L5	for SC&A?
L6	MEMBER ROESSLER: SC&A was going to
L7	look at OTIB-49 and then review
L8	MR. HINNEFELD: Oh, okay. Yes, I
L9	kind of thought that was one. But, yes. To
20	review what we've done here in Item 4?
l	

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MEMBER ROESSLER: Yes.

Because 49 has been 1 MR. HINNEFELD: 2 reviewed. 3 DR. MAURO: Yes, 49 has been reviewed --4 5 (Simultaneous speakers.) -- within the context 6 DR. MAURO: 7 of this application. Within the 8 MEMBER ROESSLER: 9 context of this. 10 MR. HINNEFELD: Yes. And then after we get DR. MAURO: 11 12 White Paper or feedback from NIOSH on 13 uranium we'll look at that? Okay. CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: 14 Okay. We're 15 on to Number 9 now? 16 DR. OSTROW: This is Steve. 17 think the issue here flakes of were 18 radioactive material. Not the airborne particles but actual flakes of object that may 19 skin or face depending on 20 on the 21 person's job. And that wouldn't be picked up by a, you know, a personal monitor.

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MR. GLECKLER: So we'd be talking about non-respirable particle sizes then?

DR. OSTROW: Yes.

DR. MAURO: This is an overarching issue that's come up on a number of occasions, where it's been NIOSH's position not to calculate the dose to the spot under the skin where there may have been a flake that landed on it and caused the skin cancer.

The reason being that the people protected and that there were monitoring related to that. I believe from conversations, but nothing in writing, the agreement was when you have a facility where there was a lot of airborne particulates, and perfect example would be the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program, where a person could have experienced particulates landing.

Now uranium's not as big a deal because the dosimetry is such that you're not

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going to really deliver some screamer. But there are certain circumstances where you could have a cobalt-60 particle.

I don't know. If it did land it could contribute significantly to a localized skin dose.

MR. GLECKLER: That's an external dose.

DR. MAURO: And that's external. So when I read, and, Steve, you help me help, when I read this Comment Number 9, it sort of reads about, at first it talks about this direct facial skin contamination then moves on to internal.

And I agree with NIOSH response with respect to internal. That is they've got internal covered to the extent, of course, we're going to review that. But I agree with you what you said, Steve, my greater concern is what about we're now moving into external.

What about the particles that land

on the skin. And under what circumstances does that have play when you're doing a PoC for skin cancer? And whether or not that dose can be an issue. This is a tough one. And it's one that we've talked about on many occasions.

And I don't think it's ever really been resolved to a point where we say, okay, here is NIOSH's policy, on what are we going to do about situations where a person, yes, could have experienced contaminant on his neck, on his ear.

Because we're always seeing people with skin cancer in the facial area, and that's probably due to the sun, everybody knows that.

But then again how do you rule out the possibility that the guy working at the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program, you know, this stuff is cooking.

I don't know what you do about that

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but it's certainly a legitimate question. 168

I was person showing up with skin cancer I would want to know an answer to that question. How do you know that it wasn't due to the particulates that landed on my skin?

MR. SMITH: This is Matt Smith, with ORAU Team. And just for the record no conflicts with INL. I've got a little bit of input on that for the group to consider.

And that would be OTIB-17 does have a section that discusses potential hot particle dose, especially when you don't know for sure.

In other words you have no skin contamination report that shows a particle landed or was found on the area of the skin where the skin cancer was found.

So in other words it gives you a way to do a distribution of dose based on the area of the skin. So that's probably something to consider when looking at this

particular item. 1 169 2 DR. MAURO: I'm is that sorry, 3 Matt? it's 4 MR. SMITH: Yes, Matthew 5 Smith. 6 DR. MAURO: Yes, Matt, I guess we 7 were thinking more of in terms of a person, finished, 8 you know, the day is leaves. 9 There's no portal monitor that's checking him 10 And he could be carrying something on out. his skin. Goes home, takes a shower, it maybe 11 12 goes away. 13 you got this period of maybe eight hours where there is this particle. 14 15 This is how I'm visualizing, on the 16 delivering a dose that no one knows about, and 17 never recorded. Twenty years later he 18 shows up with a skin cancer on his neck. 19 And somebody asks the question, 20 well makes think that you that 21 at that location wasn't due to

undetected particle that happened to fall  $_{1}\%$  the skin. Because we knew there was a lot of that going on.

For example you know it was pretty dirty at a lot of these sites. The Nevada Test Site was one the places where this came up and I know the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program can certainly be another place where this issue could come up.

where that was especially a concern. Airborne particulates and not necessarily having an exit monitoring program. You said something that sounded like the tech, they knew that the particle landed there. They knew where it was and whether or not the cancer occurred there. I misunderstood.

MR. SMITH: Well, more even a situation where you lack the contamination survey. So we're kind of talking the same thing. In other words a situation where you

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have	the	po	otent	ial	fc	r	parti	cles	being
deposi	ted	on	the	skin	,	but	you	don't	have

You're also correct in developing, you know, what is the residence time, that can get to be tricky as well. And also knowing the composition of that particle without some additional information.

But the topic is discussed somewhat in OTIB-17, and --

DR. MAURO: Yes, we reviewed OTIB-

DR. SMITH: -- we know we've applied it at sites like Hanford. In their early years we've applied that methodology. So just a little bit of input there for, you know, formulating the path forward.

DR. TAULBEE: Well it sounds to me like, you know, we initially read your comment as being internal.

DR. MAURO: Right, and withdraw

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exact information.

1	that aspect of it.
2	DR. TAULBEE: And so this is
3	external, so I guess we should ask that you
4	look at OTIB-17, and this is how we apply it.
5	DR. MAURO: Well we have. We've
6	reviewed OTIB-17, and I don't recall, and I
7	have to say this issue was never resolved,
8	not our review of OTIB-17.
9	We'll certainly take another look
10	at it as a record with the Procedures Work
11	Group on this, and we've, but I've got to say
12	I don't recall this issue being resolved to
13	any degree in OTIB-17 review.
14	DR. TAULBEE: Well can we get a
15	revised comment then as to the concern?
16	DR. MAURO: We will revise our
17	comment.
18	DR. TAULBEE: Regarding that study
19	and address it.
20	MR. DARNELL: I have one question
21	here. Where you got this, mainly in regard to

the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Project 193 someplace else?

If it's just the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Project, we do have to remember that the test requirements for doing those included specific meteorological conditions, so that whatever was put out by the test was blown away from work force.

They actually stopped tests from being conducted because meteorological conditions changed, up until the last minute they did that.

DR. MAURO: Yes, I was trying to explain just something very conceptual. That is, when we looked at so many Site Profiles and the kinds of activities that took place, we noticed that there were certain places and I remember the Nevada Test Site was one, when I think about the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion where you're generating Program, airborne particulates that could be that

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 $1 \parallel small.$ 

I mean they're, you know, in the visible range, and that they could settle out quickly, you know, that is blown up, and go away and be dispersed.

They settle out locally and quickly, and if a person isn't wearing proper protective clothing it could easily settle on the hands, the neck, the face, and that sort of thing. So given that scenario, is a realistic scenario at some sites under some circumstances.

It's something that we felt needs to be identified.

Yes, we have a situation here where that is the scenario that could occur, and that's confounded by the issue that there is also some evidence that these people may not have been monitored when they left. In other words, they get the full scan to see if there's any hot particles and, you know, and

therefore they could've gone home with the particle on them.

And I'd be the first to say even then, okay, the person goes home, he's going to take a shower. You know, so likely it's going to be washed off.

MR. KATZ: I just have a question because it seems like this has come up before, the going home part and when you leave the facility the exposure's no longer covered. Is that not the case, because it's at such a facility that your exposure is covered

MR. HINNEFELD: Dose at the facility is once you get to the point of now, that well, the particle landed while you were at the facility but then when you walk home, then clock, the dose, you know start to accumulate dose when you walk off property, Ι don't know that anyone has actually reached that judgment.

MR. MELIUS: I mean you could argue

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the same thing for any internal dose. 176
(Simultaneous speakers.)

DR. MAURO: No, no, we've got a bioassay. We've got a bioassay.

(Simultaneous speakers.)

MR. HINNEFIELD: I think that an approach might be here to find out what we can about work controls at testing, because realistically, you know, I was on the tour of INL. We didn't see all of it.

We did see the engines out in the air and they tested those out in the air. But, you know, you go up there and ICPP has got containment cells and operating corridors and the fuel, you know, fuel reprocessing facility went to, I forget what it's called now, as people, you know, we walked down the operating corridor in our street clothes. And there were people there working in essentially street clothes, and on the other side was, you know, spent fuel on the send out that they

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So, you know, in terms of Idaho there are I think a limited number of situations, cell entries and these places.

Where you're going to have this situation, as opposed to Fernald for instance, or we'll say Weldon Spring, keeping out of trouble, as opposed to Weldon Spring which is a uranium foundry, which probably didn't have any egress monitoring at any time during it's existence, and uranium was treated like a chemical and it was just kind of out there.

So in that instance you have certainly a pretty significant potential for people to have unidentified skin contamination cancers.

Seems to me to be really, really a different situation at INL, and I would just, it'd kind of be interesting if we could reconstruct, you know, work practices around these jet engines or the nuclear engines, to

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determine whether or not this is really, 198 know, you're going to have much life with that there. Okay, because theoretically the plume is, you know, if in fact things are what we think the plume was being blown away from workers as it ran --

DR. MAURO: These are particles are

DR. HINNEFELD: Well, those are particles but they are going to blow the same direction. They're going to blow the same direction and then what do you do when the people re-enter, when people had to re-enter and examine the jet engine within some short period of time afterwards. What controls were done for that?

I mean that's sort of the question, because it could be that they were dressed down and had some pretty fresh monitoring.

So to me that's more the question than to deal with the arithmetic of the dose.

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DR. MAURO: I think the arithmetics of the dose is easy. We've already done it. We've done it parametrically up and down and sideways. We could do it, you know, of our skin or any kind of calc you could do it.

The real question is the scenario.

In other words, do we have an obligation to a worker who worked at a facility, comes out with skin cancer, and we say, well you fail?

Right now it's not as if the guy's wearing an open-ended film badge, there's nothing there, right.

Oh great, if there's nothing on the film badge, well that means there's nothing any place else. I find that hard to believe.

In other words, I find that it's, you know, it may not have fallen on his film badge because he already knew is, you know, well we don't see any hot spots on the film badge, you know. And one could argue, well

there's nothing --1 180 2 Well MR. HINNEFELD: but yes, 3 that's a weak argument. I agree with you. 4 DR. MAURO: And 5 we found it weak also, yes, so this is --6 MR. HINNEFELD: Yes, in a situation 7 where the peak of contamination is, we've got legitimate opportunity for 8 real here unidentified skin contaminants. 9 10 MAURO: DR. And he may not have been picked up on exit monitoring. That's the 11 12 other because this part, yes, sure 13 happen, but you're going to pick it up, you're going to wash it off. So there's a relatively 14 15 short period of time, you know, how far do you 16 want to talk. 17 But if it turns out you combine the 18 potential for surface contamination, two, especially specific 19 in high activity particles, potential that he could've left the 20

site and end up with eight hours, ten hours,

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12 hours worth of exposure to one location all of a sudden that dose is not small for some particles. Uranium it turns out it's not that big.

MR. HINNEFELD: Uranium?

DR. MAURO: Yes, but this has been a concern we raised years ago, and really we've never come to grips with it.

And it may be a generic issue, that's something that has to be resolved here. This may be one of these old global things that needs to be dealt with. But I don't think it has been yet.

DR. HINNEFELD: Yes. I think one thing we should deal with if we're dealing with it globally, is what kind of standards are we going to use for triggering this kind of dose restriction.

Is there far, there's some, you know, a wide variety of work situations that we're encountering at different facilities

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over time, and so there's got to be some constraints on there that's credible. It's even credible terms.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay. You can get in contamination, and I say this from having been there many times, without it really showing up on your badge. But normally when it is found or detected you don't sit there and say, well it's, you know, it was counting nearly 10 centimeters.

Technically speaking, if there is even any record it will say, you know, skin contamination found on left arm, left hand, left side of their face and, you know, for many times, and particularly the earlier years before DOE regulations came, that was a simple matter. You go away and you get it cleaned up.

If it's all clean, that's good and fine, there's no documentation anywhere about this.

This is even true from a lot of the 1 2 reported older guys who never says, we 3 anything unless could not remove that we 4 contamination, then it was reported. 5 MEMBER BEACH: Washed it off. 6 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: What's that? 7 MEMBER BEACH: You just washed it 8 off on your own. 9 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Yes, you just washed it off and went back to work, you know, 10 and --11 12 MS. JENKINS: The general 13 contamination and hot particles are kind of two different things. 14 15 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Yes, they are. 16 But I'm simply saying that even in where these 17 hot particles are a lot of times, say there is 18 a notation in somebody's file that, you know, there was some found. 19 20 The problem with that is usually 21 they did not narrow it down to necessarily,

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they might have just said it was facial. And they said, well actually it was on my ear not the side of my face.

MS. JENKINS: Well I think that we can, you know, if you had the skin cancer on your face, and there was a facial contamination with the hot particles mentioned and it just said on the face, I think, you know, we could just make the assumption that -

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: It was at the location.

MS. JENKINS: -- it was under the particle. And we could, you know, do the evaluation based, you know, they would give you EPM per 100 or whatnot, and we could, based on that we could run the calculations and everything.

MR. DARNELL: And I think that's pretty much the standard.

MS. JENKINS: Yes, if we know of

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something somewhere and it's in the vicinity of the cancer, then we assume it's where the cancer was.

DR. MAURO: And I agree with that completely. And mine goes unfortunately to the point where, there is no record that the person had this contamination, but the scenario was real. That is, it could've occurred and it was missed. That's the one that I brought up and am bringing up, and it's a tough one deal with.

DR. TAULBEE: And that's what you're going to flush out in this revised comment for us?

DR. MAURO: Well what we'll do is we'll just clarify. What I just said is going to be what I'll write down. You just heard my comment and I just fleshed it out. Certainly if you need something in writing, we'll put it down.

MR. KATZ: I thought one of the

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actions here, or the action here was to look at the actual control processes used around that.

DR. TAULBEE: And we will.

MR. KATZ: And that's the DCAS action.

DR. MAURO: And that may make this go away. I would say if you could demonstrate that yes there was a, you know, a disciplined program of monitoring people on a egress, and that these were the steps that were followed, as far as I'm concerned you put that to bed.

But if that program didn't exist, then I think the concern is legitimate. That is, you know, and I only use the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program as an example. That intuitively to me sounds like one where you could have a situation like that, maybe not. But you understand the gist of my concern here? I don't think --

DR. TAULBEE: Are there areas that

have concerns?

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DR. MAURO: I would look to you. I mean I would say, you know, you look at the operation practices at, you know, as Stu mentioned, certainly at these AWE facilities where they were grinding.

Now there was no doubt, people probably were probably covered in the stuff. Now, how much of it, but in those cases, you would say that something would show up on a film badge if they were wearing film badges, but very often they weren't, because it's everywhere.

