# UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION

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NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH

ADVISORY BOARD ON RADIATION WORKER HEALTH

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NEVADA TEST SITE WORK GROUP

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TUESDAY,
DECEMBER 15, 2009

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#### MEETING

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The Work Group convened, in the Zurich Meeting Room at the Cincinnati Airport Marriott Hotel, 2395 Progress Drive, Hebron, Kentucky, at 9:30 a.m., Robert Presley, Chair, presiding.

#### BOARD MEMBERS PRESENT:

ROBERT W. PRESLEY, Chair BRADLEY P. CLAWSON WANDA I. MUNN GENEVIEVE S. ROESSLER PHILLIP SCHOFIELD

# IDENTIFIED PARTICIPANTS:

TED KATZ, Acting Designated Federal Official NANCY ADAMS, Contractor to NIOSH\* ISAF AL-NABULSI, DOE\* LYNN ANSPAUGH, SC&A\* BOB BARTON, SC&A HARRY CHMELYNSKI, SC&A\* JEFF COATES, DOL\* JOHN FUNK, Petitioner\* STU HINNEFELD, OCAS EMILY HOWELL, HHS BONNIE KLEA, Santa Susana Field Lab\* JENNY LIN, HHS\* JOYCE LIPSZTEIN, SC&A\* ARJUN MAKHIJANI, SC&A JOHN MAURO, SC&A JAMES NETON, OCAS KATHLEEN ROSNER, Office of Sen. Harry Reid\* LEW WADE, NIOSH

\*Participating via telephone

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1	P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
2	(9:30 a.m.)
3	MR. KATZ: Good morning, everyone
4	in the room and on the phone.
5	This is the Advisory Board on
6	Radiation Worker Health, the NTS Work Group.
7	We are just ready to get going now, beginning
8	with roll call, Board members in the room.
9	Please, everybody, for roll call,
10	please address your conflict-of-interest
11	situation.
12	CHAIR PRESLEY: Robert Presley,
13	Chairman, NTS Working Group. No conflict.
14	MR. KATZ: Board members.
15	MEMBER ROESSLER: Gen Roessler, NTS
16	Work Group. No conflict.
17	MEMBER SCHOFIELD: Phil Schofield,
18	NTS Work Group member. No conflict.
19	MEMBER CLAWSON: Brad Clawson, NTS
20	Work Group member. No conflict.
21	MEMBER MUNN: Wanda Munn, Board
22	member. No conflict.

1	MR. KATZ: And on the telephone, do
2	we have any Board members in attendance?
3	MR. FUNK: This is John Funk of Las
4	Vegas. No conflict.
5	MR. KATZ: Hello. John, thank you.
6	You're later, but right now we're just doing
7	Board members.
8	MR. FUNK: Sorry, Ted.
9	MR. KATZ: It's okay.
LO	Any Board members on the phone?
L1	(No audible response.)
L2	Then, the NIOSH ORAU team in the
L3	room?
L4	MR. HINNEFELD: Stu Hinnefeld,
L5	Interim Director of OCAS. I don't have a
L6	conflict at NTS.
L7	DR. NETON: Jim Neton, OCAS. No
L8	conflict at NTS.
L9	MR. KATZ: And on the telephone,
20	NIOSH ORAU team? Any?
21	(No audible response.)
22	Are you expecting any, Jim?

1	DR. NETON: No.
2	MR. KATZ: Oh, okay.
3	SC&A, in the room?
4	DR. MAURO: John Mauro, SC&A. No
5	conflict.
6	DR. MAKHIJANI: Arjun Makhijani,
7	SC&A. No conflict.
8	MR. BARTON: Bob Barton, SC&A. No
9	conflict.
10	MR. KATZ: And then SC&A on the
11	line.
12	MR. ANSPAUGH: This is Lynn
13	Anspaugh. Conflicted.
14	MR. KATZ: Welcome, Lynn.
15	Okay, that's SC&A.
16	Then let's go with other HHS or
17	federal officials, DOE, DOL, or contractors to
18	federal agencies in the room.
19	MS. HOWELL: Emily Howell, HHS.
20	MR. WADE: Lew Wade. I work for
21	NIOSH.
22	MR KAT7: And on the line?

1	MR. FUNK: John Funk.
2	MS. AL-NABULSI: Isaf Al-Nabulsi,
3	DOE.
4	MR. KATZ: Welcome.
5	Any other government employees,
6	contractors, on the line?
7	MS. ADAMS: Nancy Adams,
8	contractor, NIOSH.
9	MR. KATZ: Welcome, Nancy.
10	MR. COATES: Jeff Coates,
11	Department of Labor.
12	MR. KATZ: Welcome, Jeff.
13	MS. LIN: Jenny Lin with HHS.
14	MR. KATZ: Hi, Jenny.
15	MS. LIN: Hi.
16	MR. KATZ: Okay. Then, members of
17	the public or staff of congressional offices
18	on the line?
19	MS. ROSNER: Kathleen Rosner from
20	Senator Harry Reid's office.
21	MR. KATZ: Kathleen Rosner?
22	MS. ROSNER: Yes.

1	MR. KATZ: Welcome.
2	Any other members?
3	John Funk, you're with us still?
4	MR. FUNK: Yes, sir.
5	MR. KATZ: Welcome, John.
6	MS. KLEA: Bonnie Klea, Santa
7	Susana Field Lab.
8	MR. KATZ: Hi, Bonnie. Welcome.
9	MS. KLEA: Good morning.
10	MR. KATZ: Okay, then, let's just
11	remind folks on the phone, please mute your
12	phones except when you're addressing the
13	group; *6 if you don't have a mute button; *6
14	again to take it off of mute. Please do not
15	put your phone on hold at any point. Just if
16	you have to leave the call, hang up and dial
17	back in.
18	And it's all yours, Bob.
19	CHAIR PRESLEY: Okay. What I would
20	like to do is set the stage this morning.
21	What we plan on doing is letting Jim go

through his findings, and I would like to have

1	John and Arjun do SC&A's rebuttal. Then I
2	would like to talk about the two remaining
3	issues that we have.
4	John put a letter out stating their
5	position on these. I would like for him to
6	state that.
7	Then we will go into new business
8	after that.
9	Jim?
10	DR. NETON: Okay. Well, I am going
11	to be speaking from a White Paper that NIOSH
12	issued on November 25th, 2009.
13	CHAIR PRESLEY: Does anybody need a
14	copy of that? Has everybody got it?
15	MEMBER CLAWSON: If we had a spare,
16	I would
17	CHAIR PRESLEY: I have copies.
18	DR. MAURO: It's easy for me to
19	work from this and move back and forth.
20	DR. NETON: It's a very short
21	paper, and I just intend to do a brief
22	synopsis of what is in here.

has 1 This been cleared for 2 Privacy Act and other things. So it is available to be shared with the public. 3 I believe it is possibly on our website by now. 4 CHAIR PRESLEY: This is the cleared 5 version. 6 7 DR. NETON: There was an earlier version. It was not Privacy-Act cleared, but, 8 in fact, there are no differences. 9 10 was considered to be Privacy Act-protected in the original. 11 have been discussing 12 13 Petition 84 for quite some time now with this Working Group. We presented that in April 14 15 2007, and it was our position at that time 16 that we could plausibly bound all internal and external exposures at NTS after January 1st of 17 63. 18 There has been a lot of technical 19

discussions gone on since then, and through the detailed review by SC&A, there was a number of findings that were identified that

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required further investigation.

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After a lengthy amount of debate, the remaining issue of concern boils down, at least in NIOSH's opinion, to the ability to bound internal exposures for unmonitored workers. I call it one issue. Really, I think SC&A considers it two.

There's two pieces to that. One is the ability to construct a coworker model for internal exposure for those who weren't monitored, and the other one is for people who like, of in the field sort operations, not necessarily working with very But, for our well defined source terms. purposes, I considered them to be one source term.

So we had originally proposed the use of the claimant data. We didn't have any real extensive bioassay data for workers from NTS. So we proposed the use of the coworker dataset that we had or the claimant dataset that we had, and used the highest 100 exposed

workers as our dataset of a coworker model.

SC&A did some very serious review of that dataset and identified what we considered to be some issues of representativeness. So, to address questions, we felt that it was important to go and review the site procedures documents that indicated why people might have been monitored.

And in addition, at about that same time, we had learned of the existence of this electronic database of all of the bioassay data that had been taken over an extended period of time at NTS. So we undertook a review of both the documentation that reported why bioassay samples were taken as well as a review of the new dataset.

Briefly, the electronic dataset; we originally thought it had somewhere around a quarter million records. I believe now it is something about half that. It's 125,000 records, is my best recollection. The dataset

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was included in about four different tables, and it is out there on the O: drive or the K: drive for people to review.

We took a look at that dataset and characterized it. And indeed, there were a large number of samples for plutonium, tritium, gamma measurements and beta measurements, all in urine, over the entire time period that we were interested in.

Interestingly enough, though, the dataset did contain the name of the person, the Social Security number, but there was no indication of the job title or why the sample was taken, or where the worker was. So it didn't really give us a good, comfortable feeling that we could really better define who was monitored and why, based on that dataset, in spite of the fact that we had a large number of samples.

To make a long story short, after our analysis of the dataset and the documentation that was available to support

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the bioassay program, we ended up with four issues of concern. Those are:

The first one is that we have identified scenarios where there were a lot of job titles and work activities, a lot of varied activities that had been undertaken at the Nevada Test Site, drill-backs, construction, post-test work activities, those sort of things.

But, prior to 1993, we could find no documentation to confirm the rationale behind why those samples were actually taken. In other words, we were looking for a document that said, okay, we monitored the people that are in the database because they had the highest potential for exposure, and they were routinely monitored, and those sorts of things, the things you would like to see for a good, robust monitoring program.

Further, we looked at the available data itself, and to the extent we could, we attempted -- and SC&A had done this before --

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to characterize the types of people that were Even though the database didn't sampled. contain those identifiers, we went back into looking the NOCTS database, at claimant populations better to try to now get а correlation for who was sampled and why.

The same pattern had emerged that SC&A observed in the review of the 100 or 120. That there large number is, is а radiological technicians and security personnel that were sampled. That makes some These people were all over the site doing various activities.

But the fact remains that you cannot, sort of a priori, assume that these people were the highest-exposed workers. They were convenient people to sample to get a sense, was the Rad Control program functioning as it should. But, nonetheless, it wouldn't give you a good feeling that the highest-exposed people were sampled.

There were a lot of other job

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duties and titles represented, but samples appear to have been more incidentdriven samples as opposed to routine samples. In other words, there might have been some evidence of an elevated airborne area or campaign started up where they drill-back, and then you would see a large number of samples collected on one day. That is not distinctive mark of what I would call routine monitoring program.

The second issue we identified was that there were some data gaps, even in the electronic database. We could only find 300 bioassay records for uranium up until 1992. That, in and of itself, is not, maybe, a tremendous shock, but we really couldn't correlate, was that really the right number of samples based on what was done at the site. We just don't have a feel if that was the appropriate number.

And secondly, in that area of the data gaps, there is only tritium -- I mean

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analyses and beta gamma analyses for fission products, of which there could be a very different mix, depending upon when the sample was taken. This was, after all, a nuclear weapon that had been detonated, and there's a lot of short-lived decayed fission productions that decay over time. Depending on where that sample was taken in relation to the actual weapons detonation, you could come up with some fairly significant differences in dose conversion factors.

Our third concern was the nature of the work at NTS. It is sort of a large geographic area over which the work was conducted.

Unlike many production sites, like a Fernald or a Savannah River that has stationary operations, where routine samples were taken -- for example, there's hundreds of thousands of samples at some of these larger sites -- NTS was largely an episodic-driven program. There would be a weapons test on one

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day, and then there would be some operations over the subsequent weeks to try to characterize how well the weapon functioned by doing drill-backs and that sort of thing.

really, from So there was perspective in this time period, no real evidence of what Ι consider а monitoring program, except for radiological technicians and the security guards, who were not necessarily the highest exposed.

Because of the episodic nature of that work, which was almost an acute-type exposure scenario, NIOSH was not comfortable saying that we could develop a coworker model which largely is based on a chronic exposure situation. So the question is, how do you take an acute sampling program and convert it into a chronic coworker model to bound exposures.

And lastly, there was a variety of nuclides that were generated on the Site, in

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addition to the ones that were in the database. would include, These but not limited to things like americium, thorium, iodine, and, of course, the fission radium, products, which were sort of captured with the generic gamma and beta analyses.

So, with no bioassay records, these other nuclides that were not monitored, one would also have to establish some to come up with the intakes of nuclides other based plutonium on the would also sampling, which have been problematic for us.

So, given those four main areas of concern that weren't addressed by either looking at the bioassay records themselves or the documentation, we really could find no strong documentation for a routine program. That is not to say it was a bad program. I mean one needs to consider that during this timeframe they were largely operating under the concept, the internal dosimetry concept of

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ICRP 2, Publication 2, which basically said, as long as you stay below a certain maximum permissible concentration in air over the entire year, then the program was behaving satisfactorily. There were limits above which one shouldn't go: maybe 25 or 50 percent. I have forgotten what the limits were.

But that was the nature of the way the programs were designed in that timeframe, and it appears that NTS did a good job doing that. Unfortunately, what they have collected is not useful for us in the dose reconstruction area that we are trying to do now.

Lastly, though, I would like to say that, after 1992, it did appear to us that the condition was a little more robust because 10 CFR 835 came into effect at that time period, and that was where programs were under civil and criminal penalties for not following 10 CFR 835, which is a regulation.

Sure enough, in 1993, through the

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1	existence of a fairly large Technical Basis
2	Document for internal dosimetry it does
3	contain documentation as to who was
4	potentially exposed, why, and what the basis
5	for the monitoring programs were for those
6	workers.
7	So, based on that review and
8	looking at some of the data after 92, we
9	believe that, for two reasons, 92 is a good
10	stopping point. One is that that is the
11	cessation of underground testing at the site.
12	And secondly, 10 CFR 835 was in effect, and
13	the program appears to have embraced that to a
14	large degree.
15	And that's it. I would be happy to
16	answer any questions.
17	DR. MAKHIJANI: Could I ask a
18	question? So, Jim, you actually did a similar
19	analysis to what we have done in that, I know.
20	DR. NETON: Yes. I have not
21	presented here in the timeframe

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DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes.

1	DR. NETON: but we went back and
2	looked at
3	DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay.
4	DR. NETON: the
5	representativeness of what we had, given the
6	restrictions on the number of data points we
7	could find.
8	DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. Right.
9	You're right.
10	DR. NETON: We feel very confident
11	that that same pattern persisted into the 70s
12	and 80s
13	DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay.
14	DR. NETON: which is rad techs,
15	security guards, that sort of thing, but no
16	good evidence of a routine program for other
17	sort of first-line workers.
18	MEMBER MUNN: Jim, your report here
19	focused pretty much on a new electronic
20	database that had come to the fore recently.
21	From many months back in our deliberations, I
22	recall seeing photographs and hearing

discussions about dosimetry programs that were focused specifically on drill-backs and the folks who had tunnel entries. I recall seeing photographs of workers coming out of their drill shaft dropping their badges into a bucket so that they could be read.

It is difficult for me to reconcile what I'm hearing with respect to the electronic database and a lack of information in prior databases that we have looked at which seemed to give a much broader view of types of activities that might have gone on and individuals who might have been badged doing entirely different things that we knew were well described and defined.

So I am a little puzzled as to how this new information brings us to the conclusion that the prior information was not more robust than we thought it was.

DR. NETON: I think the prior discussions we had were focused on the external dosimetry monitoring program.