And uranium, from our calculations show even if it's a pretty large particle and that you would do this, you know, what the heck is that, you know, the dose under the skin is not that high.

But listen, all I'm really saying is that I think we just can't walk away from the concern a person might have that listen, I

1	got skin cancer. My film badge didn't show
2	any dose, but does that mean that I didn't
3	have stuff that fell on my face or my hands
4	that could've been responsible for my skin
5	cancer?
6	I think you've got to have an
7	answer and why you feel no, in your case we
8	don't think that that skin cancer was due to
9	some particles that might've fell on you.
10	Right now I don't think that answer is being
11	given.
12	MS. JENKINS: So we would look at
13	the site, determine which areas we feel, based
14	on the documentation, has a potential for this
15	to occur?
16	DR. MAURO: Yes.
17	MS. JENKINS: And then evaluate
18	those processes and how the controls were
19	implemented to see if it is a reasonable

Yes.

DR. MAURO:

scenario?

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And then if you

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1	find out at the end of the process is that
2	holy mackerel, this could've happened here to
3	this guy.
4	DR. JENKINS: Then we have to say -
5	_
6	DR. MAURO: Then you have to say,
7	all right, how are we going to do his gross
8	calculation and his Probability of Causation?
9	But that, by the way, has always
LO	been an enigma to me, a skin dose when it's
11	just a little spot.
L2	And I talked to Dave Kocher about
L3	this and he explained to me no, no, it's
L4	trackable, and he explained it to me. And
L5	I've got to say it was one of these kinds of
L6	answers that I didn't quite get.
L7	MR. HINNEFELD: Dave Kocher has
L8	that affect on a lot of people.
L9	DR. MAURO: Hey, I'm sure he's
20	right, don't get me wrong.

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MR. HINNEFELD:

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Yes, I'm sure he's

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right. I just don't know what he's saying 0

DR. MAURO: It's one of his brain teasers, you know.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Going back to Hanford we had a gentlemen speaking. I don't remember if he was an electrician or he was a pipe fitter, which it was, but he was talking about them working on the outside of the building, and he said there was these flakes coming down.

Now whether they were paint peeling off the stacks, whether it was corrosion, but it turns out they actually had these chips of material that were little flakes that were falling down that it turns out they were hot.

MR. TAULBEE: Yes, hot particles.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Yes, I mean and it's not like, you know, if you're sitting there testing the rover or something, you know, or doing one of these nuclear propulsion tests or Kiwi reactors or something.

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You know, this is a scenario where 1 2 these guys are working outside and they're not 3 expecting to be contaminated. They're not 4 wearing any kind of a face mask or anything, 5 these hot particles are literally but yet 6 raining down upon them. It was, true it's 7 unexpected. Like REDOX? 8 MEMBER BEACH: 9 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: What? 10 MEMBER BEACH: REDOX? Did they say what? 11 12 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: And they 13 didn't turn out to be wearing radon something. No, I said REDOX. 14 MEMBER BEACH: 15 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Oh. 16 MEMBER BEACH: They had a fire in 17 contamination and they just locked it down and 18 went back to work. So years later particles just started coming off. 19 20 SCHOFIELD: CHAIRMAN Okay, yes, 21 because, you know, this gentleman talked about

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1	them being out there and there was these
2	particles falling on them, and it turns out
3	they were
4	MR. HINNEFELD: Was this at the
5	Chem Plant?
6	MEMBER BEACH: Yes, REDOX was a
7	Chem Plant.
8	MR. HINNEFELD: I think that's a
9	pretty well documented thing.
10	MEMBER BEACH: Yes I think so too.
11	MR. DARNELL: Yes, and you do
12	realize that visible flakes of something
13	falling on you is not a hot particle. Hot
14	particles are very small and with just
15	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Right. All I
16	am saying is
17	MR. DARNELL: the naked eye, you
18	don't see them.
19	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Yes, but
20	these, I mean, you know, you could have that

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scenario, particles

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small

they are not noticing them. 1 193 2 this But in they case were 3 actually, you know, corrosion from pipe whatever particle 4 buildup, that particular 5 was, he did not know. But he did know when 6 actually started measuring, these 7 were contaminated from these fallouts. MR. HINNEFELD: Snowflakes. 8 9 MR. DARNELL: Snowflakes. 10 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Yes, snowflakes, 11 you know. And they not 12 expected to be, the reason you know, 13 didn't have any, you know, face masks on or anything, they weren't supposed to be being 14 15 exposed, but it did happen to these gentlemen. 16 MR. SMITH: And this is Matthew 17 Smith again. 18 On those claims we definitely, this is where we use that methodology from OTIB-17, 19 information that's 20 with the in the

Hanford Site Profile documents, to put it all

together and give a kind of a distribution 194 what that possible dose could've been to a skin cancer.  There's no way to prove whether or not that flake landed on that skin cancer spot or not, so we worked it up as a probability estimate.  CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: I'm sure Chem Plant had corrosion within those stacks. I mean this is  MR. HINNEFELD: There is a well documented event at the Chem Plant.  CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: You've got some pretty nasty chemicals inside there. And	This transcript of the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Work Group, has been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable information has been redacted as necessary. The transcript, however, has not been reviewed and certified by the Chair of the INL Work Group for accuracy at this time. The reader should be cautioned that this transcript is for information only and is subject to change.
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CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: You've got	MR. HINNEFELD: There is a well
	documented event at the Chem Plant.
some pretty nasty chemicals inside there. And	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: You've got
	some pretty nasty chemicals inside there. And
I know this is not just a problem at Hanford.	I know this is not just a problem at Hanford.
I know they had to replace the stacks in Los	

Alamos because of material eating them up.

DR. TAULBEE: Yes, and the hot particle issue is actually multiple sites. mean Savannah River has a measurement, we have so many hot particles per square foot. They

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had pans set out to measure it, so it's well 1 2 known. Well Matt makes 3 DR. MAURO: an important point. He's saying that there is 4 5 the protocol to NIOSH to deal with this issue, 6 and they've been following the protocol. 7 in OTIB-17, and I have to be the first to recall admit don't 8 OTIB-17 having the 9 machinery in place to deal with this issue. 10 If it's okay with Ted, I would like to take another look at OTIB-17, maybe we 11 12 missed it. 13 Absolutely. MR. KATZ: DR. And if it's 14 MAURO: Yes. 15 or if there's as aspect to it 16 doesn't cover some of our concerns, we'll say, 17 yes it covers this, but it doesn't cover that. So we have an action on it. 18 19 MR. GLECKLER: Do that as, I quess 20 part of your own action to revise the comment? 21 DR. MAURO: Yes, yes. This is --

we'll 1 DR. TAULBEE: And 2 looking at the different facilities, and the 3 potential for these particles and the rad monitoring. 4 5 MEMBER BEACH: So that includes the work controls then? 6 7 DR. TAULBEE: Right. It's probably 8 KATZ: a good 9 to break. Ι know Dr. Melius unless we're close to the end? 10 MR. HINNEFELD: No, we're not close 11 12 to the end. I just wanted to ask if number 10 13 is going to go on very far, because 10 looks to me like it should be done. The breathing 14 15 rate, occupational breathing rate. To me --16 Oh, let that go. DR. MAURO: 17 that go. 18 DR. OSTROW: This is Steve. Ι think this is not an issue. We've discussed 19 this before and I think it's closed now. 20 21 MR. KATZ: Issue 10 is closed?

1	DR. OSTROW: It's closed. 197
2	DR. MAURO: Any more like that?
3	MR. HINNEFELD: No, I'm sorry.
4	That's my entire contribution of the day. The
5	entire conference, the entire useful
6	contribution of the day.
7	MR. KATZ: Dr. Melius has a call
8	now for probably at least an hour or so. It
9	might be a good time to break then if good
10	with everyone else.
11	MEMBER ROESSLER: Can we leave our
12	computers in here?
13	MR. KATZ: Yes, we'll just lock the
14	door, pull the door closed, unless someone's
15	staying in here for lunch.
16	(Whereupon, the above-entitled
17	matter went of the record at 12:05 p.m. and
18	resumed at 1:00 p.m.)
19	MR. KATZ: We're reconvening. This is the INL
20	Work Group after lunch break.
21	And let me just check on the line

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and see, in particular, Steve Ostrow, do 1 y	<b>a</b>
have you with us?	
DR. OSTROW: I'm here, Ted, than	k
you for asking.	
MR. KATZ: Great. Okay, then Phil?	?
CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay, we'r	9
now on number 11. This is about the	9
background depleted uranium for non	_
occupational workers. I guess I'm going to	Э
turn this one over to Pete.	
MR. DARNELL: Sorry, I'm re-reading	3
it.	
CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Oh, okay.	
DR. TAULBEE: I guess I would have	9
a question for SC&A a little bit on this on	9
of, is the proposal from the comment that w	9
should get urine excretion data from non-IN	L
people in Idaho Falls?	

take a run at this or do you want me to take a

DR. MAURO:

shot?

Steve, do you want to

1	DR. OSTROW: Okay. I'll take <sub>19</sub> a
2	run.
3	DR. MAURO: Thank you.
4	DR. OSTROW: That was our original
5	idea. What I understand from the background
6	information is that at some point there was an
7	attempt made to get data from offsite people
8	to do the comparison, but these offsite people
9	didn't cooperate so it wasn't able to do that.
10	So the plan B was to get data from
11	people on the site who weren't exposed to the
12	DU, and use that as the background level for
13	non-exposed people.
14	And we were questioning whether
15	this was actually a valid approach, because we
16	thought that everybody on the site was exposed
17	to some level of DU over the years. That was
18	our basic concern.
19	John, do you have anything to add
20	to that?
21	DR. MAURO: Yes, my understanding
	I control of the cont

was if you're going to, you want to subtract background, and since everyone carries a little bit of uranium, when you do your dose reconstruction for a person at INL, and you have your urine bioassay data and you get a positive result, you would subtract from it the normal background, which would be about 0.05 micrograms per liter, but 0.16 micrograms per liter was what was subtracted.

So I guess, but your position is no, 0.16 is the right number as to your reference value in ICRP?

DR. TAULBEE: Right.

DR. MAURO: That being the case, I guess we're okay. We may have been incorrect thinking that the 0.04 to 0.5 would've been typical of reference man, but maybe we were wrong.

DR. OSTROW: Well, that could be.

I haven't had a chance to check the ICRP for the NIOSH comments.

## **NEAL R. GROSS**

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1	DR. MAURO: I mean, that was $_2$ my
2	understanding, that we were imposing on,
3	saying that 0.16 was too much to subtract. We
4	could've been wrong. I didn't check it. I
5	can't say that one way or the other that I
6	checked ICRP to see what the recommended
7	default values are for a typical, you know,
8	person with, everyone has some uranium in
9	urine.
10	MR. DARNELL: So the action on this
11	would be for you guys to go look it up?
12	DR. OSTROW: Well, I suggest that
13	we do a call with, we'll take a look at
14	DR. MAURO: Go give Joyce a call.
15	She'll know in about one second.
16	DR. OSTROW: It's perfectly
17	reasonable to just close the issue. And we'll
18	take a look, but we'll take NIOSH's word that
19	
20	DR. MAURO: Yes, yes.
21	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay, closed.

Okay, we're now at number 12, unmonitored workers potential displacements. The resuspension, at least for the internal, I think we've kind of already got that covered from earlier.

DR. MAURO: Well, the answer here

DR. MAURO: Well, the answer here is that you did do, the scenarios are considered. In other words you did look into resuspension exposures.

Okay. Was that something that was always there and we just thought you didn't but you did or is this something new? In other words, the resuspension pathway, was that always something that was in your --

MR. HINNEFELD: Well, now, there are two situations. This is for, you know, if you're using a coworker approach based on monitored data -- make a copy. What did we send here?

DR. MAURO: It has to do with unmonitored workers.

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1 MR. HINNEFELD: Yes, okay. 203 2 GLECKLER: MR. You've qot two categories of unmonitored workers. 3 Ones that 4 likely only exposed to environmental 5 internal levels of radioactivity. And ones 6 that were exposed to a higher level, which we 7 get a missed dose based on a hypothetical 8 bioassay result. 9 DR. MAURO: Yes. MR. GLECKLER: Well, we might need 10 to address each one of those separately. 11 Well, 12 BEACH: this MEMBER 13 real specific to me that it was from people contaminated 14 eating in area that а was 15 previously considered uncontaminated. 16 Is that from worker interviews, or 17 I guess I'm wondering where SC&A came up 18 with this issue. I believe I read, in 19 DR. OSTROW: the last day or two, our entire Site Profile 20 21 Review from 2006.

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And if I recall correctly, this was from worker interviews with anecdotal that they would be sitting, you know, outdoors eating their lunch or it could've even been in the lunchroom, whatever, and this was a question.

They claim that -- they go through an issue of, you know, breathing in resuspended contamination when they were eating in so-called clean areas.

MR. DARNELL: Something like this occurring, you know, is going to be on a worker-by-worker basis, basically. And that type of scenario is accounted for when the dose reconstructions are done.

I don't know that a TBD has to address the scenario that some guy might've been sitting in an office that two weeks later is now a contaminated area, wondering if he was eating contaminated food because he happened to be sitting in there.

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That's something that every single time the dose reconstruction is done, that type of thing has to be addressed in the dose reconstruction. I don't know if that's something that has to be in the TBD at all.

DR. MAURO: I would agree that, in general, there's always a scenario of, you know, a person's in an occupational setting, he's exposed from airborne radioactivity due to the occupation, it's the operation itself and also to the residual radioactivity on likely surfaces. And your standard approach is to have both.

And usually the, you know, if you have the bioassay data you're covered. If you don't and you have air-sampling data, you're covered.

So, you know, if it turns out you don't have any data, though, on the person, which means that okay, now we have to reconstruct his dose and you have to consider

what are we going to assign to him?

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One of the pathways, and you have your standard methods for doing this is, we've got residual radioactivity, you know what it is in terms of becquerels per meter squared, if you know what it is, and you assign a resuspension factor, and of course we've had some discussion on what that should be.

But it sounds like in this case that, well, I guess you do. You're saying that the scenarios are considered.

So you're saying that in your TBD you do have circumstances where, guidance that says if a person is unmonitored but possibly could've been in an area that might've had some residual radioactivity.

MR. DARNELL: It's actually stated more, person's unmonitored, here's how you calculate the internal dose if he had a positive --

DR. MAURO: It was unmonitored.

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MR. GLECKLER: Yes, unmonitored internal.

DR. MAURO: Right.

MR. DARNELL: Had a positive TLD reading. Here's what you do if the guy, different scenario, different type of thing, here's what you do with the guy. It doesn't specifically address someone sat down in an area. It tells you what to do with how to do the worker.

What I'm saying though is, this is taking it to the next step, okay. In other words, in the person's Computer-Assisted Telephone Interview, he would say, I ate in this one office and the day after I ate there they said it was contaminated, you know, I got exposure from that.

That would have to be addressed on a case-by-case basis in the dose reconstruction. There is no guidance to put in the TBD for that, except guidance on how to

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handle the workers in general which is already			
in there.			
DR. MAURO: So you're saying that			
in the circumstance where there's no reason to			
believe that this person was exposed to any			
airborne activity, whether direct or from			
resuspension, you make that your guidance, and			
you don't assign anything but an ambient?			
MR. GLECKLER: Correct. If their			
external doses are zero.			
MR. MAURO: And if their external			
doses are zero.			
MR. GLECKLER: Zero, they only get			
ambient.			
DR. MAURO: But along comes a			
person, let's say in his CATI. He says, but			
wait a minute I am concerned that maybe I may			

have inhaled some radioactivity because of this story.

MR. DARNELL: That would have to be addressed in the --

(Simultaneous speakers.)

1	(Simultaneous speakers.) 209
2	DR. MAURO: I have to say, I'm
3	inclined to agree that that's a sensible way
4	to go. I don't know, Steve?
5	DR. OSTROW: I agree also.
6	DR. MAURO: Yes, let's withdraw
7	this. It's resolved.
8	DR. OSTROW: Okay.
9	DR. MAURO: Everybody else okay
10	with that? Yes, I'm sorry. I shouldn't be
11	speaking through when I say that I mean
12	SC&A sense on this.
13	MEMBER BEACH: Understand.
14	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: But I think
15	NIOSH is agreeing with you so
16	DR. MAURO: I apologize.
17	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: no reason
18	to beat it around.
19	Okay, this next one's on the people
20	got a dose from naval reactor facility
21	workers. Thought this was a jurisdictional

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issue.					210
	MS. JE	NKINS:	Can't	do a	anything
about that	. •				
	CHAIRMA	N SCHOF	IELD: U	nless	there's
something	that I do	on't und	lerstand	•	
		TDO:	+	0707000	. ma if

DR. MAURO: Steve, correct me if I'm wrong, though.

If a worker is not working for the naval reactor facility, but a worker's working for DOE or as a contractor, and somehow receive some exposure because he happens to go visit or do some maintenance work on behalf of the naval reactor facility, I think that his exposure of hazard --

MR. KATZ: It's not a covered facility.

DR. MAURO: It's not a -- so any exposures he might experience when he's on assignment there --

MR. HINNEFELD: Is at NRF?

DR. MAURO: -- doesn't count.

## **NEAL R. GROSS**

That's the end of the story, isn't it? 1 211 2 DR. OSTROW: Fine, good, close. 3 DR. MAURO: Okay. 4 MEMBER BEACH: It does say though 5 that if NRF while they worker are an 6 responding to an SL-1 accident, then they're 7 covered. go the other 8 DR. MAURO: Oh, so direction. 9 10 (Simultaneous speakers.) MR. 11 HINNEFELD: Yes, there are 12 workers who work at the covered facility who 13 would be included. 14 DR. MAURO: Reverse, reverse. 15 MEMBER BEACH: So that part of it's 16 not captured in this comment. 17 MR. GLECKLER: We have encountered 18 that instance to where getting that dose, the one case that I can think of specifically that 19 involved with, was like the individual 20 21 didn't have a SL-1 dosimeter, but there was a

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chance	he	might	have	taken	his	NRF	dosimete

chance he might have taken his NRF dosimeter with him when he went over to the S to respond, he was an initial responder.

And contacting the NRF dosimetry folks, you know, going through the DOE dosimetry folks, that was a real bear, and ultimately they would not give us that but we finally got a response.

The only response that we finally were able to get out of them is in regards to that dose for that very specific time frame, for that any dosimeter that covered the SL-1 accident time frame, you know, from January 3rd, '61, and that was that his doses were indicative of his NRF exposures.

DR. MAURO: Oh, that was the answer?

MR. GLECKLER: That was all we could get out of them.

DR. MAURO: So you couldn't capture any dose of that time period while he as at

1	SL-1? 213
2	MR. GLECKLER: Yes, they
3	DR. MAURO: We could try.
4	MR. GLECKLER: So even if we needed
5	to count that data, it's like it's another
6	hurdle to be able to get it from the NRF
7	folks.
8	DR. OSTROW: What was the case with
9	that individual person? I'm curious. How did
10	you do a dose reconstruction if you only had
11	his exposure to the SL-1 accident?
12	mean, how do you know whether the SL-1
13	accident caused the cancer or whether it was
14	exposure at NRF caused the cancer?
15	MR. GLECKLER: Oh, that we can't
16	determine.
17	MR. HINNEFELD: Well, from our
18	standpoint it's the same wash you face
19	everywhere else.
20	Program only considers, again, the
21	radiation exposure at a covered facility and

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if someone worked commercially, and maybe they				
worked commercially for 30 years and they				
worked two years at one of our facilities,				
then 30 years of exposure doesn't count.				
DR. OSTROW: Okay, that's true. I				
understand it's the same type of situation.				
DR. MAURO: So unless in this case				
if they would've gotten back, you said no, you				
know, there may've been a window of time where				
he did experience some exposure while visiting				
the SL-1 and that they could, somehow a number				
could be put to that, you would've assigned to				
that?				
But right now the feedback was you				
got was, there's nothing about this guy's				

But right now the feedback was you got was, there's nothing about this guy's records that show his exposures are any greater because he happened to have been at SL-1.

MR. HINNEFELD: Right, right.

DR. MAURO: And I believe there's nothing else, what else can you do?

1 MEMBER BEACH: So can we close that 2 one? 3 DR. MAURO: Yes. Okay, thank you. 4 MEMBER BEACH: 5 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Number 14 on the plutonium monitoring. 6 7 basically MR. GLECKLER: Yes, plutonium, because plutonium wasn't separated 8 9 from the spent particulate fuel at INL. It's like they relied heavily on 10 gross beta in urine, gross gamma in urine, 11 12 strontium in urine and whole body counts for 13 their bioassay program. And that which, because the fission products were much more 14 15 readily detectable than what the plutonium 16 would be, they could use those easier 17 perform analyses indication of as an an 18 intake. And it's not until the later years 19 where they did start doing some Pu bioassay, 20 21 and typically what you see is that bioassay This transcript of the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Work Group, has been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable information has been redacted as necessary. The transcript, however, has not been reviewed and certified by the Chair of the INL Work Group for accuracy at this time. The reader should be cautioned that this transcript is for information only and is subject to change.

data, there are a lot of false positives from the fecal sample results.

We got a lot of slightly detectable Pu bioassays for fecal samples that aren't detectable on any subsequent results, whereas it should still be there if they had a real intake. You don't see any real huge intakes, they're just barely detectable results, if you see any at all.

DR. OSTROW: Okay, this is Steve.

I'm a little bit confused because I thought

that some of the fuel at INL was reprocessed,

but you're saying that even then they didn't

separate out the plutonium?

GLECKLER: Correct. That is thing that I encountered when interviewing for first job very mу Westinghouse, is I interviewed with some INL folks and they were talking about the ICPP facility and I say, oh, you're reprocessing it, and they got very tense and irate.

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And it's like, no, we're not reprocessing, we're only extracting the uranium, which, I guess, reprocessing implies that they're also taking out the plutonium.

And that was a very -- I thought I lost my opportunity to get my first job, but fortunately they shuffled me over to the Hanford folks who were the ones I wanted to talk to anyhow.

(Laughter.)

But it's a very touchy subject, from what I gathered back then. I find it hard to believe that they've never separated it, but I've looked high and low through the documents and have always been on the lookout for that and have not found anything to indicate that they have, so, so far it checks out.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Well, one thing, plutonium can be concentrated in the leftover material after you remove the highly

enriched uranium. 1 218 2 MR. GLECKLER: It would still be in the same concentration as what it was in the 3 mixed fuel, you're just extracting the uranium 4 5 out of the mixed fuel makers. So you effectively 6 DR. TAULBEE: have the plutonium in the waste stream with 7 the mixed fission products, that ratio. 8 9 GLECKLER: You have a little 10 bit that goes with the uranium and that's part of the recycled uranium matrix, a mix, and 11 12 there's new things in the INL TBD that account 13 for the recycled uranium component. The other thing to 14 DR. TAULBEE: 15 consider here is that a lot of the uranium 16 they were reprocessing -- not reprocessing, 17 separating out, was enriched. 18 And so to be making plutonium, you use more of a regular uranium-238. 19 And so 20 this has got a much higher ratio at 235.

And so to get to the plutoniums,

plutonium-239 in particular, is rather difficult from that particular isotope, if that's what you've got is mostly enriched uranium.

So you have much less than what you had at Hanford and Savannah River. That concentration of plutonium in these fuels is much smaller because of the enrichment.

DR. MAURO: The key here though is that you've got your gross beta-gamma and you're making an assumption regarding the mix, which includes of course not only your beta-gammas, but also includes your transuranics, your plutoniums, everything else.

And so my position would be, okay, in picking this mix given the variability and uncertainty in what the mixes are from time to time, place to place, or whatever, so there is a variability here. Have you picked the mix that is plausibly bounding for most workers?

I mean, really what you're saying

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is did you pick like, especially if there second lot of variability. One of the things that we would do if we were revisiting this question, and maybe we did when we originally visited it, was: what is the mix? And is it very variable? And if it is very variable, did you pick a mix that would be plausibly bounding for all workers?

Because one of the problems we keep running into over and over again is that, and this is not really a criticism, it's just that it's a mindset.

You look for the best number. This is like a reasonable mix, yes, we've got a reasonable mix here so it captures what we're dealing with.

But that's not what we're doing. What we're doing is picking the mix that we're sure no individual got worse than that.

MR. GLECKLER: I can address that. The approach that I put together for the

actinides with INL, there's basically three main types of fuel.

And they're identified by cladding categories, where the bulk of the fuel that was reprocessed at the ICPP was comprised of, got aluminum-clad fuel, which it could come from the NPR and TRA area reactors, then we've got zirconium-clad fuel and stainless steel-clad fuel.

the mixture And SO we've got information, we've got stream waste characterization data for the ICPP for each of those major fuel types. And that's where we developed ratios for the various the actinides from, and so with the INL TBD, we've got actually four options.

Because we've got a maximizing option on that, and it depends on where they work, when they work there as far as for like the reactor areas, the bulk of the reactor areas at INL, like the MTR and such, they get

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the aluminum-clad fuel category.

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If they worked at ANL West, they get stainless-clad fuel ratios applied. On the zirconium-clad fuel, ratios only really come into play if they were naval type fuels not at the ICPP. And if they worked with the ICPP, you basically got to consider all three cladding types after a certain date.

Prior to a certain date, they only processed aluminum-clad fuels. But after that certain point in time, I forget what the year is, but it's identified in the TBD, that after that point in time you have to consider all fuel types.

And for an easy maximizing approach

I put in maximum values across the board, so
there's a maximum plutonium ratio amongst all
three cladding types. A maximum uranium
ratio, neptunium ratio and so on, for all
three of those cladding types, and they can
opt to use that set of ratios, that maximizing

1	set.
2	DR. MAURO: What about burn up?
3	There was I would imagine, the mix also is
4	affected by burn up?
5	MR. GLECKLER: Yes, it's based on
6	from burn up ratio. But it was I'm trying
7	to remember now. That goes into the document
8	or the INL document that we got that
9	information from.
10	DR. TAULBEE: All of this is in the
11	internal TBD, correct?
12	MR. GLECKLER: Correct.
13	DR. MAURO: And it's been there
14	from the beginning?
15	MR. GLECKLER: No. The actual
16	source document that I did use has been one of
17	the key references from the previous approach.
18	So I kept what that, one of their key
19	references.
20	That's from somewhere, I think
21	their original ratios that were just, you

know, plutonium ratios, and I think they might have had a uranium ratio for certain areas and certain years, but that was one of the key documents that was used for that. So I kept with that key reference.

DR. MAURO: I guess what I'm looking toward is that -- the story you just told is very cogent.

In other words, you looked at the different types of fuel, and the different burners, and on the basis of that and the data that was presented to you in some source documents, you picked a mix that you felt was appropriate for different circumstances. And then of course, the dose reconstructor is giving you guidance on when to use what mix. That would be the sensible thing to do.

Is that whole thing developed and described in the original Site Profile, which means that we probably shouldn't have made this comment?

1 MR. GLECKLER: That was the problem 2 with the originals. A lot of that wasn't, we didn't have the documentation for those, you 3 know, it depended on what was in the original. 4 5 DR. MAURO: Got it. I would make a recommendation that we should look at that. 6 I just wrote that 7 MEMBER BEACH: down. 8 9 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Ι had 10 question on that. EBR 1 and EBR 2, I don't remember 11 12 which one it is, one of them used what, I 13 a three-meter fuel pin loading, and the think other one had used one-meter, I believe. 14 15 One of them was also being used a 16 lot for some test loadings of plutonium carbon 17 pellets and depleted uranium pellets. 18 seems like to me it would definitely skew the issue on the plutonium levels. 19 20 MR. GLECKLER: Yes, from what I --21 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: That was in the '70s, I can tell you that much.

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MR. GLECKLER: Yes, and from what I can tell that was a relatively small time frame in the operation of that reactor, if I'm not mistaken.

And so, it's, you know, because like all the fuel categories, ICPP processed a lot of different fuels, some from other sites even. And it's a wide variety and you'd have to boil it down a little bit. And that is like the, you know.

So we just went with what was the major -- hopefully, you know, the basis that I've together hopefully and put now sufficiently documented will defend, you know, what we did, the approach on the burn up stuff, because I don't know if I've got, the burn stuff might be in reference up my used, material that I the basis for It's somewhere.

DR. MAURO: This is John. It would

be helpful if any source documents that your drew upon to come up with your mixes that may not be in the Site Query Database, that be put be in the Site Query Database so that we could look at that, because we're going to look at that.

MR. GLECKLER: Okay.

DR. MAURO: In other words, if there's burn up information that played into your decisions, we're going to need to look at that.

MR. GLECKLER: Well, we don't have the mix, the characterization data on the other types of fuel from what I remember. I'm not -- those are the main fuel types that they characterized that the vast majority of the fuel being processed at the ICPP at the time or throughout its history.

And it's like we've got historical information that shows what fuel types are being categorized for the various years and

that throughout the ICPP's history.

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That's how you can tell that, okay, you know, the aluminum-clad, you know, prior to these years was pretty much exclusively, you know, processed at ICPP.

And then the later years, they start handling all kinds of different cladding or different fuel types with many different cladding types and stuff.

But outside of having the detailed characterization data, it might be difficult to find anything on the other.

DR. MAURO: You know what it all comes down to is, you know, what you used and what your thinking was in terms of like, listen, this is what I've got and this is the assumptions I'm going to make, and why I feel they're reasonable and we'll take a look at it.

We realize that, you know, you're never going to have complete information in

trying to do something like this. And the question becomes, given the information you do have, you have to make certain assumptions. And at some point you reach a place where you know where it might be.

So put yourself in our shoes. What we're looking at is, well, let's say you pick a certain parts per million or whatever it is of plutonium, relative to something else.

But there may have been scenarios where workers could've been working with a particular type of fuel, a typical degree of burn up, where in theory, and this is something where the nuclear physicists come in with nuclear, you know, in theory you could've had a very different mix at some period of time, in some group of workers.