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1 MEMBER MUNN: Yes, but --DR. NETON: We still believe that 2 to be a fairly good representation. You know, 3 almost everybody was badged that went 4 radiological areas, as far as we know. 5 We discussed that extensively. 6 MEMBER MUNN: Yes, we did. 7 DR. NETON: And we did this -- SC&A 8 engaged in this analysis of badges not worn, 9 10 and could not find any evidence that that was really going to bias our results. 11 MEMBER MUNN: 12 Correct. 13 DR. NETON: we feel fairly So comfortable that we can reconstruct external 14 15 exposures for workers. What we focused on in 16 this position paper is internal exposures. retrieved this 17 Uр until we electronic database, we had no internal 18 19 monitoring program except for the results that were forwarded to us for claimants under NTS. 20 So, anyone who was a claimant, the Site would 21

forward us some data.

22

We would have it in

there, and that was what our analysis was based on.

We believe that there was a correlation between the highest 100 people who were exposed externally and their internal exposures. That was our previous coworker model.

MEMBER MUNN: Yes.

DR. NETON: SC&A correctly identified; those data points were not necessarily representative of all categories workers who were exposed. There's persistent pattern of radiological technicians and security guards being, I don't want to say oversampled, but principally, largely sampled, to the exclusion of what we call the firstline workers, the people who were actually doing the drill-backs. There are some of those, but it is not obvious that those people were involved in routine monitoring programs.

In other words, from the startup -MEMBER MUNN: And routine

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1	biological monitoring
2	DR. NETON: Yes. I'm sorry.
3	MEMBER MUNN: Yes, yes.
4	DR. NETON: I mean, to be clear.
5	MEMBER MUNN: Yes, that is a point
6	which gets lost in the discussion.
7	DR. NETON: Right. So there
8	certainly were samples from people doing
9	drill-backs and the construction workers and
10	those types, but it is not clear why those
11	samples were taken.
12	We will see a sample and then
13	nothing for a while. There will be another
14	event, another operation, maybe another
15	sample. They seem to be largely based, either
16	incident-type-driven samples they were in
17	an area
18	MEMBER MUNN: Which you would
19	expect.
20	DR. NETON: Which you would expect.
21	There's nothing wrong with that.
22	But to take those incident-based

samples and to reconstruct a coworker model that assumes a chronic exposure pattern is not realistic, in our opinion.

The other sites, like a Savannah River or a Hanford where you have an operator, a chemical operator or someone running a lathe who had, every quarter, a uranium urine sample or a plutonium sample, that gives you some confidence that you can get an idea of what their actual exposure was over a period of time.

MEMBER MUNN: A pretty broad sampling program.

And it is partly the DR. NETON: unique nature of NTS that is driving this. you think about it, all monitoring programs run with this ICRP 2 requirement. So it is just interesting that NTS had these episodic events, the unique conditions that don't allow for routine programs, where the other sites did because it just constricted was confined to certain areas where they could

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easily collect a lot of routine samples.

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MEMBER CLAWSON: Where did we finally find this database at?

Well, NTS DR. NETON: had the database all along and, to be clear, we were aware of the existence of the database. We were not. aware that the database contained the complete set of bioassay samples by workers.

It was our understanding that the database was there, but to get the samples, one would have to go to microfilm records to retrieve the information to get a complete picture of a name, Social Security number, result.

It turns out that that was in there all along. getting additional We were information from the site to supplement what is in the electronic database, and it was just not clear to us that the electronic database existed where at least there was sample all in one location. But it

provided to us by the Nevada Test Site.

CHAIR PRESLEY: Any more questions?

(No audible response.)

John?

DR. MAURO: Sure. I'll get started.

I guess a good point of departure is when we prepare a summary of the state of the issues, and this is just prior to when you submitted your report. From my recollection -- I don't have it in front of me -- but it really came down to three issues, only one of which was really of great significance.

One was, if you recall, the badges-left-behind issue. That goes to external exposure. We did a lot of work on that. Our main goal in looking at that data was to see if the badges-left-behind issue could somehow bias the distribution of exposures, so that you really couldn't build a coworker model where you would have a degree of confidence that the upper end was captured.

1	For example, the concern was, well,
2	if people left their badges behind
3	deliberately, in order to avoid experiencing
4	high exposures which would have them be
5	replaced from their job, the implication being
6	that that was widespread, the upper end of the
7	tail would be cut off. And if you build a
8	coworker model, it wouldn't capture the true
9	upper end of what people's exposures were.
10	So we did a lot of work to see the
11	extent to which that practice took place and
12	the extent to which that practice might have
13	biased distribution.
14	MEMBER MUNN: John, you're speaking
15	very softly.
16	DR. MAURO: I'm sorry. I will
17	speak up a little louder.
18	MEMBER MUNN: Thank you.
19	DR. MAURO: So we did a lot of
20	work. The real question we asked ourselves
21	was, one, what's the extent to which badges
22	left behind appear to have occurred; and two,

was it of such a nature that you really couldn't construct a coworker model because the upper end of the tail was lopped off.

Because the badges that got left behind were the badges -- the people that had the highest potential for exposure.

We looked real hard at that, and the bottom line is that there's absolutely no doubt that there was a lot of badges left behind. This was as a result of lots of interviews that took place following one of our meetings at NTS.

If you recall, at one of the meetings, Harry Reid was there with a large number of workers who stood up and claimed, yes, we left our badges behind. We interviewed those and many other folks.

We did that. We also looked at badges, film badge records and pocket dosimeters. Remember, that was, like, an idea that came up real early in the process. If there was a disparity, a clear disparity,

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between the film badge record, which let's say, for example, the person left out in his pickup truck, but he left his pocket dosimeter on, something would show up that said something isn't right.

Well, to make a long story short, we could not find what we have called the smoking gun. Now it was clear that the badges-left-behind was of such a nature and to such an extent that you could not build a coworker model.

So where we stopped -- and we did the best we could -- we looked at a lot of data. It certainly wasn't a complete statistical analysis of all the data. But we did a lot of work; we've got a lot of pages.

By the way, this is all hard-copy work. This is really not electronic work. So we had to pull tens of thousands of pieces of paper out.

The bottom line, and this is what we reported back to the full Work Group at the

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time, is that we can't sit here and say that the data are biased. We believe that we did not find the smoking gun. We believe that, based on the information we have here, it appears that you could build a coworker model that would be representative of the full distribution of exposures that workers experienced.

And at that point in time, that's what the results came back. At that point in time, the Work Group said, good enough; I think we will stop at this point. Let's move on to the other issues. So that is where that issue is.

The second issue had to do with workers that worked out in the Flats, not in a post-test mode, but just were out there all the time doing prep work, and it wasn't part of, let's say, the post-test movement where you mobilized a team of workers to go into a controlled area under controlled circumstances. This was folks, ongoing all

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the time, doing work, moving equipment.

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NIOSH had an approach. In fact, there's some history here. I think it is important that we recapture this because I think we are in the home stretch here.

NIOSH originally had an approach that said, listen, we have a lot of data characterizing of residual the amount It was called the McClellan or radioactivity. the name of the fort. It started with an M, Anyway, there is a fellow that wrote M-C. this, gathered all the data, where you know the becquerels per meters squared across the entire complex. If you actually make contours of plutonium and a whole mix of radionuclides, you could actually reconstruct what the patterns of the surface contamination were on soil post-above-ground testing now. This is what was left on the ground.

Now NIOSH's original approach for reconstructing the doses to those workers from inhalation, internal dose, was to say, okay,

we know what the pattern looks like and we know that the worst location -- it was broken up in different areas. And there was one particular area -- I don't remember the number -- there was an area, and it might have been Area 3, I'm not sure.

We looked at the data, and there was one area that was clearly the worst area. We said, okay, do you know what we're going In order to place a plausible upper value, since we don't really know where all the people worked all the time, we will simply assume that the exposures were to people that, when from we construct exposures that and workers working out in scenario, general area, we are going to assume that they were working in this area that had the highest concentration and assume that they chronically exposed to a dust loading of 5 milligrams per cubic meter. So that is a very high dust loading for chronic exposure.

Certainly, there's times when for a

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short period of time you could get 5, but to assume you are chronically exposed to 5 milligrams per cubic meter all the time to all the workers, in our opinion, that was more than claimant-favorable. That was the approach that was going to be taken.

But, somewhere along the time, it was decided, well, that might be just too -not us, but NIOSH, and correct me if wrong, NIOSH felt that that was just a little bit over the top. So they moved method, which is based different sampling data that was taken from a number of air sampling towers. There were 15 or I don't know how many. They were all over the Site.

But that started in the 1970s. From that data, they, through the 63, 64, 65 time period, using a fairly sophisticated set of adjustment factors, after that was done, a report was written by Lynn Anspaugh that basically showed that that approach isn't going to work. You can't do it. You just

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can't do it. And we left it at that.

Well, no. At that meeting, Jim pointed out he understood the concerns we had. And correct me if I'm wrong, the position that you took at that time was that, yes, we are going to have to do something about that, and we have a number of options.

I think one option was to go back to the resuspension factor approach, which we already aired out and agreed it was a good approach. Or, alternatively, perhaps use what we are going to talk about next, which is the Table 7-1 approach, and assign that to everyone.

So that is where we left that issue. That is, and please correct me if I have it wrong, but we left it at that.

There was general agreement that the air sampling approach really isn't going to work, and that NIOSH would look at other strategies, including returning to the old resuspension factor approach, as a way to come

to grips with that.

So, in my mind, those two issues, the badges-left-behind and the exposure to the general outdoor areas, are what I would say, well in hand. Okay?

Then it comes to what I consider to be the single major issue. That was Table 7-1 in the DR. Okay?

Jim did an excellent job in summarizing the issues. Basically, the summary you presented was, to a large extent, similar to the kinds of things that, in fact, it's even richer. You looked into looking for reasons why they picked these people.

So, in effect, where we are right now is the major issue, in my mind, really the only issue that is left on the table is Table 7-1. Jim, basically, has agreed that, well, you really can't use Table 7-1, and it sounds like that you don't really have an alternative as a way of coming to grips with this problem.

Now that all happened over the last

1 month. A week ago last Friday, in fact, at 2 the meeting where we were meeting and greeting the new four Board members -- it was a week 3 ago on Friday -- that Ted said, John, I would 4 like to direct you to go ahead and take a look 5 6 at Jim's paper. So, that was about 10-12 days 7 ago, I imagine. MR. HINNEFELD: December 4th. 8 DR. MAURO: December 4th. There 9 10 you go.

And I said, sure. As soon as I get back.

So what I did is that weekend I rounded the crew up. We had a big, long conference call over the weekend. Monday, we launched into quite a large effort to look very closely at the data, at Jim's report, to see, to come to our own conclusions regarding the strengths and limitations of that 125,000 bioassay data. That is the work that has taken place intensively.

We had, I would say, five or six

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1	folks working the problem.
2	Bob Barton, first of all, thank you
3	for working day and night on this with Arjun.
4	At that point, I would like to hand
5	it over to Arjun and Bob to let you know what
6	we found out.
7	DR. MAKHIJANI: Thank you, John.
8	Are Harry and Joyce on the phone?
9	MR. CHMELYNSKI: Yes, I'm here.
10	DR. MAKHIJANI: Joyce, are you on?
11	MS. LIPSZTEIN: I am on the phone,
12	Arjun.
13	DR. MAKHIJANI: Oh, thank you.
14	John handed this over to me. There
15	were two things that we needed to look at.
16	There wasn't a lot of time, so we couldn't
17	look at everything in Jim's paper in detail.
18	We would be happy to, if the Working Group
19	asked us.
20	But just to remind you, what we did
21	before on this question was a little bit
22	different than what we have done at other

sites. By focusing on Table 7-1, and NIOSH saying we can build a coworker model, we actually focused on the areas where there was the most internal monitoring data, which was plutonium, beta, gamma, and tritium.

We did not seriously look at all these other radionuclides: americium, thorium, and so on, which we are often doing at other sites. We had left that aside, presumably, until the main issue was settled. Now it is sort of moot.

NIOSH had revised their radionuclide list when they revised their TBD.

We didn't look at that big, new radionuclide list. In this review also, we didn't go there because we just didn't have the time.

And as I said, this a work in progress. So we just wanted to see the core analysis that Jim talked about, and I'm very glad that he actually did the same thing that we did, was correct and whether the new data corresponded with the data we had previously

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examined.

Now, previously, we had not only looked at the NIOSH 100, but, to remind you, we picked six job categories with 20 workers in each category at random. I'll start with the plutonium Word file. So, if you will just click on that and bring up page 1, you will see the job categories: RadSafe, laborers, welders, wiremen, miners, security. Of course, there are lots of other job types. So you see the total number of claimants that you find are more than the claimants in these job categories.

So what I wanted to do was to see whether the broad pattern that emerged -- RadSafe were the most monitored. Then security were also monitored, but, really, security was monitored only, not only, but primarily in the 1980s.

Also, we wanted to see whether any new patterns or new information would emerge from this admittedly much larger database.

So, since there were no job types in this, we wanted to sort this in conjunction with the NOCTS database.

I handed this to our number-crunching man, Bob Barton, and I also asked Harry to look at it, the statistics of it. We had Joyce, as before, look at the quality of data. If you remember, Joyce had a number of issues in Attachment B of our prior report regarding quality of data.

So we wanted to revisit the issues that we had conclusions about before to see if we needed to change any of our conclusions or whether we could reaffirm, and whether anything new emerged.

We also had Rich Leggett, who is the expert's expert in many ways. It was a fresh pair of eyes. He had not been involved previously in our NTS work. I'm very glad that John brought him on because I felt having a new pair of eyes, you know, very much respected in the health physics community, if

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we could arrive at a reasonable conclusion together, that we could present you with a strong result.

With that, let me just hand it over to Bob to tell you how he sorted the data and what you are looking at.

MR. BARTON: Okay. Like Arjun said, there weren't actually any job title data contained in this new database. So we had to figure out a way to try to figure out who these people were. The only way we could really do that was to identify who the claimants were in the database.

So what we did was we matched up Social Security numbers from NOCTS, which have job titles listed, carried that over to the database. So, then, now we have a subset of this database workers in who are claimants who we can identify the job categories with.

As you can see, in the first two lines of this plutonium table we have

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1	approximately 40 RadSafe claimants that we
2	were able to identify in the database. There
3	were 21 in security.
4	DR. MAKHIJANI: There are 40
5	RadSafe claimants who had plutonium
6	monitoring.
7	MR. BARTON: With plutonium
8	monitoring, that is correct.
9	DR. MAKHIJANI: That is the
10	interpretation.
11	MR. BARTON: Yes. Thank you for
12	revising that.
13	We found 468 samples for those
14	RadSafe workers. As you go along and look at
15	who we were able to identify and how many
16	samples for each job category, you can see
17	that approximately 70 percent of the samples
18	that we identified for claimants were for
19	RadSafe and security. So that sort of affirms
20	what our earlier analysis had found, was that
21	it was primarily geared toward those two

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groups of workers.

1	You can see there's some samples
2	for the others. There's 25 samples we were
3	able to identify for miners, 18 for laborers,
4	and so on.
5	MEMBER MUNN: But, Bob, let me
6	interrupt you for just a moment. Let me be
7	clear in my own mind.
8	The RadSafe workers and the
9	security workers were the individuals who were
10	most likely to spend the most time, day after
11	day after day, on the site itself, correct?
12	DR. MAKHIJANI: No. No, no.
13	MEMBER MUNN: No?
14	DR. MAKHIJANI: They were people
15	who were likely to have been all over the
16	site, but not necessarily spend the most time.
17	It is our understanding, for instance I
18	mean RadSafe was there initially to check out
19	the conditions, but, you know, miners may have
20	spent a lot more time in the most
21	contaminated.