Well, that creates a problem. Because it means that you really are going to have a hard time saying, well, what would be the upper end of the plutonium in that mix?

So how do I interpret my gross beta-gamma results?

I mean, that's all we really do, it's nothing more complicated than that. We look for scenarios that maybe you didn't have the data, nobody's fault, it wasn't there. But the scenario could have been real; there may be enough evidence in the record that these scenarios did occur.

And here's the judgment that always find ourselves making. Was the scenario to such an extent that it's plausible group of people could've orа worked for an entire year with that type of material, and how are we going to deal with that?

You might have 99 percent of the workers 99 percent of the time you've got it cold. But there may be some real scenarios where the real people could've been exposed for an extended period of time, a year.

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And what are we going to do about that, and is it important?

We would also ask the question, well, all right, so we could've been off by a few percent, you know. But if all of a sudden you underestimate the dose to an organ by the back of his head, because it could've happened, you know, what do we do about that?

I mean, quite frankly, we're both in the same boat, you know, trying to say, what am I going to do about this guy, you know, this time period for people who might've worked on this material? And that's how we look at it.

Any information you could give us or put on the record that will help us understand the rationale and the weaknesses and the strengths to the approach you're taking, and why maybe, when you look at the whole picture, what you've done is reasonable and bounding for just about everyone. I mean,

you have to understand, we're not doing anything different in your --

MR. GLECKLER: Yes, and hopefully the revised internal TBD, it's like, we'll, you know, answer all those questions. But that's one of the key things that I tried to do when I put together that basis is document all the assumptions, or as many as I possibly could that were, you know, that I thought were, you know, everything that was important, and hopefully that's been done.

One of the things that I would recommend when you do look at that part of the TBD and review that part, also look at the references. Because we've had, I've put some references like my spreadsheets that I used to simplify the actinide list and that are out in the SRDB now, and those are key parts of, you know, the basis behind that approach.

DR. MAURO: It sounds like this is one of those places where we're probably going

to be on the phone a little bit to understand your spreadsheet, the assumptions you made and make sure we understand what you did.

Because the hardest part we encounter very often is understanding what you did and your rationale from the documentation.

You know, we spend 90 percent of our time doing that and if there's anything we can do to shorten that, so that we could put the, oh okay, I see where they did it and why they did it.

Then, amongst ourselves, it becomes self-evident, wow, there is a problem here and here's what it is. And we'll tell you that so you know here's why, and then you can come back and say, well, this is why we don't think it's a problem.

Unfortunately, we spend too much time trying to figure out what in fact you did and why you did it because it's not always well-documented. It's hard to pull the

information out of it.

MR. GLECKLE

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MR. GLECKLER: Well, there's always the possibility of there is an exposure, you know, some sort of a scenario out there that wasn't, you know, thought of or planned for.

DR. MAURO: Yes, and there's no doubt that's true. But then I think reasonable people come to the point, well, that scenario is just too obscure. And here's where the Board comes in.

I mean, we get to a point where there's a scenario that wasn't modeled, can't be modeled, what do you do about it? And, you know, then it becomes a judgment call. Is that a showstopper, you know, and that's where the Working Group has to get your best story, and decide for themselves.

So we've got this as an action item.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Do you have a good feel about when they were doing these

experimental fuel pin loadings using the EBR3
Like I said, I can't remember right now if
it's 1 or 2, and as far as the breeder reactor
program.

MR. GLECKLER: You asking me that,
or --

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Yes.

MR. GLECKLER: Okay.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Do you have a handle on that?

MR. GLECKLER: No, I can't --

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Because it seems like that would change the amount of plutonium in the mix.

MR. GLECKLER: Yes, I mean that's something we could look into in more detail as far as exactly when that was. And I know there's not a whole lot of information out there or at least I haven't, but I haven't gone specifically searching the SRDB documents for that sort of thing.

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DR. MAURO: Phil, it sounds like
you have a lot of knowledge on these different
fuels most of the time and you're likely to
help us make sure that there's no holes there.
Because it's too easy to say, sounds like you
know about what went on to a level of
resolution that could identify scenarios that
might be important that haven't been
explicitly addressed, so we have one, you
know, help us out if you can.
CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay. Anybody
got anything else on 15? Any comments, Jodi?
MS. JENKINS: No.
DR. MAURO: Is that 14?
CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Yes, that's
14.
DR. MAURO: It's 14, okay.
CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay, we're on
to number 15 now. This is dealing with the
SL-1 incident, potential from this, and
internal and external doses.

So has NIOSH  $-\frac{7}{237}$ 1 MEMBER ROESSLER: 2 both of read these, has updated now 3 information to come up with this conclusion that they have significant dosimetry history, 4 5 or was there a misunderstanding by SC&A in the 6 first place there? 7 Sounds like NIOSH is saying yes, we can do that because we do have the records, 8 9 and --10 Look at the list of MR. DARNELL: all personnel involved, 11 that the were 12 dosimetry that was used, the whole gamut of 13 information on the accident. MEMBER ROESSLER: 14 Then how come 15 SC&A said that you don't have --16 MR. DARNELL: I don't remember what 17 that revision said about it. 18 DR. MAURO: Steve, do you recall in the original Site Profile that we reviewed, 19 20 where this comment emerged regarding concern 21 about adequacy and completeness of the SL-1 accident and the 1,000 rescue and clean 238 workers? I don't know, have you had a chance to look at, when you said you did look at our original review?

DR. OSTROW: John, I think the original TBD we looked at covers SL-1, but we thought it was sort of scanty. Possibly the current TBD may have a lot more information on it. I didn't compare the old TBD to the new one.

But I think, I see what NIOSH is saying in that we would have to take a good look at the current, the data that was covered.

DR. MAURO: Did you folks add a lot of material in the new TBD on SL-1 or is it basically the same as it originally was?

MR. GLECKLER: In regards to the SL-1, it's pretty much unchanged.

DR. MAURO: Unchanged, okay.

MR. GLECKLER: Pretty much either

## **NEAL R. GROSS**

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the individuals were monitored for dose or the site estimated the individual's other external dose based on one of the coworkers that present and had was dosimeter.

And typically bioassays were performed on those for the initial responders. It's like for the ones that, you know, the post-accident type activities, it's like they went in with respiratory protection and stuff like that have performed they not SO may bioassays, then they would've but monitored for external.

You know, so we assume appropriate monitoring was performed for the ones at post-accident type activities that took place.

But if it's the initial responders where there's only the potential for that type of concern, and from what we can tell the site estimated external doses for those individuals, and we do --

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If you have the data 1 MS. JENKINS: 2 iust do it just like regular а 3 reconstruction. And these doses are 4 DR. TAULBEE: 5 high. 6 DR. MAURO: I mean, fair enough. 7 What you're saying is, you do not agree with 8 our comment. 9 Nothing's really changed. 10 believe that you do have the data and we have the statement here that says well, we think 11 12 the data may be deficient. And that's fine, 13 and the suggestion will be made that we should take another look. 14 15 MEMBER BEACH: Take another look. 16 DR. MAURO: Take another look. 17 Shouldn't take too long to see whether, you 18 know, why did we say this in the first place. 19 Maybe we were wrong. Certainly we should 20 MEMBER MELIUS: 21 take a look at the metric used to estimate the

coworker doses. 1 241 2 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Got a question 3 there on the --MR. GLECKLER: Yes, but that's what 4 5 the site did. The coworker dose that we used was the site's coworkers. 6 Particularly 7 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: on the first responders in those first hours 8 9 and days, are there any documentation to show 10 there weren't many people present that weren't monitored, at least externally? 11 12 MR. HINNEFELD: In the 13 documentation of the accident, if I recall, there's pretty clear write-up 14 of the 15 accident, the night of the accident itself, 16 and who responded that night. That seems to 17 be pretty well -- that was reconstructed at 18 the time by the site. 19 it was during that process,

this site estimated some of those responder

investigation,

that

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believe,

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1	doses from the people who received the dose
2	from the vantage of the people responded with
3	them. Isn't that how that happened?
4	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay, so the
5	later workers who came in later for the
6	deconstruction themselves to do clean-up and
7	stuff, were they all badged?
8	DR. TAULBEE: Yes.
9	MR. GLECKLER: Yes. There's no
10	reason why they wouldn't have been badged like
11	any other routine effort. You know, they're
12	doing a somewhat routine
13	MR. HINNEFELD: Now in terms of, I
14	mean, this thing I think went on for months,
15	right?
16	MR. GLECKLER: Or longer.
17	MR. HINNEFELD: Now as far as I
18	know, we don't have a roster of all the people
19	who worked on it during the month or is that -
20	_
21	MP DARNELL' Welve got the roster

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1	of who responded. 243
2	MR. GLECKLER: The initial
3	responders.
4	MR. DARNELL: But all of the
5	remaining activities, no, we don't have a
6	roster of all of those people.
7	MR. HINNEFELD: And so, you know,
8	the thought being that those people, you know,
9	at that point you have a known radiologic
10	situation. You are doing known radiologic
11	work and you're treating your people with
12	radiologic work. So, you know, there's badge,
13	then I don't know what the bioassay situation
14	is, but
15	MR. GLECKLER: So you're dealing
16	with a planned activity for the post-accident
17	stuff versus the initial responders that was
18	an unplanned event, right?
19	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay, because
20	there has been at least one person make the
21	comment that their family member was one of

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those who responded in that initial $\operatorname{group}_{244}$
that they weren't badged.
MR. HINNEFELD: That I believe is
true. I believe that is true and that's why
they used the people that responded with the
badges for those people in order to
reconstruct the dose. The site did that at
the time of their investigation.
MR. GLECKLER: And their documents
do identify the names of the individuals that
were present.
DR. TAULBEE: And we've redone that
The first of the f
dose reconstruction for that particular I

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: How did your numbers come up against theirs?

DR. TAULBEE: Ours were much higher.

MR. HINNEFELD: Ours were much higher than the site's.

MR. GLECKLER: And something to be

aware of too, just as a note. You there's a lot of individuals that claim to be initial responders. The DOE person that provides us the dosimetry data for INL workers last time I talked to them, they said, yes, they're up to about 20 different ambulance drivers so far.

MR. HINNEFELD: For the one ambulance.

MR. GLECKLER: For the one ambulance. I don't know how they could fit all the drivers into the car, but -- so there's quite a few people that kind of --

it probably Ι think, you know, comes from claimants, you know, survivor-type claimants, where it's like, to where original energy employee bragged up, you know, their personal involvement some years ago, so that's how they understood that, oh yes, they were probably initial responder and stuff and so it gets blown out of proportion.

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1	MR. HINNEFELD: There's a certain
2	amount of lore about the history of that
3	specific ambulance, too.
4	DR. TAULBEE: To answer your
5	question about how we did that dose
6	reconstruction for that, based upon that
7	coworker data. It wasn't documented in the
8	TBD, it was documented in the individual dose
9	reconstruction because it only affects, I
10	believe there were seven people for which we
11	did not have data on, and so for those people
12	we do an individual dose reconstruction.
13	DR. MAURO: Okay. Was that
14	triggered by the CATI? What triggered it, you
15	said that
16	DR. TAULBEE: Well, we have the
17	name of the people who went back into the
18	building.
19	DR. MAURO: Oh, I see.
20	(Simultaneous speakers.)
21	MR. GLECKLER: So it usually shows
	II

up, I mean, just shows up. Usually anyone employed in 1961, the dose reconstructor is going to look, you know, for SL-1 exposures because that's a very good chance that, you know, not a very good chance but a reasonable chance that you can maybe work that as an easy comp claim on that and make it go comp, because you're going to get a decent amount of external dose for that time frame.

In some instances, that's where virtually all of their professional dose came from is from that incident.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay. Any questions on that one? Okay, number 16.

MR. KATZ: So wait, for 15, just to clarify, SC&A's going to take another look at the --

MR. HINNEFELD: Yes, clarify the basis for their comment. If they're getting caught cold here like everybody else, you know, we're kind of all refreshing our

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MR. KATZ: Yes. No, I just wanted to make it clear in my head. That's fine.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay, this is in relation to the beta-gamma dosimetry of record-keeping program.

We'll go back to the DNFSB and the Tiger Team reports. So I guess really it's your chance to response to what NIOSH said. John?

Yes, I mean, I quess I DR. MAURO: don't have anything to add. Ι mean with the position that disagree well, apparently, Steve, it looks like that we got some feedback from some people that said that there were the data adequacy and completeness in question on the bioassay samples. this has to do with, I believe, the guess gross beta-gamma.

DR. TAULBEE: Actually, this would be beta dosimetry.

Oh, this is beta-gamma 1 DR. MAURO: 2 I'm trying to read it quickly. MS. JENKINS: External dose. 3 This is, oh, this is --4 DR. MAURO: 5 we're going into external dose. Missed external dose. 6 DR. TAULBEE: DR. MAURO: Missed external dose. 7 So is this something 8 MEMBER BEACH: 9 that was updated in the TBD also, or not at all? 10 MS. JENKINS: Well, it kind of, my 11 12 interpretation was it kind of boils down to 13 the fact of facilities' dosimetry test badging practices. 14 15 I went through, and like I said, I 16 reviewed their reports and everything and they 17 were, you know, the DOE was running the lab 18 and everything. their internal audits 19 And and program assessments and everything didn't have 20 21 a problem with their badging process. And you

said, radiatien know, like it Ι was the all safety, this is coming of the out radiation and safety labs.

MR. HINNEFELD: Yes, I don't know if this is particularly relevant or if this is even related to the topic, but in my lifetime I also interviewed INL. And I can remember being told during that, it must have been that visit, that there was a period of time at Champlain, and I don't know if this was for the entire site, but there was an issue with the badge construction.

Because they had had a combination security and dosimetry badge, and there was a security requirement to redesign the badge every so number of years.

And so security redesigned a new security badge without worrying about including any dosimetry window. And by the time the dosimetry people figured this out they were kind of stuck with this situation.

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What are we going to do, they didn't want to separate, they didn't want any people to wear separate dosimetry badge and separate security badge, they wanted them to be combined.

And so they hung the dosimetry chip behind the security badge. The security badge had already been designed and they wouldn't go back. They did acquiesce in drilling a hole in it.

And so the idea is you hang your TLD behind there so that your open window TLD pokes out through the hole in your security badge. Now there was some misgivings on the part of the radiation staff about are you really developing reproducible geometry by having this, because it wasn't fastened to the security badge, it hung behind it on the clip.

So there was some discomfort about that, on the part of the radiation safety people. And I don't know what, I can tell you

about when I interviewed out there but I don't know what year this badge was -- I don't know if any of this is related to that at all. But I hate to sit here quiet and have that in the back of my mind.

DR. TAULBEE: With the Tiger Team report what was the -- you know I'm coming into this a little bit cold here as well. What was the actual issue with the completeness and quality? Steve, could you elaborate some on that?

DR. OSTROW: I can elaborate a little bit. I don't have the Tiger Team report in front of me, but in our original 2006 Site Profile Review, on page 96, we just list, I think six different things summarized in the Tiger Team report.

They say the overall gamma neutron response was within plus or minus 40 percent, which did not satisfy the 25 percent requirement specified in DOE 5480.11, for one

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thing. Absence of centralized, integrated
dosimetry program. Absence of calibration
sources for the dosimetry program.
DR. TAULBEE: Did they elaborate on
absence of calibration sources?
DR. OSTROW: The absence of any
calibration sources for daily functioning of
dosimetry processing and developing element
collection factors and quality control. This
is like a summary from the Tiger Team report.
DR. TAULBEE: Okay, so that's on
the reading of the dosimeters, not daily
checks on the TLD readers, okay?
DR. OSTROW: Well, anyway, there's
a couple of, I'd have to go back to the
original Tiger Team Reports, it's hard to tell

from these summaries what it is you're talking about.

But what they say the conclusion during these -- they interviewed five experts and past and current workers, and they

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came up with they think there's potential missed dose scenarios and deficiencies in personnel protection programs and dosimetry record-keeping overall. I'd have to go back and see what the actual details are for that.

DR. MAURO: What I'm hearing is that, well, one of the things that's becoming clear during this conversation is that there are categories of comments that we make, where in our original review, that NIOSH feels, you know the original TBD that we review is okay.

And there are other comments where we note that NIOSH has done a lot of work in this area and it's probably a good idea for SC&A to take a look at the new TBD.

So it's really two things, either the action is going to be on SC&A to go back and revisit the original comment we made, maybe we were overzealous. Or maybe, no, NIOSH has developed a lot more material and so, you know, and therefore we should go look

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at the new TBD and to see if that new TBD answers the questions.

Now that being the overall framework, we look at this one. Now this one looks to me that NIOSH's position is no, our original TBD, it was okay. And this concern that's being expressed by the Tiger Team, et cetera, et cetera, is really not a real problem.

But NIOSH is saying, please provide us with a little bit more information. So maybe there is more to the story that we better look into.

Steve just said that, well, there is a lot more to the story, and it's all laid out in Tiger Team Report and the citations and so forth.

So I walk away from this saying, clearly Steve has just read some material that goes to some very specificity about problems that might have existed at the time that were

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uncovered by the Tiger Team and NIOS $\frac{1}{25}$ 6 reaction is one to dismiss that.

Now I would argue that really maybe this is a case where perhaps NIOSH may want to go back, and take a look at the Tiger Team Report, concerns in the record, follow the record and whether or not you feel that everything is in fact fine, notwithstanding what the Tiger Team said.

Because I think we did give you everything we need. Steve, is there any other things that we need to provide them, for them to see whether or not our position has legs or not?

DR. OSTROW: This is a little bit - I agree with you, this is a little bit of a
philosophical question. We did, we had a
number of our comments that we developed
originally, based on our reading of the Tiger
Team report and the DNFSB report.

And NIOSH is saying, I think sort

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of in general that the, well, even if these reports are true they're not directly applicable to the NIOSH dose reconstructions, because they were done for the purpose of these reports. And NIOSH isn't really relying on the same information that the Tiger Team was, that the Tiger Teams looked at.

And so it's a little bit of a philosophical question whether the Tiger Team report apply or not.

I think, I agree with DR. TAULBEE: you, John, that at least in my opinion, Stu, if I'm wrong here, but it seems correct me like where there's things like this that the Tiger Teams have identified, we should go through what their findings are and the ones that, know, in the absence of you а centralized system, well, do you really need one if you've got, each facility has their own and it's working fine.

It doesn't matter. The 40 percent,

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though, plus or minus, does our TBD incorporate that? And so it seems to me we should go through each of those Tiger Team issues and address them as to which ones apply and which ones don't.

MEMBER BEACH: Also site interview, your write-up pinpointed the site interviews and what their problems were, correct, John?

DR. MAURO: Yes, that's thoroughly supported.

MEMBER BEACH: So those points are in your write-up also.

DR. MAURO: Yes.

MEMBER BEACH: That those need to be addressed as well.

MEMBER MELIUS: I think there's a third possibility to John's too, which is that NIOSH was asking for clarification on your comments, and what specifically in the Tiger Team Report or whatever were you referring to.

And in that case I think the

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burden's back on SC&A in this new review  $_{259}$  come back, yes.

DR. MAURO: And that's fine, that's what I was really looking for is who's got the ball right now?

MEMBER MELIUS: Right, yes.

DR. MAURO: And what I'm hearing though is a consensus that maybe we better go back and provide some, if there is, you know, do the best we can to give you everything we have and why we --

MEMBER MELIUS: Yes, and if you go back, because like Steve said he hasn't looked at the Tiger Team, so go back and look at it again.

If you think you've provided everything you should have then, you know, like maybe it's something for some sort of a technical call or something that we're having trouble understanding the issue.

I think we can avoid, if we just

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start in the right place, we avoid going back and forth ten times.

DR. MAURO: So we'll take it, we got to the -- we'll take another look at it, make sure that we've collected all the information, make sure our position is still as it is, and if any information or rationale for where we come out that you don't have, we'll give it to you.

And then we'll have one of these conference calls and we'll see where it goes. So we got the action.

MR. GLECKLER: Has anyone looked at the site's responses to those Tiger Team findings, to see if, you know, did the site make any major changes in what they, in the practices that would change the doses, because if it affected the doses, you would think that they would have to go back and recalculate the doses.

DR. TAULBEE: Not necessarily.

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MR. GLECKLER: No. 261
MR. HINNEFELD: They wouldn't
necessarily go back retrospectively.
MEMBER BEACH: It would just go
forward from there, from what I've seen.
MR. GLECKLER: That would be a clue
that we might need an adjustment.
MR. HINNEFELD: Yes.
DR. OSTROW: My understanding of
what happens is that Tiger Team generally only
deals with the complex, going-forward type of
exercise. That the different sites improve
their monitoring program going forward but I
don't think they generally recalculate
anything in the past.
MR. HINNEFELD: That's not my
recollection, either, that they would.
CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: I've never
seen them do anything like that.
MR. HINNEFELD: This really doesn't
matter to our discussion but I just want to

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point out that 40 percent, you know, which 262
higher than 20 percent, is specifically in
regards to the nuclear accident dosimeters.
So that would only matter if we
actually reconstructed a dose using nuclear
accident dosimeters. It's not their first but
it's not their normal personal dosimeters.
DR. TAULBEE: That was quick.
DR. MAURO: We got them, the
actions are on us.
MR. HINNEFELD: Well, we have an
action too, though, we won't sit around, we're
going to go check out the Tiger Team report.
I think that they were lobbying for
additional funding for the dosimetry in order
to pass DOELAP. Because these are right out
of DOELAP requirements.

MR. DARNELL: I worked for DOE and it was part of stuff like this, and you would not believe the low levels they would stoop to to use these Tiger Team's reports and reviews

for what they wanted to get done. 1 263 2 (Simultaneous speakers.) 3 MR. HINNEFELD: Believe me, we do not have a lower opinion of you. 4 5 MR. DARNELL: Yes, know that Ι 6 about you. 7 MR. KATZ: Do you hear that, Greg? 8 (Laughter.) 9 DR. MAURO: Thank you, but 10 going to have to leave, sorry. It's great to see everybody. Steve, carry on. 11 12 HINNEFELD: It's good to see MR. 13 you, John. CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: 14 By the way, 15 those who leave first get dumped on. 16 17, the penetrating, non-penetrating Number 17 dose. NIOSH should re-evaluate the missed 18 gamma dose due to deficiencies in procedures and calibration. 19 That one, I don't know enough about 20 21 that to make a informed decision.

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DR. OSTROW: Well, I want 264 apologize a little bit, you know, the official summary, this was actually in the original Site Profile AWE did its like a page and a half of material, that I think I orally summarized in one sentence here. It's a little bit hard to see issue, just by reading this little summary we have in the matrix.

I think that the basic issue, and NIOSH addresses it under seven pages here, is the categorization of gamma and beta doses, penetrating versus non-penetrating dose and the methodology for handling it.

NIOSH responded here with a methodology that -- I think maybe NIOSH could, it would be good if you summarize a little bit, how you handled this issue.

DR. TAULBEE: I guess, just for my own benefit, I'm not clear what the issue is here.

MEMBER MELIUS: It makes it

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1	difficult to summarize. 265
2	DR. OSTROW: If you take a look at
3	the NIOSH response to the matrix, it goes on
4	for a couple pages.
5	DR. TAULBEE: Right, well, I've
6	read that, what the NIOSH response was, I'm
7	just not sure what the original SC&A issue
8	was. Maybe somebody here who's more familiar
9	with that, can give more detail the paragraph
10	that's here listed.
11	MR. HINNEFELD: Well, part of the
12	issue is that in the early days the film badge
13	service underestimated Hp(10), because low-
14	energy photons were considered beta radiation.
15	I guess this would be a low-energy photon
16	that would register on the open window but not
17	under the shield.
18	DR. TAULBEE: Okay.
19	MR. HINNEFELD: And they were
20	registered as beta radiation, that's one
21	thing.

	DR. TAULBEE: So it 6
	underestimating the shallow dose? Well, it
	wouldn't underestimate these, you use the open
	window the photons would over respond. Low-
	energy photons would cause an over response,
	so you guys should be overestimating that
	dose.
	Low energy photons in a shielded
	window doesn't have the penetration power for
	Hp(10).
	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Then you need
	to help us out here.
	MR. GLECKLER: The key individual
	that helped provide the response to this is
	Jack Fix, who was on the call but was
	conflicted.
	DR. TAULBEE: Matt, are you on the
	phone? Matt Smith?
	MR. SMITH: Yes, I am. When I
	think about Idaho and correction factors I'm
	visualizing the table, I don't it have right
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in front of me, but Brian knows what  $\frac{1}{26}$  talking about.

There are correction factors in there for the open window, to deal with beta dose or electron dose. To my knowledge we don't do any adjustment downward, in other words, we're not taking anything away for an over response to low energy protons.

Although, again, there's some language in OTIB-17 that, you know, if you're aware of the correction made by the site you can take that into account.

DR. TAULBEE: This is where I'm guess I'm confused with the, I'm surprised at what the SC&A issue is here with penetrating, non-penetrating, missed dose due deficiencies to in the procedures and algorithms for the over response, under response, the badge.

MEMBER BEACH: This may be another one when SC&A needs to come back with -- maybe

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relook at that issue. Shallow dose 268 captured later on, I don't think it's that.

They kind MR. GLECKLER: of summarize things a little bit with INL, I guess the key thing is where are the plausible scenarios where there's a significant less 30 keV photon energy, as in than exposure. For the site there really are very few of those, I won't say there aren't any because it's such a large site.

There are so many exposure scenarios, but the vast majority of the exposure scenarios do not have a significant less that 30 keV photon component to it.

But if there was, the way that we currently do our dose reconstructions, those dosimeters would have over responded to the less than 30 keV photons and we would have assigned them as electron dose. Based on our current --

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: That's what I

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1 was going to ask, is that actually -- because 2 an over response actually helps the claimants? 3 MR. GLECKLER: Yes, and then we also, on top of that over response, we apply 4 5 typically a fairly large electron dosimeter 6 correction factor. They range, depending on 7 the year, they range from one, the later years are just one, but for the early years from 8 9 about two to 4.8. 10 MS. JENKINS: 4.8 in 1974 and 1975, and we have a 3.3, a 3, a 2.8. In the '50s it 11 12 was 2 to 2.8 and in the '60s it was 2.8. 13 GLECKLER: So it shouldn't MR. really be an issue of underestimating the dose 14 15 versus underestimating the PoC because of it 16 being assigned to the electron dose versus the 17 less than 30 keV proton dose. If that's, if 18 there is an issue there. 19 MS. JENKINS: Prior to 1986, factor 20 correction of a minimum οf 21 assigned and it could go as high

After 1986 then that's when they're using the Panasonic TLDs, and it's a correction factor of one. Prior to that, it would be a minimum of 2, a maximum of 4.8, depending on the background.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Sorry, you health physicists want to kind of help me out on this one, man, I'm lost.

MEMBER BEACH: Steve, are you still there?

DR. OSTROW: I'm busy reading. I'm not an expert in this either to tell you the truth. Too bad John left at just the right the moment.

MR. DARNELL: I think John needs to go back and re-review this.

MEMBER BEACH: I think so too.

MR. HINNEFELD: It seems to me that none of the arguments in the Site Profile is that, there are low energy photons which will contribute to Hp(10), which will not be read

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under the filter of the two-element badge.  $_{271}$ 

Now I'm not saying that's true or not, that's the nut of the conversation, they even talk about, well, it gets into Compton scatter and mean free path of photons for low energies and effective dose for photons at 60 keV, greater than 1.2 NEV, I think is missing something.

But that seems to be the nut of the argument, is that the filter over the deep element, the filtered element of the two-element badge, will filter photons that contribute to Hp(10), or will sit there completely, essentially completely filtered, they don't make any contribution to this heat -stamped badge reading.

MS. JENKINS: They would be assigned as a electron dose in that case.

MR. HINNEFELD: And they would go into electron, yes, to the extent that they contribute to Hp(10) then, the question is

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though, if those photons, if a), that they  $\frac{1}{2}$  present, because like you said, they seem to be kind of a high-energy photon facility.

If you have fields where you have a significant contribution of low-energy photons, and in fact they are completely shielded by the filter over the filtered element, but they are energetic enough to contribute to Hp(10), or to the organ dose that you're interested in, then you've missed that information by using the deep element of a two-element badge. That seems to be the argument from the Site Profile.

DR. OSTROW: Okay, this is Steve. I suggest that they may take a look at the NIOSH's response, and then see if our concerns are answered or not. We'll have to evaluate it.

MR. KATZ: Okay, thanks, Steve.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Now number 18

here. Correction for beta dose and

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1	uncertainties. 273
2	MR. DARNELL: I think this is just
3	a continuation of the same type of stuff and
4	may be something that SC&A needs to review.
5	Not that I'm trying to cut off any
6	discussion, but it's really kind of pointless
7	to go over it right now.
8	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: The trouble
9	is, you guys quit speaking English after a
10	while.
11	DR. TAULBEE: We tend to do that.
12	MEMBER ROESSLER: Well, when the
13	question is specific they have to get into
14	specific information.
15	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: You guys could
16	be totally BS'ing us and we wouldn't know.
17	MEMBER ROESSLER: We'll try.
18	MR. DARNELL: We could always do
19	that.
20	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Thanks, that
21	gives me a lot of confidence.

1 Reminds me MR. HINNEFELD: 2 old tell if joke, how do health you physicist is BS'ing you? 3 MR. DARNELL: His lips are moving. 4 5 (Laughter.) 6 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay, we're on 7 The angular dependence correction factor for gamma dose, seems like this comes 8 9 every facility, correction, 10 correction factors are, if they're correct. DR. TAULBEE: This is something --11 in our response, just to correct it a little 12 13 bit here for you all. The TIB-10 is actually a geometry correction factor, not an angular 14 15 correction factor. Technical information, so we will revise this and respond back to you 16 17 all. 18 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay. 19 MEMBER ROESSLER: So, in other 20 words, you've done it but need to revise your 21 answer, or what?