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1	measurements a little bit later because we
2	have some new evidence
3	MEMBER MUNN: Okay. I didn't want
4	to interrupt the flow of thought. I was just
5	trying to get something clear.
6	DR. MAURO: But I think you bring
7	up the heart of the matter.
8	DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, and we have
9	some, actually, new information about that.
10	DR. MAURO: But if I understand
11	your question, and it is a question that,
12	otherwise, we have a lot of data on RadSafe
13	workers, plutonium data, which basically says
14	you probably could reconstruct exposures to
15	RadSafe workers to plutonium.
16	The question becomes, is that
17	bounding for everybody else?
18	MEMBER MUNN: I understand.
19	DR. MAURO: Is there any evidence
20	that says, wait a minute, maybe welders or
21	wiremen could have had a greater potential for
22	exposure than RadSafe workers?

In other words, for us to say, yes, you could use the RadSafe workers as a coworker for all other categories of workers, there's got to be some argument that could be made as to why that would happen. And as Jim pointed out, we really couldn't find anything.

We actually, to the contrary, which you will hear more from Arjun about, found that there's some evidence that there are other categories of workers that may very well have had higher exposures than RadSafe workers internal.

But, I mean, your question goes right to the issue.

MEMBER MUNN: My question, really and truly, was, were these not truly the most chronically exposed ones? And I'm hearing probably not, that that comes later.

DR. NETON: What really surprised me, and you are probably going to get into this, is the number of positive plutonium results that there were in the database.

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DR. MAURO: Nine thousand.

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DR. I originally thought NETON: that we would see this and say, well, they are all less than or something like that, really no potential for exposure. there's But, somehow, there apparently was a large potential for plutonium exposure, which really took me by surprise.

DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, it surprised me, too. And in all categories, there is quite a large number of positive results.

MR. BARTON: And as Jim was just saying, in that first line of sort of the second section of the table, under Data Characteristics, you can see the number of positive samples there were generally ranged from between 50 to 70 percent.

I will warn you that I noticed the percentages for all workers in that part got lost in translation somewhere. I have actually just fixed it. But that figure of 6,598 positive samples for all the workers in

1	the plutonium database, that represents about
2	71 percent of the total
3	DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, I didn't
4	notice that.
5	MR. BARTON: Yes.
6	DR. MAKHIJANI: I missed that.
7	MR. BARTON: If you reopen the file
8	now, it will have the correct numbers in
9	there.
10	DR. MAKHIJANI: That's why I don't
11	want you to download that.
12	(Laughter.)
13	MR. BARTON: Yes. I certainly
14	apologize for that, the short notice and
15	everything.
16	But you can see that for all
17	workers it was fairly comparable to the
18	RadSafe workers, which had 77 percent positive
19	samples. It got a little bit lower for the
20	welders and the miners. We only had one entry
21	for plutonium that we could identify with a

wireman. It was a whole body count, which in

this database, when there was a whole body count entry, there was never a result attached to it. It was just a blank entry.

Arjun, did you want to comment?

DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. Let me kind of make one comment.

This database, this analysis is different in one very important way than our previous analysis. Our previous 120 took a random sample of 20 workers in each of six job categories. So we had a number of workers who have no bioassay monitoring, and NIOSH wrote in their evaluation report about a third of NTS workers had some internal bioassay data.

And we found -- I don't remember. We calculated a percentage, but we found that many workers had bioassay data and many workers had no bioassay data.

In this set of claimants you're looking at, 144, and the subsets for these six workers, these are all workers who are preselected in this database who actually all

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have bioassay data. So we have no workers in this database who did not have bioassay data, but may have had exposure potential.

We haven't had time to go back and sort our previous database and eliminate people who did not have bioassay data and make that old 120 comparable to this, whatever it is, maybe close to 100 that are in this database.

So it is not fully comparable, but I did some back-of-the-envelope work with this. The number of samples per worker are broadly comparable, and the pattern of samples is broadly comparable.

If you go to page 2, which is actually in some ways the most important page, where it says, plutonium data samples by period, you will see that in the 60s and 70s there were several categories of workers who had no samples or almost no samples.

Most of the plutonium sampling, except for RadSafe, was focused in the 1980s,

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and then, to a lesser extent -- yes, except for RadSafe, most of the plutonium sampling was focused in the 1980s.

If you go to the spreadsheets, please don't open it now because the spreadsheets are very big and huge, and I will go through it in a minute.

But if you look at that, you will see that the exposures tended to be higher in the earlier years, where there were more tests; there were more events. So you would expect that the exposures would tend to be higher in the earlier years.

So the time, we had previously selected four time periods to look at. One of the things that this new data showed us was that, while you can argue about where the cutoff should be for the time periods, that it is very important to look at this in time periods. You can't just say we have a lot of data and most of the data will be from the 1980s and then use that to reconstruct doses.

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I will go through those spreadsheets after a 1 2 while. Do you want to comment? 3 Sure, just to kind of 4 MR. BARTON: expand on what Arjun is saying with the 1980s, 5 if you look at the security guard category, 6 almost 90 percent of the samples we identified 7 for them were from 1981 and onward. 8 other categories, you can also see that the 9 10 percentages are just much higher in the 1980s, and I am not sure if that is just how the 11 database is put together. 12 13 One thing we haven't been able to investigate yet is, how complete is this 14 15 actual database. 16 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, we know it is incomplete. Joyce actually looked at 17 little bit. 18 19 Joyce, do you want to give us a couple of examples? Joyce? 20 MS. LIPSZTEIN: Hello. 21 Yes. Now can you hear me? 22

1 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, thank you. MS. LIPSZTEIN: Okay, because I was 2 on mute. 3 just compared the data that we 4 had from the 120 records that we have from 5 6 claims. I saw that there were some people 7 that we analyzed and that these people, those the 8 workers, were not on new electronic database for plutonium. So this is not a 9 10 complete report because we didn't look at all the claimants from NTS. 11 But from the 120, for example, in 12 13 1965, there was one worker that was analyzed from June until October '65. He had 18 14 15 measurements, and there is no data on this 16 worker on the new electronic database. Also, the data from 65 goes up to June 1965, when 17 only the 120 database that we had -- we had 18 19 data until October 65. So this means that it is incomplete. 20 DR. MAKHIJANI: We fairly 21 are comfortable with the idea that this database 22

1	does not represent all workers who have
2	bioassay data, but we don't know how
3	incomplete this database is.
4	DR. NETON: That is interesting
5	because that is not what the site that
6	provided the data is portraying it as.
7	DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, we have one
8	example of a person who was pretty frequently
9	monitored in 65, and none of those bioassays
10	have
11	DR. NETON: That surprises me.
12	DR. MAKHIJANI: But we have not had
13	time to put a fine point on it.
14	I did ask Bob to sort how many of
15	the claimants are in this database. And what
16	did you find, 20?
17	MR. BARTON: It was 20 percent.
18	DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, about 20,
19	maybe 22 percent, something. Roughly, 20
20	percent of the claimants are in this database,
21	but the claimants are, more or less,
22	representative of how many were monitored.

You would expect to find more of the claimants 1 2 in this database. I think that we should go to our 3 120 and sort that. It won't be hard to see 4 how many of those 120 are in this electronic 5 database, so we can get some idea. 6 I am not sure how much 7 DR. NETON: extra work needs to be done. If it's not 8 appropriate, it's not appropriate. 9 10 DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. I mean it depends on how detailed a report from us the 11 Working Group wants in order for the Board to 12 have its comfort level in considering the 13 This is completely up to the Working 14 matter. 15 Group, the Board, Ted, and what you feel. 16 I am just putting stuff out there, not that I think necessarily it should be done 17 because our conclusion is pretty firm, as I 18 19 will come to it. Arjun, you just made 20 MEMBER MUNN: statement that I'm wondering about your 21 basis for. 22

1 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. 2 MEMBER MUNN: You said that you would expect more than 20 percent of 3 the database to be claimants. 4 I am wondering why you would expect that. 5 6 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, no, Ι no. 7 would expect more than 20 percent of the be in the database if 8 claimants to the claimants are broadly representative of people 9 Then about a third of 10 who worked at NTS. them --11 MEMBER MUNN: But we don't know --12 13 DR. MAKHIJANI: We don't know that. MEMBER MUNN: 14 No. 15 DR. MAKHIJANI: This is something, 16 if there is a large number of claimants, this is something you would normally statistically 17 expect, that if you have a large enough 18 19 sample, they should be representative of the whole population. And it is something that 20 NIOSH has also kind of relied on in other 21

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contexts, right, Jim?

1	So I am not saying that it should
2	be so. I'm just saying I suspect that, based
3	on what Joyce has told you and based on
4	NIOSH's count previously, that about a third -
5	- I presume a third of the claimants had had
6	bioassay data, that you should find more than
7	20 percent of the claimants in this database.
8	But I don't know for a fact what
9	the reasons are. That is part of the reason I
10	would suggest that, as a very simple exercise,
11	we actually
12	DR. NETON: Was that a match based
13	on Social Security number?
14	MR. BARTON: Yes.
15	DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, that we
16	actually complete this exercise because it
17	will just take a couple of hours or three
18	hours.
19	It will kind of, since we have
20	raised the question of the completeness of
21	this database I think there are also how

many workers are in this database? Do you

1	have a rough count?
2	MR. BARTON: Let me see if I can
3	get that for you.
4	MEMBER MUNN: Originally, we were
5	told 125,000.
6	DR. MAKHIJANI: That is the number
7	of samples
8	MEMBER MUNN: Samples.
9	DR. MAKHIJANI: in the SEC
10	period.
11	MEMBER MUNN: But I saw the number
12	somewhere.
13	MR. BARTON: It was about 15,000
14	workers.
15	DR. MAKHIJANI: Fifteen thousand
16	workers.
17	I mean I don't know how
18	incomplete we have an idea that there are
19	some workers who are not in this database.
20	But it may be fairly complete. It may not be.
21	I don't have an opinion on that at this time.
22	MEMBER CLAWSON: Arjun, you made a

comment a little bit earlier that it showed the timeframe of 1991 and 1992, that, you know, there was more information. That goes to show the exact same thing, though, that we have found at all the other sites; that as the RadCon practices had improved, and so forth -- remember, we call it the pre-Tiger Team or after-Tiger Team -- all of a sudden, we start to see a lot more broader spectrum of people being monitored and so forth like this. This, basically, shows the exact same thing.

DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, yes. We haven't looked at why. I mean we don't know where that cutoff is, but it is a real knee in the curve, number of workers who were monitored, and what that exact date is.

But in this sorting, it definitely looks like the monitoring went up drastically in the 1980s sometime.

MR. BARTON: Well, if we move on to the next chart, it will show you the number of workers sampled for plutonium by year. So, in

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1	that one, you can definitely see, as the 80s
2	come around, the number of workers who are
3	submitting samples goes up.
4	DR. MAKHIJANI: Right.
5	MEMBER CLAWSON: There it is.
6	DR. MAURO: Which file is that?
7	MR. BARTON: It will be on the next
8	page or page 3.
9	DR. NETON: Part of that could be
10	the amount of activity going on at the site.
11	I mean if it's got more work going on, more
12	shots, more
13	DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, the number of
14	tests, I think the number of tests overall in
15	the 1980s were lower, but I think in the first
16	part of the 1980s there were more tests, and
17	then it tapered off. So we haven't looked at
18	it year by year.
19	MEMBER MUNN: There is probably a
20	budgetary factor in there, too, if you want to
21	really think about it.
	1

CHAIR PRESLEY: There's a few test

1 bands in there, too. That has a lot to do 2 with it. DR. MAKHIJANI: Do you want to go 3 over the rank order? Then I can take over. 4 MR. BARTON: 5 Sure. Okay. If we can move on to the next chart there, we show a 6 7 rank order --DR. MAKHIJANI: On page 2. Also on 8 page 2. 9 10 MR. BARTON: As you can see here, we have several different job categories. 11 yellow line there represents all the workers 12 13 in the database. They follow along fairly closely, but we can see that your RadSafe 14 15 group, in general, is a little bit higher than 16 the overall worker average, and in this case security guards is a little bit higher on 17 certain points in the graph. Once you get 18 19 above about the 70th percentile, the security quard concentration kind of falls off a little 20 bit. 21

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1	there that were showing higher concentrations
2	in urine at various points, especially when
3	compared to the all worker average, and in
4	some cases compared to the RadSafe and the
5	security guards as well.
6	DR. MAKHIJANI: Now one very
7	important thing about limitation of this chart
8	is that this mushes all the periods together.
9	This does not tell you anything about what
10	happened when.
11	Actually, if you can go to the
12	Excel file and open the spreadsheet that says,
13	plutonium data scrubbed for chart
14	MR. BARTON: Before we get into
15	this, let me just explain what that actually
16	means.
17	DR. NETON: Could I ask just a
18	question? On this rank order, where is the
19	detection limit on this?
20	DR. MAKHIJANI: The detection limit
21	is 1.5 times 10 Joyce, what is the
22	detection limit?

1	DR. NETON: It's all years. So
2	maybe it has changed over time.
3	DR. MAKHIJANI: Right.
4	DR. NETON: But just to get a rough
5	idea
6	DR. MAKHIJANI: If I remember what
7	Joyce said yesterday during our conference
8	call, it was 1.5 times 10 to the minus 11, is
9	what is in the TBD.
10	DR. NETON: And, remember, they had
11	a practice of reporting all data. They didn't
12	censor their data to any extent.
13	DR. MAKHIJANI: Right.
14	DR. NETON: So you have a lot of
15	data that are below the detection.
16	DR. MAKHIJANI: That's right.
17	DR. NETON: You really have
18	several I've always felt there's a normal
19	distribution about the non-detectables layered
20	on top of the log-normal distribution. So I
21	think you've really kind of got two things
22	going on here.

1	DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes.
2	CHAIR PRESLEY: Let me ask a
3	question. This is Bob Presley.
4	Where you have
5	MS. LIPSZTEIN: Jim?
6	CHAIR PRESLEY: Go ahead, Joyce.
7	MS. LIPSZTEIN: My phone was on
8	mute, so I was trying to answer.
9	From 77 to 87, the detection limit
10	was 5E to the minus 11 microcuries per mL.
11	Then from 88 to 2000, it was 1E to the minus
12	11 microcuries per centimeter probably, mL.
13	The problem is from 61 to 76, we
14	have a limit of detection in microcuries per
15	sample instead of per volume. So we don't
16	know how to deal with it.
17	
	CHAIR PRESLEY: Okay. Thank you,
18	CHAIR PRESLEY: Okay. Thank you, Joyce.
18 19	
	Joyce.
19	Joyce.  DR. MAKHIJANI: Joyce, did you say

1	the occupational internal dosimetry.
2	DR. NETON: So it is up around the
3	median value of the rank order, which is
4	interesting.
5	CHAIR PRESLEY: Question: each one
6	of the little dots, triangles, you've got one
7	area here where the laborers are very, very
8	high. Is that one person or is that
9	DR. MAKHIJANI: One sample.
10	CHAIR PRESLEY: That's one sample?
11	Okay. That's what I wanted to make sure.
12	That's one sample.
13	DR. MAKHIJANI: Laborers had only
14	five or six non-zero samples, and there were
15	very few samples all together. So you don't
16	expect a lot of
17	CHAIR PRESLEY: Right. I just
18	wondered if that was one or if that was a
19	number.
20	DR. MAKHIJANI: If you actually had
21	many samples for these workers' categories,
22	then we would be in a fairly different

situation, at least in regard to plutonium.