DR. TAULBEE: Many of the sites there is angular responses, and this morning when we were discussing this in more detail, there was some misunderstandings.

MR. HINNEFELD: Tim, you need to make sure you speak up, so you're captured on the microphone so that the recorder can record your comments.

COURT REPORTER: Thank you.

DR. TAULBEE: I'm sorry. We are looking at this from the actual question of angular response and not geometry correction factor, which is what the TIP-10 is, is just a it's glove factor, geometry, а box that particular response. So it was misunderstanding on our part, we will correct that.

MEMBER MELIUS: See, if she doesn't pick up your voice then she'll just say "Health physicist is moving his lips."

(Laughter.)

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	DR.	TAULBEE:	I	understand	ngw

1 276 2 okay. I'll try to speak up some, sorry. 3 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Number 20. 4 Restate beta dose as gamma dose, this is not 5 claimant-favorable to state the entire dose measured in open window is due to the beta 6 7 dose. MS. JENKINS: Doesn't this go back 8 9 to 17. 10 DR. OSTROW: It goes back to Number 18, I believe, looking at it. Is it 17? 11 12 DR. TAULBEE: Seventeen. 13 MR. DARNELL: Comment 21. CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Steve, you got 14 any comments on this? 15 DR. OSTROW: Number 21 we're on? 16 17 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Number 20. He said it's 18 MEMBER ROESSLER: covered. 19

MR. HINNEFELD: Covered.

(Simultaneous speakers.)

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

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1 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay, 3.FF 2 Number 21. The photon spread 3 split. You got any comments there, Steve, on 4 their reply? 5 MEMBER BEACH: Well, they're asking for a basis for the 50/50. 6 7 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Yes, split. I think SC&A 8 MEMBER MELIUS: So 9 needs to clarify. 10 MEMBER BEACH: Yes. DR. OSTROW: We wrote up something 11 12 in our original discussion, and at a quick 13 look at it, I think we have to provide you more information on that, why we think 50/50 14 15 may be good or whether we're dropping that or 16 not. 17 HINNEFELD: This is Stu, MR. 18 again I'm probably better off keeping my mouth 19 shut. Were we really calling dose reconstructor on each individual case to make 20

Wouldn't there be some general

judgment?

1	guidelines for areas? 278
2	MR. GLECKLER: For the energy
3	splits?
4	MR. HINNEFELD: Yes.
5	MR. GLECKLER: No, it's like
6	basically it's a 25/75 split for every
7	location on the site, except for the SMC. And
8	in that case it's like it's a 90 percent, 30
9	to 250, ten percent greater than 250.
10	MR. HINNEFELD: So there is is
11	that specifically written in the Site Profile?
12	MR. GLECKLER: Yes, it's embedded
13	in our tool for that site.
14	MR. HINNEFELD: Okay, then I don't
15	understand the comment.
16	MR. GLECKLER: Well, the comment
17	kind of implies that a 50/50 split's more
18	appropriate.
19	MR. DARNELL: In the write-up it
20	really doesn't explain why.
21	DR. TAULBEE: Which is why I think

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1	SC&A is going to revisit it. What the basis $_{279}$
2	- why they feel a 50/50 is better than a
3	25/75.
4	MR. HINNEFELD: So apparently their
5	scenario is described by SC&A, but at this
6	point, I should I just need to go back and
7	read it. I'll shut up.
8	MR. DARNELL: No, we like it when
9	you talk, Stu.
10	MR. GLECKLER: Gives us time to
11	read.
12	MR. DARNELL: Gives us time to
13	catch up.
14	(Simultaneous speakers.)
15	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: It says the
16	margin dose reported on dosimeter due to semi-
17	infinite cloud radiation be approximately half
18	the actual dose received. NIOSH should
19	therefore consider a weighting factor of two
20	for immersion dose.

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OSTROW:

DR.

This

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was

comment

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actually	based	on a	teleconference	we	had	wżth

NIOSH about five years ago.

DR. TAULBEE: Can you elaborate a

little on that?

DR. OSTROW: I think we're going to drop this, it doesn't appear that TBD looked at it afterwards. I looked at this yesterday actually, the semi-infinite clouds that appear to the TBD. This comment that we made wasn't based on the TBD, it was based on a phone conference that we had with NIOSH, 2005 or 2006. I think we'll withdraw this comment.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay.

MR. STIVER: Hey, Steve, this is John Stiver from SC&A. Was there a situation or many instances where a semi-infinite cloud may have been a significant source of exposure?

I was just kind of wondering what the basis was. I know it's digging way back in the past here. Do you recall any of the

details of that conversation and why it eyer 1 2 even came up? 3 DR. OSTROW: I'm trying to recall 4 why it came up. 5 MR. STIVER: It would be applicable 6 if, you know, if that was a significant source 7 of exposure, then it may be something that, should be addressed. 8 you know, 9 DR. OSTROW: I think it had to do 10 possibly with the plume releases and then, you know, exposure to something else. 11 12 MR. STIVER: Yes, I just wondered 13 if there are situations where that would have been significant source of a dosimeter 14 15 reading, as opposed to just, you know, more of 16 a background or environmental type dose that 17 was a pretty small component. 18 MR. GLECKLER: But the original Review Document indicated it was in terms of 19 20 internal dose, is what the concern was about

and that's what had us confused.

MR. STIVER: Yes, that doesn't make 1 2 any sense, I mean, this would clearly be an 3 external exposure. I guess that's another one we need to go back and revisit then. 4 5 DR. OSTROW: I think -- I'm doing 6 some reading, I don't think it actually 7 appears in the TBD that we're commenting on. I think we're just going to go ahead and close 8 9 this issue. 10 MR. STIVER: We're just going to go ahead and close it out? 11 12 DR. OSTROW: Yes. 13 MR. STIVER: Okay, like I say, I've got practically no background on INL and just 14 15 been listening in on the conversation here. 16 Let's go ahead and close that one. 17 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: We are now on 18 Number 23, high-risk jobs. Beta-gamma 19 exposures, site experts interviewed by SC&A 20 classified INL as an acute dose site with a 21 significant number of facilities, operations,

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experiments and occurrences providing possibilities for personnel receiving dangerous levels of radiation.

NIOSH did not evaluate comprehensively facility and field data to identify and separate the high risk or high dose jobs for worker external exposures. This information is essential for dose reconstructors to fill the gap when dose records in a claimant's file are not complete.

According to your guys' documentation, there was 99 episodic events which would definitely qualify there.

DR. TAULBEE: Well, from the standpoint of monitoring for individuals for external radiation, going into any of these facilities, you had to pick up a badge. So I guess my question is: what is the concern here?

From an external dose standpoint people are monitored, for these type of high

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risk jobs, for these episodic releases. $284$
these areas, people were monitored here, so
I'm asking, I guess.
MR. GLECKLER: SL-1 being the only
exception.
MR. STIVER: This is Stiver again.
Steve, was this was an issue related to missed
dose or unmonitored dose that we felt might
have been significant?
MR. DARNELL: Well, when you go
back to the original write-up that SC&A
provided, it talks about hot particles in
fission products, rather than acute dose in
high risk jobs. So I don't know.
MR. STIVER: Back to your earlier
comment on the hot particle deposition.
MR. DARNELL: Yes, there's
something wrong here because the write-up for

the issue appears different than what's in the

original write-up from your -- SC&A's report.

1	which comment you're actually making. 285
2	DR. OSTROW: I'm looking at the
3	original report right now, because the
4	characterization, the original report focused
5	on what we talked before with the hot
6	particles are actually flakes that wouldn't be
7	necessarily monitored that landed on the
8	clothing or skin. I think actually the
9	original issue was the matrix summary doesn't
10	really reflect that correctly.
11	DR. TAULBEE: I believe that we
12	have that under Issue 9, correct?
13	MEMBER BEACH: Right.
14	MR. KATZ: Yes, that's been covered.
15	DR. TAULBEE: In which case both
16	SC&A and NIOSH have action items.
17	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Yes, that's
18	number 9.
19	MR. DARNELL: So 23 could be
20	closed?
21	MR. GLECKLER: Merge this one then

1	with 9? 286
2	MR. HINNEFELD: It's the same as
3	number 9, we'll just answer 9.
4	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay, Number
5	24 is extremity dose, they should evaluate the
6	potential for missed external dose, workers in
7	facilities or highly contaminated equipment,
8	piping
9	MR. DARNELL: Excuse me, I'm sorry
10	to interrupt but, 9 is an observation, 23 is a
11	finding, so we should go the other way.
12	MR. HINNEFELD: Well, however we do
13	it, Andrea wants to know the answer both
14	places.
15	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: I didn't see
16	anything in there about someone correct me
17	if I'm wrong, but I didn't see anything in any
18	documents that indicates that the use of
19	dosimetry rings, finger rings, sort of thing
20	was widely used?
21	MR. GLECKLER: They did use them,

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we do see those in the record, it's not<sub>28</sub>? frequent thing, except for some individuals, you do see it fairly frequent during different eras.

MR. STIVER: This is Stiver again, it looks like this is an example of potential missed dose for a worker who might not have been wearing those rings.

You guys have adjustment factors that you'd apply, evidently, according to your comment here, as needed. I guess the question in my mind is then how do you determine that, do you typically have enough information, the granularity on a particular worker's tasks that you can confidently assign those factors? Or is it something that you just kind of use a claimant-favorable assumption to provide?

MR. DARNELL: The worker or the workers, send it, give the information in the Computer-Assisted Telephone Interview. That's where we would be told whether they worked in

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1	glove boxes or not or they did specific work
2	that would trigger looking at extremity
3	dosimetry.
4	MR. STIVER: Okay, if it's in the
5	case file then you'd address it, otherwise
6	then it wouldn't be an issue?
7	MR. DARNELL: Yes, unless we saw
8	something in the worker's job title.
9	MR. STIVER: The job title or
10	something in the CATI or the correspondence
11	that would indicate maybe there was some
12	potential for that.
13	DR. TAULBEE: And in general we
14	would really only consider that when there was
15	a skin cancer or some cancer.
16	MR. STIVER: And it would have to
17	be related to a shallow
18	(Simultaneous speakers.)
19	DR. TAULBEE: On the hands or
20	forearms, something.
21	MR. GLECKLER: On an extremity,

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which is very rare. 1 289 2 DR. TAULBEE: On a typical cancer we wouldn't even --3 Typically 4 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: 5 speaking, you didn't see these finger rings issued to particularly construction workers or 6 7 something. I think that, 8 MR. STIVER: Yes, 9 this is what that would really get to is those 10 who weren't monitored who may have still had that type of exposure potential. 11 12 GLECKLER: Ι know MR. we're 13 typically cautious about pipefitters a lot, especially because when they have high doses, 14 15 because there's a good chance that they would 16 have had. 17 in most instances, we're not 18 dealing with a cancer on the extremity. So we don't need to do anything in that regards, and 19 so if there's actually, the instances of when 20

those two things come together, to where they

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have a likelihood of having that exposure
scenario, and then also having an extremity
cancer.
MR. STIVER: Yes, skin cancer on
the hands or forearms, something along those
lines?
MR. GLECKLER: Yes, it becomes very
limiting as far as, you know, the number of
claims that you'll encounter, and it's really
hard to think of any offhand.
MR. STIVER: My initial assumption
would be that we could probably close that one
out. Steve, do you have any objections to
that?
DR. OSTROW: No, that's fine, I
just wanted an explanation from NIOSH on how
to handle it, sounds like it's a good
explanation.

affecting the TBD tables, those values, how

STIVER: Now these factors are

they're used?

Yes, it's kind of, a 1 DR. OSTROW: 2 combination of OTIB-17 for skin claims, and then also potential glove box factors, there's 3 hand to wrist ratios. 4 5 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Wouldn't those 6 be based upon expected potential for dose? 7 dose, particularly glove mean entire 8 workers? 9 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, the wearing of it is --10 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: There would be 11 12 some criteria, I assume, that separated those 13 who used and those who don't. Well, it typically 14 MR. STIVER: 15 would be glove box workers, but this would be 16 like pipefitters who wouldn't category 17 necessarily be assigned ring dosimeters but 18 might still have additional exposure, extremity exposure potential. 19 20 MR. GLECKLER: Yes, so to make sure 21 I'm clear on this, are we talking basically an This transcript of the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Work Group, has been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable information has been redacted as necessary. The transcript, however, has not been reviewed and certified by the Chair of the INL Work Group for accuracy at this time. The reader should be cautioned that this transcript is for information only and is subject to change.

unmonitored extremity exposure versus missed dose, which means they were monitored but the dose might not be fully accounted for by the dosimeter's detection limit?

MR. STIVER: It seems to me if they were issues of extremity dosimetry, it would probably be for a well-defined type of work, like glove box work. But in my mind it would apply more to the unmonitored exposure.

MR. GLECKLER: I know some of the early reactor workers would have ring dosimeters at times.

MR. STIVER: Well, it could potentially be in either situation. You might have to have an adjustment factor to account for that or, you know, for a person who may have had dosimetry but may not have adequately measured the dose, the potential dose, you know, the upper bound dose, and you might also have other categories of workers who had no dosimetry at all that may have been exposed to

these situations.

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MS. JENKINS: Well, we put them in the response on a case-by-case basis and, like Brian was saying, the case where you've got an unmonitored worker with the actual lack of dosimetry data, is probably going to be rare.

In those cases we would evaluate it and there are things that would tip us off, pipefitters, stuff like that, type of job they're doing and that's something could be incorporated into the actual that dose reconstruction itself, as opposed doing it the TBD. Because it's in so specific.

MR. STIVER: I guess is there the machinery in place to do that, is there a methodology that's been developed and a TIB that addresses that or some portion of a TIB?

Or is this all based on the adjustment of the dosimeter readings? Maybe we should just keep this one open until we

have a chance to look at it. 1 294 2 MR. DARNELL: Isn't that TIB-10 or 17? 3 DR. TAULBEE: So TIB-17's a shallow 4 5 dose right, Matt? 6 MR. STIVER: Yes, a shallow dose, 7 17. MR. SMITH: That's correct. 8 9 MR. DARNELL: Ι mean, there's 10 already procedures in place, if you guys want to go look at them again. 11 12 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I think we'll 13 -- I think we decided to take an action on here to kind of consider how we're doing this. 14 15 One thing that gives me a little 16 discomfort is relying on the interview. To 17 say, okay, give me, if it's uncovered in the 18 interview that a particular thing is done, then we'll assign --19 DARNELL: Well, there's only 20 MR. 21 done if --

Well, that's what 1 MR. HINNEFELD: 2 saying, let's I'm complete have а more 3 discussion, let's put together a more complete discussion, how we would deal with it. 4 5 And even, we could even go so far 6 as to look for extremity cancer cases and see 7 what, know, how rare those you are, 8 because --9 STIVER: Yes, that might 10 good place to start and see how many cases does this really affect? 11 12 MR. HINNEFELD: I don't think there 13 are going to be that many cases, possibly affected by it because my perception is you 14 15 don't see extremity cancers that often. 16 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: The limits are 17 very high anyhow, very high. 18 MR. HINNEFELD: Yes, the 19 limits are high but we don't even see the 20 so in this case we wouldn't be doing 21 a dose reconstruction.

1 MR. STIVER: I've only 2 couple of them myself. MR. GLECKLER: The ones I do recall 3 from INL are typically truck drivers and it's 4 5 usually their left arm. MR. HINNEFELD: Oh is that right? 6 Yes, hanging out 7 MEMBER ROESSLER: the window. 8 9 (Laughter.) 10 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: On the site's health physics program they had there, do you 11 12 run across any documents where they spell out, 13 when they're going to be using these? 14 Because typically speaking, 15 for a person who's going to be doing a high-16 level, very short-term job I wouldn't think 17 would, even then would be given, likely to be 18 given extremity finger rings. Well, for the modern 19 DR. TAULBEE: 20 look what the dose could era, you at 21 potentially be, if it's short enough so

duration, yes, you wouldn't. 1 297 2 If it's going to be less than, say, ten percent of what the regulatory limit is 3 you might not assign extremity dosimetry. 4 So 5 I guess that is something we could look at is 6 when they assigned extremity dosimetries, 7 follow up what Stu was saying. might 8 MR. STIVER: That also 9 something where we have a historical change in 10 procedures where it may be more important in earlier years than in later. 11 12 MEMBER BEACH: So it looks like SC&A and NIOSH both have actions out of this. 13 Yes, I'd say that we 14 MR. STIVER: 15 definitely need to take another look. 16 MEMBER BEACH: Okay. 17 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay, we're 18 now on Number 25, the discrepancy between PIC and film readings. NIOSH should compare PIC 19 20 film badge, shallow and deep. 21 Here again we run into this problem

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of the use of the PIC to begin with. 298
DR. TAULBEE: We don't really use
that.
CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Yes, I know
most facilities will not use the PIC as
official data measurement.
MS. JENKINS: It's a go/no-go
CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Yes it's
basically a go/no-go or, you got enough on
your PIC that we're going to pull the badge
immediately.
MR. STIVER: Yes, my experience of
those have been that they typically over
respond, they're just more, not really a
triage-type dosimeter, but something that
would trigger a more thorough review.
MEMBER BEACH: So does this one go

STIVER:

MR.

CHAIRMAN

close that one.

away?

Yes, I'd say we can

SCHOFIELD: Yes, I think

so.

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DR. OSTROW: Our original suggestion, this was more of a suggestion than anything else, that it might be possible to use the PIC data indicated the film dosimetry underestimated the Hp(10) dose. I'm not sure what it would show, but you know, if the PIC data was available, it might provide some information.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: How much -- I mean, how many records even show any data, PIC in them, I mean, I'm kind of curious now, this is more curiosity than anything else.

MR. GLECKLER: The records up to 1958, the particular format that they used does have PIC data for a good chunk of the weeks. They have the weekly PIC dosimeter value there next to the, right after they have the film dosimeter results for that week. And it's like any others, they usually don't correlate very well at all.

1	It's not like there's a fixed
2	ratio, you know, because you would think if
3	they were being exposed to the same photon
4	sources, you'd gradually start to notice, oh,
5	they vary by their certain PIC's value that
6	different by, but they're all over the board,
7	sometimes.
8	MR. STIVER: Yes, there's some kind
9	of a calibration factor or there may be some
10	bias, some offset.
11	MR. GLECKLER: Or if they just
12	knock it against the wall.
13	MR. STIVER: Yes, they're easily
14	damaged.
15	MR. GLECKLER: It doesn't take much
16	to cause them to go off scale. I mean, this
17	issue is brought up by a lot of claimants in
18	the CATIs, you know, that they were restricted
19	from a radiation area because they were
20	overexposed and they are over the limits.

And it's like we go look at their

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dosimetry records, which for us is JARF looking at the dosimeter results, not the PIC data, and it's like, well, wait, there's nothing here that would have caused them to have been restricted or whatever for that time frame.

And yet, you look at the pencil readings and okay, that's what they're going а lot of times it we, difficulty for us because we have to kind of explain them in the DR this scenario to Report.

MR. STIVER: A lower tier in the data quality hierarchy. Steve, was there a significant number of those PIC data we looked at back in our original review that triggered this?

DR. OSTROW: Well, this is based more on the talking to some of the claimants that brought up that issue that was just mentioned. That their PIC dosimeters would,

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you know, spike on the high end and they'd see things so they were very suspicious.

We raised the question: did NIOSH take a look to see if there's any sort of correlation between the PIC and the film badge result?

MR. STIVER: Yes, we had this issue a lot for the Atomic Veterans, there was a lot of them had pencil dosimeters and they consistently read about a factor of one and a half to two times higher than the film badges.

I can't recall offhand but I believe there were some studies that were done that compared the two under controlled conditions that were able to determine that there indeed was a bias to the high side on the pencil readings.

I don't know if anything's been done with that, you know, regarding this site or the types of dosimeters that were used in this program but it might be worth at least

putting something together, you know, that the claimants would be able to look at and see, you know, these are the reasons why, it's just an over response issue.

MR. GLECKLER: Well, that's usually what we explain and explain how it does over respond, we've kind of got some generic --

MR. STIVER: Almost seems like something for a fact sheet, really.

we'll MR. GLECKLER: Yes, and usually describe that or address that in the incident sections and not on the DR report. Because, and we have informally kind of looked if there is a correlation know, you between the PIC data and, you know, the actual dosimeter results, which back in the the time frame that have that where, we information is in the film era, and myself and one of the former experts for the INL sites that's no longer, he's now retired.

And we weren't observing any, we

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1	couldn't find any correlation, they're just
2	all over the board. Sometimes you'd have
3	high, sometimes I think the PIC data would
4	even be less than the film dosimeter results.
5	MR. STIVER: My inclination would to
6	be to close this one out, to tell you the
7	truth.
8	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: The film
9	dosimetry was the one of official record, not
10	the PICs, correct?
11	DR. TAULBEE: That's correct.
12	MEMBER BEACH: Yes, I think we
13	should close it.
14	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Yes, I think
15	close it.
16	DR. OSTROW: Yes, SC&A agrees.
17	MR. KATZ: Okay, so we're closing
18	issue 24?
19	MEMBER BEACH: 25.
20	MEMBER ROESSLER: 25.
21	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: We're now on

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The minimum detection limit, NIQSH Issue 26. should reevaluate their approach in determining MDL of the dosimetry system by taking into account the system's uncertainties. DR. OSTROW: That would be, what you just said was from our original report.

DR. OSTROW: That would be, what you just said was from our original report. In 2008 we did a extended look at other issues and we expanded this issue where it said the standard is wrong.

We questioned if the ten millirem was collected for high energy gammas and we think that's too low, even for the modern dosimeters.

DR. TAULBEE: Why do you feel that? OSTROW: Oh, DR. this was, the did this, this person who was based on knowledge of what the current dosimeters, you know, film decimeters work.

MEMBER BEACH: So, Steve, did you look at the responses for finding Number 327?

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DR. OSTROW: Hang on. I see 306 looked at it, but we didn't get a chance to evaluate it for this region. What NIOSH wrote, but we haven't had a chance to evaluate it yet.

MEMBER BEACH: So it sounds like SC&A needs to evaluate 26 and 27 and come back to us?

DR. OSTROW: Exactly.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: 26, 27, 9 -- I mean, that's an eight. Okay, we are now on Number 28, minimum reporting level for neutrons, here again this is a something I know that's been, that has changed over time with a different dosimeter.

DR. TAULBEE: Again, this is one that I think NIOSH will take the action on, to revisit our response on this, if we need to dig a little deeper on how they were reading the NTA films.

These detection limits are not

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unreasonably low, they are lower than other sites', but it really depends upon how they were, how the films were read, and the number of fields that were investigated.

So it's not implausible that these are this low, I just think it -- we need to look at that a little closer and provide some better documentation of why we feel that these are reasonable.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Now you have taken INL since AEC/DOE and really doing the health physics reading and calibration stuff.

I assume you do have access to all that information?

DR. TAULBEE: We should.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay.

DR. TAULBEE: I'm not -- like I said, I'm not as familiar with this site yet, but I know at other sites we certainly have this information. So we should have access to it here. Do you know if it's in the SRDB

1	already?
2	MR. GLECKLER: That I don't know,
3	but if I remember correctly from Jack Fix, it
4	sounds like we do have a lot of access to a
5	lot of detailed records that we might just
6	need to capture.
7	But they do, from what I gathered
8	from Jack, it's like they have a lot of
9	detailed records. Dosimetry data stuff and
10	calibration type stuff. He might have
11	captured that already from part of his other
12	efforts.
13	DR. TAULBEE: Matt Smith, do you
14	happen to know if that, if some of that
15	information had been captured?
16	MR. SMITH: Just from responses
17	here it sounds like there is quite a few
18	reports that detail how these MDLs were
19	computed
20	DR. TAULBEE: Okay.
21	MR. SMITH: and that they're

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1	going to be okay.
2	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: That one's
3	for NIOSH.
4	MEMBER BEACH: So is it time for a
5	break or are we just going to roll through?
6	MR. KATZ: That sounds great.
7	MEMBER BEACH: Great.
8	MEMBER ROESSLER: What time is your
9	plane?
10	MEMBER BEACH: Not till seven.
11	MEMBER ROESSLER: Okay.
12	MEMBER BEACH: I have lots of time.
13	MEMBER ROESSLER: I need to leave
14	here about 3:30.
15	MEMBER BEACH: I have a feeling
16	we're going to be done by then.
17	MR. KATZ: What time is it now?
18	MEMBER BEACH: 2:41.
19	MR. KATZ: Five minute break?
20	MEMBER BEACH: Short break.

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matter went off the record at 2:42 p.m. and
resumed at 2:49 p.m.)
MR. KATZ: Okay, we're restarting
after a short break, and, Steve, are you
there? Steve?
John, are you online?
MR. STIVER: Yes. John Stiver, I'm
on the line, Steve should be back here in a
minute I would think.
MR. KATZ: Okay, I'm going to
it's sort of fair for him normally we're
never as quick as we promise. We're on time.
So I can understand Steve betting on averages
here. I'll keep checking, I think we should
wait for Steve, we need him to have any of
these conversations.

Steve, are you back with us?

DR. OSTROW: Yes.

MR. KATZ: Okay, Steve is back, so continue on.

MR. STIVER: John is back too.

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thanks, 1 KATZ: Okay, great, MR. 2 John. 3 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: We're now on Number 30, the neutron calibration. 4 5 MEMBER ROESSLER: Wait, what did we do with 29? 6 7 MEMBER BEACH: I appreciate your hurrying, but --8 9 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay, my 10 mistake, I get in too big of a hurry here. We're on Number 29, neutron exposures in Iowa 11 12 had --13 The first page on MEMBER BEACH: failure to properly address neutron exposures. 14 15 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Right, neutron 16 exposures. "INL had a total of 52 reactors, 17 most of which were experimental prototype in 18 design, which typically operate in high-power density with minimum shielding and neutron 19 moderation. It is unjustified to presume there 20 21 are no missed neutron doses.

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In addition, there are deficiencies associated with the neutron calibration. Due to use of plutonium-beryllium sources for neutron calibration, dosimeters would significantly under measure neutron doses from source's lower energy spectra. NIOSH should reevaluate its entire approach in the TBD to account for the potential missed neutron doses."

One thing I do know is that talking to people, they used a number of different types of shielding in this facility. The reactors from some that are almost bare to lead, water, polyethylene -- I mean, plastic and --

MEMBER BEACH: Steve, I have a question for you, this is Josie. You expanded, you guys expanded on this one, is that a new expand or --

DR. OSTROW: No, this is 2008.

MEMBER BEACH: Okay, so it goes back to then, thanks.

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1 DR. Looks like TAULBEE: 2 asking a question here that we're not clear of 3 what the concern is. Is that correct, Brian? MR. GLECKLER: 4 Yes, when it comes 5 to the under measurement of neutron doses, the 6 lower energy neutrons? 7 DR. TAULBEE: I mean, we know that 8 NTA under responds to lower energy neutrons 9 depending upon the calibration factor, or the 10 calibration source, compared to the work place energy spectra. 11 12 So I guess I would like a little 13 more explanation from SC&A: is that the issue that's concerned and that it's not addressed 14 15 in the TBD? 16 If you look at DR. OSTROW: 17 NIOSH response, I think that's sort of -- I'm 18 sorry, the issue now is the new response. Where you say here that you revised the TBD, 19 20 the appropriate instructions up 21 discount the INL workers and this neutron dose

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assessment eliminated for this neutron dase
section of the external dosimetry TBD, and
gone later, filled out the guidance provided
in Rev 3 of the external TBD. We haven't
reviewed the latest external TBD.
DR. TAULBEE: Okay, that sounds
like it would be an appropriate place to
MR. DARNELL: Start.
DR. TAULBEE: Or just to continue
this one.
DR. OSTROW: Our comments on the
original TBD.
MR. STIVER: So would this just
roll in to our previous action item to review
the new TBDs then and just this other aspect
of it

of it.

KATZ: Well, we MR. haven't actually had a tasking on the external TBD have we?

DR. TAULBEE: I don't think so, but it seems appropriate that they would revise,

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1	100k at the data.
2	MR. KATZ: I guess the question is
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4	MR. STIVER: If anything's been
5	revised significantly since our last review.
6	MR. KATZ: My question is whether
7	the revisions in the TBD have dramatically
8	changed this component that you're addressing?
9	MR. HINNEFELD: This finding?
10	MR. KATZ: Yes.
11	MR. DARNELL: Actually if they're,
12	if SC&A is going to do a review it would
13	behoove them to look at the whole thing,
14	because we had two different Technical Basis
15	Documents combined, major changes in all the
16	documents. They haven't read what's current.
17	MR. KATZ: I understand that, but
18	
19	MR. DARNELL: The original isn't
20	even close to what's current now.
21	MR. KATZ: Right, I understand

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that, it's just that we've been going sort 306 focused, we did say review the whole internal, and up to this point we haven't needed to say that to the external and so far we just have this issue. It seems like jumping the gun to say review the whole external on this basis or this one element.

DR. OSTROW: I agree with Ted, I don't want to do the entire external one if I can help it. I think, at least so far it's focused. I would want to review it on this particular issue.

MR. STIVER: Weren't there also some issues related to the external dosimetry photon and the shallow dose that we needed to look into?

MEMBER BEACH: Yes.

MR. KATZ: Right, I mean, these are sort of focused questions and that's all I'm saying here is if it gets to the point where it looks like the whole TBD comes into play

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then, sure, review the whole thing but
otherwise we don't need to.
MR. STIVER: So at this point we're
looking at a focused review?
MR. KATZ: Right.
CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay,
basically, after reviewing that external
DR. TAULBEE: Yes.
CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: That's what I
was just thinking, just there was some major
rewriting in there.
MR. KATZ: This is 30.
CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay, Number
30, neutron calibration deficiencies due to
the use of plutonium-beryllium source for
neutron calibration. Dosimeters would

significantly under measure neutron doses from sources of low energy spectra, NIOSH should reevaluate the approach in the TBD to account for potential neutron doses.