CHAIR PRESLEY: Okay.

MEMBER SCHOFIELD: I've got question. Going back to the dust loading, particularly those people who were working out in the piler areas of the facility, it seems like the dust loading out there could be substantially higher if they are trying to the coworker model and trying look at calculate the amount of dust these people might be exposed to versus the people who were up near the tunnels, which usually is around the mesas, in that area.

Can they actually break those workers out? Or is there any way of knowing?

DR. NETON: No, that's one of the problems. That is one reason we abandoned this soil mass-loading model, is I didn't feel, we didn't feel that we could partition those workers to any large extent.

Just to elaborate a little bit on what John was saying, originally, we proposed

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that mass-loading model for all workers. SC&A's comment was that it appeared to be on the high side, and we agreed.

We went back to this environmental sampling model. Then the Lynn Anspaugh report questioned that for people who were engaged in activities that disturb soils. In words, if you were just sort of walking around the site, maybe the environmental model works. But if you are out there with a bulldozer or a grader or something, and you're kicking up dust, that is when we had proposed maybe this mass-loading model for that category actually workers, for people who are in contaminated areas disturbing soils.

But, at the end of the day, we couldn't figure out a way to partition those versus the coworker model ones. So that is why we ended up where we are.

DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. I mean, just to supplement what Jim said now and in his earlier presentation, the nature of the work

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at the Site is that, if you don't know who was doing what when, the whole matter becomes very difficult or impossible.

MEMBER SCHOFIELD: I would think in those areas where the pilers were, there people would, even just being in that area would have a much higher, a substantially higher probability of dust loading, and high dust loading, because there's no vegetation to hold that soil down when you get a dust level going through there.

DR. MAKHIJANI: Also, you will actually see some -get off when we plutonium, where there are almost no samples for laborers and wiremen, and so on, when we go to other categories where these groups of samples, workers have some more we will actually see a pattern like that indicated, but we don't have enough samples to make any definite opinion.

DR. NETON: And again, you really don't know whether these are incident samples

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or routine samples.

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DR. MAKHIJANI: That's right.

DR. MAURO: The model I have in my head about it is I make a clean distinction between the exposures that people get not when there was a test, on the ground test. You know, we're in the post-1962 time period now. And let's make believe there were no more tests. Let's say there were no tests starting in 63, on the ground or otherwise. Okay?

And the only thing you really had to do now was say what type of internal exposures workers might have gotten who were out there doing things. You know, no tests now.

Well, in my mind, the resuspension factor or function will work. And you could reconstruct what is the upper bound inhalation by going with the 5 milligrams, but that's not what we have. What we actually have is that work is going on, but superimposed on that are these underground

tests.

Now the way I see these underground tests in my head is that, okay, the test occurs. Some RadSafe workers come in, perhaps wearing respiratory protection, go in to check if there's a problem. Before they let the rest of the crew in to do the work they do, they come in, they check it.

Let's say they give it a green light. We can have people go in. In my mind, I could even envision that maybe many of the RadSafe workers were wearing respiratory protection, maybe not. I don't know.

Then they sort of step aside. They have done their job, and now a team comes in behind them. Now we are talking a controlled area now. It is not just a general area. This is the area where the test took place, and they are doing their job.

Now these could be welders, carpenters, various trades, crafts. They come in and are doing the work that needs to be

done, which could last, I guess, several weeks at that location.

Now, during that time period, I'm envisioning that -- and this comes, to some extent, from information that John Funk provided. He said, well, there could have been some leakage. Sometimes leakage occurs later. Sometimes there's subsidence, where some radionuclides could escape.

Also, he had mentioned that there were also -- and this is all out in the Flats now -- there's also these coaxial cables that ran down that were true coaxial cables with an opening before they were plugged.

So the model I have in my head is that there are these scenarios one could envision that the crafts and trades and other specialists that come in after the RadSafe workers, working at the site, where they, in theory, could have experienced some internal exposures that were not experienced by the RadSafe workers.

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1	So it creates a situation where
2	there are questions whether the RadSafe
3	workers truly were the ones that had the
4	highest potential for exposure. In other
5	words, that is sort of the model I have in my
6	head as I go through this material.
7	And that's why I guess the sense
8	being that it is possible that welders,
9	laborers could very well have experienced
10	exposures that could have been higher than the
11	RadSafe workers. I'm not saying they were.
12	We have no way to really know that. But there
13	is certain reason to think they could have
14	been, and that's the picture that emerges for
15	me.
16	MEMBER MUNN: That is always the
17	final question, the difference between
18	possibility and probability.
19	DR. MAURO: Well, we have some
20	data.
21	DR. MAKHIJANI: As I said, we have

some more data than we did before.

22

Before we

idea. 1 had no Bob, can we open that 2 spreadsheet? 3 MR. BARTON: Sure, yes. 4 DR. MAKHIJANI: If you go to that spreadsheet, the 5 plutonium that one 6 plutonium data scrubbed for chart, and open 7 that --And let MR. BARTON: me just 8 explain what is meant by the word scrubbed. 9 10 You couldn't just simply take this data and throw it in a chart and expect it to tell you 11 what is really going on there. There had to 12 13 be some work for it for samples that couldn't be converted to microcuries per cc. 14 There 15 there that would be simply were some 16 microcuries that we didn't have а sample volume with it to be able to normalize it to 17 microcuries per cc. 18 19 So those samples that I couldn't correlate to that particular unit were removed 20

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scrubbing, so to speak, only applies to the rank order charts. All the other counting statistics we were looking at earlier include all of the samples.

Other things I had to do was, for instance, remove the whole body scans because they were blank and not relatable to a urine sample. Also, if a sample was just simply blank, it didn't have a less-than or nodetects tag next to it, that was removed. If it did have a less-than tag, those samples were always either less than zero or less than a blank cell. So, if it has a less-than tag next to it, it was entered as zero for the purposes of rank ordering.

So that is what is meant by scrubbing of the data, just so all the samples in there are relatable and indicate a urine sample in microcurie per cc.

DR. MAKHIJANI: I just wanted you to look at this for one reason only. I mean some massive numbers. There's almost 8,000

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rows in here.

But if you look at the Column G, that is the date of the sample. If you look at Column K, that is the rank order, not in percentage, but in fraction. And if you look at Column L, that is the value in microcuries per cc. Obviously, a lot of the initial values are just zeroes.

If you scroll down rapidly, you will see -- and you have to scroll down very rapidly because there are lots and lots of zeroes --

MEMBER MUNN: There sure are.

DR. MAKHIJANI: -- you will be able to see that the lower values, as you scroll down, are generally in the 80s and 90s. You know, you have ones that go up to 1.6 times 10 to the minus 11, which is below the detection limit. You are now at a rank order of 25, 26, 30 percent.

This is partly because there were more samples taken in the 80s and 90s, but,

1	also, as I will show you, the lower end of the
2	numbers were in the 80s and 90s.
3	So, if you scroll down
4	DR. MAURO: Just give me a line
5	number where we should be.
6	DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, I'm at near
7	3,000.
8	DR. MAURO: Oh, okay. So you're
9	way down. Okay.
10	DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. Well, because
11	it goes very slowly, most of the samples,
12	almost all of the initial samples are from the
13	80s and 90s until you get well above 50
14	percent. So you have to go very deep down.
15	You know, there are occasional
16	of course, there are samples from the 60s and
17	70s that are also below detection limit or
18	zero.
19	But now, if you go to the very
20	bottom of the database, in the 7,000s, more
21	than the 7,000s, line numbers like 7700
22	downward, you will see that the I'm at

1	7700, yes, 7700. You'll go down. You'll see
2	like from 7720, 21, you will see very, very
3	many more samples from the 60s that are in the
4	higher percentile of readings.
5	Harry, actually, had done this by
6	period. Right, Harry? Are you on the line?
7	MR. CHMELYNSKI: Yes, I'm here,
8	Arjun.
9	DR. MAKHIJANI: And Harry worked up
10	these plutonium data. They are not ready for
11	even sort of semi-primetime here.
12	But you can see that most of the
13	high readings are concentrated in the early
14	periods. And this is why you actually need to
15	parse this data by period, and you can't just
16	aggregate the whole data and say, I can
17	construct a coworker model out of this.
18	DR. NETON: I have always
19	constructed coworker models by time period.
20	DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, right. You
21	know, I'm not saying that you haven't done
22	that. I'm just illustrating that in this case

there are actually very dramatic differences between the place where we have the mass of data and the place where we have most of the exposure.

And that is the only reason.

Because now we have been looking at this plutonium data chart in the Word file, which has no time periods in it. But Harry actually did a little bit of analysis corresponding to time period. Right, Harry?

MR. CHMELYNSKI: Yes, Arjun. I tried to do what I would assume NIOSH would do if they were to build a coworker model, which was to go into the same data you are looking at for plutonium and to separate it out by decade and by job category.

When I did that, it turns out that in the early years really all you have to look at are RadSafe workers. Later, there's other groups that enter in, but mainly they are the security workers in the 80s. Between those two groups, that is three-quarters of the

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data.

Now, when I tried to fit log-normal distributions, the first thing you see is the distributions are very irregularly shaped. They have very long tails, in particular, in the RadSafe, in the early years, most likely due to incident data being defined in the database with no identifiers as to why the samples were taken.

When I do fit a log-normal distribution, even though they don't fit very well, the numbers in the 60s ended up being somewhere in the neighborhood of -- well, if you looked at the 95th percentile, it was in the neighborhood of about 400 times higher than in any of the other decades for the RadSafe people, which is the only group where we have data in all the decades to look at.

The security folks had about the same numbers as the RadSafe people for the 95th percentile when you look in the data in the decades where we had data for the security

people, which was after 1980. 1 2 And the other groups, there were just too few samples to really fit log-normal 3 distributions that you could depend on. 4 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. So this is 5 6 just sort of to put a fine point on something. 7 I agree with Jim. I mean NIOSH normally does it by year even, I think, when they estimate 8 doses, not by decade, if possible. 9 10 And just to kind of illustrate the limitations of this chart, so you can actually 11 go from this chart to a coworker model, 12 13 that is plutonium. I would like to illustrate, just quickly go through the other 14 15 three files on tritium. 16 See, if you open the tritium Word file -- I don't think 17 we need any more spreadsheets. 18 19 DR. MAURO: There's a scrubbed one? 20 DR. MAKHIJANI: No, no, not The Word file. spreadsheet. It's in the 21

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Working Group --

1	DR. MAURO: Oh, I've got to back
2	out of here. Okay.
3	DR. MAKHIJANI: No, no, no, you
4	have to go there.
5	DR. MAURO: I've got go here, okay.
6	DR. MAKHIJANI: Go to the Working
7	Group subdirectory.
8	DR. MAURO: Got it.
9	DR. MAKHIJANI: And you can open
10	the tritium data.
11	DR. MAURO: Back home again.
12	DR. MAKHIJANI: And you see there
13	are more tritium data, especially in the miner
14	category. Miners did have a fair amount of
15	tritium monitoring.
16	I don't think we found any quality
17	problems with the tritium-monitoring data
18	before or now?
19	MS. LIPSZTEIN: No.
20	DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay.
21	DR. MAURO: I am sorry to
22	interrupt, but, Joyce, we started talking

1	about, a little earlier, possible quality
2	problems related to the plutonium data, but we
3	really never got there. I mean I guess I
4	don't
5	DR. MAKHIJANI: Let me just go over
6	the quantity issues, and then I will get to
7	the work that Joyce
8	DR. MAURO: Okay. Sure. Okay.
9	DR. MAKHIJANI: for a fuller
10	view of the quality.
11	So, if you go to page 2 of the
12	tritium data, you will see that for miners we
13	actually have samples in all periods. And we
14	have more samples for our other worker
15	categories except welders and wiremen. Up to
16	1970, we really don't have significant data.
17	We don't have much data for welders and
18	wiremen. We have a little more for laborers.
19	If you go to the chart on page 4,
20	you will see this is very different than the
21	plutonium chart. Clearly, miners had more

exposure, at least if you leave out the

2 other worker categories, including RadSafe. Now this may be partly because it 3 is incident-driven and they were going in a 4 particular time and they were being monitored 5 6 immediately after they had exposure because tritium monitoring would be very sensitive to 7 8 that. This, again, raises the question 9 10 how much do you know about what monitoring regime was and what can you say 11 about dose reconstruction. 12 13 But here you can see there are three, four worker categories where much of 14 15 the -- if something is to the right of the 16 RadSafe, which is the magenta -- would you call that color magenta? 17 MEMBER MUNN: Yes, that's magenta. 18 19 DR. MAKHIJANI: Thank you, Wanda. MEMBER MUNN: 20 Yes. (Laughter.) 21 DR. Ιf 22 MAKHIJANI: you go

periods, miners had more exposure than all

horizontally across the chart, anything that is to the right of the magenta line would indicate that, for that cumulative probability, that that group of workers is more exposed than RadSafe.

So you can see that there are a number of categories of workers that were, overall, more exposed to tritium or at least had higher -- more precisely, we should say they had higher monitoring results.

So, in this case, you have a little bit more of a systematic indication that, for tritium at least, RadSafe was not the most exposed category, if you used monitoring data as a proxy for exposure, which is the only thing we can do, actually. If you go to gamma data, which is the next Word file --

MEMBER MUNN: But security, on the other hand --

DR. MAKHIJANI: Security, yes, and that's the other thing to look at, Wanda, you're quite right.

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1	Security the samples from
2	security indicate less exposure, at least
3	lower samples, depending on when they were
4	monitored. Now, if they were on a routine
5	monitoring regime, they might have been
6	exposed, but
7	DR. NETON: It is a little
8	confusing because that is all-years aggregate.
9	DR. MAKHIJANI: It is all-years
10	aggregate. We actually have the year-by-year
11	data, and in order to see when this
12	happened yes, security will be dominated by
13	the 80s. So, to do a security worker exposure
14	comparison with the other categories, you
15	really have to eliminate everything except the
16	1980s to do that.
17	MEMBER CLAWSON: Well, what I find
18	interesting is that the welders is almost
19	pretty close to what the RadSafe was on it.
20	DR. MAKHIJANI: Wiremen, yes.
21	MEMBER CLAWSON: The welders. The
22	welders are the black triangles.

1	MEMBER MUNN: The welders are very
2	different than the welders
3	DR. MAKHIJANI: Are you in tritium
4	or gamma?
5	MEMBER MUNN: Tritium. We're in
6	tritium.
7	DR. NETON: I guess the point,
8	though, that I was making earlier is that we
9	couldn't tell the coworker model is really
10	to substitute data for people who are
11	monitored not monitored, but should have
12	been. So it is a little different
13	distribution.
14	If you believe that all the highest
15	workers were monitored to begin with, you
16	could establish that, which we couldn't
17	here
18	DR. MAKHIJANI: Right, we couldn't.
19	DR. NETON: Then the coworker model
20	would only fill in for those who were not
21	monitored but should have been, but were not
22	among the highest exposed workers.

DR. MAKHIJANI: That's right.

DR. NETON: So that's a little --

DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. We're just reinforcing that conclusion of yours. I mean the bottom line is we agree with you -- but we tried to kind of make sure that we had gone in enough detail in the data to be comfortable in our own minds that your paper -- that we could agree with it or say partly or we need to do more work, or we don't agree with it. We just wanted to be sure that whatever we said was clearly done.

If you go to the gamma Word file, you will see the similar pattern. There is more data on gamma than for plutonium. More worker categories have data. That is on page 1. So you have more claimants represented in the gamma.

We agree with Jim that this data, even if it were complete, would be very hard to interpret and do anything with. Just proceeding along the quantity of data and

taking the data at face value, and then if you go by period, you see, again, that RadSafe was monitored in all periods, but most of the monitoring is focused in the latter periods.

If you go to page 3, 4, you will see a comparison. And you see a similar pattern to tritium here, except it is not miners who are the right-most. This time it is laborers and welders.

This, again, has the limitation that you are mushing all periods together. So security looks like they have at least potential, but you shouldn't exposure it that way. This is because interpret security data are focused on the 80s, and the others are more evenly distributed.

So this, again, indicates that, you know, RadSafe was everywhere. They may be convenient to monitor, as Jim said. We think that is probably what happened.

We agree with Jim that they were monitoring people and they were monitoring

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1	people who were convenient to monitor to
2	maintain some kind of regime and protocol, but
3	not necessarily monitoring the people who were
4	most exposed.
5	And data is a similar pattern.
6	MR. BARTON: Arjun, if I could just
7	point to one thing?
8	DR. MAKHIJANI: Sure.
9	MR. BARTON: When we are talking
10	about the gamma graph, if you look at that
11	yellow line, which is the all-worker rank
12	order, from about the 50th percentile onward,
13	the all-worker concentration here was higher
14	than the RadSafe category.
15	DR. MAKHIJANI: So the average of
16	all workers was higher.
17	MEMBER MUNN: Well, of course, you
18	have a much larger number of individuals in
19	the laborers, welders, wiremen, miners
20	category
21	DR. MAKHIJANI: That's right.
22	MEMBER MUNN: in the gamma

DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. So that's what --

MEMBER MUNN: -- than you do in the others. So that larger number of individuals gives you, would be expected to give you a quite different picture.

The question then arises as to whether or not the gamma exposure records are not the most reliable and the most informative.

DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, they are informative in the sense that they indicate that RadSafe wasn't necessarily the most exposed. So you can actually build a coworker model out of the group that has the richest amount of data for all periods, and we agree that they were monitored in all periods.

But, with gamma, you have this problem of how you are going to interpret that data with beta and gross fission products.

Unless you know the time of the monitoring and the reason for the monitoring, you are not

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1	going to be able to interpret this data to do
2	any dose reconstruction with. I mean we agree
3	with Jim on that. And we did explicitly
4	discuss that yesterday.
5	Joyce is on the line.
6	Unfortunately, Rich Leggett could not be on
7	the line, but he did send me a written summary
8	of his opinion. He would agree with NIOSH
9	that this gamma data are such that I
10	actually have it open on my regular computer,
11	and I can read what he said.
12	But, broadly, he agreed that this
13	is not a dataset that is easily manipulable to
14	get a reliable dose estimate out of it.
15	MEMBER ROESSLER: Could you send us
16	Dr. Leggett's report?
17	DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, Dr. Leggett -
18	- as I said, this is not ready for primetime.
19	It is informal conversations between us.
20	I did check with him whether I
21	could represent him, and he did send me kind
22	of an informal thing to guide me. Dr. Leggett

will be involved in finishing this product, if 1 2 the Working Group wants us to do something. And, yes, he explicitly authorized 3 4 me to say this. MR. HINNEFELD: I should have asked 5 this earlier, but what are the units, MI per 6 7 cc? Microcuries per cc, MR. BARTON: 8 9 yes. 10 MEMBER SCHOFIELD: I would assume where they are going back in after a test 11 shot, going back into these areas, that if it 12 13 is typical of most facilities, you have a pool of RadSafe workers. When you're going back 14 15 in, you're going to have these laborers, these 16 miners, whatever they are going back into that area with. There's only going to be x number 17 of RadSafe workers at a shot. 18 19 So you've got this large pool of RadSafe workers, but a lot of them aren't even 20 involved directly at that time. 21 They're

rotated in and out, depending on where their

work area is for the day.

That is going to also bias these numbers because you are going to say, well, yes, they were all monitored, but how many were actually there when they were going back in or doing a drill-back or anything else?

We know you don't have a one-on-one ratio of RadSafe workers to any other kind of workers.

MEMBER MUNN: No, but based purely on the conversations we have had with workers themselves, and that we have heard from them, these folks seem to have a tendency to work on a project and not be quite as controlled by shifts as many of the other sites seem to have been.

They gave us the impression, many of the workers gave us the impression, when we talked to them, that once they went out to work on this job, they stayed there. There wasn't a lot of --

MEMBER SCHOFIELD: No, I'm saying

they do. It's just, when you look at the numbers of RadSafe workers in this pool, I mean they have various jobs, and we know some of them sat at the entrance to these tunnels when they were going back in.

MEMBER MUNN: Yes.

MEMBER SCHOFIELD: And you might have 50-60 people sitting in that tunnel working. You might have two or three RadSafe workers in the tunnel with them. Then you have one or two sitting on the outside to monitor people as they come out.

But those pools typically are rotated around. They are not assigned to a tunnel the whole time. So you've got this large pool of RadSafe workers who are, obviously, moved where they are needed or where they're suspected they are going to be needed.

Then you have these miners and these other people who are going, at least until they got in whatever they need to do at

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that particular drill-back or re-entry, until they are done, they are going to be there on a daily basis.

So that would bias the total amount of exposure these RadSafe workers are going to get. Some of them are going to have higher; some οf them are going to have depending on the particular shop they are going back into. But they are not going to be assigned to, typically, a RadSafe pool, and assigned to where they are needed. It is not like a facility like Rocky or somewhere that they are assigned to a building.

At Nevada, I mean even by the pictures, you can see some of them within the tunnels in protective gear; others sat outside the tunnels to monitor those coming back out.

MEMBER CLAWSON: This is Brad.

The bottom line, though, it comes down to, just as the claimants have said, that by using the RadSafe as supposedly the highest exposed, that's not the fact. And it has been

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DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. The caveat to that is that should be regarded as indicative in this data because of its problems, that we don't know why this was done. But, certainly, this data indicates if you are going to do a coworker model, you cannot use RadSafe as the reference population. You can't do that.

the other You on hand, can, conclude that there was some other group that So that also, because different groups was. emerge in these different monitoring datasets, so there is a different group that emerges when you look at tritium and a different group that emerges when you looked at gamma, you don't actually have a consistent pattern that emerges that you can say, okay, I'm going to use this.

Just to clarify a little bit, in regard to the second point that Jim made in his paper, which was NIOSH identified data gaps exist in the electronically available

database, and specific analysis for fission products are not available to NIOSH, and given that fission products were the most likely source of potential exposure and make-up fission products, source term was project- and time-dependent, this brings into question the ability to reconstruct а representative distribution of NTS fission products. This is what is in the NIOSH report.

As a preliminary response, Dr. Leggett asked to me say that we have generally agreed with this, although, you know, there are situations where you can use mixed fission products to extract dose information. I just wanted to put that caveat, but, in general, he was in agreement with you on this.

The data beta are t.he same. Yesterday, we had a conference call to review Bob's analysis, also review the analysis that Harry has done. And I, actually, because Dr. fresh eyes the new Leggett was and respected by everyone, I asked him

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1	whether he thought the bottom line in Jim's
2	paper, whether he would agree with that, that
3	looking at this electronic database and the
4	other reports that we had done, and all the
5	analysis, admittedly, he only had a week to
6	look at this, what was his opinion of the
7	NIOSH conclusions that you could not
8	reconstruct internal doses, and he agreed with
9	the NIOSH conclusion.
10	Then I did a poll. Joyce is on the
11	line, so let her speak for herself.
12	MS. LIPSZTEIN: Yes. Are you
13	talking about my personal opinion or?
14	DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, your vote
15	yesterday, when we went around. Rich Leggett
16	agreed
17	MS. LIPSZTEIN: Yes.
18	DR. MAKHIJANI: basically, with
19	the NIOSH position.
20	MS. LIPSZTEIN: Yes, he agreed,
21	basically, with the NIOSH position, yes.
22	DR. MAKHIJANI: And you did, too,

1	right?
2	MS. LIPSZTEIN: Yes, I do, too.
3	DR. MAKHIJANI: And, Bob, you
4	scrubbed the numbers. Do you want to throw
5	your opinion in the pot?
6	MR. BARTON: I'll let those more
7	brilliant than I make that decision.
8	(Laughter.)
9	DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. All right.
10	Basically, all of us agreed that we
11	have enough information. When I went into
12	this, I didn't know what was in this database.
13	My main object was to look at whether Jim's
14	analysis, whether we agreed with it.
15	I also wanted to look at whether
16	the patterns in this 125,000 samples
17	reproduced what we had done before. Because
18	if it had not reproduced what we had done
19	before, then I couldn't have given you a
20	conclusion today because then I would have
21	said: give me more time; I can't tell you.

it very strongly reinforced

But

1	what we had done before. Other than more data
2	points which indicate RadSafe was not the most
3	high you can't use RadSafe for a coworker
4	model, and we are more sure about that now
5	there's nothing really new that emerged from
6	our previous analysis of this, and that makes
7	me very comfortable in the conclusion we all
8	arrived at, that the NIOSH recommendation is
9	technically sound.
10	CHAIR PRESLEY: Can we stop right
11	here? Let's go take a break, no more than 10
12	minutes. Be back in here at 15 after. We are
13	going to try to break again around noon. Some
14	of us have to check out and go get our bags.
15	(Whereupon, the above-entitled
16	matter went off the record at 11:02 a.m. and
17	resumed at 11:14 a.m.)
18	MR. KATZ: We are coming back
19	online.
20	Let me just check to see, someone
21	on the phone, that we have you again.
22	CHAIR PRESLEY: John, are you

1	there?
2	MR. KATZ: Somebody say, hey, from
3	the phone.
4	MS. ADAMS: Hey.
5	MR. KATZ: Okay, great. Thank you.
6	DR. MAKHIJANI: Ted, could I say
7	just say one more thing?
8	MR. KATZ: Of course.
9	DR. MAKHIJANI: One caveat to our
10	analysis is we were looking at the SEC period.
11	So this is what we did. We didn't examine
12	the post-SEC statements, the 10 CFR 835
13	statement, because it goes beyond the SEC
14	period, and we weren't asked to do that.
15	So we limited ourselves to
16	basically examining whether the bottom line on
17	the NIOSH paper, our previous analysis, the
18	nature of this dataset so there's a lot of
19	data that goes 1993 and beyond, and we have
20	not looked at that.
21	I mean we would be happy to, if you
22	want us to, but we haven't done it so far. I

1	just wanted to make that clear.
2	MR. BARTON: Arjun, could I also
3	make a comment that goes to whether this
4	database is actually complete or not?
5	We had said that, when we looked to
6	see how many claimants were actually included
7	in these files, we had about 20 percent. From
8	the SEC evaluation report, we see that, from
9	the DOE-supplied records, that the hard-copy
10	records are not, because you have 32.8 percent
11	had some sort of internal dosimetry data. So,
12	if it were a complete electronic database, we
13	would expect to see something near that
14	number, and, in fact, we are about 10 percent
15	lower than that.
16	DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. I mean I
17	indicated that earlier. We are not sure, but
18	it seems like that, and we can certainly
19	verify that, if necessary.
20	CHAIR PRESLEY: Okay. Do you all
21	have anything else to add?
22	DR. MAKHIJANI: Let me ask our

1	team.
2	Joyce? Harry?
3	MS. LIPSZTEIN: Yes?
4	DR. MAKHIJANI: Did you have
5	anything to add? Joyce?
6	MS. LIPSZTEIN: Could you repeat
7	that? I just joined in. I'm sorry.
8	DR. MAKHIJANI: Did you want to add
9	anything to our prior discussion regarding
10	quality of data or any of the observations
11	that you have made that you think are
12	important to add?
13	MS. LIPSZTEIN: Okay. From the
14	quality pattern, I had one question, actually.
15	What does it mean, HDDR error, in the tables?
16	DR. NETON: I don't know. I
17	couldn't tell you.
18	MS. LIPSZTEIN: There were many
19	results with this comment.
20	DR. MAKHIJANI: Especially, like in
21	65 and 66; right, Joyce?
22	MS. LIPSZTEIN: No, all over, and I

1	could not associate no, all over the years
2	and I could not associate it either with
3	the result itself or the percentage error and
4	things like that. But there was no
5	correlation at all with anything. So I didn't
6	know what this comment was.
7	And with the main error, it strikes
8	you, what's this?
9	DR. NETON: Yes, I don't know.
10	I'll see what I can find out, though.
11	MS. LIPSZTEIN: Okay. And the
12	other thing is the percentage error that was
13	associated with the measurements. There were
14	many results where there is no percentage
15	errors. There are some results that have like
16	very, very big percentage errors. So I don't
17	know how valid they are.
18	And I don't know when there is zero
19	percentage errors, no percentage errors, what
20	does it mean if it was not calculated, and
21	what happens with this data? So we get a lot

of uncertainty because you don't know what it

is.

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Many years there are like 100 results and 10 of them have a very high percent of errors, and all the others have zero. So we don't know what it really means to the quality of the data.

And the other problem that I had is that sometimes you have measurement results in a Code 40, which is microcuries, and other results you have in microcuries per cubic centimeters, and I don't know how to correlate them. I didn't know how to do to correlate them.

Also, I didn't know if they really meant microcuries or if it was, you know, the cubic centimeter was forgotten. I tried to i f the results on the higher see all microcuries whether were instead microcuries per cubic centimeters, and in some years, yes, but in other years, no. So I still don't know.

It talks about the quality of the

measurements.

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BARTON: Joyce, I can add a MR. little bit of information there. From our experience when we compiled the data from the hard-copy records last time, we found that in the 70s, and perhaps in the 1980s, the practice at NTS was just to put in M-I for microcurie as shorthand for microcurie per cc.

Now you point out the values with the numerical code of 40. These generally outside period. that So mу impression was that, if it simply had an MI and it was in the 70s and the 1980 period, it was probably microcurie per cc. And you could verify that by just seeing whether it is in the range of the other values that microcuries per cc, but oftentimes the ones with the Code 40 were significantly higher. We would need to believe that they needed to be corrected by some sort of sample volume, which is not listed in the database.

DR. MAURO: And is that part of the

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1	scrubbing that you did when you
2	MR. BARTON: The 40s were gone.
3	The MIs from the 70s were in.
4	MS. LIPSZTEIN: In 1980, for
5	example, we had 38 results in the range of 8
6	to the minus 9 to 8 to the minus 7, when the
7	other measurements were in the range of 8 to
8	the minus 11. Those results in the range of 8
9	to the minus 9 and 8 to the minus 7 were in
10	microcuries. So it made me believe, well,
11	that's it because one is for a sample, the
12	other is for cubic centimeters.
13	But, then, in the same year, we had
14	21 results in the range of 8 to the minus 6
15	and some with units of microcuries and others
16	in units of microcuries per cubic centimeters.
17	So, then, I didn't know what to think about
18	it.
19	DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. Now, you
20	know, if you look at all these caveats,
21	obviously, there's been some judgment calls
22	that we made in putting the whole database

1	together. Earlier we had been able to make a
2	more detailed analysis of quality, because we
3	went from a paper record, which had a lot more
4	detail, but we still have quality concerns
5	with this database, and some new issues have
6	emerged.
7	But would you say, broadly, Joyce,
8	that our previous how do your concerns
9	about quality reflect what we found before?
10	MS. LIPSZTEIN: I think they are
11	the same concerns we had. I just examined the
12	plutonium quality data from the new electronic
13	database, and I think the same patterns that
14	we had before, they are repeated in this
15	database, with the addition that I found it
16	was probably not a complete database.
17	DR. MAKHIJANI: I think Harry?
18	Did you want to add anything, Harry?
19	MR. CHMELYNSKI: No. I just have
20	to second the problems that have been stated
21	so far. The database is not very clean. It

takes a lot of work to try to get to where you

can have a set of numbers you can believe are all comparable.