> Is that also addressed MR. KATZ:

in the new TBD? 1 318 2 DR. TAULBEE: I would think so. (Simultaneous speakers.) 3 think the action 4 DR. OSTROW: Ι 5 item here, because we agreed that SC&A should check out NIOSH's statement. 6 7 MR. KATZ: Right. We'd have to address 8 DR. OSTROW: this. 9 10 Right, and you have the MR. KATZ: new TBD, you're looking at this part of the 11 12 TBD anyway. 13 DR. OSTROW: Yes. 14 MR. KATZ: Yes. 15 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay, Number 16 31, complete disquality of Idaho National Lab 17 neutron dosimetry and recordkeeping programs. 18 Identification and determination of neutron dose from workers are heavily influenced by 19 confidence 20 the assumption of this 21 assumption of confidence.

But SC&A found this premise to 3 be 1 2 unsupported after examining several critical 3 DOE Headquarters, Tiger Team and DNFSB Site 4 Audit Reports. 5 DR. TAULBEE: Ι think this 6 another one where we can go through the Tiger 7 Team issues and identify them. The ones that addressing 8 are the neutrons here and go 9 through and address them like we are for the 10 beta-gamma dosimetry ones. MR. HINNEFELD: 11 Yes. 12 MR. STIVER: I agree. 13 MR. KATZ: That sounds good. CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay, we might 14 15 get to go home tonight after all. Number 32, 16 on certain re-estimation for neutron doses, 17 NIOSH should explain how the **FNCFs** were 18 obtained and provide instruction to dose reconstructors how to apply them. 19 20 DR. OSTROW: again, Here NIOSH

responded that the latest provision of

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aŗ	ppears to adequately explain the FNCF. 320
	MEMBER ROESSLER: Is that fast
ne	eutron correction factor, is that what that
st	tands for?
	MR. DARNELL: Facility.
	MEMBER ROESSLER: Facility neutron
	_
	DR. TAULBEE: Yes, each facility
ha	ad a different correction factor.
	MEMBER ROESSLER: These acronyms
Cá	an sometimes get you.
	MR. GLECKLER: That's the site's
a	cronym, yes.
	MR. KATZ: Okay, so SC&A will cover
tl	hat because that's part of this neutron
re	evisitation well, not revisitation, but
V	isitation of the new TBD.
	MEMBER REACH: Sounds like 33 and

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MR. KATZ: Is that true?

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maybe

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thing.

sure, are the same

33 is also, SC&A has 1 DR. OSTROW: 2 to check it out. 3 MR. STIVER: Yes, 33 would be applicable too. 4 5 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay, Number 6 34, let's see. 7 MEMBER ROESSLER: I know, late in the day it goes faster. 8 9 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, John left. 10 Multiple factors MR. KATZ: but that's right. 11 12 SCHOFIELD: High risk CHAIRMAN 13 NIOSH did neutron exposure: not evaluate comprehensively the facility and field data to 14 15 identify and separate out the high risk or 16 high dose jobs from worker neutron exposures. 17 This information is essential for dose reconstructors to fill in the gap when 18 dose records in the claimant's file is not 19 20 complete. 21 DR. TAULBEE: This is very similar

1	to the language in the other comments on high
2	risk jobs. And the last one on beta-gamma
3	actually was related to hot particles, and so
4	that was being revised for that. So I guess
5	my question for clarification is: what is the
6	concern with regard to neutrons from this
7	standpoint? Steve or John, can one of you
8	guys?
9	MR. STIVER: Steve, want to take
10	this one?
11	DR. OSTROW: Okay, I think here
12	this is specifically for neutron
13	MR. KATZ: Steve, can you speak
14	closer to the speaker phone? It's hard to
15	hear you.
16	DR. OSTROW: specifically for
17	neutron exposure and we didn't see where NIOSH
18	provided a list of what was considered to be
19	at the high risk for neutron exposure, I mean
20	what sort of job.

GLECKLER:

MR.

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TBD

The external

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identifies the specific facilities where neutron exposures were possible. It doesn't specifically identify any as high risk neutron exposures, typically, I think, about the highest total neutron dose that I've seen for a worker is about 500 millirem for a career dose.

There might be a couple that were a little bit higher, but those are very rare that you see anything in that magnitude, most of them are lots of zeroes. So to me there's no real indication that there's any real high risk neutron jobs -- exposure jobs at INL, other than an accident.

MR. HINNEFELD: I have a question Ι want to make sure that we're here and complete on our investigation in this issue. believe all of these findings by experts as being, hey, you know, we had really high doses here. And there's a chance for really high dosage, and I would believe that

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those are summarized and the site expert		
interviews are summarized in SC&A's documents		
in their report. Would that be true, Steve?		
DR. OSTROW: Some of it, yes. In		
our report we had some site interviews.		
MR. HINNEFELD: Okay.		
DR. OSTROW: And they identified		
what at least they thought was high exposure		
risk.		
MR. HINNEFELD: Yes, now we		
certainly agree that there are places in INL		
were you get really high dose rates; we		
certainly agree with that.		
Now the question remains: are		
people exposed to those dose rates while		
they're not monitored, in which case, that's		
cite, ie not monitorea, in winen case, that s		

only time this would be the an issue, otherwise you're wearing a monitor that would measure those high dose rates.

think for completeness So I should go back look at, specifically at the

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1 interview portion of the report -- of 2 Just to satisfy ourselves that they review. are not describing a situation that we don't 3 4 know about, in terms of people encountering 5 without being monitored. these dose rates 6 Does that sound acceptable? 7 That pretty CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: 8 well sums it up. 9 MR. STIVER: Yes, that sums it up 10 pretty well in my mind. 11 DR. TAULBEE: Okay, SO your 12 information as to that there were certain high 13 risk forth, jobs, from those so came interviews? 14 15 MR. HINNEFELD: I think all these 16 findings ascribed that finding to site experts 17 who were interviewed for this. I think each one does. 18 19 DR. TAULBEE: Okay. 20 STIVER: MR. Yes, so you see, 21 there's some description of a facility or job

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1	type that would not have been covered in the					
2	assignment of unmonitored dose in another					
3	situation.					
4	MR. KATZ: Okay, and if you dor					
5	find that their interviews are substantiated,					
6	then we're done.					
7	MR. HINNEFELD: Well, one way or					
8	another we've got to provide something back or					
9	what we found out.					
10	MR. KATZ: Yes, right.					
11	MR. HINNEFELD: Report back what we					
12	found out.					
13	MR. KATZ: Right, right.					
14	MR. DARNELL: So we're reviewing					
15	the interviews to see if an unmonitored worker					
16	could have excess					
17	DR. TAULBEE: To see if there's any					
18	areas of neutron exposure.					
19	MR. HINNEFELD: To see if there are					
20	any gaps in the					
21	DR. TAULBEE: Is there something					

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1	that we didn't know about, that we feel that					
2	we've got an approach that works, but this may					
3	even describe a situation that we didn't know					
4	about, you know, things like that. You know,					
5	is there something to this comment?					
6	MEMBER BEACH: Is this something					
7	that SC&A can cite different interviews that					
8	brought this comment on?					
9	MR. HINNEFELD: Well, if they could					
10						
11	MEMBER BEACH: I mean, that might					
12	be helpful.					
13	MR. HINNEFELD: If there's a					
14	specific person or a way to identify the					
15	specific interview.					
16	MR. STIVER: We certainly might be					
17	able to narrow it down that way.					
18	MR. HINNEFELD: Yes, that way that					
19	would save us some time.					

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MEMBER BEACH: That would save you

a lot of time.

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1	MR. HINNEFELD: Yes. 328					
2	DR. OSTROW: Then SC&A would have					
3	to go through the interviews that					
4	MR. HINNEFELD: Yes, if they don't					
5	know any better than us, I mean					
6	DR. OSTROW: It could work either					
7	way.					
8	MEMBER BEACH: But they're the					
9	one's that brought the issue up, SC&A did.					
10	MR. STIVER: But I think we might					
11	be able to better identify where we felt that					
12	might have been a problem.					
13	MR. KATZ: Don't you normally					
14	reference these in your reports, when you have					
15	a finding?					
16	MEMBER BEACH: Yes, I believe we					
17	do.					
18	MR. DARNELL: There's a summary in					
19	Attachment 3.					
20	MR. STIVER: They usually include a					
21	summary attachment.					

1	MR. DARNELL: It's not the
2	interview that came from this, it's just a
3	summary of this situation.
4	MR. HINNEFELD: What I'm reading
5	from is Rev 1 of the Site Profile Review and
6	in this they is, I found no other explanation
7	than site experts interviewed by SC&A
8	classified INL as an acute dose site.
9	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay, Number
10	35, multiplying factors for missed neutron
11	dose. NIOSH provided data support, two
12	multiplying factors, 1.25 and 2, the fixed
13	missed neutron dose, default value of 50
14	millirem.
15	MEMBER BEACH: That takes us back
16	to 29.
17	DR. TAULBEE: Yes. We're going to
18	revisit or revise that TBD.
19	MR. DARNELL: Or SC&A's going to go
20	back.
21	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Anybody else

1	have any other comments on that?				
2	MR. STIVER: Part of the Rev 3				
3	neutron component review.				
4	MEMBER BEACH: For 36 and it looks				
5	like 35 I mean 35 and it looks like 36 is				
6	going to be the same. Is that correct?				
7	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Looks like it.				
8	No, this is a 36, 37 issue.				
9	DR. TAULBEE: This is a different				
10	issue from the				
11	MR. STIVER: Yes, this is the beta				
12	dose.				
13	DR. TAULBEE: This would be beta				
14	dose, this would be another focused part of				
15	that TBD.				
16	MEMBER BEACH: Which is, there's a				
17	current revision to the TBD. Yes.				
18	DR. TAULBEE: Yes.				
19	MR. STIVER: Yes.				
20	DR. OSTROW: So SC&A will look at				
21	the section that covers this.				

1 MR. KATZ: Okay. 331 2 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay, we're on Number 36, 35, SC&A is going to go back and 3 review that. 4 5 MR. DARNELL: Same for 36. 6 MEMBER BEACH: Same for 36. 7 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay, SC&A review. 8 Sounds like 37 is 9 MEMBER BEACH: 10 done. CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: 11 Okay, we're 12 to 38, the shallow dose. NIOSH 13 consider of should making OTIB-17, use Technical Information Bulletin, 14 the 15 interpretation of dosimeter data for 16 assignment of shallow dose where appropriate. 17 Additionally, the contrary to 18 OTIB's claim, on page 15, the assumption of 19 undergarment pant thickness, two millimeter is claimant-favorable. 20 SC&A believes 21 the measured thickness are about half that and

	personally identifiable information has been redacted as necessary. The transcript, however, has not been reviewed and certified by the Chair of the INL Work Group for accuracy at this time. The reader should be cautioned that this transcript is for information only and is subject to change.					
1	hence the OTIB assumptions are not claimant $\frac{1}{332}$					
2	favorable.					
3	MR. DARNELL: I think that's an old					
4	one.					
5	DR. TAULBEE: This is OTIB-17, it's					
6	been reviewed from the Procedures?					
7	MR. SMITH: Yes, it has, this isn't					
8	that. We've dealt with that issue in the					
9	Procedures Work Group.					
10	DR. TAULBEE: Okay, so can we close					
11	this one out then?					
12	MR. STIVER: Okay, we can close					
13	this one out.					
14	MR. GLECKLER: Excellent.					
15	MEMBER BEACH: So who gets the					
16	action of revising the matrix at the end of					
17	all this?					
18	MR. DARNELL: SC&A people.					
19	(Laughter.)					
20	MEMBER BEACH: It is SC&A people?					
21	MR. STIVER: Steve, you want to					

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1	take that one?				
2	DR. OSTROW: Just by referencing				
3	the Linde review, as Gen Roessler notes, we				
4	ended up with, I don't know, about ten columns				
5	of				
6	MEMBER ROESSLER: Say that agair				
7	Steve, I couldn't hear you very well.				
8	DR. OSTROW: What I'm saying is,				
9	well, you know, where we ended up with Linde				
10	we ended up with about ten columns in our				
11	matrix review before we finally closed				
12	everything out, we kept on adding columns to				
13	it.				
14	MEMBER ROESSLER: Yes, as long as				
15	it fits on the paper it's okay.				
16	MR. STIVER: You have to use the				
17	17-inch paper for that.				
18	MEMBER ROESSLER: Or small print.				
19	MR. STIVER: Yes, really really				
20	small print.				
21	DR. OSTROW: I don't think we have				

to revise anything right now, because we have all these action items, but I'm suggesting, I've been taking very good notes, I think, and what I'd like to do probably today, before I lose everything in my mind, just summarize the 38 issues very quickly, what's closed and what the action items are. Send out a draft to Ted and to the Board and to NIOSH. And if everybody agrees that will be our action item. We could have like a checklist and make sure we cover everything. Does that sound like a good idea? That sounds good. MR. KATZ: Are you covering the NIOSH actions too? DR. OSTROW: Yes, Ι worked on everything. ROESSLER: You're MEMBER SO organized. MR. KATZ: Yes, I got them too so

have questions, I took good notes too,

I think.

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1	DR. OSTROW: I'm just going to 3 do				
2	sort of a draft and send it out and, you know,				
3	people can finalize it and, Ted, maybe you can				
4	put out the final one after everybody agrees				
5	on the action.				
6	MR. KATZ: Absolutely, that's, I				
7	think, always a good way to go, and doing it				
8	soon like you're saying, is, I think, helpful				
9	for everyone since we want to move these				
10	things along.				
11	DR. OSTROW: Yes, I'm going to work				
12	on that actually right now.				
13	MR. KATZ: Great, thank you, Steve.				
14	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Anybody got				
15	anything else?				
16	MR. KATZ: Anything else for the				
17	good of the order?				
18	MEMBER BEACH: How about				
19	deliverables and meeting plans?				
20	MR. KATZ: I think, so we know the				
21	deliverables, we got those captured pretty				

well and clearly, I think. And meeting plans; it seems like we need, folks need to go back after they have their action list and do some figuring before we can schedule the next meeting.

CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Yes, before we schedule --

MR. KATZ: And it sounds like they'll be some technical calls before we have a meeting too, so I think we can put that off for a bit.

MR. HINNEFELD: I think the idea is that, you know, we have 38 issues, we got rid of a few today and the idea is to get it down to manageable number, just identify a few issues that are important issues, you know, and try to get rid of the lesser, the ones of lesser importance, you know, get them out of the way.

MR. KATZ: Yes, and there are a lot of overlapping issues that will get conquered

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with one effort, s	so			337
MR. HI	NNEFELD:	Yes.	I don't	think

MR. HINNEFELD: Yes. I don't think we're in a situation to schedule anything today.

MR. KATZ: Yes, no, absolutely.

MR. HINNEFELD: That'd be a resource of time.

MEMBER BEACH: Right, I understand.

MR. KATZ: So, thank you everybody, on the phone and in the room, and have a good rest of your day. It's starting to pour and looking really ugly here.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter was concluded at 3:14 p.m.)

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338

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