MS. LIPSZTEIN: And the other thing that told me about the quality of the results, I was looking at the 1990 results, which should be, you know, fairly recent. And when you look at the results that are fairly high results, and then there are some workers that were monitored two or three months after the high results, and then it drops to very low results and something that is not compatible with what you would expect from plutonium.

DR. MAURO: That is the plutonium.

Okay. All right.

MR. BARTON: And just to sort of expand on what Harry was just saying, I think there are definitely some QA problems that we identified with the database, things like someone with the same Social Security, but their last name is spelled differently or incorrectly. Or, you know, you may have some dose entries that was simply a 1E and then

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1	nothing. You know, what can you really do
2	with that value? Or sometimes you would have
3	a 1E K to the minus 7, or something like that.
4	So I think it is certainly not in pristine
5	condition, anyway.
6	DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, but, I mean,
7	most of the data were usable in terms of a
8	gross analysis that we have given, enough to
9	say what we have said.
10	DR. MAURO: Is there paper behind
11	every one of these? These 125,000; there's
12	paper somewhere?
13	DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes.
14	MR. BARTON: So we could probably
15	get sample volumes and be able to convert a
16	lot of those over simply
17	DR. NETON: I think a lot of these
18	issues could be reviewed and determined, you
19	know, one way or the other. But the fact is,
20	if we don't know, again what the data were
21	collected, the purpose the data were collected
22	for in the first place, is it really that

relevant to go back and have a quality review of the data?

MEMBER MUNN: I am hearing a lot of negative information here with respect to data that exists, based on what one can only truly term as clerical idiosyncrasies.

It seems unreasonable to discard, obviously, carefully obtained data based on the idiosyncrasies of the time or the speed or personal preferences of the individuals who recording the data and, in all were probability, recording, who were transferring the data from the paper record to the electronic record.

So this puts us in the position, of course, of having to always be looking at the same original paper records. But, even then, to discard them because -- and, Bob, I understand the need for filters. Yes, I understand what you are doing.

But, by the same token, to discard the information because of these issues that

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1	are being presented as quality issues that are
2	more human activity issues than lack of
3	quality in the original data is very
4	unfortunate for a long list of reasons.
5	MR. BARTON: I certainly didn't
6	mean to imply that these things I was
7	simply pointing out some observations that we
8	saw going through it.
9	DR. MAKHIJANI: Wanda, we are not
10	discarding the data because of anything.
11	MEMBER MUNN: No.
12	DR. MAKHIJANI: In fact, the data
13	always, all these things that could be in the
14	typo category, actually, I know I discussed
15	this with Bob, he corrected the typos and
16	eliminated some of the obvious typo issues and
17	used as many data points as were usable. And
18	most of the data points were usable.
19	The quality concerns that Joyce
20	expressed are somewhat more fundamental than
21	the kind of, you know, whether the database

its transcription,

in

QAed

was

which

is

1 certainly fixable. If everything were right, you would go back and fix it, and you 2 wouldn't have a problem with that. 3 MEMBER MUNN: No, I understand her 4 concerns with the database. 5 DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. Right. 6 7 CHAIR PRESLEY: Did anyone contact anybody that might have transcribed this or 8 knew something of the transcription and the 9 10 personal items that were put in or left out, or anything like that? Did you all get with 11 anybody to try to reconcile why they left 12 13 these out or why that they did some of the things that they did? 14 15 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, Mr. Presley, 16 the extent of the problem in regard to transcription wasn't extensive. 17 We are not meaning to imply that. And if it had been, we 18 19 would probably have felt the necessity of contacting somebody, yes. 20 CHAIR PRESLEY: Let's get that on 21 the table. You all did not feel that there

1	was a big problem in
2	DR. MAKHIJANI: No.
3	CHAIR PRESLEY: the
4	transcription that was available?
5	DR. MAKHIJANI: No. There was
6	and Bob is most familiar with the database,
7	and Jim is.
8	DR. NETON: Any time you have
9	100,000 records collected over
10	DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, exactly.
11	DR. NETON: a 30- or 40-year
12	period, you are going to have some issues
13	identified, some legacy kind of issues. But,
14	with some work, those could be evaluated and
15	remedied to a large extent.
16	CHAIR PRESLEY: But we feel like
17	that there's not a problem going back with
18	that, the missing data? Is that correct?
19	DR. NETON: Well, again, I don't
20	know how much more work it would be worth
21	putting into evaluating the pedigree of all
22	these records, given that we really have come

1	to the conclusion that we are not certain if
2	the highest exposed workers were monitored in
3	the first place.
4	CHAIR PRESLEY: Oh, okay. That's
5	what I
6	DR. NETON: Once you make that
7	conclusion, come to that conclusion, then the
8	rest of it is sort of a moot issue.
9	CHAIR PRESLEY: Yes.
10	DR. MAURO: One of the things that
11	I was thinking about is you do have all of
12	this hard-copy data that does contain, in
13	theory, the job categories, the hard copy.
14	It's not in the electronic.
15	Now, however, we sampled enough of
16	the hard-copy data, a couple of hundred, and
17	we are finding that it is mostly security and
18	RadSafe. In my mind, there's no reason to
19	believe, if you went in and looked at all that
20	data, anything is going to change. So that is
21	an important point.

DR. MAKHIJANI: John, I think the

conclusion of this analysis, and the reason, one of the main reasons, certainly the main reason I'm very comfortable that the bottom line is robust, is this larger dataset -- I mean before we had selected the 120 at random, and we had gone fairly methodically. Then we So there was some examined the NIOSH 100. overlap, but nearly about 200 individuals that had looked all the we at hard-copy information, and that corresponds very closely to this electronic database, which covers a lot more workers.

So I do not believe we will find -if you spent two more years, I doubt that you
would find anything else.

DR. NETON: I agree.

MEMBER MUNN: So the real wrap-up here is we have adequate data for external exposures, but we do not have a large enough number of individuals covered in the database for a bioassay to be able to say with confidence that we can bound internal dose.

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1	So that is the real bottom line here?
2	DR. NETON: For workers who were
3	not monitored.
4	MEMBER MUNN: Yes.
5	DR. NETON: We have monitoring data
6	for workers that we would use for dose
7	reconstruction, but we have no confidence, if
8	a worker wasn't monitored and should have
9	been, that we could reconstruct their dose.
LO	MEMBER MUNN: Internally?
L1	DR. NETON: Internally, that's
L2	correct.
L3	DR. MAURO: Would you go as far as
L4	to say, well, you could fill the coworker
L5	model for RadSafe workers, I was thinking, or
L6	for
L7	DR. NETON: Yes, I'm reluctant to
L8	say we could do that. I mean, first of all,
L9	we are not sure that even all the RadSafe
20	workers were monitored or not.
21	Secondly, you get into the job
22	category situation, and it is never clear to

1	me that a guy who is a RadSafe today was a
2	RadSafe three years ago. Typically, what you
3	have on, especially people who are survivors,
4	you have their last job category, and that's
5	about all you've got.
6	DR. MAURO: You don't know what
7	else they might have done.
8	DR. NETON: So then it becomes a
9	real dicey enterprise to try to go back and
10	say I can, with confidence, know that I can
11	reconstruct the
12	DR. MAURO: Thank you.
13	DR. NETON: In fact, I suspect
14	that, given what we see here, most of the
15	RadSafe workers already have monitoring data.
16	DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes.
17	DR. NETON: And that will be in our
18	database, and we will reconstruct them, if
19	they are not
20	DR. MAURO: Got you.
21	CHAIR PRESLEY: Gen, do you have
22	anything?

1 MEMBER ROESSLER: No. CHAIR PRESLEY: Phil? 2 MEMBER SCHOFIELD: I quess I have 3 to agree. I just don't feel comfortable with 4 the data because we don't know what kind of 5 internal exposures some of these people who 6 7 weren't monitored received. Just because you have an external badge doesn't show what you 8 got internally. 9 10 DR. MAURO: That's true. CHAIR PRESLEY: Brad? 11 Well, you know, I MEMBER CLAWSON: 12 13 applaud Jim for what he has put forth. guess one of my issues is we have been told 14 numerous times that all the data that is out 15 16 there had been found and that everything was But with the SEC petition, they even 17 there. brought up this extra data. 18 19 I just want to make sure that, as we go into this and other sites, that when we 20 say that we have all the data, that we do have 21

I applaud Jim because to review this and

1	come forward with this, it shows a dedication
2	to the science, and so forth. And I stand
3	good with what has been discussed. I just
4	want to make sure that we do explore the
5	avenues for the data that is out there.
6	CHAIR PRESLEY: And again, on what
7	Brad said, I would like to add one thing.
8	This is a work in progress. We are never, I
9	mean never, going to be able to get all of the
10	data that's out there on this because a lot of
11	it has been thrown away.
12	So, you know, you may come up 10
13	years down the road and somebody will open a
14	safe somewhere and say, my gosh, look what's
15	here.
16	So the fact that you're going to
17	find all the data, again, know this is work in
18	progress. Things are going to change. It did
19	change.
20	So that is what I would like to get
21	on the record, that this is a work in
	11

progress, and when things come forward, they

1	will be looked at, I presume.
2	Is that correct, Jim?
3	DR. NETON: Yes, sir, that is
4	correct.
5	CHAIR PRESLEY: Thank you.
6	Wanda?
7	MEMBER MUNN: No, if we don't have
8	the material to do it, then the rest of the
9	good science goes out the window. It's that
10	simple.
11	CHAIR PRESLEY: Unfortunately.
12	Ted?
13	MR. KATZ: I am just the DFO here.
14	(Laughter.)
15	CHAIR PRESLEY: What I would like
16	to do is let's talk about our task and what
17	we are going to do forward. Coming up, we
18	have one more meeting. We have a technical
19	database that I would like to see us say yea
20	or nay on. We have an SEC petition coming up
21	that I would like to hear some discussion on.

And we have one more meeting coming up in

January. I believe it is on the 27th or the 28th, the 26th, the 27th, somewhere in that timeframe --

DR. MAKHIJANI: I think the 28th.

CHAIR PRESLEY: To come up with a final recommendation for the Board, what I would like to do is for us to go away from this meeting today with a path forward as to what we are going to do, either today, or if we think it is going to take another meeting on the 28th to do this, let's have that path forward today. I want to get something done, one way or the other.

Ted?

MR. KATZ: On the process question,

I am happy to make a suggestion here, which
is, it is sounding like -- I mean you haven't
taken a vote, but you have all spoken your
minds, and I assume you will form a position
and second it and take a vote.

But if there's consensus among the Work Group about this analysis and the SEC, I

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mean you don't have before you an actual redo of the SEC petition evaluation yet. You have this White Paper, but it is pretty, sort of, closely aligned with what a petition evaluation would say ordinarily. I am just thinking about trying to save your resources in terms of time and all that.

I mean I think, if you have consensus and you want to take a vote on the position as it stands, as laid out in the White Paper, you can do that, contingent with the final evaluation report being consistent with what's laid in the White Paper, and not necessarily have to come together again.

You could formulate your recommendations today to the Board, wrap all that up, again, contingent on the final product being consistent with all this, and then wait and see. We can leave the January meeting on the books as a possibility, but if it all comes forward the way it has been discussed today, you wouldn't necessarily have

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1	to use that January meeting. I would just
2	leave it on the books for now, so barring any
3	unforeseen
4	CHAIR PRESLEY: Okay, that's the
5	SEC. What about the TBD?
6	MR. FUNK: Hey, Ted, may I make a
7	comment here with this point?
8	MR. KATZ: John. Well, I mean
9	right now we are just discussing process, but,
LO	yes, go ahead, John. Go ahead, if it's
L1	MR. FUNK: Okay. I will make it
L2	really short.
L3	I would like to bring up this IG
L4	audit, DOE IG-0773, which is a mirror of what
L5	NIOSH has done and also a mirror of what SC&A
L6	has done. And in this, to cover it real
L7	quick, it says, bioassay programs were not
L8	working as it was intended to work and was
L9	inefficient. People who should have been
20	bioassayed were not. People who should not
21	have been bioassayed were. Bios were not
	1

timely so as to capture all possible

1	exposures. Seven out of 30 of the documents
2	that had bioassays could not be found of the
3	workers. Methodologies for determining who
4	should be tested did not always ensure those
5	who should be tested were tested. Weaknesses
6	on how individuals were entered into the
7	bioassay or removed from the database were
8	exposed. There was computer failures.
9	Federal monitoring of site-level bioassay
10	programs was inadequate, and to finish it off,
11	the Department of Energy concurred with all
12	the findings in this report, which is merely a
13	mirror of what both sides have done.
14	And there's another report, which
15	you have, called OAS-M-08-02, which also
16	covers. It's called the Audit Report Contract
17	Transitional Activities at the Nevada Test
18	Site.
19	And that's all I have to say.
20	Thank you, Ted.
21	MR. KATZ: Thank you, John.

I don't know if anyone wants to --

1	just as a matter of record, these reports John
2	forwarded to me, maybe to SC&A as well, I
3	forwarded them to the Work Group. So everyone
4	has these in hand. I don't know if anyone
5	wants to respond at this point.
6	DR. NETON: Well, I would only
7	comment this is Jim Neton that the
8	report IG-0773 was for an audit that was
9	conducted after the end of this SEC evaluation
10	period. It was in the 2000s. Well, this
11	covers a different era. It might be discussed
12	at another time.
13	MR. FUNK: Jim, there was a point
14	in there about the buried and lost records, is
15	why I brought that out.
16	DR. NETON: Okay. Fine.
17	MEMBER CLAWSON: Well, this brings
18	up one question that I have now. The petition
19	goes from the beginning to 1991. Are we
20	looking at that because I have seen NIOSH

forth, like that. Have we looked at that to

with certain information extended,

21

22

and so

see if, from 1991 on, or --

DR. NETON: In the report, we have evaluated, we've put our opinion forth that we believe, after 92, we can do dose reconstructions.

MEMBER CLAWSON: Okay.

DR. NETON: But it is certainly the Board's purview to weigh in on that, how they want to deal with it.

MR. HINNEFELD: If I could offer something from my perspective, if the Board wants to withhold judgment on post-92, feeling that has not been completely discussed, it would seem like there could still be an action to recommend addition of a class as petitioned, and specifically withhold judgment about whether or not dose reconstruction is feasible after the end of that.

So that, essentially, holds it open and it allows for additional debate or discussion on the post-92 period. And what that does, though, is to get these claimants

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who fall into the petition period 63 to 92 and 1 2 start their path moving. MEMBER CLAWSON: Right. 3 4 MR. HINNEFELD: Without that recommendation, they --5 MR. FUNK: A little clarification 6 7 on that. I wasn't intending to try to get that past 92. 8 Okay. 9 MR. HINNEFELD: 10 FUNK: Although the audit is dated 2008, or 2007 -- excuse me -- it did 11 investigate the 12 past practices, the 13 practices I was referring to was only 1992 and on back, so don't misunderstand that. 14 15 MR. KATZ: Thank you, John. MR. HINNEFELD: Just a vote on the 16 petition class, on saying, you know, based on 17 the discussion here, your recommendation I 18 19 guess is what the discussion would lead to, would essentially have this petition, but it 20 does not close out discussion elsewhere for 21

22

other things.

DR. NETON: Or it does not prevent anyone from petitioning further for 93 forward. I mean we see no evidence at face value why we couldn't reconstruct after 93. If the Board wants to continue down that path and keep the SEC working group alive, I guess that's okay.

MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I mean it would be a site profile question then.

MEMBER CLAWSON: Yes, this is basically what it comes down to. We've just dealt with a lot of information here. I don't know how to do it politically or anything else. I would like to be able to get the SEC that Jim has already put before us, and stuff like that. I would like to get it going toward that, but I, myself personally, I would like to just have a little bit of time to make sure that we have the adequate time pass there.

It may be one or two years that could be added to it, or whatever else like

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1	that, but I would like us to be able to
2	address it because we are putting a lot out
3	onto this table, and a lot of things have
4	changed. I do not want to in any way hold up
5	the people for the SEC at all, but I just want
6	to make sure that, when we go to the public or
7	anything else like that, that all of our Ts
8	are crossed and our Is are dotted on this.
9	That's just my personal opinion on
10	it. I just want to make sure that we have
11	covered everything. That is what Stu has
12	said. I think that is kind of what I am
13	looking at.
14	CHAIR PRESLEY: And again, we
15	stopped testing in 91. This thing goes for a
16	year prior or post that, is that correct, I
17	believe?
18	DR. MAKHIJANI: The last test was
19	in 92.
20	CHAIR PRESLEY: Nineteen ninety-two,
21	and it goes through
22	DR. NETON: No, it stops at 92.

1	CHAIR PRESLEY: It stops at 93?
2	DR. NETON: Through 92.
3	CHAIR PRESLEY: Okay. It starts
4	and then it goes to the end of 1992, I
5	believe.
6	DR. NETON: Correct.
7	CHAIR PRESLEY: I don't have
8	DR. NETON: This coincides with the
9	end of atmospheric testing.
LO	CHAIR PRESLEY: Right.
L1	DR. NETON: Oh, no, underground
L2	testing.
L3	CHAIR PRESLEY: Underground
L4	testing.
L5	DR. NETON: I mean there's still
L6	nuclear activities going on, but there was no
L7	more underground testing after 92.
L8	CHAIR PRESLEY: Right.
L9	DR. NETON: It also coincides with
20	the introduction of 10 CFR 835, which is a
21	much more robust monitoring effort required by
22	all contractors. We found evidence that they

had a fairly good documentation as to who they sampled and why, which we couldn't prior to 92. That's the basis for us saying we can do it at this point.

MEMBER CLAWSON: Right, up to that point, and I understand that. But, after the atmospheric testing, and so forth, it also took us into another era. But you're right, the monitoring was a little bit better and stuff like that, but a lot of the cleanup of the Nevada Test Site, it went into that. This is still being implemented. I just want to make sure that we have kind of looked at that a little bit.

I guess that is more of a site profile issue than an SEC, but I just want to make sure that we don't miss that.

DR. NETON: Yes, I think Stu is right. I mean it could certainly be taken up under the site profile review because it has been reviewed, and if issues arise to a level where it looks like they become SEC issues, we

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certainly would discuss them at that point.

There's many ways this could be handled, I
think.

MEMBER CLAWSON: Right. In no way, shape or form do I want to hold this back. I want to get this SEC taken care of, get the people proceeding forward, but I want to make sure that we clean up the site profile. Because we have been focused on many things in the earlier days, and so forth like that.

My personal opinion is we have that data opened up to us. I would like to be able to see SC&A's final paper that they've got, be able to discuss it, and maybe even from NIOSH just a preliminary of what they see past the 92 timeframe, and be able to bring this to the Board at the February meeting.

But that is just my opinion on it.

DR. MAKHIJANI: I didn't understand. Are you saying that we should compile the work that we have done so far up to 92 into a report to consider? Is that

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1	what
2	MEMBER CLAWSON: The information
3	that you just brought to us today, I would
4	like to have it in
5	DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay.
6	MEMBER CLAWSON: a more formal
7	form
8	DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes.
9	MEMBER CLAWSON: that the public
10	could actually look at, and that we could put
11	out there, so that people see what we are
12	doing.
13	DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. I think
14	that
15	MR. HINNEFELD: We will be
16	delivering an evaluation report in the
17	meantime, too.
18	MR. KATZ: Right. So that will all
19	be coming in January.
20	DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. So I would
21	like some explicit guidance from the working
22	group about that because you know it will

have to go through DOE review. There's sort of a lengthy process before it can -- and then Privacy Act reviews -- before the petitioners can look at it. So I would like to be able, if we are going to do this report, I would really like to start on it tomorrow.

CHAIR PRESLEY: Yes, because you don't have a whole lot of time.

DR. MAKHIJANI: No. I actually talked with our team about this yesterday, that in case we were asked to do this, that we would start on it right away, try to finish a draft, you know, by the end of the year or early in January, so that we can send it to for review and through all DOE go necessary steps, so that the Working Group can know, before your consider it, you scheduled meeting or by teleconference before the Board, whatever, that you have ample time and that the petitioners also have some time to look at it.

CHAIR PRESLEY: What's this going

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to do to the site profile?

DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, I think what it's going to do is it is going to remove the major issue that has been there. Well, as Jim said, the two major issues with resuspension and that environmental model and the internal dose are now taken care of, up to the end of 1992. So the most difficult issues will be resolved.

Now there are some things in regard to the site profile. NIOSH published a new internal dose and list of radionuclides, and there's possibly some post-93 issues: the waste workers and things that we have not looked at since we created the original matrix.

We haven't received any direction from you about that to my recollection, but the major issues from the previous matrix will be over.

CHAIR PRESLEY: That's what I want to get on record. We have taken those 22

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issues and we've worked the hound out of them.

I want to make sure that everybody understands that those original 22 issues are going to be put to bed, and, hopefully, we won't have another 22 issues from 1993 to 2009.

DR. MAURO: From а practical perspective, going through this process, let's say that a recommendation is made to grant the SEC through 1992. That leaves NIOSH position where, do partial dose to reconstructions for that time period, means reconstructions for prostate cancer, for reconstructions skin cancer, and some others, that would still need to be done.

Presumably, they would be done in accordance with your latest version of your site profile. So the question becomes -- it sounds to me that the path forward seems clear in one respect. That is, SC&A will put together its report on this matter, as we have just reviewed it, and deliver it to the Work

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Group as early as we can. It is going to be tight because of the DOE cycle. And you will have a piece of paper that will be available for PA clearance, to put up on the public accounting. Of course, that will put the Work Group in the position to make a recommendation to the full Board.

However, what we don't have is, okay, are there any technical issues regarding partial dose reconstruction now that really emerge from your latest version of your site profile, which we haven't reviewed, I guess.

DR. NETON: Right. But we would also, though, at the same time, have to revise our site profile to incorporate these partial dose reconstructions. That is typical of what we do.

DR. MAURO: So I am looking at it from the point of view of SC&A and what it can do to add value. And it seems to me that, right now, the most important thing we have to do is to get this report out to support the

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January 29th meeting.

These other matters that you bring up certainly are important, but it sounds like perhaps they should wait until you finish your paperwork related to whether it is a revision to your site profile or a revision to your evaluation report that addresses how you would approach partial dose reconstruction.

But if you are planning to do that, then it really would make more sense for us to just sit tight for a while on that matter.

DR. NETON: I would agree with that process perspective. I mean we are going to take another look at the site profiles and modify them, if this petition is granted as we propose.

We have to make some decisions about what level of internal monitoring data remains. For instance, I would suspect that we would still use the environmental modeling for those who are not presumptive cancers, that sort of thing, for internal exposures.

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1	But we have to make some of those decisions.
2	That is typically what we do after an SEC is
3	granted, what's left to do.
4	DR. MAKHIJANI: So the short answer
5	to your question, Mr. Presley, is that what
6	issues remain will depend on what NIOSH comes
7	up with in terms of revising its site profile,
8	in light of what has happened.
9	Right now, I would say that, from
10	our point of view, no issues are on the table
11	until NIOSH provides the site profile.
12	CHAIR PRESLEY: Okay. So what I am
13	hearing is that Jim needs to come up,
14	essentially, with their input to a new site
15	profile or additions to the original site
16	profile and submit that. Is that correct?
17	DR. NETON: That would be
18	appropriate
19	CHAIR PRESLEY: Okay.
20	DR. NETON: although, you know,
21	typically, we wait until the SEC has been
22	granted

1	CHAIR PRESLEY: But we need to get
2	your data for the SEC and SC&A's data for the
3	SEC, and then say, okay, we agree with this.
4	We will either recommend to the Board that
5	this be accepted at the end of 1992 or we
6	disagree and something else.
7	DR. MAKHIJANI: Right, and I would
8	hope that, at least a week before your next
9	scheduled Working Group meeting, that the
10	Working Group would have our report on this.
11	I will try to make it as much before, if
12	possible, so that we can make it go through a
13	Privacy Act review, so petitioners can also
14	have it on the 20th.
15	DR. NETON: I think, from what I
16	have heard at this meeting so far, I think we
17	can proceed with generating a revised
18	evaluation report that we could have in hand
	11
19	for the working group in that same timeframe,

MAKHIJANI:

DR.

comfortable with the NIOSH paper.

21

22

And we are very

DR. NETON: Right, and our evaluation has to be based on this White Paper. I mean, we will probably do a lot of cut and paste.

DR. MAKHIJANI: If you did a line-by-line review, we would have some fine points to put on it, as Rich Leggett did. But we have no doubt about the bottom line.

CHAIR PRESLEY: Wanda?

MEMBER MUNN: There should be no extensive reports necessary between now and the end of January. The reports that need to come from NIOSH and from SC&A should be brief. all of the You do not need to repeat information that is involved in the study. That is not what we are looking for. All we need is a very brief report with two or three points that have made it necessary for us to do what NIOSH and our contractor are now suggesting.

It is very clear the agency is charged with the responsibility of doing these

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1	dose reconstructions in the best scientific
2	manner. If there is a portion of them that
3	they cannot do, then there is no question that
4	we must accept at least some portion of the
5	SEC.
6	And whatever we are going to do
7	with the SEC needs to be clear in those two
8	very brief papers: recommendations that we can
9	then turn into a one-paragraph recommendation
10	to the full Board in February. I can see,
11	personally, no reason for any involved
12	reporting between now and then. It would seem
13	to be fairly simple.
14	MR. HINNEFELD: Well, our
15	evaluation report is going to be pretty much
16	what's in this White Paper.
17	MEMBER MUNN: Any additional
18	revision that needs to be done to the site
19	profile
20	MR. HINNEFELD: The site profile
21	revisions will be largely a matter of removing
22	things.

MEMBER MUNN: And that would be -right -- subsequent to any action that would
be taken in February. I can see no reason why
that should precede the February
recommendation.

Sorry, Ted.

MR. KATZ: I am just saying, I mean, based on Stu's and Jim's statement that the evaluation report is going to be, basically, what you already have before you, I think you can go ahead and, in a contingent sense, make a recommendation today, not leave that up necessarily until the end of January, which is just a week before the Board meeting.

MR. HINNEFELD: I just worry about things, you know, whether it is things happening that you can't control for: DOE not clearing something, what have you. I would encourage you, if you are prepared to take though action today, even it is in contingent sense, to do that, just because I worry about just things that you

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CHAIR PRESLEY: Let me pass this forward. There's two or three of us that have to check out.

Can we break right here, go to lunch, be back in here no later than one o'clock, and let's talk about going forward with accepting the SEC as it stands to the end of 1992 with a contingent that, if everything goes fine and we get a thing from SC&A -- and not the site profile, but the SEC petition from Jim that doesn't change, and that if something should go awry and we cannot meet, at least we've got that and we can get on the phone and say, hey, everybody's got a copy of this. Do you agree? So that we can pass this on to the Board.

I don't want to hold this up. We've got people out there that really need to have this pass, so that dose reconstructions can be done.

So can we break now? You all think

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1 about it. If somebody's got some big reason 2 why that they don't want to do this, then I would like to hear it at one o'clock. If not, 3 come back prepared to -- let's vote on this. 4 Also, if I might 5 DR. MAKHIJANI: make one request, Mr. Presley and Ted, I would 6 7 like a little more specific quidance about the report, because I kind of had the impression 8 that the work that we have done should be in 9 10 the report, maybe as an addendum, and maybe we should have a two-page report that we could 11 clean it up and not do new analysis. 12 13 Was that the --MEMBER CLAWSON: That is what I was 14 15 looking at, too. I just want to be able to 16 get it to where the people, the public, can actually see it and so forth, too. 17 DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. 18 19 MR. KATZ: I mean I think you would loose ends that you 20 to tie up your mentioned because you want a quality product 21

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to be delivered.

1	DR. MAKHIJANI: Right.
2	MR. KATZ: But I agree with that.
3	And it just occurs to me that some
4	of these, like these tables and so on, I don't
5	know how you will handle that to minimize the
6	Privacy-Act challenge.
7	DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, I think it
8	can't be done.
9	Sorry, Wanda.
10	MEMBER MUNN: Only gross numbers
11	can be done.
12	DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. I think we
13	would probably produce some aggregate tables
14	and a summary. In the past, that is what we
15	have done, is produce a summary with some
16	aggregate data that could be made public
17	pretty easily and pass Privacy-Act review
18	relatively rapidly, at least as I remember.
19	Is that right?
20	CHAIR PRESLEY: I can see some bar
21	charts like you had in there.
22	DR. MAKHIJANI: Right.

1	MR. KATZ: As you think about that,
2	exactly what data you want to put forth in a
3	way that minimizes the hurdles
4	DR. MAKHIJANI: And then we would
5	have everything else in an appendix that the
6	Board would be able to look at.
7	MEMBER MUNN: Highly truncated,
8	please.
9	DR. MAKHIJANI: No, we are not
10	going to do anything new. We are going to
11	clean up what we have.
12	You know, we did discuss yesterday
13	whether there are you know, there are,
14	obviously, a lot of things that we didn't look
15	at, and all of us agreed I've even made a
16	list and all of us agreed that, given where
17	we were with the bottom line and how
18	comfortable we were with Jim's report, that we
19	didn't even want to recommend to you that we
20	do further work on this.
21	MEMBER MUNN: There's really no
22	reason to.

DR. MAKHIJANI: No, there is not.
MEMBER MUNN: If the agency says
they cannot do the reconstruction that is
necessary for internal exposure, there's no
reason for you to qualify that.
DR. MAKHIJANI: No, I agree with
that and our whole team agrees with that.
CHAIR PRESLEY: Okay, let's break.
MR. KATZ: For an hour, is that
CHAIR PRESLEY: One hour. So be
back in here as fast as you can at one
o'clock.
MR. KATZ: Okay. So everyone on
the phone, we will be back in session about
five after 1:00. Thank you, everybody.
(Whereupon, the above-entitled
matter went off the record at 12:02 p.m. and
resumed at 1:05 p.m.)

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A-F-T-E-R-N-O-O-N S-E-S-S-I-O-N
(1:05 p.m.)
MR. KATZ: Good afternoon.
This is the NTS Work Group, the
Advisory Board on Radiation Worker Health. We
are just reconvening after lunch.
We have all of our Board members in
the room.
Bob, you can take over from here.
CHAIR PRESLEY: All right.
As we discussed before we went to
lunch, what we want to take up this afternoon
is to come up with a proposed motion that we
either accept or deny the SEC petition 0084
for NTS. At this time, the dates on this
petition are January the 1st, 1963 through
December 31st, 1992.
December 31st, 1992.  The motion will be, I hope, to
The motion will be, I hope, to
The motion will be, I hope, to accept, with a caveat in there that we are

1	Do I hear a motion as to the path
2	forward? Or has anybody got any more
3	discussion from the Working Group on this
4	first?
5	Brad?
6	MEMBER CLAWSON: I would just like
7	to move that we accept NIOSH's proposed date
8	at this time of January 1st, 1963, through
9	December 31st, 1992 in the SEC.
10	MEMBER SCHOFIELD: I will second
11	that.
12	CHAIR PRESLEY: That we accept
13	NIOSH's proposal. Do I hear any type of a
14	caveat in there?
15	MEMBER CLAWSON: Just the caveat
16	that they are going to get us the exact dates.
17	It is what you had mentioned earlier about
18	the petition.
19	MR. HINNEFELD: In fact, we will
20	provide the evaluation.
21	CHAIR PRESLEY: Correct.
22	Okay, do I hear a motion or any

1	discussion on the motion prior to our vote?
2	The vote is to accept this.
3	Wanda?
4	MEMBER MUNN: I would have a
5	friendly addendum based on the information
6	that we have discussed earlier and based on
7	NIOSH's own recommendation that we have that,
8	although they recommend adding a portion of
9	the class to the SEC, NIOSH intends to use any
10	available internal and external data for the
11	recommended period. That can be interpreted
12	using existing NIOSH processes and/or
13	procedures for the purpose of partial dose
14	reconstructions.
15	I would request that be added as a
16	friendly adjunct to what Brad has proposed for
17	the motion.
18	CHAIR PRESLEY: Do we have any
19	discussion on the amendment?
20	(No audible response.)
21	Any more discussion on the main

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motion?

1	MS. HOWELL: Can I clarify
2	something?
3	CHAIR PRESLEY: Yes, ma'am.
4	MS. HOWELL: The Working Group is
5	really just making a motion about what you are
6	going to recommend to the full Board
7	CHAIR PRESLEY: That's correct.
8	MS. HOWELL: as opposed to
9	okay, I'm not sure that the wording of the
LO	motion spoke to that, but maybe it did. Maybe
11	I missed it.
12	CHAIR PRESLEY: This is a
L3	recommendation to the full Board that we
L4	accept SEC-0084 NTS and the time period
L5	December 31, 1992 I'm sorry January 1st,
L6	1963 through December 31st, 1992 with the
L7	addition of the words that Wanda, I hope, has
L8	on her computer where we can get a copy of
L9	that to him.
20	Is there any more discussion?
21	Everybody ready to vote?
22	MEMBER MUNN: I guess I would like

1 to make one comment. It is not really a 2 discussion. It is unfortunate that, given the 3 very good science that has transpired with 4 this other 5 respect to and many issues 6 surrounding the Nevada Test Site, that we find that we are unable to complete the internal 7 dosimetry information as we would like to be 8 able to do. 9 10 This is so often misinterpreted by people outside of the circles we work in as 11 indicative of a failure in the program and a 12 failure on behalf of the individuals who have 13 worked so hard to see that safety and security 14 were maintained at that site. 15 16 But this is the reality of the information we have now. Given that reality, 17 this is, obviously, the move we need to make 18 19 next.

Are we ready to vote?

CHAIR PRESLEY:

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what you said, Wanda.

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And I agree with

1	Ted?
2	MR. KATZ: You know, you can just
3	do it all in favor, if you want.
4	CHAIR PRESLEY: I can do that.
5	All in favor of the motion signify
6	by saying aye.
7	(Chorus of ayes.)
8	Opposed?
9	(No audible response.)
10	Let the record show that it was a
11	unanimous vote by the NTS Working Group that
12	the petition be granted and that we make a
13	full report to the Board as such.
14	New business.
15	What I would like to discuss just a
16	little bit before we go on is, what do we
17	anticipate for what information is going to
18	come to us on the TBD or the site profile? I
19	had a few thoughts at lunch.
20	You know, the site profile is,
21	what, Arjun, 214 pages long; something like

that?

DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, it is in six 1 2 volumes. I don't remember the total. CHAIR PRESLEY: Oh, the total 3 thing, yes, it is very long. 4 I wonder if, rather than going back 5 and doing this, can we have an amendment so 6 7 that we can say where the changes are in that thing without having to come up with changing 8 Volume 1, 2, or 3 or Volume 3 and 4, 9 10 whatever, so that we have some type of a short version to look at what changes were made down 11 the road for this thing? 12 13 realize this is not something that is going to be done here in the next 14 15 month, but when we do get to this -- you know, 16 I work with documents all the time that use change bars or I get a revision that says, 17 okay, the revision's on page 4, 10, 15, and 18 19 22, line so-and-so. And it sure helps me when

Does anybody have any feelings

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I don't have to go through 500 pages to re-

review a document when the changes are there.

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1	about this?
2	MEMBER MUNN: Don't we normally
3	have a revisions sheet incorporated in the
4	transmittal document?
5	DR. NETON: There is, but it is a
6	fairly brief summary of all the changes that
7	were made.
8	MEMBER MUNN: And that's really all
9	we need, isn't it?
10	CHAIR PRESLEY: I think we ought
11	to
12	MEMBER CLAWSON: It would be nice
13	to be able to see how it lays out
14	CHAIR PRESLEY: See how it lays
15	out.
16	MEMBER CLAWSON: into the rest
17	of the all my procedures that are sent out
18	to us, we always have a highlighted change
19	through it, and I would really like to be able
20	to see that. It would make better use of my
21	time, if there's any way.
22	CHAIR PRESLEY: Yes. If you are

1	going to do in the whole TBD, then put change
2	bars out there or highlight the changes where
3	we can look at that, and we can go back and
4	discuss some of the things like this.
5	DR. NETON: Refresh my memory,
6	though, where we are in the process because it
7	seems like we have issued a new revision since
8	you, SC&A, has reviewed at least the internal
9	dosimetry. So SC&A has not even reviewed the
10	latest revision.
11	CHAIR PRESLEY: Right. That's
12	correct.
13	DR. NETON: At the same time, we
14	are going to a lot of the issues that were
15	raised are going to go away with the potential
16	addition of the class.
17	So I would take the assignment on
18	to see if I can provide some type of
19	characterization. I don't know if I can get
20	an exact track-changes mode version, but
21	something that could indicate the differences
22	between the two revisions and where we feel

the existing issues lie.

at, we've got another meeting coming up. If Jim's not going to be ready and John has not had time for SC&A to review the position or the SEC, not the SEC, but the TBD and the site profile, then the only thing really that we have to discuss is the up-and-coming paper on the petition that I hope everybody would have before then in hand.

I see maybe getting on a conference call and us doing that, rather than spend the government's money on all of us and everybody taking a day to come up here for that. I mean, that is my thoughts.

We had a meeting the other day for the full Board, and it only lasted 55 minutes.

That's all it was.

And I'm just wondering if we can't, if at all possible, everybody's got that date held -- if that's all we have to discuss --

MR. KATZ: Well, you may not have

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1	to discuss anything. I mean, you have made
2	your recommendation to the full Board. Unless
3	anything changes unexpectedly, it should
4	stand.
5	CHAIR PRESLEY: I still would like
6	for everybody to have a chance to look at that
7	thing and one more time say, I don't have a
8	problem with this. Let's get it to the Board.
9	MR. KATZ: So let me just suggest,
10	once the documents go out from SC&A and OCAS,
11	those will go out and be distributed to all
12	the members of the Work Group, and when they
13	are PA-cleared, they will be given to the
14	public.
15	But I think you can confer by
16	email, just to say, is there any new issue?
17	If there's no new issue, I don't think you
18	need even a meeting.
19	CHAIR PRESLEY: Okay. I
20	understand.
21	MR. KATZ: I think you're okay.
22	MEMBER ROESSLER: So no

1	teleconference on the
2	MR. KATZ: So it could be a
3	teleconference if there were a new issue, but
4	if there is not
5	CHAIR PRESLEY: If there's a new
6	issue
7	MR. KATZ: If there's no new
8	business
9	MEMBER ROESSLER: We will hold it
LO	then?
11	MR. KATZ: So I will hold that
L2	meeting in case we need it, but
L3	DR. MAURO: The question is, what
L4	piece of paper is needed on the record in
L5	order for the Board to be able to act on your
L6	recommendation? Because, in theory, right
L7	now, you have effectively made a
18	recommendation, concluded a recommendation
L9	contingent on
20	CHAIR PRESLEY: I'm going to be
21	honest with you. The only thing that I see
22	that we would need is the evaluation.

DR. MAURO: So that is where I'm headed.

CHAIR PRESLEY: Right.

Now if your evaluation DR. MAURO: report is in place, our review of what I would say is in your White Paper which, for all intents and purposes, we expect to be very similar to what your eventual -- you would have two pieces of paper in place prior to the next full Board meeting. That would be to provide the evaluation report and SC&A's And on that basis, I think the commentary. Board could proceed based on recommendations.

MR. KATZ: Those would be circulated to the whole Board, and I'm sure Jim would be planning to present to the full Board on the new evaluation report, or someone from OCAS.

Certainly, SC&A would have an opportunity to present their findings on this to the full Board.

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1	The Work Group would have its
2	opportunity to make its recommendation to the
3	full Board, and then it would be taken up by
4	the full Board.
5	CHAIR PRESLEY: By the full Board.
6	DR. MAURO: I just want to make
7	sure the White Paper is there.
8	CHAIR PRESLEY: That is what I want
9	to make sure, that everything is in order for
10	us to do this.
11	DR. MAURO: But the only reason I
12	brought this up is that, to move it to the
13	world of site profiles and what's needed, I
14	don't know if that's really
15	DR. NETON: No, that's not
16	required.
17	DR. MAURO: That is not in play
18	here. We can put that on the shelf.
19	CHAIR PRESLEY: The site profile is
20	on the shelf until we can get something from
21	Jim for you all to look at, and then we will
22	go back and discuss the site profile.

	DR. NEION: Yes, I don't think we
2	would be ready by this 28th timeframe.
3	MR. KATZ: So it would be, in
4	effect, like as you did SC&A did with
5	Hanford after there was a new SEC added. You
6	are sort of going to have to they are going
7	to have to produce the new site profile, or at
8	least clarify what has changed with respect to
9	the site profile, and then reconcile what has
10	been taken off the table and what might be
11	remaining to discuss, and what new might
12	DR. NETON: But Hanford is a little
13	different in the sense that there were still
14	pieces of the proposed SEC
15	MR. KATZ: Yes. Right.
16	DR. NETON: hanging out there.
17	DR. MAKHIJANI: Formally speaking,
18	there is no SEC issue remaining.
19	CHAIR PRESLEY: With the petition.
20	DR. MAKHIJANI: The petition, yes.
21	Jim is right; at Hanford, the petition went
22	up to 1990, I think, something like that. So

1	there's a period in the petition that is
2	outstanding. In this petition, there's no
3	period outstanding. So it is all, basically,
4	going forward from 93, which we are not ready
5	to do.
6	And we, as I said, did not look at
7	the 93-forward issues because
8	DR. MAURO: That's not on the
9	table.
10	CHAIR PRESLEY: That is not on the
11	table. We don't have an SEC that has been
12	applied.
13	DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. Correct.
14	MEMBER CLAWSON: Yes, but the thing
15	that we have gone into before, NIOSH has come
16	to us and extended dates when they found more
17	information and so forth, and I want to make
18	sure that we because you're right, we have
19	taken up to the end of the atmospheric testing
20	and everything else like that, but then we
21	started into a different realm, and we need to

make sure that we don't lose sight of that, is

my only issue.

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DR. Yes, I guess NETON: the question remains in my mind; is that extension of the site profile review itself? Because SC&A still has an active role in the review of the site profile. And if those issues rose to the level of significance, where we all agreed that this was a showthen we certainly would stopper, be position to add an 83.14 class, if it got to that point. I'm not sure what the process would be here, but that would be a way to accomplish that, but the same profile continues through its logical process conclusion.

DR. MAURO: The only possible caveat is, very often, your evaluation reports draw heavily and make reference to your site profiles. Now the extent to which you could put an evaluation report out that basically scientific the basis for presents your recommendation, the did in this way you

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1	summary, and not have to draw heavily on a
2	site profile that is going to be revised, you
3	see you want clean boundaries.
4	DR. NETON: Well, I'm not in favor
5	of making issues occur that don't exist. We
6	have posited our position. It is on the
7	table. The site profile says we can do it.
8	SC&A is charged with a complete review of the
9	site profile. I think that, to me, is the
10	logical place at which to pick up the debate
11	or discussion.
12	DR. MAURO: My main concern is I
13	want to make sure that, whatever paperwork
14	needs to be in place and in the public domain,
15	which would allow the Board to be able to
16	vote, I just want to make sure everybody
17	DR. NETON: Okay. I misunderstood
18	what you were saying.
19	DR. MAURO: I'm sorry.
20	CHAIR PRESLEY: Do we have any more
21	business to come before the Board? Any new
22	business? Any old business? Anything to come

before the NTS Working Group today? 1 2 (No audible response.) I want to thank Jim and his people, 3 John and his people, and the Working Group for 4 doing their due diligence on this. 5 MR. KATZ: Bob, are you going to 6 7 need some help preparing a presentation to the Board? 8 I will prepare a 9 CHAIR PRESLEY: 10 presentation to the Board, and you will see it before -- everybody on the Board will see it 11 it 12 before get to them, and in we presentation -- at the end I will hold that 13 part of the presentation until -- or what we 14 15 will probably do is let him do his thing. 16 John will do his thing and then we will make our presentation. 17 For all of you, I will MR. KATZ: 18 19 just keep in mind sort of the combined result of all your presentations. The full Board 20 hasn't been at the table here for all of this 21

and they will need

22

discussion,

lot

1 context beyond what you have 2 discussed today. CHAIR PRESLEY: And that is one of 3 the things that we have been, John and I and 4 Wanda and Brad, we've been real good at is, 5 when we have done these things in the past, we 6 7 have had a history --MR. KATZ: Right. 8 CHAIR PRESLEY: -- lesson up front 9 10 about where we have been. MR. KATZ: Right. 11 CHAIR PRESLEY: And I've got that 12 13 on the computer up until the last time, and we will add to it. 14 15 MEMBER CLAWSON: You know, this is 16 kind of what I was looking at the 28th date, trying to keep it open, because if we've got 17 to kind of review kind of where we are going 18 19 heading forward, or whatever, even if it is a conference call or whatever else like that, 20 just so that we are onboard and ready to 21 present all this to the full Board, because I

1	know that there will be numerous questions.
2	It is just a good opportunity to get freshened
3	up.
4	CHAIR PRESLEY: It will be in your
5	hands, hopefully, in the next two to three
6	weeks, so that we can
7	MR. KATZ: Well, all of you, if you
8	have thoughts about materials that the rest of
9	the Board members ought to particularly look
10	at in addition to what is going to be provided
11	that would help them, let me know and I will
12	get those submitted to the rest of the Board
13	members, whether it be transcripts or White
14	Papers, or whatever, that has come along the
15	way.
16	MEMBER MUNN: The White Papers are
17	the easiest to read and do a better job of
18	concentrating information in small doses.
19	CHAIR PRESLEY: If I remember
20	correctly, I have an abbreviated version of
21	our 22 matrix that we had that was in one of

the reports where we went to the Board, and we

1	can add the last two, which was the badging
2	and the internal doses to that and go from
3	there.
4	MR. KATZ: Very good.
5	CHAIR PRESLEY: Anything else?
6	MEMBER MUNN: No.
7	CHAIR PRESLEY: Thank you for your
8	time.
9	MEMBER MUNN: Thank you for your
10	efforts.
11	MR. KATZ: We are adjourned, and
12	thank you everyone on the telephone who has
13	contributed to this call, as well.
14	Have a good day. Happy holidays.
15	(Whereupon, the above-entitled
16	matter went off the record at 1:26 p.m.)
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